Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 203
- Title: Homee Pte Ltd v Hah Biang Kian Terence
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Proceeding Type: Registrar’s Appeal from the State Courts
- Registrar’s Appeal No.: DC/OC 869/2024 (Main Suit) / DC/SUM 803/2025 (Application to set aside default judgment) / Registrar’s Appeal from the State Courts No. 13 of 2025
- Date of Judgment: 15 October 2025
- Date of Hearing: 6 October 2025
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Plaintiff/Applicant (Appellant): Homee Pte Ltd
- Defendant/Respondent (Respondent): Hah Biang Kian Terence
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Judgments and orders (setting aside regular default judgment)
- Statutes Referenced: Not specified in the provided extract
- Cases Cited: Mercurine Pte Ltd v Canberra Development Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 907
- Judgment Length: 5 pages, 1,006 words (as indicated in metadata)
Summary
In Homee Pte Ltd v Hah Biang Kian Terence [2025] SGHC 203, the High Court allowed an appeal against a District Judge’s decision dismissing an application to set aside a regular default judgment. The dispute arose from a tenancy for a student hostel property, where the landlord terminated the tenancy on notice following an en bloc redevelopment/sale clause, and the purchaser subsequently sued for vacant possession and rent-related relief after the tenant failed to respond to the proceedings.
The High Court applied the Court of Appeal’s framework in Mercurine Pte Ltd v Canberra Development Pte Ltd for setting aside regular default judgments. While the District Judge had concluded that the tenant raised no triable issues and that the delay in bringing the setting-aside application was fatal, the High Court disagreed. It held that the tenant had raised arguable issues—particularly concerning the contractual consequences of termination under the tenancy agreement’s clause on en bloc redevelopment/sale—and that the delay was explained and should not be used to stymie a litigant who merited a full trial.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
Homee Pte Ltd (“Homee” or the Appellant”) operated a student hostel business. It rented a property (“Property”) from Liow Lee Lan (“Liow”) for a 24-month term commencing on 8 August 2023. The tenancy agreement (“TA”) contained an “en bloc redevelopment/sale” clause, which provided a mechanism for the landlord to terminate the tenancy upon an en bloc redevelopment or sale by private treaty, subject to giving three months’ written notice and refunding the deposit to the tenant without interest. The clause also stated that neither party would have any claims against the other.
On 18 March 2024, Liow served a three-month termination notice on Homee pursuant to cl 5(i) of the TA. Subsequently, on 2 May 2024, Liow sold the Property to Hah Biang Kian Terence (“Hah” or the Respondent”), with the sale being subject to the remaining duration of the TA. After the transfer, the Respondent served a notice of termination dated 20 May 2024 on Homee, alleging non-payment of rent. Homee disputed the termination.
On 3 June 2024, the Respondent commenced District Court proceedings (DC/OC 869/2024, referred to as the “Main Suit”) against Homee. The claims included vacant possession, outstanding rent, and double rent for holding over. The record indicates that Homee did not file a Notice of Intention to Contest in the Main Suit. As a result, the Respondent obtained a default judgment on 21 August 2024.
Following default judgment, damages were assessed on 14 February 2025, and enforcement measures were taken on 23 April 2025. Homee then applied in DC/SUM 803/2025 on 30 April 2025 to set aside the default judgment. The District Judge dismissed the application. Homee appealed to the High Court against that dismissal.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The appeal primarily raised two legal issues relevant to the setting aside of a regular default judgment. First, applying the Mercurine test, whether Homee had demonstrated a prima facie defence that raised triable or arguable issues. The District Judge had found that Homee raised no triable issues, concluding that non-payment of rent entitled the Respondent to terminate the TA.
Second, the appeal required the High Court to consider whether the delay in bringing the setting-aside application was fatal. The District Judge had treated the delay as undermining Homee’s application, inferring a nonchalant attitude from the director’s explanation that he only became aware of the court proceedings on 21 October 2024 and then waited for lawyers to respond.
Underlying both issues was the broader procedural principle that the court’s approach to setting aside default judgments must balance finality and efficiency against the overarching objective of doing justice—particularly where a party may have a genuine defence that should be ventilated at trial.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by confirming that the District Judge correctly relied on the principles in Mercurine Pte Ltd v Canberra Development Pte Ltd. In Mercurine, the Court of Appeal held that where a regular default judgment is sought to be set aside, the test is whether the defendant can show a prima facie defence that raises triable or arguable issues. This is not a full determination of the merits; rather, it is a threshold inquiry to see whether there is a real question to be tried.
On the first issue—triable issues—the High Court disagreed with the District Judge’s conclusion. While the District Judge had reasoned that non-payment of rent entitled the Respondent to terminate the TA, the High Court emphasised that Homee had raised arguable issues, particularly concerning the effect of cl 5(i) of the TA. The clause, reproduced in the judgment, provided that in the event of en bloc redevelopment or sale by private treaty, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving three months’ notice in writing, refund the deposit without interest, and that neither party shall have any claims against the other.
The High Court noted that when Liow terminated the lease under cl 5(i), it appeared that the deposit should have been refunded to Homee. However, according to the Respondent’s own evidence, the security deposit was still in the Respondent’s possession. The High Court reasoned that if the Respondent, by taking over the TA, was contractually required to return the security deposit, then the legal implications of that obligation should be examined fully at trial. This was sufficient to constitute triable issues, because it raised questions about the contractual consequences of termination under cl 5(i) and the Respondent’s entitlement to the rent-related relief claimed.
In other words, the High Court treated the deposit and termination mechanics as more than peripheral facts. They potentially affected whether the Respondent’s termination and subsequent claims were properly grounded. The court’s approach reflects a common principle in setting-aside applications: where the defence is not frivolous and raises issues that could affect liability or relief, the matter should generally proceed to trial rather than be shut out at the default stage.
On the second issue—delay—the High Court again departed from the District Judge’s reasoning. The District Judge had inferred nonchalance because Homee’s director said he only learned of the proceedings on 21 October 2024 and then contacted lawyers, but did not take further steps because he was waiting for responses. The High Court accepted that Homee contacted lawyers, but it found that those lawyers were the Respondent’s lawyers, apparently seeking clarity rather than legal representation. Neither the Respondent nor his lawyers replied. Homee only contacted the Respondent’s lawyers after it had approached the Small Claims Tribunal and realised that the order was not from them.
The High Court accepted the director’s explanation that the delay was due to unfamiliarity with Singapore court processes, given that the director and staff were foreigners. Importantly, the court also considered Homee’s conduct after the accounts were frozen on 23 April 2025: Homee filed for leave to set aside the default judgment on the next day. This rapid action after the enforcement impact suggested that the delay was not strategic or indifferent, but rather attributable to genuine procedural unfamiliarity.
In articulating the procedural justice rationale, the High Court invoked the idea that “procedure is the handmaiden of justice”. The court used this to emphasise that procedural rules should not be applied strictly in a manner that stymies a litigant who merits an opportunity to ventilate its case at trial. While the court did not disregard delay entirely, it treated the explanation and subsequent promptness as sufficient to overcome the District Judge’s inference of nonchalance.
Overall, the High Court’s analysis demonstrates a two-pronged approach consistent with Mercurine: (1) identify whether there is a prima facie defence raising triable or arguable issues; and (2) assess whether the defendant’s conduct, including delay, justifies refusing the setting aside. Here, both prongs favoured Homee.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the District Judge’s dismissal of Homee’s application to set aside the default judgment, thereby granting Homee the opportunity to contest the claims at trial (or at least to have the default judgment removed so that the matter could proceed on its merits).
As to costs, the court directed the parties to file submissions on costs within seven days. Practically, this means the substantive dispute would no longer be determined by default, and the parties would proceed to litigate the underlying tenancy and termination issues, including the effect of cl 5(i) and the deposit-related implications.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how the High Court will apply Mercurine to ensure that default judgments do not become a substitute for adjudication on arguable defences. The case reinforces that the threshold for “triable or arguable issues” is not onerous: where contractual provisions raise questions that could affect entitlement to relief, the court should generally permit the matter to proceed.
From a tenancy and contractual perspective, the judgment also highlights the importance of carefully analysing the consequences of termination clauses. The High Court’s focus on the deposit refund obligation under cl 5(i) shows that even where a landlord or purchaser asserts termination for non-payment, the contractual framework governing termination under special circumstances (such as en bloc redevelopment or private treaty sale) may still be relevant. This can affect not only liability but also the availability and quantum of rent-related claims.
Procedurally, the case provides a useful reminder that delay is assessed in context. Where the delay is credibly explained—particularly by unfamiliarity with court processes—and where the defendant acts promptly once enforcement consequences materialise, the court may be reluctant to treat delay as automatically fatal. For litigants and counsel, the decision underscores the value of providing a coherent explanation for procedural steps (or omissions) and demonstrating prompt remedial action.
Legislation Referenced
- Not specified in the provided judgment extract.
Cases Cited
- Mercurine Pte Ltd v Canberra Development Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR(R) 907
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 203 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.