Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 138
- Title: Hertel Singapore Pte Ltd (now known as Altrad Services Singapore Pte Ltd) and another v Cheng Swee Guan and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of decision: 18 July 2025
- Date of hearing: 8 July 2025
- Judge: Chua Lee Ming J
- Originating Claim No: 993 of 2024
- Registrar’s Appeal No: 84 of 2025
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Hertel Singapore Pte Ltd (n.k.a. Altrad Services Singapore Pte Ltd)
- Plaintiff/Applicant (2): Kok Chang Scaffolding Pte Ltd
- Defendant/Respondent: Cheng Swee Guan
- Defendant/Respondent (2): Lorenzo Wang Lianzhong
- Defendant/Respondent (3): Neo Cheng Soon
- Defendant/Respondent (4): Ang Thian Lai
- Defendant/Respondent (5): Ang Tian Beng
- Defendant/Respondent (6): Kee Seow Chua, in his capacity as the sole proprietor of Seow Chuan Engineering
- Defendant/Respondent (7): Lim Zi Xiang, in his capacity as a partner of SHC Engineering and Trading
- Legal area: Civil Procedure — Rules of Court 2021
- Key procedural provisions: O 9 rr 9(8) and 9(9) ROC 2021
- Judgment length: 15 pages, 3,376 words
- Cases cited (as provided): [2022] SGHC 188; [2025] SGHC 138
Summary
This High Court decision concerns the procedure for seeking leave to file an application outside a single application pending trial (“SAPT”) in the context of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”). The claimants (Hertel Singapore Pte Ltd, now known as Altrad Services Singapore Pte Ltd, and Kok Chang Scaffolding Pte Ltd) appealed against an Assistant Registrar’s decision granting the second defendant permission to file an application for further and better particulars (“FBP”) of the Statement of Claim before the SAPT was made.
The appeal raised two connected questions: first, whether the claimants were entitled to be heard before the court granted permission adverse to their interests; and second, how the court should exercise its powers under O 9 r 9(9) when dealing with requests made under O 9 r 9(8). The judge held that the right to be heard is a rule of natural justice and that, although the court may deal with the request “summarily” by letter, it cannot allow the request without giving the opposing party an opportunity to be heard. The court therefore set aside the Assistant Registrar’s decision and clarified the procedural requirements for such permission requests.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute arose from allegations of fraud and the improper release of payments by employees of the first claimant. At all material times, the first and second defendants were employed by the first claimant and were two of three authorised signatories. The signatories were authorised to approve payment releases, claims and all financial matters, and the payment release process required two signatories to sign off on payments to vendors.
The claimants’ pleaded case was that the first and second defendants devised a fraudulent scheme involving fictitious third-party vendors and documents. In substance, the claimants alleged that false quotations were created in the names of third-party vendors and submitted to the first claimant. Based on those false quotations, the claimants alleged that the first and second defendants caused the claimants to issue purchase orders to those third-party vendors.
Further, the claimants alleged that false invoices were then issued in the names of the third-party vendors and submitted to the first claimant for payment, despite no goods or services being supplied by those vendors. The claimants’ case was that, pursuant to the first and second defendants’ approvals and/or instructions, the first claimant made payment on the false invoices. These allegations formed the core of the claimants’ Statement of Claim, including the pleaded assertion that certain underlying transaction documents were fictitious.
Procedurally, the second defendant’s solicitors (TSMP Law Corporation) made a request for permission on 2 April 2025 to file an application before the SAPT was made. The intended application was for FBP of the claimants’ Statement of Claim, particularly seeking particulars of the underlying transaction documents that the claimants pleaded were fictitious. The request was allowed by the court on 3 April 2025. The claimants then appealed the Assistant Registrar’s decision on 17 April 2025, contending that they were not given an opportunity to respond to the permission request and that the intended FBP application was not necessary at that stage.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was whether the claimants were entitled to be heard before the court granted permission under O 9 r 9(8) and O 9 r 9(9) ROC 2021. The claimants argued that the Assistant Registrar’s decision was procedurally defective because it was made without affording them an opportunity to respond to the second defendant’s request to file an application outside the SAPT framework.
The second issue concerned the proper construction and application of O 9 r 9(8) and O 9 r 9(9). In particular, the court had to consider what “summarily” means in the context of O 9 r 9(9), and whether the court could allow the permission request by letter without hearing the opposing party, or whether natural justice required some form of opportunity to respond before permission was granted.
Related to these issues was the question whether the permission decision involved the adjudication of substantive rights. While the permission decision was not a determination of the merits of the intended FBP application, it had practical consequences for the litigation timetable and the scope of pleadings and disclosure. The court therefore had to determine the extent to which natural justice applies to such procedural permission decisions.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The judge began by setting out the SAPT regime under O 9 of the ROC 2021. The rules emphasise that, as far as possible, the court must order an SAPT for each party, and that the SAPT must deal with all matters necessary for the case to proceed expeditiously, including matters such as further and better particulars of pleadings. The case conference is generally conducted by the registrar, with the assigned judge able to be involved if referred. Importantly, O 9 r 9(7) restricts applications outside the SAPT: parties may not take out applications at other times unless directed at the case conference or with the court’s approval, subject to limited exceptions.
Against this framework, the judge analysed the permission mechanism in O 9 r 9(8) and O 9 r 9(9). Under O 9 r 9(8), the requesting party must seek the court’s approval by letter setting out the essence of the intended application and the reasons why it is necessary at that stage. Under O 9 r 9(9), the court may deal with the request by letter “summarily” or fix a case conference to deal with the matter. The judge treated these provisions as procedural tools that must be exercised consistently with natural justice.
On the natural justice point, the judge rejected the second defendant’s submission that there is no right of reply because the ROC 2021 does not expressly provide for it and because the permission request does not involve adjudication of substantive rights. The judge held that the right to be heard is a rule of natural justice. A litigant is entitled to be heard before an order adverse to its interests is made. While the permission decision is not a decision on the merits of the intended FBP application, it is still a judicial determination about whether the requesting party may take out an application outside the SAPT process. That determination affects the opposing party’s procedural position and litigation burden, and therefore requires observance of natural justice.
The judge then addressed the meaning of “summarily”. The decision explained that “summarily” is commonly used to describe the court’s power to decide without a trial or without an oral hearing. The judge compared the language in ROC 2021 with the earlier ROC 2014, where “summarily” appeared in contexts such as interpleader and garnishee proceedings, and also noted that courts have used “summarily” in other procedural settings such as summary judgment and judgment on admissions. The key point, however, was not the label but the consequence: O 9 r 9(9) allows the court to deal with the request without an oral hearing at a case conference, but it does not remove the requirement that the opposing party must be given an opportunity to be heard where the court is considering allowing the request.
Accordingly, the judge articulated a structured approach to O 9 r 9(9). If the court is not satisfied, based on the reasons given by the requesting party, that the intended application is necessary at that stage, the court may reject the request summarily without hearing the opposing party. A rejection is not adverse to the opposing party in the same way as granting permission. However, the court cannot allow the request without giving the opposing party an opportunity to be heard. That opportunity may be provided by letter (if the court chooses to proceed summarily) or by an oral hearing at a case conference (if the court considers it appropriate). The judge’s reasoning therefore reconciled the “summarily” procedure with the minimum content of natural justice.
Applying these principles to the facts, the judge examined the correspondence and timing around the permission request. The second defendant’s request was allowed on 3 April 2025. The claimants’ solicitors had written on the same day requesting leave to submit a response by 11 April 2025, but it was unclear whether that letter was received before or after the court’s reply to the permission request. The court’s reply indicated that the claimants were “not in any position to respond” and that the request had been “dealt with”. The judge treated this as inconsistent with the requirement that, where permission is to be granted, the opposing party must be given an opportunity to be heard.
In other words, the procedural defect was not merely that the claimants did not file a response before the permission was granted; it was that the court’s process did not provide a meaningful opportunity for the claimants to address the necessity of the intended FBP application at that stage. The judge’s analysis thus focused on the fairness of the permission process rather than on whether the claimants could have anticipated the decision.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Assistant Registrar’s decision granting permission to the second defendant to file the FBP application before the SAPT was made. The practical effect was that the second defendant would have to proceed within the SAPT framework (or obtain permission again in a manner consistent with the natural justice requirements articulated by the court).
More broadly, the decision clarified that while the court may process permission requests “summarily” by letter, it cannot grant permission without giving the opposing party an opportunity to be heard. This ensures that procedural permissions that alter the litigation timetable and the parties’ burdens are not granted in a one-sided manner.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it provides authoritative guidance on the interaction between the SAPT regime and the natural justice requirement in permission requests under O 9 r 9(8) and O 9 r 9(9) ROC 2021. The decision confirms that the absence of an express “right of reply” in the ROC 2021 does not eliminate the court’s obligation to ensure fairness when granting permission adverse to a party’s interests.
For litigators, the judgment has immediate procedural implications. When a party seeks permission to take out an application outside the SAPT, the requesting party must provide sufficient reasons why the application is necessary at that stage. Conversely, the opposing party should be prepared to respond promptly by letter if the court indicates that it will deal with the request summarily. The court’s approach also suggests that, where the court is minded to reject a request, it may do so without hearing the opposing party, but where it is minded to allow the request, it must provide an opportunity to be heard.
From a precedent perspective, the decision is useful for arguing procedural fairness in interlocutory matters and for challenging permission orders made without an opportunity to respond. It also helps lawyers structure submissions on necessity and timing, which are central to O 9 r 9(8). In fraud-heavy pleadings disputes—where FBP and document particulars can materially affect discovery and AEIC preparation—the judgment underscores that procedural acceleration must still comply with natural justice.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), O 9 rr 9(2), 9(3), 9(4), 9(7), 9(8), 9(9)
Cases Cited
- [2022] SGHC 188
- [2025] SGHC 138
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 138 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.