Case Details
- Citation: [2025] SGHCR 37
- Title: GHP Far East Limited v NPG Global Pte Ltd & Anor
- Court: High Court (General Division)
- Originating Claim No: OC 379 of 2023
- Summons No: SUM 1663 of 2025
- Decision Date(s): 1 August 2025; 26 August 2025; 21 November 2025
- Judge: AR Perry Peh
- Plaintiff/Applicant: GHP Far East Limited
- Defendants/Respondents: NPG Global Pte Ltd; Chia Po Li
- Legal Area(s): Civil Procedure; Pre-trial conferences; Default judgment; Absence at Registrar’s Case Conferences
- Key Procedural Provision(s): Order 9 rr 4(1) and 4(2) of the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”)
- Related Procedural Context: Order 4 r 8(4) ROC 2021 (self-representation); Order 4 rr 3(1) and 3(3) ROC 2021 (corporate representation); Order 9 r 9(7) ROC 2021 (permission to proceed despite absence)
- Judgment Length: 35 pages; 11,567 words
Summary
In GHP Far East Limited v NPG Global Pte Ltd & Anor ([2025] SGHCR 37), the High Court considered when and how the court’s discretion under Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2) of the ROC 2021 is enlivened where a party has been absent from Registrar’s Case Conferences (“RCCs”). The claimant, GHP, applied for judgment against the second defendant (Ms Chia) and for her counterclaims to be dismissed, relying on Ms Chia’s prior absences from multiple RCCs without valid reason.
The court dismissed the application. Although the judge accepted that Ms Chia’s earlier absences had caused unnecessary time and costs, the discretion under Order 9 rr 4(1) and 4(2) was not enlivened at the time the application was heard because Ms Chia attended a subsequent RCC after SUM 1663 was filed. The court treated the phrase “the case conference” in Order 9 rr 4(1) and 4(2) as referring to the most recent RCC convened in the matter at the point when the court is invited to give judgment or dismiss the action.
Even if the court had been wrong on enlivenment, the judge indicated that Ms Chia’s subsequent attendance and her overall conduct were factors militating against the exercise of discretion in GHP’s favour. The court therefore refused to grant the default-type relief sought, but ordered costs against Ms Chia in relation to SUM 1663 and reserved costs from a previous RCC.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
GHP commenced OC 379 of 2023 against NPG Global Pte Ltd (“NPG”) and Ms Chia Po Li (“Ms Chia”). The claims arose from an alleged profit sharing arrangement concerning the supply of medical products, as well as allegations that the defendants made “secret profits”. GHP’s case was that Ms Chia was a director and a 90% shareholder of NPG. The defendants disputed GHP’s claims and also brought counterclaims against GHP.
Procedurally, the defendants were represented by solicitors until 16 December 2024, when they filed a notice of intention to act in person pursuant to Order 4 rule 8(4) of the ROC 2021. This shift to self-representation became relevant because NPG, being a Singapore-incorporated company, generally required representation by solicitors unless the court granted permission for an authorised officer to act on its behalf. The court had dismissed an application for Ms Chia to represent NPG in OC 379 on 26 February 2025. After that dismissal, no further application for corporate self-representation was brought.
As a result, NPG was regarded as absent at all RCCs from 16 December 2024 onwards. GHP then successfully applied in HC/SUM 984/2025 for judgment on its claims against NPG and for NPG’s counterclaim to be dismissed under Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2). Judgment was entered as JUD 246. The present application, SUM 1663, concerned only the second defendant, Ms Chia, and sought similar default-type relief against her personally.
SUM 1663 was brought because Ms Chia was absent from three RCCs: (i) the RCC fixed for 17 April 2025; (ii) the RCC fixed for 15 May 2025; and (iii) the RCC fixed for 26 June 2025. GHP asserted that these absences were without valid reason. For the 17 April 2025 RCC, Ms Chia emailed the Supreme Court Registry the night before, requesting postponement due to medical condition and attaching a medical certificate. The Registry refixed the RCC to 15 May 2025 and highlighted that the medical certificate did not comply with paragraph 89 of the Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (“SCPD”) and Form B15 in Appendix B to the SCPD.
For the 15 May 2025 RCC, Ms Chia was notified and provided with videoconferencing login details. The RCC proceeded with GHP’s counsel present, but Ms Chia failed to attend without explanation. After obtaining permission under Order 9 rule 9(7) of the ROC 2021, GHP filed SUM 1663 on 13 June 2025. Subsequently, two further RCCs occurred. First, after Ms Chia’s absence at the 15 May 2025 RCC, the Registry fixed another RCC for 26 June 2025. Ms Chia emailed the Registry a day before with a medical certificate and requested an adjournment; however, GHP’s counsel attended and Ms Chia remained absent. The court adjourned the RCC to 10 July 2025 and reserved costs of the adjournment. The Registry again highlighted non-compliance with paragraph 89 of the SCPD and noted that the medical certificate did not specify that Ms Chia was medically unfit to attend court.
Second, Ms Chia finally attended the RCC on 10 July 2025. At that RCC, she informed the court that she would not file a reply affidavit in SUM 1663 but wished to file written submissions. The court directed that written submissions be filed by 25 July 2025, which Ms Chia did. Against this procedural backdrop, the court had to determine whether Ms Chia’s earlier absences justified the court exercising its discretion under Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2) at the hearing of SUM 1663.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The application raised two principal issues. First, the court had to decide whether its discretion under Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2) of the ROC 2021 should be exercised to give judgment against Ms Chia and to dismiss her counterclaims in OC 379, given her absences from earlier RCCs.
Second, if the court was minded to grant the judgment and dismissal sought, it had to consider whether the terms of JUD 246 could be varied so that both NPG and Ms Chia would be jointly and severally liable under a single judgment for the sums payable under the judgments already obtained by GHP in OC 379.
While the second issue depended on the first, the court’s reasoning ultimately turned on the first issue—specifically, whether the discretion under Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2) was enlivened at the time the court was invited to grant default-type relief.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The judge began by setting out the text of Order 9 rule 4 of the ROC 2021. In substance, Order 9 rule 4(1) provides that if no party attends the case conference (or if the claimant is absent), the court may dismiss the action. Order 9 rule 4(2) provides that if the claimant attends but the defendant is absent, the court may give judgment for the claimant upon proof of service of the originating claim or originating application on the defendant. Order 9 rule 4(3) allows the court to set aside or vary the dismissal or default judgment on proof of valid reasons for the absence.
Although the judge accepted that Ms Chia’s earlier absences without valid reason had caused unnecessary time and costs to GHP’s prejudice, the central question was procedural: when is the court’s discretion “available” for invocation? The judge considered the predecessor provision in the revoked Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), namely Order 34A rule 6(1), and the case law that had interpreted it. This historical comparison was used to inform the meaning and operation of the corresponding provisions in the ROC 2021.
The judge articulated a two-stage inquiry for the applicability of Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2). The first stage required that the defaulting party be absent without valid reason at the most recent RCC which the court had convened in the matter at the point in time when the court was invited to give judgment or dismiss the action. The second stage concerned discretion: even if the absence requirement is satisfied, the court should exercise its discretion against the defaulting party where the party’s conduct is of a nature that warrants depriving the party of substantive rights.
Applying the first stage, the judge held that the discretion was not enlivened in GHP’s favour. The key factual development was that Ms Chia attended the RCC on 10 July 2025, after SUM 1663 was filed. By the time SUM 1663 came to be heard, Ms Chia was no longer “absent” for the purposes of Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2). The judge therefore treated the words “the case conference” as a reference to the most recent RCC convened in the matter at the time the court is invited to give judgment or dismiss the action under those rules. Because Ms Chia attended that most recent RCC, the condition for enlivenment was not met.
The judge also addressed a practical point raised by the structure of the application: whether the non-defaulting party must file an application by summons to invoke Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2). The judge observed that, on the facts, the discretion was not enlivened in any event, and therefore the court did not need to decide the broader procedural necessity in a definitive way. Nonetheless, the judge’s analysis reinforced that the court’s power under Order 9 rule 4 is not automatic; it is triggered only when the relevant absence requirement is satisfied at the relevant conference.
Even assuming for argument’s sake that the discretion had been enlivened, the judge indicated that the court would still have been disinclined to exercise discretion against Ms Chia. The judge considered Ms Chia’s subsequent attendance at the RCC and her general conduct as factors militating against depriving her of substantive rights. This reflects the second stage of the inquiry: the court’s discretion is not merely punitive for procedural default; it is grounded in fairness and proportionality, and it is exercised where the defaulting party’s conduct warrants the consequence of losing substantive rights.
Finally, because the court dismissed SUM 1663, it did not grant the consequential relief sought by GHP to vary JUD 246 to make NPG and Ms Chia jointly and severally liable under a single judgment. The outcome on the first issue rendered the second issue effectively moot.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed SUM 1663. Although the judge agreed that Ms Chia’s earlier absences had caused unnecessary time and costs to GHP’s prejudice, the court held that the discretion under Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2) was not enlivened because Ms Chia attended the most recent RCC after SUM 1663 was filed.
As to costs, the court ordered Ms Chia to pay GHP the costs of SUM 1663 and the costs of a previous RCC that had been reserved in GHP’s favour. The quantum of those costs was to be determined separately. GHP did not appeal the decision.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for civil litigators because it clarifies the operational meaning of “the case conference” in Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2) of the ROC 2021. Practitioners often treat procedural absence at RCCs as a basis for default-type relief, but GHP Far East emphasises that the relevant absence must be assessed by reference to the most recent RCC convened at the time the court is invited to grant judgment or dismiss the action. This temporal framing can be decisive: a party who attends a later RCC may avoid the enlivenment of the court’s discretion, even if earlier absences were unjustified.
The case also illustrates the court’s two-stage approach—first, the factual/legal threshold of absence at the relevant conference; second, the discretionary assessment of whether the party’s conduct warrants depriving them of substantive rights. This approach aligns procedural enforcement with fairness. It signals that courts may still penalise procedural default through costs, without necessarily stripping a party of substantive rights where the procedural posture has changed.
For plaintiffs and defendants seeking to rely on Order 9 rules 4(1) and 4(2), the practical implication is clear: counsel should monitor RCC schedules and attendance closely, and should consider whether any subsequent attendance will affect enlivenment. For self-represented litigants and corporate parties, the decision also underscores the importance of complying with medical certificate requirements under the SCPD and ensuring that adjournment requests are properly supported and communicated.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 9 rule 4(1) and (2)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 9 rule 4(3)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 9 rule 9(7)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 4 rule 8(4)
- Rules of Court 2021 (ROC 2021), Order 4 rules 3(1) and 3(3)
- Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (SCPD), paragraph 89
- Supreme Court Practice Directions 2021 (SCPD), Appendix B, Form B15
Cases Cited
- (Not provided in the supplied extract.)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2025] SGHCR 37 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.