HSU HSUEH HUI @ JENNY HSU v FOONG YOOK KOOI & 3 Ors

"On the totality of the evidence before me, I find that the plaintiff willingly surrendered her keys and access cards to the Studio Unit to the defendants on 22 May 2019." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 99

Case Information

• Citation: [2022] SGHC 108 (Para 0)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Case Number: Suit No 943 of 2019 (Para 0)
• Coram: Kwek Mean Luck J (Para 0)
• Hearing Dates: 3–4, 8–11 February 2022; 26 April 2022; judgment reserved on 13 May 2022 (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Plaintiff: A Rajandran (A. Rajandran) (Para 105)
• Counsel for the Defendants: Quek Mong Hua and Chua Yi Ying (Lee & Lee) (Para 105)
• Area of Law: Landlord and Tenant — Termination of leases; Tort — Conversion (Para 0)
• Judgment Length: The extraction does not provide the page count or word count of the full judgment, and that detail is not answerable from the material provided. (NOT ANSWERABLE)

Summary

The dispute arose out of a tenancy of a studio unit at 29 Simei Street 3, #09-10, My Manhattan, Singapore 529901, under a 12-month tenancy agreement running from 18 July 2018 to 17 July 2019. The plaintiff alleged that she was wrongfully evicted on 22 May 2019, that the defendants wrongfully terminated the tenancy, and that they wrongfully detained her belongings after that date. The court’s central factual conclusion was that the plaintiff had already indicated an intention to move out, had stopped paying rent by GIRO, and voluntarily surrendered her keys and access cards on 22 May 2019. (Paras 2, 21, 24, 98, 99)

The court approached the case by examining objective evidence, including CCTV recordings, WhatsApp messages, call timings, police evidence, photographs, and medical material. It rejected the plaintiff’s account that the police forcibly took her access cards and keys, found that she was able to access the unit on 22 May 2019, and concluded that the notices issued by the defendants were notices of breach and termination steps rather than a forcible repossession. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to prove that her belongings remained in the unit after she left. (Paras 13, 30, 42, 52, 59, 81, 101)

Ultimately, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for wrongful eviction, wrongful termination, and wrongful detention/conversion, but ordered the return of the security deposit of $4,600. The court also held that the defendants were entitled to damages for the plaintiff’s repudiatory breach, quantified as pro-rated rent of $4,229.05, and awarded costs to the defendants by consent at $140,000 plus reasonable disbursements. (Paras 102, 103, 104, 105)

What Was the Tenancy Arrangement and Why Did It Matter?

The tenancy arrangement was the foundation of the entire dispute. The plaintiff became a tenant of the Studio Unit pursuant to a 12-month tenancy agreement starting on 18 July 2018 and ending on 17 July 2019, with monthly rent of $2,300 and a security deposit of $4,600. The court reproduced the relevant terms of the tenancy agreement and treated them as central to determining whether the defendants had lawfully acted in response to the plaintiff’s conduct. (Paras 2, 20)

"The plaintiff became a tenant of a Studio Unit at 29 Simei Street 3, #09-10, My Manhattan, Singapore 529901 (the “Studio Unit”), pursuant to a 12-month tenancy agreement starting on 18 July 2018 and ending on 17 July 2019 (the “TA”)." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 2

The court noted that the tenancy agreement provided, inter alia, for the monthly rent, the security deposit, and the parties’ obligations. Those contractual terms mattered because the plaintiff’s case depended on showing that the defendants had unlawfully ended the tenancy before expiry, whereas the defendants’ case depended on showing that the plaintiff had herself abandoned the unit and repudiated the tenancy. The court’s analysis therefore turned on whether the plaintiff’s conduct on and before 22 May 2019 amounted to voluntary surrender and repudiation, rather than wrongful eviction. (Paras 20, 24, 99, 102)

"The terms of the TA provides, inter alia, for the following:" — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 20

The contractual structure also explained the court’s damages analysis. Once the court found that the plaintiff had repudiated the tenancy by surrendering the keys and access cards and leaving the unit, the defendants’ acceptance of those items and retaking of possession did not prevent them from claiming damages for the repudiatory breach. The court expressly relied on authority for that proposition and then quantified the defendants’ loss by reference to pro-rated rent. (Paras 102, 103)

"As per Tan Soo Leng David v Lim Thian Chai Charles and another [1998] 1 SLR(R) 880 at [15], the defendants’ acceptance of the plaintiff’s keys and access cards and their subsequent retaking of possession of the Studio Unit on 23 May 2019 do not prejudice their right to seek damages for a repudiatory breach of the TA." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 102

How Did the Court Reconstruct the Events of 22 and 23 May 2019?

The court reconstructed the events by starting with objective evidence. It observed that the available CCTV recordings of the lift lobby, WhatsApp messages, and timings of calls allowed the court to identify the sequence of events leading up to the alleged wrongful termination. This evidential approach was important because the parties’ accounts diverged sharply on whether the plaintiff had been excluded from the unit or had instead chosen to leave. (Para 13)

"From the available objective evidence, which are the CCTV recordings of the lift lobby and WhatsApp (“WA”) messages and timings of calls, the following can be ascertained as having taken place in the lead-up to the alleged wrongful termination of the plaintiff’s tenancy:" — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 13

On the notices, the court found that the three notices were slid under the plaintiff’s door on 5, 18, and 21 May 2019 respectively. That finding mattered because it showed that the defendants were issuing notices in relation to the tenancy rather than secretly or physically dispossessing the plaintiff. The court treated the notices as part of the chronology showing escalating dispute and communication, not as proof of unlawful eviction. (Para 30)

"I therefore find that the Three Notices were slid under the plaintiff’s door on 5, 18 and 21 May 2019 respectively." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 30

The court then addressed the critical question of access on 22 May 2019. It found that the plaintiff was able to access the main door of the Studio Unit on that date, whether by the access code, which the defendants maintained had not been changed, or by the Samsung access card. That finding undercut the plaintiff’s claim that she had been locked out and supported the defendants’ case that she could still enter the unit before she surrendered her keys and access cards. (Para 42)

"I therefore find that the plaintiff was able to access the main door of the Studio Unit on 22 May 2019, whether with the access code (that the defendants maintained was not changed) or with the Samsung access card." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 42

The court also rejected the plaintiff’s version that the police forcibly took the access cards and keys from her hands. It found, on the balance of probabilities, that the plaintiff had not proved that the police took the items forcibly, and instead accepted the defendants’ account that the plaintiff surrendered them voluntarily. This finding was central to the conclusion that there was no wrongful eviction by the defendants. (Para 52)

"I hence reject the plaintiff’s version of the events and find that the police did not forcefully take the access cards and keys from the plaintiff’s hands." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 52

Finally, the court accepted the evidence of Nicholas and the fourth defendant that the first time they entered the Studio Unit after the plaintiff handed over her keys was around mid-day of 23 May 2019, and that the Studio Unit was vacant, as evidenced by the photographs. That finding was important because it supported the defendants’ case that the plaintiff had already vacated the unit before the defendants retook possession. (Para 98)

"I accept the evidence of Nicholas and the fourth defendant that the first time they entered the Studio Unit after the plaintiff handed over her keys, was around mid-day of 23 May 2019, and that the Studio Unit was vacant, as evidenced by the Photographs." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 98

Did the Plaintiff Prove Wrongful Eviction or Wrongful Termination of the Tenancy?

The plaintiff’s case was that she was wrongfully evicted from the Studio Unit on 22 May 2019. The defendants’ case was that they had intended to evict her through the Small Claims Tribunal process for nuisance and breach of the tenancy agreement, but that unbeknown to them she had already vacated the unit by 22 May 2019. The court accepted the defendants’ version and found that the plaintiff had abandoned the Studio Unit in furtherance of her intention to terminate the tenancy prematurely. (Paras 21, 24, 99)

"The plaintiff’s case is that she was wrongfully evicted from the Studio Unit on 22 May 2019." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 21

"The defendants’ case is that while the first defendant did intend to evict the plaintiff via the SCT for nuisance and breach of the TA, unbeknown to them, the plaintiff had already vacated the Studio Unit by 22 May 2019." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 24

The court’s reasoning on this issue was cumulative rather than isolated. It considered the plaintiff’s message to Nicholas on 1 May 2019, in which she indicated that she intended to move out at the end of the tenancy and wished to use the security deposit to offset the remaining two months’ rent. It also considered the fact that she had stopped paying rent by GIRO and the fact that she was able to access the unit on 22 May 2019. These facts, taken together, supported the conclusion that she had already decided to leave and was not forcibly evicted. (Paras 98, 99)

"The plaintiff had, by way of her message to Nicholas on 1 May 2019, indicated to the first defendant that she intended to move out at the end of the tenancy and that she wished to use her SD to offset the remaining 2 months of rental payment." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 98

The court then made the decisive finding that the plaintiff willingly surrendered her keys and access cards on 22 May 2019. That finding disposed of the wrongful termination claim because it meant the defendants did not unlawfully terminate the tenancy by force or exclusion; rather, the tenancy ended because the plaintiff voluntarily gave up possession. The court therefore dismissed the wrongful termination claim. (Para 99)

"This being the case, I dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination of the tenancy." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 99

Why Did the Court Reject the Plaintiff’s Account of the Police Taking Her Keys and Access Cards?

The plaintiff’s account depended heavily on the assertion that the police took her access cards and keys from her hands. The court rejected that account because the plaintiff bore the burden of proving it on the balance of probabilities, and the court found that the evidence did not support her version. The court’s approach was explicit: the plaintiff had to prove that the items were forcibly taken rather than surrendered. (Para 52)

"it is for the plaintiff to prove her case on the balance of probabilities, ie that her access cards and keys were forcefully taken away from her by the police, rather than surrendered by her." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 52

The court also considered the plaintiff’s attempt to rely on adverse inference. It held that the plaintiff could not obtain the benefit of an adverse inference unless she first established a prima facie case on the issue. The court cited The Posidon for the proposition that a party seeking adverse inference must have a case to answer and that there must be a substratum of evidence establishing a prima facie case. On the facts, the court found that the plaintiff had not met that threshold. (Para 97)

"a party seeking to draw adverse inference must have a case to answer on the issue sought to be strengthened by the drawing of the inference", that is, "there must be a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case because the court’s ability to draw an adverse inference cannot displace a party’s legal burden of proof". — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 97

Having applied that principle, the court preferred the evidence of the police officers and the defendants over the plaintiff’s version. It expressly found that the police did not forcefully take the access cards and keys from the plaintiff’s hands. That finding was not merely a credibility preference; it was the factual basis for rejecting the plaintiff’s claim of wrongful eviction and for concluding that the surrender of possession was voluntary. (Paras 52, 97, 99)

"I hence reject the plaintiff’s version of the events and find that the police did not forcefully take the access cards and keys from the plaintiff’s hands." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 52

How Did the Court Deal with the Plaintiff’s Claim That Her Belongings Were Still in the Unit?

The plaintiff also claimed that her belongings remained in the Studio Unit and were wrongfully detained by the defendants. The court rejected that claim. It found that the plaintiff had not proved that her belongings were left in the unit as of 22 May 2019, and it therefore rejected the allegation of wrongful detention and conversion. (Para 101)

"I reject the plaintiff’s claims that she left her belongings in the Studio Unit as of 22 May 2019 and that they were wrongfully detained by the defendants." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 101

The court’s reasoning on this issue was tied to the evidence that the unit was vacant when the defendants first re-entered it on 23 May 2019. The photographs were relevant but not conclusive, because they only showed the state of the unit at the time they were taken, around mid-day on 23 May 2019. The court therefore treated the photographs as corroborative rather than determinative, and it relied on the broader evidential picture to conclude that the plaintiff had not established that her belongings remained inside. (Paras 59, 98, 101)

"The Photographs however, are not conclusive of the issue, as they only show the state of the Studio Unit at the time they were taken, which was around mid-day of 23 May 2019." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 59

That conclusion also affected the conversion claim. If the plaintiff could not prove that the items were in the unit when the defendants took possession, she could not prove that the defendants wrongfully detained or converted them. The court therefore dismissed the claim in its entirety, while separately ordering the return of the security deposit because there was no evidence of damage to justify withholding it. (Paras 101, 103, 104)

Why Did the Court Find the Plaintiff’s Evidence on Her Heart Condition Unreliable?

The plaintiff relied on a heart-condition narrative as part of her broader account of events, but the court found that evidence unreliable. It stated that the plaintiff’s evidence on her heart condition was flatly contradicted by the Medical Report that she herself produced. This was a significant credibility finding because it affected the court’s assessment of the plaintiff’s overall reliability on contested factual matters. (Para 81)

"The plaintiff’s evidence on her heart condition, is flatly contradicted by the Medical Report that she herself produced." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 81

The court did not treat the medical issue as a standalone cause of action. Rather, it used the contradiction between the plaintiff’s testimony and her own medical evidence to assess credibility. In a case turning heavily on whether the plaintiff was forcibly evicted or voluntarily left, credibility was central. The court’s adverse view of the plaintiff’s medical evidence therefore reinforced its broader rejection of her version of events. (Paras 81, 97, 99)

That credibility assessment also helps explain why the court preferred the defendants’ evidence on the key disputed events of 22 May 2019. The court’s reasoning was not that one inconsistency alone defeated the claim, but that the plaintiff’s evidence, viewed as a whole, was not reliable enough to displace the objective evidence and the defendants’ account. (Paras 13, 52, 81, 97, 98)

How Did the Court Apply the Burden of Proof and the Adverse Inference Principle?

The court applied orthodox civil proof principles. It stated that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving her case on the balance of probabilities, including the specific allegation that the police forcibly took her access cards and keys. That allocation of burden was decisive because the plaintiff’s case depended on proving a coercive taking, not merely raising suspicion. (Para 52)

The court also addressed adverse inference. It cited The Posidon for the proposition that a party seeking adverse inference must have a case to answer on the issue sought to be strengthened by the inference, and that there must be a substratum of evidence establishing a prima facie case. The court’s use of that principle shows that adverse inference is not a substitute for proof; it is only available where the evidential foundation already exists. (Para 97)

"In The “Posidon” and another matter [2018] 3 SLR 372 (“The Posidon”) at [92], the court held that “[a] party seeking to draw adverse inference must have a case to answer on the issue sought to be strengthened by the drawing of the inference”, that is, “there must be a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case because the court’s ability to draw an adverse inference cannot displace a party’s legal burden of proof”." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 97

Applying that principle, the court found that the plaintiff had not established the necessary prima facie basis. It therefore declined to draw the inference she sought and instead resolved the factual dispute by reference to the evidence actually before it. This was a classic example of the court refusing to let speculation replace proof in a civil claim. (Paras 52, 97)

What Damages and Monetary Orders Did the Court Make?

The court’s monetary orders were carefully separated into two distinct questions: the defendants’ entitlement to damages for repudiatory breach, and the plaintiff’s entitlement to return of the security deposit. On the first, the court held that the defendants were entitled to pro-rated rent of $4,229.05 as damages arising from the plaintiff’s repudiatory breach of the tenancy agreement. The court expressly stated that the defendants’ acceptance of the keys and access cards and their retaking of possession on 23 May 2019 did not prejudice that right. (Paras 102, 103)

"The defendants are hence entitled to the pro-rated rent of $4,229.05 as damages arising from this repudiatory breach." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 102

On the second question, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the return of her security deposit of $4,600 because there was no evidence of damage to the Studio Unit or other justification for detaining the deposit. This is an important distinction: the defendants could recover damages for the plaintiff’s breach, but they could not retain the security deposit absent a proper basis for doing so. (Para 103)

"As there is no evidence of damage caused to the Studio Unit, or other justification for the detention of the security deposit, the plaintiff will be entitled to the return of her security deposit of $4,600." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 103

The final order therefore dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims except for the return of the security deposit. The court also awarded costs to the defendants by consent at $140,000 plus reasonable disbursements to be agreed or taxed. The result reflects the court’s view that the plaintiff’s substantive claims failed, even though she retained a limited contractual entitlement to the return of the deposit. (Paras 104, 105)

"I dismiss all of the plaintiff’s claims, except for the security deposit of $4,600, which is to be returned to the plaintiff." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 104

"Parties informed the court that they have agreed to fix by consent the party and party costs at a lump sum of $140,000 excluding reasonable disbursements to be agreed or taxed." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 105

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it shows how a landlord-tenant dispute can turn almost entirely on contemporaneous communications and objective evidence rather than on competing narratives alone. The court relied on WhatsApp messages, call timings, CCTV, police evidence, and photographs to determine whether the tenant had been evicted or had voluntarily left. For practitioners, the case is a reminder that documentary and digital evidence can be decisive in possession disputes. (Paras 13, 30, 42, 52, 98, 99)

The case also illustrates the importance of credibility. The court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s evidence on the police taking her keys, her heart condition, and her alleged belongings in the unit shows how one unreliable aspect of testimony can affect the overall assessment of a party’s case. In practical terms, litigants who allege wrongful eviction or conversion must be able to prove not only the legal theory but also the factual chain with consistency and corroboration. (Paras 52, 81, 97, 101)

Finally, the case is useful on remedies. It distinguishes between a landlord’s right to damages for repudiatory breach and the separate question whether a security deposit may be retained. The court’s treatment of pro-rated rent and the return of the deposit provides a clear example of how contractual remedies can be split according to proof of breach and proof of loss. (Paras 102, 103, 104)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• No statutory provisions or section numbers are expressly cited in the extracted material. The judgment instead relies on the tenancy agreement and case law. (Paras 20, 102)

"I will hence award to the defendants, by consent of parties, costs at $140,000 plus reasonable disbursements to be agreed or taxed." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 105

"The plaintiff’s case is that she was wrongfully evicted from the Studio Unit on 22 May 2019." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 21

"The defendants’ case is that while the first defendant did intend to evict the plaintiff via the SCT for nuisance and breach of the TA, unbeknown to them, the plaintiff had already vacated the Studio Unit by 22 May 2019." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 24

"The plaintiff had thus abandoned the Studio Unit in furtherance of her intention to terminate the tenancy prematurely." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 24

"I accept the evidence of Nicholas and the fourth defendant that the first time they entered the Studio Unit after the plaintiff handed over her keys, was around mid-day of 23 May 2019, and that the Studio Unit was vacant, as evidenced by the Photographs." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 98

"On the totality of the evidence before me, I find that the plaintiff willingly surrendered her keys and access cards to the Studio Unit to the defendants on 22 May 2019." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 99

"This being the case, I dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination of the tenancy." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 99

"I reject the plaintiff’s claims that she left her belongings in the Studio Unit as of 22 May 2019 and that they were wrongfully detained by the defendants." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 101

"The defendants are hence entitled to the pro-rated rent of $4,229.05 as damages arising from this repudiatory breach." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 102

"As there is no evidence of damage caused to the Studio Unit, or other justification for the detention of the security deposit, the plaintiff will be entitled to the return of her security deposit of $4,600." — Per Kwek Mean Luck J, Para 103

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "The terms of the TA provides,..."
• View in judgment: "Kwek Mean Luck Judge of the..."
• View in judgment: "The terms of the TA provides,..."

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 108 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.