Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHC 138
- Title: Hertel Singapore Pte Ltd (now known as Altrad Services Singapore Pte Ltd) and another v Cheng Swee Guan and others
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of decision: 18 July 2025
- Date of hearing: 8 July 2025
- Judge: Chua Lee Ming J
- Originating Claim No: 993 of 2024
- Registrar’s Appeal No: 84 of 2025
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Hertel Singapore Pte Ltd (n.k.a. Altrad Services Singapore Pte Ltd) and Kok Chang Scaffolding Pte Ltd
- Defendant/Respondent: Cheng Swee Guan and others (including Lorenzo Wang Lianzhong as the key respondent in the permission application)
- Legal area: Civil Procedure — Rules of Court 2021
- Core procedural issue: Leave/permission to file an application other than in a single application pending trial (SAPT) under O 9 rr 9(8) and 9(9) ROC 2021; whether the opposing party must be heard
- Statutes referenced: Rules of Court 2021 (O 9 rr 9(2), 9(3), 9(4), 9(7), 9(8), 9(9))
- Cases cited (as provided): [2022] SGHC 188; [2025] SGHC 138
- Judgment length: 15 pages, 3,376 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerns a procedural appeal arising from an Assistant Registrar’s grant of permission to a defendant to file an application for further and better particulars (“FBP”) before the parties had filed their single application pending trial (“SAPT”). The claimants, Hertel Singapore Pte Ltd (now known as Altrad Services Singapore Pte Ltd) and Kok Chang Scaffolding Pte Ltd, appealed against the Assistant Registrar’s decision, arguing that they were not given an opportunity to be heard on the permission request.
The court held that the “right to be heard” is a fundamental aspect of natural justice and applies even where the Rules of Court allow the court to deal with a permission request “summarily” by letter. While the court may reject a permission request summarily if it is not satisfied that the intended application is necessary at that stage, it cannot grant permission without giving the opposing party an opportunity to respond—either by letter or, where appropriate, at an oral hearing at a case conference.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute was a civil claim brought by the claimants against multiple defendants, including Cheng Swee Guan and others. The claimants alleged that the first and second defendants were employed by the first claimant and were among the authorised signatories who could approve payment releases, claims, and other financial matters. The claimants’ case was that two signatories were required to sign off on payments to vendors, meaning that the defendants’ approvals were integral to the payment process.
At the heart of the claim was an allegation of a fraudulent scheme. The claimants pleaded that the first and second defendants devised a scheme involving false quotations, purchase orders, and invoices. In summary, the claimants alleged that false quotations were created in the names of third-party vendors and submitted to the first claimant. Based on those false quotations, the claimants were said to have issued purchase orders to the third-party vendors. Thereafter, false invoices were allegedly issued and submitted for payment, despite no goods or services being supplied by those vendors. Finally, the claimants alleged that the first claimant made payments on those false invoices pursuant to the defendants’ approvals and/or instructions.
Procedurally, the dispute entered the pre-trial stage where the parties were expected to use the SAPT framework. Under the Rules of Court 2021, the SAPT is designed to consolidate interlocutory applications so that the case can proceed expeditiously. However, the second defendant’s solicitors, TSMP Law Corporation (“TSMP”), sought permission to file an application for FBP before the SAPT was made. This was done by a request dated 2 April 2025.
TSMP’s permission request was made on 2 April 2025 and was allowed by the court on 3 April 2025. TSMP’s reasons included that without the underlying transaction documents being identified, the second defendant could not address basic case matters such as whether expert evidence would be necessary. TSMP also argued that FBP before the SAPT was required because the second defendant would need the particulars to determine the scope of discovery, to prepare an affidavit of evidence-in-chief (“AEIC”) if AEICs were ordered before discovery, and to identify witnesses for trial.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The appeal raised two closely related procedural questions under O 9 of the Rules of Court 2021. First, the court had to determine whether the claimants were entitled to be heard before the Assistant Registrar granted permission to the second defendant to file an application for FBP outside the SAPT framework. This required the court to consider the interaction between the permission procedure in O 9 r 9(8) and the court’s power under O 9 r 9(9) to deal with the request “summarily”.
Second, the court had to consider whether the Assistant Registrar’s decision to grant permission could be justified on the merits of necessity at that stage of the proceedings. Although the appeal included an argument that the intended application was not necessary at that point, the central focus of the judgment extract provided was the natural justice question: whether granting permission without hearing the opposing party was procedurally defective.
In other words, the court was not deciding the merits of the fraud allegations. Instead, it was deciding the threshold procedural question of whether the Rules permit the court to grant permission without giving the opposing party an opportunity to respond, and how the court should exercise its discretion under O 9 r 9(9) when the opposing party’s interests are affected.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by setting out the SAPT framework in O 9 r 9. Order 9 r 9(2) requires that, as far as possible, the court must order an SAPT to be made by each party. Order 9 r 9(3) provides that the SAPT must deal with all matters necessary for the case to proceed expeditiously, including those specified in O 9 r 9(4), which includes FBP of pleadings. The Rules also provide that directions as to the filing of SAPTs are given at a case conference, generally conducted by the registrar, with the possibility of referral to the assigned judge.
Crucially, the court emphasised that O 9 r 9(7) restricts when applications may be taken out. As a general rule, applications should be taken out in the SAPT or with the court’s approval. An application for FBP does not fall within the exceptions. Accordingly, the second defendant’s application for FBP could not be taken out on its own unless directed by the court or with the court’s approval. This is why the permission procedure under O 9 r 9(8) and O 9 r 9(9) mattered.
Under O 9 r 9(8), the requesting party must seek approval by letter setting out the essence of the intended application and the reasons why it is necessary at that stage. Under O 9 r 9(9), the court may deal with the request by letter “summarily” or fix a case conference to deal with the matter. The court then addressed the claimants’ argument that they were not given an opportunity to respond to the permission request.
The defendant initially submitted that there was no right of reply to a request for permission, reasoning that the ROC 2021 does not provide for a right of reply and that the permission request does not involve adjudication of substantive rights. However, the court noted that the submission was withdrawn during the hearing. Even without that withdrawal, the court disagreed with the proposition that natural justice has no role in this context.
The court held that the right to be heard is a rule of natural justice. A litigant is entitled to be heard before an order adverse to its interests is made. While O 9 r 9(9) allows the court to deal with the request “summarily” without an oral hearing at a case conference, the court must still observe natural justice when deciding whether to grant permission. The court further clarified that although a decision on permission is not a decision on the merits of the intended application, it is still a judicial function: the court must decide whether the requesting party has satisfied the threshold requirement that the intended application is necessary at that stage (as required by O 9 r 9(8)).
To interpret the meaning of “summarily”, the court compared the language used in earlier versions of the Rules of Court and in other procedural contexts. In ROC 2014, “summarily” appeared in provisions allowing the court to determine certain issues without a trial, such as in interpleader and garnishee contexts. The court also referenced how “summarily” has been used in other procedural rules to describe the court’s ability to decide without a full trial, including summary judgment and judgment on admissions of fact. The court’s point was not that permission requests are equivalent to summary judgment, but that “summarily” generally refers to deciding without a trial or oral hearing.
Applying this understanding to O 9 r 9(9), the court reasoned that “summarily” in this rule means the court may decide the permission request without an oral hearing at a case conference. However, the court drew a critical distinction between (i) rejecting a permission request and (ii) granting it. If the court is not satisfied, based on the reasons given, that the intended application is necessary at that stage, it may reject the request summarily without hearing the opposing party because a rejection is not adverse to the opposing party. By contrast, the court cannot allow the request without giving the opposing party an opportunity to be heard, because granting permission affects the opposing party’s interests by altering the procedural timetable and compelling the opposing party to respond to an interlocutory step outside the SAPT structure.
Accordingly, the court concluded that where the opposing party is heard by letter, the court may still decide summarily; but where the court intends to grant permission, it must provide an opportunity for the opposing party to respond. That opportunity may be by letter, or if the court considers it appropriate, at an oral hearing at a case conference.
Although the extract provided truncates the remainder of the judgment, the procedural narrative indicates that the claimants’ solicitors wrote to the court on 3 April 2025 requesting leave to submit a response by 11 April 2025, and the court replied that the claimants were not in a position to respond and that the request had been dealt with. The appeal therefore turned on whether that approach complied with the natural justice requirement identified by the court: the court could decide summarily, but it could not grant permission without hearing the opposing party.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Assistant Registrar’s decision granting permission to the second defendant to file the FBP application before the SAPT was made. The practical effect of the decision is that the procedural step taken outside the SAPT framework could not stand, and the parties would need to proceed consistently with the SAPT timetable and the court’s directions.
More broadly, the outcome confirms that, in permission applications under O 9 r 9(8) and O 9 r 9(9), the court must ensure that the opposing party is given an opportunity to be heard before permission is granted, even if the court resolves the request “summarily” by letter.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the procedural safeguards that apply to permission requests to file applications outside the SAPT framework. The decision underscores that the SAPT regime is not merely administrative; it is a structured mechanism intended to promote expeditious case management. However, the court’s discretion to permit departures from that regime is constrained by natural justice.
For litigators, the judgment provides a practical rule of thumb: if the court is minded to grant permission that will be procedurally adverse to the opposing party, the opposing party must be given a meaningful opportunity to respond. This can be by letter, but the opportunity must exist before the permission is granted. Conversely, if the court rejects the request because it is not satisfied on necessity, it may do so summarily without hearing the opposing party.
From a precedent perspective, the decision contributes to the developing body of Singapore civil procedure jurisprudence on the meaning of “summarily” and the extent to which natural justice informs interlocutory case management decisions. It is particularly relevant where parties seek urgent or strategic procedural steps—such as FBP, discovery-related directions, or early AEIC-related steps—before the SAPT is filed.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 9 rules 9(2), 9(3), 9(4), 9(7), 9(8), 9(9)
Cases Cited
- [2022] SGHC 188
- [2025] SGHC 138
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHC 138 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.