ED&F Man Capital Markets Limited v STRAITS (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD.

"I granted an injunction against the plaintiff’s use of the documents and information disclosed in OS 533 in proceedings outside of Singapore, but did not grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain the English proceedings against the defendant. No order was made as to costs." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 65

Case Information

• Citation: [2019] SGHC 203 (Title page)
• Court: In the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Title page)
• Date of decision: 29 August 2019; hearing dates: 27, 31 May and 14 June 2019 (Title page)
• Coram: Aedit Abdullah J (Title page)
• Case number: Originating Summons No 533 of 2017 (Summons No 1087 of 2019) (Title page)
• Area of law: Civil Procedure — Injunctions; Civil Procedure — Injunctions — Anti-suit injunctions (Title page)
• Counsel for the plaintiff: Prakash Pillai, Koh Junxiang, Charis Toh Si Ying (Clasis LLC) (Para 65)
• Counsel for the defendant: Toh Kian Sing SC, Ting Yong Hong, Davis Tan Yong Chuan, Wang Yufei (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP) (Para 65)
• Judgment length: The extracted grounds span the title page and paragraphs 1 to 65, with detailed reasoning on pre-action disclosure, the Riddick principle, open justice, and anti-suit injunctions (Title page; Paras 1-65)

Summary

This case concerned a narrow but important question: whether documents and information obtained through Singapore pre-action disclosure could be used in English proceedings, and whether the English proceedings themselves should be restrained by an anti-suit injunction. The court held that the disclosed material could not be used outside Singapore because the statutory power for pre-action disclosure was directed to Singapore proceedings, and using the material elsewhere would be an abuse of process and contrary to the implied undertaking that accompanied the disclosure order. The court, however, refused anti-suit relief because Singapore was not shown to be clearly the natural forum and the defendant had not established vexation or oppression of the kind required for such relief. (Paras 1, 18, 52, 65)

The dispute arose in a commercial fraud context involving warehouse receipts, Hong Kong companies, and a Singapore warehouse company. The plaintiff, an English brokerage and financial services company, first sought information consensually and then obtained pre-action disclosure and interrogatories in Singapore against the defendant. The defendant’s senior vice president filed an affidavit exhibiting documents and information about dealings with the Hong Kong companies. The plaintiff later commenced English proceedings and joined the defendant there, relying on the Singapore-disclosed material. The court treated that use as impermissible outside Singapore, but it did not treat the English proceedings themselves as warranting an anti-suit injunction. (Paras 3-6, 30, 65)

The judgment is also significant for its careful treatment of the Riddick principle, the open-court exception discussed in Dennis Foo, and the relationship between statutory purpose and implied undertaking. The court accepted that the Riddick principle generally prevents use of discovered material for an alien purpose, but it reasoned that the present disclosure was not voluntary in the relevant sense and that the open-court exception did not justify use in foreign proceedings. The court also canvassed the anti-suit injunction authorities, including Kirkham, and concluded that the defendant’s forum arguments were largely neutral. (Paras 22-25, 27, 33, 39-49, 52)

Why Did the Court Hold That the Singapore Pre-Action Disclosure Could Not Be Used in England?

The first issue was whether the plaintiff could use the documents and information disclosed in OS 533 in English proceedings. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had, by pursuing pre-action disclosure in Singapore, represented that substantive proceedings would be brought in Singapore and that the disclosed material would only be used there. The plaintiff resisted that position and argued that there was no such undertaking, that the disclosure was voluntary, and that the Riddick principle did not apply. The court approached the issue by first identifying the statutory source of the disclosure power and then asking whether use outside Singapore would be consistent with that statutory purpose. (Paras 7, 11, 18-20)

"I also accepted the defendant’s argument that as the language of the statute points to the courts being empowered to order pre-action disclosure for the purpose of Singapore proceedings, any use outside that purpose would amount to a disregard of a statutory objective and for that reason would amount to an abuse of the court process." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 18

The court relied on section 18(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and paragraph 12 of the First Schedule, which confer power before or after proceedings are commenced to order discovery of facts or documents. It also referred to the Rules of Court provisions under which the plaintiff had applied for pre-action discovery and interrogatories. Reading those provisions together, the court held that the statutory language pointed to disclosure in aid of Singapore proceedings. It therefore concluded that use of the disclosed material in England would be outside the statutory purpose and, for that reason, an abuse of process. (Paras 4, 18-20)

The court reinforced that conclusion by referring to Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd and Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd v DealStreetAsia Pte Ltd. It noted that “proceedings” in the SCJA, absent contrary language, refers to proceedings in Singapore, and that the applicant need only show a credible Singapore nexus to obtain pre-action disclosure. That framework supported the view that the disclosure jurisdiction is Singapore-centric. The court therefore treated the plaintiff’s later use of the material in England as inconsistent with the limited purpose for which the Singapore court had permitted disclosure. (Paras 17, 20)

"Within the SCJA, the reference to “proceedings” must, in the absence of any other words, be taken to refer to proceedings in Singapore: see Dorsey at [69]." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 20

What Was the Riddick Principle and Why Did It Matter Here?

The court next addressed the Riddick principle, which it described as the rule that a party who obtains discovery may use the documents only for the purposes of that action and no other purpose. The court cited local authorities including Hong Lam Marine, Pertamina Energy Trading, BNX, and Beckkett, and it also referred to the English formulation in Prudential Assurance and the Singapore endorsement of the undertaking-based formulation in Microsoft Corp v SM Summit Holdings. The practical significance of the principle in this case was that it supplied an additional doctrinal basis for preventing the plaintiff from repurposing the disclosed material in England. (Paras 22-25)

"A party who seeks discovery of documents gets it on condition that he will make use of them only for the purposes of that action, and no other purpose." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 23

The court observed that the principle has been explained in Singapore as an implied undertaking imposed by the court, even though the judge expressed reservations about the formulation. The judgment nonetheless accepted that the courts have endorsed that formulation and used it in the grounds. The court’s reasoning was that the plaintiff had obtained access to the material through a court process designed for a specific litigation purpose, and that the plaintiff could not then deploy the same material in a different jurisdiction for a different action. That would undermine the integrity of the disclosure process and the quid pro quo on which such disclosure rests. (Paras 24-25)

The court also emphasized that the Riddick principle applies to documents disclosed under compulsion of court process. It cited Hong Lam Marine for the proposition that compulsion may arise through the rules of court or a specific court order. That mattered because the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s disclosure was voluntary. The court rejected that characterization, reasoning that the affidavit and exhibits were filed to resist the pre-action disclosure application and were therefore not voluntary in the relevant sense. The disclosure was made in the context of a contested application and under the pressure of court process. (Paras 27, 30-33)

"The Court of Appeal in Hong Lam Marine explained at [21] that the Riddick principle applies only to documents disclosed under compulsion of court process, “whether by virtue of the enforcement of the rules of the court or by a specific court order”." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 27

Why Did the Court Reject the Plaintiff’s Argument That the Disclosure Was Voluntary?

The plaintiff’s position was that the defendant had voluntarily exhibited the documents and information, and that the Riddick principle therefore did not apply. The court rejected that submission after examining the affidavit evidence. It focused on the language used by the defendant’s senior vice president, who stated that the information was provided to assist the court and to demonstrate why the application should be dismissed, while expressly reserving the defendant’s position that the plaintiff was not entitled to the information or documents sought. That language showed that the disclosure was made in response to the application and not as a free-standing voluntary waiver of confidentiality. (Paras 11, 30-33)

"In this affidavit, I will begin by providing some background information on the warehouse receipts … Such information is provided to assist the Honourable Court and to demonstrate why the Application should be dismissed. The disclosure is without prejudice to the Defendant’s position that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the information and/or documents sought in the Application, for reasons I will elaborate on below." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 30

The court reasoned that the defendant’s disclosure was made in order to resist the pre-action disclosure application, and that this context brought the material within the protective logic of the Riddick principle. The judge therefore concluded that the disclosure was not voluntary in the sense that would take it outside the principle. This finding was important because it allowed the court to treat the material as subject to the usual restriction on use, rather than as information freely deployable by the plaintiff in any forum. (Paras 30-33)

Having reached that conclusion, the court also noted that the plaintiff’s use of the material in the English proceedings reinforced the need for relief. The plaintiff had commenced English proceedings against the Hong Kong companies and later joined the defendant there, relying on the Singapore-disclosed material. That sequence of events made the misuse concern concrete rather than hypothetical. The court therefore granted a targeted injunction against use outside Singapore. (Paras 6, 33, 65)

"Accordingly, I was not persuaded that the defendant’s disclosures in OS 533 amounted to voluntary use: the documents and information were exhibited and deposed in order to resist the pre-action disclosure application." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 33

How Did the Court Deal With the Dennis Foo Open-Court Exception?

The plaintiff relied on the open-court exception discussed in Dennis Foo Jong Long v Ang Yee Lim and another, where the High Court held that the Riddick principle ceases to apply to a document disclosed during discovery in a prior suit once it has been used in open court. The court examined that exception alongside the principle of open justice and the statutory provision in section 8(1) of the SCJA, which states that court proceedings are open and public. It also cited Tan Chi Min v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc for the proposition that open justice requires judicial decisions to be amenable to public scrutiny through inspection of court documents considered in the decision-making process. (Paras 39-41)

"The High Court in Dennis Foo introduced an exception to the Riddick principle, holding that the principle ceased to apply to a document disclosed during discovery in a prior suit once it has been used in open court (at [54])." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 39

The court, however, expressed doubts about whether the open-court exception could be extended to the present situation. The judge reasoned that the exception in Dennis Foo was tied to the public character of proceedings and the inspection of documents filed in court that were considered in the decision-making process. But the present case involved use of disclosed material in foreign proceedings, not merely public access to Singapore court documents. The court therefore considered the exception to be limited and not a general licence to use disclosed material in unrelated litigation elsewhere. (Paras 39-44)

Ultimately, the court said that even if the precise operation of Dennis Foo was uncertain, it was enough to conclude that the defendant’s disclosure fell within a limited exception to that exception. In other words, the court treated the present disclosure as remaining protected despite the open-court argument. The practical result was that the plaintiff could not rely on the Singapore disclosure to support its English claims. (Paras 41-44)

"I therefore had doubts about the operation of the exception in Dennis Foo. Be that as it may, it was sufficient in the present case to find that the defendant’s disclosure fell within what I perceived to be a limited exception to the Dennis Foo exception to the Riddick principle." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 44

Why Was an Anti-Suit Injunction Refused Even Though the Court Protected the Disclosure Material?

The second issue was whether the court should restrain the English proceedings by an anti-suit injunction. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had represented that substantive proceedings would be in Singapore, that the English proceedings were vexatious and oppressive, and that the court should protect its own process and orders. The plaintiff responded that Singapore was not the more appropriate forum, that the English proceedings were connected to England through the governing law and exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the contracts with the Hong Kong companies, and that the defendant had not shown the level of vexation or oppression required. The court accepted the plaintiff’s position on this issue. (Paras 7, 10, 45-52, 62)

"The Court of Appeal’s guidance on the specific factors relevant to the determination of whether to grant an anti-suit injunction was laid down in John Reginald Stott Kirkham and others v Trane US Inc and others [2009] 4 SLR (R) 428 (“Kirkham”) at [28]–[29]: (a) whether the defendants are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court; (b) the natural forum for resolution of the dispute between the parties; (c) the alleged vexation or oppression to the plaintiffs if the foreign proceedings are to continue; (d) the alleged injustice to the defendants as an injunction would deprive the defendants of the advantages sought in the foreign proceedings; and (e) whether the institution of the foreign proceedings is in breach of any agreement between the parties." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 45

The court applied the Kirkham factors and found that the defendant’s arguments were largely neutral. Singapore was not shown to be clearly the natural forum. The court noted that the claims against the defendant would be governed by Singapore law because Singapore was the lex loci delicti, but it also recognized that the plaintiff’s contracts with the Hong Kong companies contained exclusive jurisdiction clauses and that the English proceedings were tied to those contractual arrangements. The court therefore did not accept that the forum analysis decisively favored Singapore. (Paras 49-52)

The court also held that vexation and oppression were not made out. It referred to the Privy Council’s discussion in Société Nationale Industrielle AeroSpatiale v Lee Kui Jak and another, including the observation that vexation and oppression should not be restricted by definition, and the examples in Peruvian Guano Co v Bockwoldt. It then considered the delay and comity concerns discussed in Sun Travels and Beckkett. Those authorities showed that anti-suit relief is sensitive to the stage of foreign proceedings and the need to avoid wastage of judicial time and costs. On the facts, however, the court was not persuaded that the English proceedings were so oppressive as to justify restraint. (Paras 46-47, 52)

"As the Privy Council noted in the landmark case of Société Nationale Industrielle AeroSpatiale v Lee Kui Jak and another [1987] 1 AC 871 at 893, the notions of vexation and oppression should not be restricted by definition." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 46

How Did the Court Assess the Natural Forum and the Alleged Vexation or Oppression?

On the natural forum question, the court stated that the natural forum is the forum with which the action has the most real and substantial connection. It then considered the factors relied on by the defendant and concluded that they were largely neutral. The court did not find that Singapore was clearly the natural forum. That conclusion was central to the refusal of anti-suit relief because the injunction would have required the court to interfere with proceedings already underway in England without a sufficiently strong forum basis. (Paras 49-52)

"The natural forum is “that with which the action has the most real and substantial connection”: Eng Liat Kiang v Eng Bak Hern [1995] 2 SLR(R) 851 at [19]." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 49

The court also considered the defendant’s reliance on Evergreen International SA v Volkswagen Group Singapore Pte Ltd and others, which was invoked for the proposition that the court should grant an anti-suit injunction to protect its own jurisdiction and to give effect to its orders. The court did not treat that proposition as sufficient on its own to justify relief. Instead, it maintained the distinction between protecting the use of Singapore-disclosed material and restraining foreign proceedings altogether. The former was warranted; the latter was not. (Paras 52, 62)

In practical terms, the court’s analysis meant that the plaintiff could continue the English proceedings, but it could not use the Singapore-disclosed documents and information in those proceedings. That was a tailored response to the misuse concern. The court evidently considered that this narrower remedy addressed the mischief without overreaching into the foreign litigation itself. (Paras 14, 52, 65)

"The mischief or conduct raised could be better and specifically targeted by the injunction against the use of the documents and information disclosed." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 14

What Was the Effect of the Further Arguments and Why Were They Rejected?

After the initial decision, the defendant sought further arguments. The court considered those further submissions but did not change its conclusion. The defendant relied on Evergreen International to argue that the court should protect its own jurisdiction and orders. The court also noted a procedural point: the request for further arguments had been made out of time, because it was made after the order in SUM 1087 had been extracted, contrary to section 28B(1)(a) of the SCJA. Even so, the court addressed the substance and remained unpersuaded. (Paras 62-63)

"the defendant’s request for further arguments pursuant to O 56 r 2 of the ROC read with s 28B of the SCJA had been made out of time: the request for further arguments was made after the order in SUM 1087 was extracted (see s 28B(1)(a) of the SCJA)." — Per Aedit Abdullah J, Para 63

The court’s treatment of the further arguments underscores that the final result was not a tentative one. The judge had already concluded that the disclosure material should be protected from foreign use, but that anti-suit relief was unwarranted. The further arguments did not alter the balance. The court therefore maintained the original order: a use injunction, but no anti-suit injunction, and no order as to costs. (Paras 62-65)

That outcome reflects a careful calibration of remedies. The court protected the integrity of Singapore’s pre-action disclosure process without extending that protection into a broader restraint on foreign litigation. In doing so, it preserved comity while preventing misuse of material obtained from the Singapore court. (Paras 14, 18, 52, 65)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it clarifies that Singapore pre-action disclosure is not a free-standing discovery tool for global litigation strategy. The court treated the statutory power as tied to Singapore proceedings and held that material obtained through that process cannot be repurposed in foreign proceedings. That is a significant practical constraint for litigants who seek pre-action disclosure in Singapore while contemplating litigation elsewhere. (Paras 18-20, 65)

The case also matters because it distinguishes between two different forms of relief. A targeted injunction against use of documents and information is one thing; an anti-suit injunction restraining foreign proceedings is another. The court was willing to grant the former because it directly addressed the misuse of the Singapore disclosure process, but it refused the latter because the forum and oppression requirements were not satisfied. That distinction is likely to be important in future cross-border disputes involving pre-action disclosure. (Paras 14, 45-52, 65)

Finally, the judgment is a useful exposition of the Riddick principle in Singapore law. It shows how the implied undertaking operates, how voluntariness is assessed, and how the open-court exception in Dennis Foo should be understood in context. For practitioners, the case is a reminder that disclosure obtained in one proceeding may carry continuing restrictions even where the material later becomes relevant to litigation elsewhere. (Paras 22-25, 27, 39-44)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed): section 18(2); First Schedule paragraph 12; section 8(1); section 28B(1)(a) (Paras 19, 41, 63)
• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed): Order 24 rule 6; Order 26A rule 1; Order 1 rule 3; Order 1 rule 4; Order 38 rule 2A; Order 38 rules 36 and 37; Order 56 rule 2 (Paras 4, 62-63)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2019] SGHC 203 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.