Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC(I) 13
- Title: Hii Yii Ann & Anor v Tiong Thai King & Anor
- Court: Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC)
- Originating Application No: 15 of 2023
- Summons No: Summons No 1 of 2024
- Procedural Posture: Application to vary a costs order following dismissal of a summons to strike out a counterclaim
- Date of Judgment (Costs): 22 April 2025
- Date Judgment Reserved: 21 March 2024
- Judge: Thomas Bathurst IJ
- Applicant (Second Defendant): Everrise Cooperation Pte Ltd
- Respondent (First Defendant): Tiong Thai King
- Claimants / Defendants (Main Action): Hii Yii Ann; Alliance Lumber (PNG) Limited (claimants)
- Defendants (Main Action): Tiong Thai King; Everrise Cooperation Pte Ltd
- Counterclaim: Counterclaim by the First Defendant (Tiong Thai King) against Hii Yii Ann, Alliance Lumber (PNG) Limited, and Everrise Cooperation Pte Ltd
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs
- Key Issue(s): Whether costs should be varied; whether costs claimed were reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount; proportionality and reasonableness under SICC costs regime
- Statutes / Rules Referenced: Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021, Order 22 r 3
- Domestic Costs Framework Considered: Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021, Appendix G (range for striking out applications)
- Cases Cited: Senda International Capital Ltd v Kiri Industries Ltd [2023] 1 SLR 96
- Judgment Length: 12 pages; 2,421 words
Summary
This SICC decision concerns costs arising from an earlier interlocutory judgment in which the court dismissed an application by Everrise Cooperation Pte Ltd (the “Second Defendant”) to strike out the counterclaim brought against it by Tiong Thai King (the “First Defendant”). After the striking-out application was dismissed, the court ordered the Second Defendant to pay the First Defendant’s costs of that summons. The present judgment addresses the First Defendant’s costs and, separately, the Second Defendant’s attempt to vary the costs order.
The Second Defendant sought, without a formal application, to re-characterise the costs of the dismissed summons as “costs in the cause” rather than costs payable immediately. The court rejected the application to vary. It held that the Second Defendant’s submissions did not provide a basis to depart from the earlier costs order, particularly because the chronology showed that the First Defendant’s counterclaim was known to the parties before default judgment was pursued, and there was no unfairness or bad faith in the First Defendant’s conduct.
On the substantive costs assessment, the court applied the SICC costs principles in Order 22 r 3 of the SICC Rules, emphasising that a successful party is entitled to costs sensibly and reasonably incurred, subject to proportionality and reasonableness. The court scrutinised the First Defendant’s costs schedule, made targeted adjustments, and ultimately fixed a reasonable costs sum that reflected both the complexity of the legal issues and the proportionality concerns raised by the Second Defendant.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute involved proceedings in the SICC where Hii Yii Ann and Alliance Lumber (PNG) Limited were claimants, and Tiong Thai King and Everrise Cooperation Pte Ltd were defendants. Tiong Thai King brought a counterclaim against the claimants and also against Everrise Cooperation Pte Ltd. Everrise then applied to strike out that counterclaim in its entirety.
On 5 January 2024, Everrise filed a summons (SIC/SUM 1/2024) seeking to strike out the counterclaim. The SICC dismissed that summons by judgment dated 10 July 2024, and ordered Everrise to pay the First Defendant’s costs of the summons. The present judgment is the court’s determination of the First Defendant’s costs following that earlier decision, and it must be read together with the 10 July 2024 judgment.
After the costs order was made, Everrise (the Second Defendant) sought to vary the costs treatment. The Second Defendant’s position was that the costs of the dismissed summons should be “costs in the cause” rather than costs payable immediately. Although the Second Defendant did not bring a formal application, it effectively invited the court to revisit the earlier costs order based on alleged unfairness and alleged delay in the counterclaim.
In support of the variation request, the Second Defendant argued that the First Defendant brought the counterclaim belatedly—approximately four weeks after the claimants applied for default judgment against the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant also relied on an email dated 22 December 2022 and contended that the First Defendant or his nominee failed to take timely action, which the Second Defendant characterised as waiver of rights and as “unfairness and bad faith”. The court examined the chronology and rejected these characterisations, finding that the parties were aware of the First Defendant’s claim before default judgment was sought and that the counterclaim was served in circumstances where the claimants requested urgent handling of their default judgment application.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was procedural and remedial: whether the Second Defendant had a proper basis to vary the earlier costs order. The court had to decide whether the Second Defendant’s submissions—particularly those framed around alleged delay, waiver, and unfairness—could justify changing the costs order from immediate costs to “costs in the cause”.
The second issue was substantive costs assessment. The court had to determine what costs were reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount for the dismissed striking-out summons. This required applying the SICC costs framework under Order 22 r 3 of the SICC Rules, including the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, and considering the complexity of the issues, the time and labour expended, the conduct of the parties, and the stage at which the proceedings concluded.
A further issue was the interaction between the SICC costs regime and the domestic costs guidance. The Second Defendant argued that the court should take into account the General Division costs regime and Appendix G to the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021, which provides a range of costs for striking out applications. The court had to decide how far that guidance should influence the SICC’s assessment, and whether the claimed costs exceeded what was sensibly and reasonably incurred.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
On the request to vary the costs order, the court began by addressing the Second Defendant’s argument about timing. The Second Defendant suggested that the First Defendant chose to bring the counterclaim belatedly after the Second Defendant applied for default judgment. However, the court corrected the factual premise: it was not the Second Defendant who applied for default judgment; rather, the claimants sought default judgment against the Second Defendant. The court also found no basis to infer that the First Defendant was aware of the default judgment application at the time the counterclaim was filed. Without that factual foundation, the argument could not justify a variation of the costs order.
The court then addressed the Second Defendant’s “unfairness and bad faith” narrative. The Second Defendant relied on an email of 22 December 2022 and argued that the First Defendant or his nominee failed to take timeous action, leading the Second Defendant to believe the First Defendant had waived the monies claimed. The court held that this too did not provide a basis to vary the order. Importantly, the court referred back to the chronology it had set out in the earlier 10 July 2024 judgment. That chronology showed that before default judgment was issued, each of the claimants and the Second Defendant was aware of the First Defendant’s claim. The court therefore concluded that the First Defendant’s conduct did not amount to unfairness or bad faith.
In addition, the court considered the procedural context: after the First Defendant served the counterclaim, the claimants requested that their default judgment application be dealt with urgently. In those circumstances, it was not persuasive to suggest that the First Defendant’s counterclaim was strategically timed to prejudice the Second Defendant. The court therefore refused to vary the costs order.
Turning to the costs assessment, the court identified the governing principles as set out in Order 22 r 3 of the SICC Rules. It noted that the successful party is generally entitled to costs reflecting costs incurred, subject to proportionality and reasonableness. The court emphasised that proportionality and reasonableness are assessed by reference to a non-exhaustive list of factors, including complexity, counsel’s skill and time and labour, urgency and importance, number of counsel, and the parties’ conduct. The court also relied on the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Senda International Capital Ltd v Kiri Industries Ltd, which clarified that the entitlement to costs is to whatever costs were in fact sensibly and reasonably incurred, and that assessing reasonable costs necessarily involves an inquiry into both whether costs were reasonably incurred and whether the amount is reasonable.
The First Defendant provided a detailed costs schedule itemising work by individual counsel, hours, and charge-out rates, totalling $56,765 plus disbursements of $1,461. The First Defendant sought a fixed sum of $40,000 inclusive of disbursements, arguing that he succeeded on all issues raised in the striking-out application, including waiver, res judicata, issue estoppel, the extended doctrine of res judicata, and abuse of process. He characterised these as significantly complex and difficult legal issues and also pointed out that the Second Defendant’s evidence and submissions were voluminous, with lengthy affidavits and substantial written submissions.
The Second Defendant, by contrast, argued for a low-end costs figure. It referred to remarks by the Deputy Registrar on transfer to the SICC, suggesting that Order 22 r 3(5)(b) could protect the Second Defendant from a disproportionate costs order by taking into account the General Division costs regime. It relied on Appendix G, which provides a range of costs for striking out applications of $6,000 to $20,000. The Second Defendant urged the court to fix costs at $6,000, citing proportionality (small claim and circumstances), the absence of novel or complex questions, the fact that the striking-out application was based on only two grounds, and the short hearing time (less than 1.5 hours).
In its analysis, the court accepted that it could consider Appendix G by virtue of Order 22 r 3(5)(b). However, it did not treat the range as determinative. The court focused on whether the costs claimed were sensibly and reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount, and it examined the First Defendant’s schedule in context. The court expressed some doubt about whether certain components—particularly preparation of affidavits in reply and preparation of written submissions—could be said to be reasonably incurred or reasonable in amount when considered in isolation. Nevertheless, it recognised that the First Defendant was claiming less than the total actual costs incurred, and that the claimed figure reflected a deduction from the total costs.
Specifically, the court noted that the First Defendant’s claimed amount was $16,765 less than the actual costs incurred. Applying that deduction to the two items under scrutiny reduced the combined preparation costs from $44,875 to $28,110. The court then concluded that, when viewed in that adjusted context, the remaining claimed amounts appeared reasonable and proportionate to the issues involved. This approach reflects a pragmatic costs assessment: the court did not require that every line item be perfect, but it required that the overall claim be anchored to what was sensibly and reasonably incurred.
Although the excerpt provided is truncated before the final figure is stated, the reasoning indicates that the court would calibrate the award by balancing (i) the complexity and legal work required for the striking-out application, (ii) the proportionality concerns raised by the Second Defendant, and (iii) the guidance from Appendix G as a contextual benchmark rather than a strict cap.
What Was the Outcome?
The court refused the Second Defendant’s attempt to vary the earlier costs order. It held that the submissions did not establish unfairness, bad faith, or any other basis to depart from the costs consequence of the dismissed striking-out application.
On the First Defendant’s costs, the court fixed a reasonable costs sum after applying the SICC costs principles in Order 22 r 3 and the guidance in Senda. The court’s approach indicates a measured reduction from the full schedule, reflecting proportionality and reasonableness while recognising that the legal issues in the striking-out application were not trivial and required substantial legal work.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is a useful reference point for practitioners in two respects. First, it demonstrates that costs orders in the SICC will not readily be revisited on the basis of post hoc characterisations of procedural timing. Where the chronology shows that the relevant claim was known and where the counterclaim was served in a context that did not prejudice the opposing party, the court is unlikely to treat alleged delay as a reason to shift costs to “costs in the cause”.
Second, the judgment provides practical guidance on how SICC courts assess costs after interlocutory applications, particularly where parties seek to import domestic costs benchmarks. The court confirmed that it may consider Appendix G under Order 22 r 3(5)(b), but it also made clear that the assessment remains anchored in the SICC principles of sensibly and reasonably incurred costs, proportionality, and reasonableness. This is important for counsel preparing costs schedules: line-item scrutiny will occur, but the court may accept overall reasonableness where the claimed figure already reflects internal reductions from actual time and expense.
For law students and litigators, the case also illustrates the evidential and analytical discipline expected in costs disputes. The court’s reasoning shows that costs arguments must be supported by accurate procedural facts (such as who applied for default judgment and when) and by a coherent explanation of why particular work was necessary. Unsupported assertions of waiver, unfairness, or bad faith are unlikely to influence costs outcomes unless they are tied to the chronology and to the court’s earlier findings.
Legislation Referenced
- Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021, Order 22 r 3
- Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021, Appendix G (General Division costs guidance for striking out applications)
Cases Cited
- Senda International Capital Ltd v Kiri Industries Ltd [2023] 1 SLR 96
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHCI 13 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.