Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHCR 37
- Title: GHP Far East Ltd v NPG Global Pte Ltd and another
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of decision: 21 November 2025
- Originating Claim No: 379 of 2023
- Summons No: 1663 of 2025
- Procedural context: Pre-trial conference application under Order 9 Rules of Court 2021
- Judge: AR Perry Peh
- Plaintiff/Applicant: GHP Far East Ltd (“GHP”)
- Defendants/Respondents: (1) NPG Global Pte Ltd (“NPG”) (2) Chia Po Li (“Ms Chia”)
- Legal area: Civil Procedure — Conferences (pre-trial)
- Key statutory provisions referenced: Order 9 r 4(1) and (2) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”)
- Other procedural provisions referenced (within the extract): Order 4 r 8(4), Order 4 rr 3(1) and 3(3), Order 9 r 9(7) ROC 2021
- Practice directions referenced: Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (“SCPD”), para 89; Appendix B Form B15
- Related prior decision mentioned: JUD 246 (judgment entered against NPG and dismissal of NPG’s counterclaim pursuant to O 9 rr 4(1) and (2))
- Judgment length: 35 pages, 11,567 words
- Cases cited (as per metadata): [2023] SGMC 39; [2024] SGHC 65; [2025] SGCA 32; [2025] SGHCR 37; [2025] SGHCR 9
Summary
In GHP Far East Ltd v NPG Global Pte Ltd and another [2025] SGHCR 37, the High Court considered how and when the court’s discretion under Order 9 r 4(1) and (2) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”) is enlivened in the context of Registrar’s Case Conferences (“RCCs”). The claimant, GHP, sought judgment against the second defendant, Ms Chia, and dismissal of her counterclaims on the basis that she had been absent from multiple RCCs without valid reason.
The court dismissed the application. Although the court accepted that Ms Chia’s earlier absences had caused unnecessary time and costs, it held that the discretion under Order 9 r 4(1) and (2) was not enlivened at the time the application was heard because Ms Chia had attended a subsequent RCC. The court also indicated that, even if the discretion had been enlivened, Ms Chia’s later attendance and overall conduct were factors militating against the exercise of discretion in GHP’s favour.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
GHP brought claims in Originating Claim No 379 of 2023 against NPG and Ms Chia in connection with alleged sums owing under a profit sharing agreement for the supply of medical products, as well as alleged “secret profits” made by the defendants. GHP’s case was that Ms Chia was a director and 90% shareholder of NPG. The defendants contested GHP’s claims and also brought counterclaims against GHP.
Procedurally, the defendants were represented by solicitors until 16 December 2024, when they filed a notice of intention to act in person pursuant to Order 4 r 8(4) of the ROC 2021. This shift to self-representation became significant because, as the court explained, NPG is a Singapore-incorporated company and therefore generally must be represented by solicitors unless the court grants permission for an authorised officer to act for the company. The court had previously dismissed an application for Ms Chia to represent NPG in the proceedings (on 26 February 2025). After that dismissal, no further application for corporate self-representation was brought.
As a result, the court treated NPG as effectively absent at RCCs from 16 December 2024 onwards. In HC/SUM 984/2025 (“SUM 984”), GHP successfully applied for judgment against NPG and for NPG’s counterclaim to be dismissed under Order 9 rr 4(1) and (2) ROC 2021. The resulting judgment was entered as JUD 246. The present application, HC/SUM 1663/2025 (“SUM 1663”), was therefore brought in a different posture: it targeted Ms Chia personally, rather than NPG.
SUM 1663 was filed after Ms Chia’s absences from RCCs. GHP’s supporting affidavit described three relevant absences. First, at the RCC fixed for 17 April 2025, Ms Chia emailed the Supreme Court Registry the night before requesting that the RCC be “postponed” due to medical condition and attached a medical certificate. The Registry refixed the RCC to 15 May 2025 and highlighted that the medical certificate did not comply with para 89 of the SCPD and Form B15. Second, at the RCC fixed for 15 May 2025, Ms Chia was notified and provided with videoconferencing login details, but she failed to attend without explanation. Third, after that absence, a further RCC was fixed for 26 June 2025; Ms Chia again emailed the Registry a day before with a medical certificate and requested an adjournment. The RCC proceeded in her absence, and the court adjourned it to 10 July 2025 while reserving costs of the adjournment. The Registry again highlighted non-compliance with para 89 of the SCPD and that the medical certificate did not specify that Ms Chia was medically unfit to attend court. Ms Chia ultimately attended the RCC on 10 July 2025, informed the court she would not file a reply affidavit in SUM 1663, and sought to file written submissions, which were duly filed.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The court identified two issues for decision. The first was whether the court’s discretion under Order 9 rr 4(1) and (2) ROC 2021 should be exercised in GHP’s favour to (a) give judgment against Ms Chia and (b) dismiss Ms Chia’s counterclaims, based on her absences from earlier RCCs without valid reasons.
The second issue was conditional: if the court were minded to grant judgment and dismissal, whether the terms of JUD 246 could be varied so that both NPG and Ms Chia would be made jointly and severally liable for the sums payable under the two judgments obtained by GHP in OC 379.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The analysis began with the text and structure of Order 9 r 4 ROC 2021. The rule provides, in substance, that where no party attends the case conference (or where the claimant is absent), the court may dismiss the action; and where the claimant attends but the defendant is absent, the court may give judgment for the claimant upon proof of service. The court also noted the related power to set aside or vary default judgment on proof of valid reasons for the absence of the defaulting party.
However, the court considered it “helpful” to examine the predecessor provision under the revoked Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (Order 34A r 6(1) and (2)), because the contents of Order 9 r 4 ROC 2021 mirror the earlier regime. This comparative approach was used to understand how the discretion is intended to operate in practice, particularly in relation to the timing of the absence and the procedural stage at which the court is invited to act.
Crucially, the court adopted a two-stage inquiry for whether the discretion under Order 9 rr 4(1) and (2) should be exercised. The first stage focuses on whether the defaulting party was absent “at the most recent RCC which the court has convened in the matter” at the point in time when the court is invited to give judgment or dismiss the action. In other words, the relevant absence is not necessarily any earlier absence; it is the absence at the operative conference that is contemporaneous with the court’s decision-making on the application.
The second stage concerns discretion. Even if the defaulting party was absent at the relevant RCC, the court will exercise discretion against that party where the party’s conduct is of a nature that warrants depriving them of substantive rights. This stage is not purely mechanical; it requires an evaluative assessment of the conduct, including whether the absences were justified, whether they caused prejudice, and whether the defaulting party’s subsequent behaviour suggests that the harsh procedural consequence is warranted.
Applying the two-stage inquiry, the court held that the discretion under Order 9 rr 4(1) and (2) was not enlivened in GHP’s favour. Although Ms Chia had been absent from RCCs on 17 April 2025 and 15 May 2025 without valid reason, and had also been absent at the RCC on 26 June 2025, she attended a subsequent RCC on 10 July 2025. By the time SUM 1663 came to be heard, she was no longer “absent” for the purposes of Order 9 rr 4(1) and (2). Therefore, the court concluded that the operative condition for invoking the discretion—absence at the most recent RCC convened at the relevant time—was not satisfied.
The court further addressed an important procedural observation: whether a non-defaulting party must make an application by summons to invoke Order 9 rr 4(1) and (2). While the court’s ultimate conclusion was that the discretion was not enlivened, it emphasised that the words “the case conference” in Order 9 r 4(1) and (2) refer to the most recent RCC convened in the matter at the time the court is invited to give judgment or dismiss the action. This interpretive point effectively prevents a party from relying on earlier defaults alone, where the defaulting party has since attended the operative conference.
Even if the court had been wrong on enlivenment, it indicated that it would still have declined to exercise discretion in GHP’s favour. The court treated Ms Chia’s attendance at the subsequent RCC and her general conduct as factors militating against depriving her of substantive rights. This reflects the second-stage principle: the court’s discretion is guided by fairness and proportionality, not merely by counting absences.
Finally, because the court dismissed SUM 1663, the second issue—variation of the terms of JUD 246 to impose joint and several liability on both NPG and Ms Chia—did not arise for decision. The court’s reasoning therefore focused on the procedural threshold and discretionary considerations under Order 9 r 4.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed SUM 1663. While the court accepted that Ms Chia’s earlier absences had caused unnecessary time and costs to GHP’s prejudice, it held that the discretion under Order 9 rr 4(1) and (2) was not enlivened because Ms Chia attended the subsequent RCC before the application was heard.
As to costs, the court ordered Ms Chia to pay GHP the costs of SUM 1663 and the costs of a previous RCC that were reserved in GHP’s favour. The quantum was to be determined after a separate hearing, and GHP did not appeal the decision.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the timing and mechanics of invoking Order 9 r 4(1) and (2) ROC 2021 in the RCC context. The court’s two-stage framework—(1) absence at the most recent RCC convened at the time the application is heard, and (2) whether conduct warrants depriving substantive rights—provides a structured approach for litigants seeking default-type relief based on non-attendance.
For claimants, the case highlights a practical risk: relying on earlier absences may be insufficient if the defaulting party attends a later RCC before the application is determined. In other words, the “absence” relevant to enlivenment is not frozen at the first missed conference; it is tied to the operative conference at the time the court is asked to act. This affects how and when applications should be brought, and it underscores the need to monitor the procedural calendar closely.
For defendants, the case offers reassurance that the court will not automatically impose the harsh consequences of dismissal or default judgment solely because earlier conferences were missed. The court’s emphasis on fairness and proportionality—particularly at the second stage—means that subsequent attendance and overall conduct can be relevant mitigating factors even where earlier absences were unjustified.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 9 r 4(1) and (2)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 9 r 9(7)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 4 r 8(4)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 4 rr 3(1) and 3(3)
- Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (SCPD), para 89
- SCPD, Appendix B, Form B15
Cases Cited
- [2023] SGMC 39
- [2024] SGHC 65
- [2025] SGCA 32
- [2025] SGHCR 37
- [2025] SGHCR 9
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHCR 37 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.