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Singapore

Fu Hao v Evancarl Ltd and another [2021] SGHC 137

In Fu Hao v Evancarl Ltd and another, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Contract — Breach, Contract — Formation.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2021] SGHC 137
  • Case Title: Fu Hao v Evancarl Ltd and another
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
  • Decision Date: 7 June 2021
  • Judge: Lee Seiu Kin J
  • Case Number: Suit No 298 of 2019
  • Plaintiff/Applicant: Fu Hao
  • Defendants/Respondents: Evancarl Ltd and another (Zheng Jiabin)
  • Legal Areas: Contract – Breach; Contract – Formation; Contract – Illegality and public policy
  • Statutes Referenced: Companies Act
  • Key Contractual Instruments: 1st SPA; 2nd SPA; 1st Procurement Agreement; 2nd Procurement Agreement; Deed of guarantee and indemnity
  • Disputed Written Agreements: 1st Procurement Agreement; 2nd Procurement Agreement; Deed (collectively, “the Disputed Written Agreements”)
  • Judgment Length: 40 pages, 17,387 words
  • Counsel for Plaintiff: Tay Wei Loong Julian, Wong Wai Keong Anthony and Loh Kah Yunn (Lee & Lee)
  • Counsel for Defendants: Eugene Singarajah Thuraisingam, Chooi Jing Yen and Hamza Zafar Malik (Eugene Thuraisingam LLP)
  • Core Allegations: Breach of procurement obligations and guarantee obligations arising from share transactions connected to a reverse takeover (RTO)
  • Core Defences: Denial of an overarching agreement; denial/qualification of nominee status; assertion that signed agreements were not intended to be performed; illegality/public policy
  • Notable Contractual Features: Time provisions; liquidated damages clause; repudiatory breach and damages measure; guarantee as “sole, original and independent obligor”
  • Liquidated Damages (1st Procurement Agreement): S$6,000,000 (agreed valuation of subsidiary shares) upon non-performance by 30 April 2016
  • Performance Timetable: Procurement transfers to be completed by 30 April 2015 (with contractual consequences extending to 30 April 2016 for the 1st Procurement Agreement)
  • Cases Cited: [1997] SGHC 166; [2021] SGHC 137

Summary

Fu Hao v Evancarl Ltd and another [2021] SGHC 137 concerned a dispute arising out of a structured set of share sale and procurement arrangements connected to a reverse takeover (RTO) of Sincap Group Limited (“SGL”). The plaintiff, Fu Hao, alleged that the defendants entered into multiple written agreements pursuant to an overarching commercial plan: the plaintiff would sell a controlling stake in SGL to Zheng Jiabin and his company, Evancarl Ltd, so that Zheng could execute an RTO. In return, the defendants were to procure the transfer of SGL’s subsidiary shares (in Beijing Sino-Lonther International Trading Co Ltd and Shandong Luneng Taishan Mining Co Ltd) and additional SGL shares to the plaintiff, with Zheng personally guaranteeing Evancarl’s procurement obligations.

The High Court (Lee Seiu Kin J) addressed, among other matters, whether the relevant procurement agreements and the deed of guarantee were legally binding and enforceable, and whether the plaintiff could recover damages for breach. The defendants resisted liability by disputing the existence or effect of the overarching agreement, characterising certain transfers as non-performance “in favour” of the plaintiff, and asserting that the Disputed Written Agreements were illegal and therefore void and unenforceable on grounds of statutory illegality and/or common law public policy.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The plaintiff, Fu Hao, was a businessman with a long-running business presence in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He incorporated SL in or around 2005, a trading company dealing in alumina, aluminium products, and bauxite. In or around 2008, he acquired a majority stake in LTM, a PRC company involved in mining, processing, and supplying gypsum. To expand the businesses of SL and LTM by attracting investors from Singapore, he incorporated SGL on 10 March 2010 as a holding company for the PRC subsidiaries. SGL was listed on the Catalist board of the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited (SGX-ST) in July 2012, and the plaintiff remained the beneficial owner of 78.2% of SGL’s ordinary shares. He served as Executive Chairman and Executive Director of SGL until April and July 2014 respectively.

The second defendant, Zheng Jiabin, was also a businessman. He was the sole director and shareholder of Evancarl Ltd, a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. The commercial relationship between the parties culminated in a set of written agreements signed in late January 2014. While the parties agreed that the agreements were signed, the defendants disputed the legal effect of some of them, particularly as to whether they were intended to be performed and whether they formed part of a binding overarching arrangement.

At the centre of the dispute were five written instruments. First, there was a sale and purchase agreement (“1st SPA”) under which the plaintiff sold 45,000,000 SGL shares to Evancarl for S$2,500,000. Second, there was a sale and purchase agreement (“2nd SPA”) under which the plaintiff sold 45,000,000 SGL shares to one Joseph Yeo for S$2,500,000. Third, there was a procurement agreement (“1st Procurement Agreement”) under which Evancarl agreed to procure the transfer of all SGL shares in SL and LTM to the plaintiff, in consideration of the plaintiff entering into the 1st SPA. Fourth, there was a procurement agreement (“2nd Procurement Agreement”) under which Zheng agreed to procure the transfer of 12,226,500 SGL shares to the plaintiff, in consideration of the plaintiff entering into the 1st SPA with Evancarl. Fifth, there was a deed of guarantee and indemnity (“the Deed”) in which Zheng personally guaranteed Evancarl’s procurement obligations under the 1st Procurement Agreement.

Performance timelines and remedies were expressly stipulated. The 1st Procurement Agreement required Evancarl to procure the transfer of the subsidiary shares by 30 April 2015, with further contractual consequences for delay. It contained a liquidated damages clause (“LD clause”) providing that if Evancarl failed to procure the transfer by 30 April 2016, Evancarl would pay S$6,000,000 as agreed liquidated damages. The 2nd Procurement Agreement similarly required transfer by 30 April 2015 and stated that time was of the essence. It further provided that if Zheng repudiated the agreement by failing to complete the transfer by the deadline, the plaintiff’s damages would include, among other things, the actual cost of acquiring the shares in the shortest possible time from the market.

After the agreements were signed, the plaintiff transferred his entire shareholding in a company he controlled (which owned 45,999,900 SGL shares) to one Simson Kwok, and transferred 44,000,100 SGL shares to Joseph Yeo. The plaintiff’s case was that these transfers were made in performance of the sale and purchase agreements and that Simson Kwok and Joseph Yeo were nominees of Zheng. The defendants, however, denied key aspects of this narrative. Zheng denied the existence of the alleged overarching agreement and accepted only that there was a sale and purchase agreement for 45,000,000 SGL shares between him and the plaintiff, and that Simson Kwok was indeed his nominee. Zheng denied that Joseph Yeo was his nominee and claimed that he purchased SGL shares because he believed their value would increase over time rather than because of the broader RTO plan.

Critically, Zheng also argued that although he signed the Disputed Written Agreements, he did so merely as a favour to the plaintiff and that the agreements were not intended to be performed. In addition, he asserted that the Disputed Written Agreements were illegal and therefore void and unenforceable. The plaintiff commenced an action for breach of contract seeking damages arising from the defendants’ alleged failure to procure the transfers contemplated by the procurement agreements and the deed.

The first cluster of issues concerned contractual formation and enforceability. The court had to determine whether the Disputed Written Agreements were intended to be binding and capable of performance, and whether the plaintiff could rely on their terms to establish enforceable obligations. This required the court to assess the parties’ competing accounts: the plaintiff’s position that the procurement agreements and deed were part of a binding structure for the RTO and subsequent transfers, and the defendants’ position that at least some of the agreements were signed without an intention to perform.

The second cluster concerned breach and remedies. Assuming enforceability, the court had to consider whether the defendants failed to procure the relevant transfers within the contractual deadlines, and what damages framework applied. The presence of a liquidated damages clause in the 1st Procurement Agreement and a repudiatory breach/damages measure clause in the 2nd Procurement Agreement meant that the court’s analysis would necessarily engage with how contractual remedies were triggered and calculated.

The third cluster concerned illegality and public policy. Zheng’s defence was that the Disputed Written Agreements were illegal and therefore void and unenforceable. This raised questions of statutory illegality under the Companies Act and, alternatively, illegality at common law as a matter of public policy. The court therefore had to examine whether the agreements were tainted by illegality in a way that engaged the doctrine of voidness, and if so, whether any severance or other remedial approach could preserve enforceability.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

On contractual formation and intention to be bound, the court’s approach would necessarily focus on the objective evidence of the parties’ conduct and the language of the documents. The Disputed Written Agreements were not informal understandings; they were written instruments with detailed obligations, deadlines, and express remedies. The 1st Procurement Agreement set out procurement obligations in terms that required Evancarl to use “all reasonable endeavours” to take actions for completion of transfer formalities, including obtaining waivers, consents, resolutions, authorisations, and regulatory approvals. It also contained a liquidated damages clause that would apply upon non-performance by 30 April 2016. Similarly, the 2nd Procurement Agreement contained a “time is of the essence” clause and a repudiatory breach mechanism, including an express damages measure tied to the cost of acquiring shares from the market.

In assessing the defendants’ “favour” argument, the court would have considered whether a party who signs a deed or agreement with clear operative provisions can later deny intention to perform by asserting subjective motives. Singapore contract law generally treats intention to create legal relations as an objective inquiry, and where parties have executed documents that appear to allocate risk, specify performance, and provide remedies, courts are typically reluctant to accept that the documents were mere gestures. The deed’s language was particularly significant: Zheng undertook “unconditionally and irrevocably” to guarantee Evancarl’s obligations as a “continuing obligation” and as “sole, original and independent obligor.” Such language is inconsistent with a characterisation of the deed as non-binding or purely gratuitous.

On breach and contractual triggers, the court would have examined whether the procurement obligations were performed or whether the defendants failed to procure the transfers by the relevant deadlines. The plaintiff’s case was that the defendants did not perform the obligations under the procurement agreements and deed. The defendants’ case, by contrast, was that the agreements were not intended to be performed and that the plaintiff’s subsequent share transfers were not necessarily evidence of performance obligations by the defendants. Where time is of the essence, and where the contract specifies completion dates, the court’s analysis would focus on whether the contractual conditions for breach were met and whether the contractual remedies were properly triggered.

Regarding illegality, the court had to consider both statutory illegality and common law public policy. The Companies Act reference suggests that the alleged illegality may have involved corporate or securities-related requirements, potentially connected to the RTO structure and/or the manner in which shares and control were to be transferred or held. The doctrine of illegality in Singapore generally renders a contract unenforceable if it is founded on, or involves, conduct that is prohibited by statute or contrary to public policy. The analysis typically requires the court to identify the precise illegality, determine whether it is sufficiently connected to the contract’s formation or performance, and then decide the appropriate legal consequence (voidness, refusal of relief, or sometimes severance depending on the circumstances).

In addition to statutory illegality, the court would have considered common law illegality principles. These principles aim to prevent the court from lending its assistance to a party who seeks to enforce rights arising from wrongdoing. The court would have weighed the policy rationales against the contractual expectations of the parties. Where the illegality is central to the bargain, the court is more likely to refuse enforcement. Where the illegality is peripheral, the court may consider whether the contract can be severed or whether restitutionary or other remedies might still be available. The presence of detailed contractual mechanisms and the plaintiff’s reliance on them would have made the illegality inquiry particularly consequential: if the procurement arrangements were designed to facilitate conduct that the law prohibits, the court would likely treat the agreements as unenforceable.

Finally, the court would have addressed the interaction between the defendants’ factual denials and the legal consequences of illegality. Even if the defendants disputed the overarching agreement and nominee status, the enforceability of the Disputed Written Agreements would turn on whether the agreements were validly formed, intended to be performed, and not tainted by illegality. The court’s reasoning therefore would have proceeded in a structured manner: first, determine whether the agreements were binding; second, determine whether breach occurred and what remedies apply; and third, assess whether illegality bars enforcement.

What Was the Outcome?

Based on the court’s determination of the issues, the High Court ultimately ruled on the enforceability of the Disputed Written Agreements and the plaintiff’s claim for breach. The outcome turned on whether the procurement obligations and the deed of guarantee were legally binding and whether the defendants’ illegality defence succeeded in rendering the agreements void and unenforceable.

Practically, the decision provides guidance on how Singapore courts approach disputes involving complex share transaction structures, especially where parties later attempt to recharacterise executed agreements as non-binding “favour” arrangements or invoke illegality to avoid contractual liability.

Why Does This Case Matter?

Fu Hao v Evancarl Ltd is significant for practitioners dealing with contractual arrangements that are embedded in corporate transactions and capital markets activity. First, it illustrates the evidential and doctrinal weight Singapore courts place on written agreements that contain detailed obligations, deadlines, and remedies. Where parties have executed documents with clear operative terms—particularly deeds with strong guarantee language—courts are likely to treat them as binding unless there is a compelling legal basis to the contrary.

Second, the case highlights the seriousness of illegality and public policy defences in contract litigation. Even where parties have performed parts of a transaction or where the commercial rationale appears plausible, illegality can still bar enforcement if the contract is sufficiently connected to statutory or public policy wrongdoing. For lawyers, this underscores the importance of conducting legality checks at the drafting and execution stage, especially in transactions involving corporate control, share transfers, and RTO-like structures.

Third, the decision is useful for law students and litigators because it demonstrates how courts can integrate multiple strands of analysis—formation, breach, remedies, and illegality—within a single dispute. The presence of liquidated damages and repudiatory breach clauses also makes the case relevant to discussions on contractual risk allocation and the circumstances in which agreed damages mechanisms are triggered.

Legislation Referenced

  • Companies Act (Singapore) (as referenced in the judgment in relation to statutory illegality)

Cases Cited

  • [1997] SGHC 166
  • [2021] SGHC 137

Source Documents

This article analyses [2021] SGHC 137 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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