DNZ v DOA & Anor

"We cannot however accept the State and Professor Hindelang in their conclusion that primacy of EU law applies to defend the autonomy of the EU legal order with respect to general international law including international agreements applicable between EU Member States." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 34

Case Information

• Citation: [2026] SGHC(I) 1 (Para 1)
• Court: Singapore International Commercial Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 1)
• Date: 9 January 2026; heard on 22–24 July and 26 September 2025 (Para 1)
• Coram: Andre Maniam J, Dominique Hascher IJ, Vivian Ramsey IJ (Para 1)
• Case Number: Originating Application No 2 of 2025 (Para 1)
• Area of Law: Arbitration — Award — Recourse against award — Setting aside (Para 1)
• Counsel for the State: Not answerable from the extraction provided (Para 1)
• Counsel for the UK Investors: Not answerable from the extraction provided (Para 1)
• Judgment Length: Not answerable from the extraction provided (Para 1)

Summary

This was an application by the State to set aside an award rendered under the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT Award”). The dispute arose out of an investment in a project company incorporated in the State, in which the UK Direct Holding Company held 72% of the shares, while a State X holding company held 100% of the shares in a parallel investment structure connected to the same project. The tribunal had found the State liable in both the ECT arbitration and a related BIT arbitration, and the ECT Award was calibrated at 72% of the BIT Award amount, with anti-double-recovery protection built in. The court identified five objections raised by the State: an intra-EU jurisdictional objection, a subject-matter objection, a fork-in-the-road objection, public policy, and natural justice. (Paras 2, 8, 9)

"The State raises five objections to the ECT Award: (a) Jurisdictional Objection 1: the Intra-EU Objection; (b) Jurisdictional Objection 2: the Subject-Matter Objection; (c) Jurisdictional Objection 3: the Fork-in-the-Road Objection; (d) breach of public policy; and (e) breach of natural justice." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 9

The central issue addressed in the extracted material was whether the ECT arbitration agreement was governed by EU law or by international law. The court rejected the State’s contention that EU law displaced Article 26 of the ECT in an intra-EU setting. It held that the ECT arbitration agreement was governed by international law, not EU law, and that the primacy of EU law did not operate to defeat the ECT in the manner argued by the State and Professor Hindelang. The court therefore rejected the State’s intra-EU objection and upheld the Tribunal’s jurisdictional approach on that issue. (Paras 25, 34, 35)

"The ECT remains an international treaty. As such, it is governed by international law in the courts of third States, like the SICC, who are not charged with any mission regarding the functioning of the EU legal order under the EU Treaties." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 35

The extracted material also shows that the court engaged with the Tribunal’s treatment of Achmea, Komstroy, the Withdrawal Agreement, the 2019 and 2024 Declarations, and a range of comparative authorities. The court accepted the Tribunal’s view that Achmea was limited to intra-EU BITs and did not extend to the multilateral ECT in the way the State suggested. It also referred to the declaratory nature of preliminary rulings, the autonomy of the EU legal order, and the interpretive rules in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, the excerpt does not include the final orders section, so the ultimate dispositive outcome beyond the rejection of the intra-EU objection is not fully answerable from the supplied text. (Paras 17, 21, 22, 31, 33, 36, 40, 41, 44)

Why Did the State Say the ECT Award Should Be Set Aside?

The State’s application was directed at an award issued under the ECT, and the court recorded that the State advanced five distinct objections. The first and most important was the intra-EU objection: the State contended that Article 26 of the ECT was invalid and/or inapplicable because the dispute was an intra-EU dispute. The State’s position was that EU law governed the arbitration agreement, whether by express choice, implied choice, or as the law with the closest connection, and that EU law therefore displaced the ECT’s investor-state arbitration mechanism in this setting. (Paras 9, 11, 25)

"The State contends that in so far as Art 26 of the ECT provides for investor-state arbitration, it is invalid and/or inapplicable in the present case, because the dispute submitted to arbitration is an “Intra-EU Dispute”" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 11

The court’s analysis shows that the State’s argument was not confined to a bare jurisdictional objection. It was embedded in a broader theory of EU legal autonomy and treaty hierarchy. The State relied on Article 26(6) of the ECT and the Anupam Mittal framework to argue that EU law governed the arbitration agreement. It also invoked the CJEU’s decisions in Achmea and Komstroy, the Withdrawal Agreement, and the 2019 and 2024 Declarations. The court therefore had to address not only the text of the ECT, but also the interaction between the ECT, EU law, and general international law. (Paras 12, 17, 21, 25, 34, 35)

"The State argues that under Art 26(6) of the ECT, EU law applies under the three-stage test in Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] 1 SLR 349 (“Anupam Mittal”) either as an express choice of law to the arbitration agreement or as an implied one" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 25

The court’s response was to reject the premise that EU law governed the arbitration agreement in the way the State suggested. It held that the ECT arbitration agreement was governed by international law, and that EU law did not displace Article 26 of the ECT in this case. In doing so, the court distinguished between the autonomy of the EU legal order within the EU system and the position of a third-state court, such as the SICC, which is not charged with safeguarding the functioning of the EU legal order. That distinction was central to the court’s rejection of the State’s intra-EU objection. (Paras 34, 35, 36, 37)

"We conclude by referring to the Tribunal’s holding (at paras 371–372 of the ECT Award) about the limited scope of the Achmea judgment as applying only to BITs so that it cannot be read as applying equally to multilateral international agreements as the State suggests" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 21

What Were the Key Facts Behind the ECT and BIT Arbitrations?

The extracted facts show a parallel investment and dispute structure. The UK Direct Holding Company owned 72% of the shares in the project company incorporated in the State, and that project company undertook the project in question. The State was a Member State of the European Union. The award under challenge was the ECT Award, issued by a tribunal constituted under the ECT. The amount awarded in the ECT Award was 72% of the amount awarded to the State X Holding Company in the related BIT arbitration, reflecting the respective shareholdings in the project company. (Paras 2, 8)

"The UK Direct Holding Company owned 72% of the shares in a company incorporated in the State (“Project Company”) which undertook the Project in question. The State is a Member State of the European Union (“EU”)." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 2

The court also recorded that the State X Holding Company had commenced BIT arbitration while the UK Investors commenced ECT arbitration the next day. The Tribunal found the State liable in both arbitrations and awarded damages proportionate to the shareholdings, while also including anti-double-recovery protection. The ECT Award was thus not an isolated award; it was part of a coordinated arbitral response to the same underlying investment dispute, with the tribunal taking care to avoid double recovery. (Para 8)

"The amount awarded to the UK Investors in the ECT Award was 72% of the amount awarded to the State X Holding Company in the award issued in the BIT Arbitration3 (“BIT Award”): this was proportionate to their respective shareholdings in the Project Company: the UK Investors had a 72% shareholding, whereas the State X Holding Company had a 100% shareholding." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 8

The extracted material does not provide the full factual matrix of the project, the alleged breaches, or the detailed chronology of the underlying measures. What it does show is enough to explain why the court’s analysis focused so heavily on treaty interpretation and jurisdictional characterisation. The existence of parallel BIT and ECT proceedings, the proportional damages structure, and the anti-double-recovery mechanism all formed part of the context in which the intra-EU objection was advanced and rejected. (Paras 8, 9, 17, 21)

How Did the Court Frame the Main Jurisdictional and Setting-Aside Issues?

The court framed the case as an application to set aside an ECT award on five grounds. The first was the intra-EU objection, which was the principal issue addressed in the extracted material. The second was a subject-matter objection, the third a fork-in-the-road objection, and the remaining two were alleged breaches of public policy and natural justice. The excerpt does not provide the court’s full analysis of the latter four objections, but it does show that the court treated the intra-EU issue as the threshold and most legally significant question. (Para 9)

"The State raises five objections to the ECT Award: (a) Jurisdictional Objection 1: the Intra-EU Objection; (b) Jurisdictional Objection 2: the Subject-Matter Objection; (c) Jurisdictional Objection 3: the Fork-in-the-Road Objection; (d) breach of public policy; and (e) breach of natural justice." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 9

The court’s reasoning on the intra-EU objection was structured around the law governing the arbitration agreement. The State relied on Article 26(6) of the ECT and the Anupam Mittal framework to argue for EU law as the governing law. The court then examined whether Achmea and Komstroy compelled the conclusion that Article 26 could not operate in an intra-EU dispute. It also considered the effect of the Withdrawal Agreement and the temporal position of the relevant CJEU authorities. (Paras 17, 21, 22, 25)

"The Tribunal decided (at paras 369–373) that: (a) Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, CJEU Case C-284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, Judgment (6 March 2018) (“Achmea”),8 a judgement by the CJEU on the incompatibility of arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs with EU law, does not extend to a multilateral treaty such as the ECT" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 17

The court’s analysis also made clear that it was not simply applying EU law as if it were a domestic or transnational choice-of-law rule. Instead, it treated the ECT as an international treaty governed by international law in a third-state court. That framing mattered because it shaped how the court approached the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the role of Article 31, and the relevance of EU law as a possible “rule of international law” under Article 31(3)(c). The court concluded that EU law was not such a relevant rule in the circumstances advanced by the State. (Paras 34, 35, 48)

"Article 31 of the VCLT" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 48

Why Did the Court Reject the State’s Intra-EU Objection?

The court rejected the State’s intra-EU objection because it did not accept the State’s premise that EU law primacy displaced the ECT arbitration agreement in the present setting. The court expressly stated that it could not accept the conclusion advanced by the State and Professor Hindelang that primacy of EU law applied to defend the autonomy of the EU legal order with respect to general international law, including international agreements applicable between EU Member States. This was the core holding on the jurisdictional issue addressed in the excerpt. (Para 34)

"We cannot however accept the State and Professor Hindelang in their conclusion that primacy of EU law applies to defend the autonomy of the EU legal order with respect to general international law including international agreements applicable between EU Member States." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 34

The court further reasoned that the ECT remained an international treaty and that, in a third-state court such as the SICC, the treaty was governed by international law. The court emphasised that such a court is not tasked with ensuring the functioning of the EU legal order under the EU Treaties. That distinction allowed the court to reject the State’s attempt to transpose EU-law autonomy principles into the setting of a Singapore court reviewing an ECT award. (Para 35)

"The ECT remains an international treaty. As such, it is governed by international law in the courts of third States, like the SICC, who are not charged with any mission regarding the functioning of the EU legal order under the EU Treaties." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 35

The court also relied on comparative authority, including Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v Kingdom of Spain, to support the proposition that EU law does not trump international law in the interplay between treaties. It referred to Costa v ENEL to explain the EU legal order and primacy within that system, but distinguished that internal EU principle from the position of a third-state court dealing with an international treaty. The court’s reasoning therefore proceeded by separating the internal constitutional logic of EU law from the external public international law framework governing the ECT. (Paras 36, 37)

"EU law does not trump international law on the interplay between treaties" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 36

How Did the Court Treat Achmea, Komstroy, and the Withdrawal Agreement?

The court treated Achmea as limited to intra-EU BITs. It accepted the Tribunal’s conclusion that Achmea did not extend to a multilateral treaty such as the ECT. The court’s own summary of the Tribunal’s reasoning shows that the Tribunal had expressly distinguished the ECT from BITs and had concluded that the Achmea judgment could not be read as applying equally to multilateral international agreements. That distinction was central to the rejection of the State’s attempt to use Achmea as a broad invalidating principle. (Paras 17, 21)

"the reasoning in the Achmea judgment was limited to dispute resolution provisions contained in BITs between EU Member states." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 21

The court also addressed Komstroy, but the excerpt indicates that the court did not accept the State’s reliance on it in the way urged. The extracted material records that the Tribunal considered Komstroy and that the State argued about its effect, but the court’s reasoning emphasised the temporal and contextual limits of relying on that judgment. In particular, the excerpt notes that Komstroy was said not to apply in the circumstances because it was issued after the expiry of the Transition Period. The court also referred to the declaratory nature of preliminary rulings and their ex tunc effect, but the excerpt does not provide a fuller analysis beyond that. (Paras 17, 22)

"the Komstroy judgment … does not apply in the circumstances as it was issued after the expiry of the Transition Period." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 17

The Withdrawal Agreement was part of the legal context because the State relied on it in support of the intra-EU objection. The excerpt shows that the court considered provisions including Articles 89(1), 127(1), 127(3), 131, 86, 87, and 4(5). However, the supplied material does not reproduce the court’s full reasoning on each of those provisions. What can be said from the excerpt is that the court did not accept that the Withdrawal Agreement altered the conclusion that the ECT arbitration agreement remained governed by international law in the SICC. (Para 6)

"preliminary rulings are of a declaratory nature and take effect from the date on which the rule interpreted entered into force" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 22

What Law Governed the ECT Arbitration Agreement?

The court’s analysis of the governing law of the arbitration agreement was anchored in the Anupam Mittal framework. The State argued that Article 26(6) of the ECT led to EU law applying either as an express choice of law or as an implied choice of law. The court did not accept that submission. Instead, it held that the arbitration agreement was governed by international law, and that EU law did not displace Article 26 of the ECT in the circumstances of this case. (Paras 25, 34, 35)

"The State argues that under Art 26(6) of the ECT, EU law applies under the three-stage test in Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] 1 SLR 349 (“Anupam Mittal”) either as an express choice of law to the arbitration agreement or as an implied one" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 25

The court’s reasoning also engaged with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It considered whether EU law could be treated as a relevant rule of international law for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c), but the excerpt indicates that the court concluded it was not relevant in the way the State contended. The court’s approach was therefore not to deny the relevance of treaty interpretation rules, but to insist that those rules did not produce the result the State sought. (Paras 35, 48)

"Article 31 of the VCLT" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 48

The court also referred to Article 26(6) of the ECT itself, which the State relied on as the gateway to EU law. The excerpt does not reproduce the full text of Article 26(6), but it does show that the court was required to interpret the ECT as a treaty under international law, rather than as an instrument subordinated to EU law in a third-state court. That interpretive choice was decisive in rejecting the State’s jurisdictional objection. (Paras 12, 25, 35)

"Article 26(1) to (3) of the ECT read as follows: (1) Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 12

How Did the Court Use the Tribunal’s Own Reasoning?

The court placed weight on the Tribunal’s own treatment of Achmea and related authorities. The excerpt records that the Tribunal decided Achmea did not extend to a multilateral treaty such as the ECT. The court referred to that reasoning approvingly when summarising the Tribunal’s analysis, and it concluded by referring to the Tribunal’s holding that Achmea was limited to BITs and could not be read as applying equally to multilateral international agreements. This shows that the court did not treat the Tribunal’s reasoning as merely background; it treated it as a substantive part of the jurisdictional analysis. (Paras 17, 21)

"the Tribunal decided (at paras 369–373) that: (a) Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, CJEU Case C-284/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, Judgment (6 March 2018) (“Achmea”),8 a judgement by the CJEU on the incompatibility of arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs with EU law, does not extend to a multilateral treaty such as the ECT" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 17

The Tribunal’s reasoning was also relevant because it had considered the legal effect of the CJEU authorities and the relationship between the ECT and EU law. The court’s summary indicates that the Tribunal had addressed the limited scope of Achmea and the non-extension of that reasoning to the ECT. The court’s own conclusion aligned with that approach, reinforcing the view that the ECT’s multilateral character mattered for the jurisdictional analysis. (Paras 17, 21, 41, 44)

"We conclude by referring to the Tribunal’s holding (at paras 371–372 of the ECT Award) about the limited scope of the Achmea judgment as applying only to BITs so that it cannot be read as applying equally to multilateral international agreements as the State suggests" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 21

The court also considered comparative arbitral and judicial decisions that supported the multilateral character of the ECT and the inapplicability of the intra-EU objection. These included Infrastructure Services Luxembourg and Landesbank Baden-Württemberg. The court used those authorities to reinforce the proposition that the ECT does not become bilateral merely because the dispute is between two parties, and that the treaty’s obligations run among all Contracting Parties. (Paras 40, 41)

"the mechanism within the ECT for resolving disputes does not make it a bilateral treaty" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 40

What Role Did EU Autonomy and Primacy Play in the Court’s Reasoning?

The State’s argument depended heavily on the autonomy and primacy of EU law. The court acknowledged the existence of those doctrines within the EU legal order, but it refused to extend them to defeat the ECT in a third-state court. It cited authorities such as Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Opinion 1/91, Simmenthal, Exportur, and Kadi in the course of discussing the autonomy of the EU legal order. Yet the court’s key point was that those authorities did not answer the question before it, because the SICC is not part of the EU judicial system and is not charged with protecting the functioning of that system. (Paras 33, 34, 35)

"Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by [EU] law." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 33

The court also drew a distinction between primacy within the EU legal order and primacy at the level of general international law. It rejected the proposition that EU law’s internal primacy could be used to invalidate or displace an international treaty obligation in a third-state court. That distinction was critical to the court’s treatment of the State’s reliance on EU law as a supposed rule of international law under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. (Paras 34, 35, 48)

"By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 37

The court’s use of Kadi is also significant. The excerpt records that Kadi was cited for the proposition that the European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers. That citation supports the court’s broader point that EU autonomy does not mean EU law automatically overrides general international law in every external setting. The court’s reasoning therefore preserved the distinction between internal EU constitutional doctrine and external treaty relations. (Para 34)

"the European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 34

How Did the Court Deal With the Multilateral Character of the ECT?

The multilateral character of the ECT was central to the court’s rejection of the State’s attempt to analogise the ECT to a bilateral investment treaty. The court referred to Infrastructure Services Luxembourg, where it was said that the dispute-resolution mechanism within the ECT does not make it a bilateral treaty. It also referred to Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, which emphasised that the ECT, as a multilateral treaty, involves obligations by each Contracting Party towards all other Contracting Parties. These authorities supported the conclusion that the ECT could not be collapsed into a bilateral relationship simply because the dispute involved an EU Member State and UK investors. (Paras 40, 41)

"the ECT, as a multilateral treaty, involves obligations by each Contracting Party towards all other Contracting Parties" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 41

The court further referred to the absence of a disconnection clause. In RREEF Infrastructure, the proposition was stated that absent such a clause in a multilateral treaty, it is intended to be integrally applied by the EU and its Member States. The court used that authority in the course of addressing the State’s argument, but the excerpt does not provide a fuller exposition of how the court weighed that proposition against the State’s position. What is clear is that the multilateral structure of the ECT was treated as a reason not to read Achmea as automatically invalidating Article 26 in this context. (Para 44)

"Absent such a clause in a multilateral treaty, it is intended to be integrally applied by the EU and its Member States." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 44

The court also noted that the State relied on Green Power Partners as an example of a tribunal upholding the intra-EU objection, but the excerpt does not show the court adopting that reasoning. Instead, the court’s own analysis moved in the opposite direction, emphasising the treaty’s multilateral nature and the limits of Achmea. The result was a rejection of the State’s attempt to recharacterise the ECT as if it were a bilateral treaty for jurisdictional purposes. (Para 31)

"the question of the seat is irrelevant for considering the law of the arbitration agreement" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 31

What Did the Court Say About Article 16 of the ECT and More Favourable Treatment?

The extracted material shows that Article 16 of the ECT was part of the legal provisions discussed, and that the court considered authorities relating to the “more favourable treatment” argument. The cases listed in the extraction include Sevilla Beheer, NextEra, BayWa re, RENERGY, and 9REN, all cited in relation to Article 16. However, the excerpt does not reproduce the court’s full reasoning on Article 16, nor does it set out a final holding on that issue. Accordingly, only the fact that Article 16 and the related authorities were discussed can be stated with confidence from the supplied text. (Paras 6, 47)

"the application of international law for finding whether a valid offer to arbitration could be made" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 26

The State also relied on ESPF Beteiligungs and Encavis in relation to the more favourable regime argument. Again, the excerpt does not provide the court’s detailed treatment of those authorities, but it does show that the court was working through a broader matrix of ECT jurisprudence on the relationship between Article 16 and intra-EU objections. The presence of these authorities in the extracted material indicates that the court’s analysis was not confined to a single doctrinal point, even though the excerpt only fully reproduces the intra-EU reasoning. (Para 49)

"cited on the more favourable regime argument" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 49

Because the supplied text does not include the court’s complete analysis of Article 16, it would be unsafe to infer a definitive holding on that provision beyond its relevance to the broader jurisdictional debate. The only secure conclusion from the excerpt is that Article 16 formed part of the legal landscape considered by the court, alongside Article 26 and the VCLT. (Paras 6, 48, 49)

What Is the Practical Significance of the Court’s Treatment of EU Law and International Law?

The practical significance of the case lies in its treatment of the relationship between EU law and international arbitration in a third-state court. The court’s reasoning makes clear that a Singapore court reviewing an ECT award will approach the treaty as an international instrument governed by international law, not as an instrument automatically subordinated to EU constitutional doctrine. That has obvious implications for future attempts to resist enforcement or set aside awards on the basis of intra-EU objections in non-EU fora. (Paras 34, 35)

"The ECT remains an international treaty. As such, it is governed by international law in the courts of third States, like the SICC, who are not charged with any mission regarding the functioning of the EU legal order under the EU Treaties." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 35

The case also matters because it clarifies how a court may distinguish between BIT jurisprudence and the ECT’s multilateral structure. By accepting that Achmea was limited to BITs and by refusing to extend that reasoning automatically to the ECT, the court preserved the distinct legal character of multilateral investment treaties. That distinction is likely to be important in future disputes involving EU Member States, UK investors, and post-Brexit treaty relations. (Paras 17, 21, 40, 41)

"the reasoning in the Achmea judgment was limited to dispute resolution provisions contained in BITs between EU Member states." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 21

Finally, the case is significant for its method. The court did not simply announce a conclusion; it worked through treaty text, the VCLT, EU case law, comparative arbitral decisions, and the tribunal’s own reasoning. That makes the judgment a useful reference point for practitioners dealing with setting-aside applications involving overlapping treaty regimes and competing claims of legal primacy. (Paras 12, 22, 25, 31, 33, 34, 35, 40, 41, 44, 48)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Energy Charter Treaty: Articles 2, 10, 13, 16, 25, 26, 30, 36, 39, 41, 42, 46 (Paras 6, 12, 25, 26, 47, 49)
• Treaty on European Union: Article 19(3) (Para 6)
• Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: Articles 267 and 344 (Para 6)
• Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Articles 30, 31, 41 (Paras 6, 48)
• Withdrawal Agreement: Articles 4(5), 86, 87, 89(1), 127(1), 127(3), 131 (Para 6)
• UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Article 16 (Para 6)
• International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed) (Para 6)

What Does This Case Mean for Future ECT Challenges in Singapore?

This case is important because it signals that a Singapore court will not automatically import EU constitutional doctrines into the review of an ECT award. The court’s approach suggests that, where an ECT arbitration is challenged in Singapore, the starting point will be the treaty as an international instrument and the applicable rules of international law, not the internal primacy doctrine of EU law. That has practical consequences for setting-aside applications based on intra-EU objections. (Paras 34, 35)

"The ECT remains an international treaty. As such, it is governed by international law in the courts of third States, like the SICC, who are not charged with any mission regarding the functioning of the EU legal order under the EU Treaties." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 35

It also matters because the court’s reasoning preserves the distinction between BIT jurisprudence and the ECT’s multilateral architecture. Practitioners dealing with ECT awards should therefore expect courts to scrutinise attempts to transpose Achmea-style reasoning onto the ECT, especially where the treaty text, the VCLT, and the multilateral structure point in the opposite direction. The case is thus a significant reference point for treaty interpretation, jurisdictional objections, and the interaction between arbitral awards and foreign public law systems. (Paras 17, 21, 40, 41, 44)

"the mechanism within the ECT for resolving disputes does not make it a bilateral treaty" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 40

Finally, the case underscores the importance of careful issue-framing in setting-aside proceedings. The State raised five objections, but the excerpt shows that the intra-EU objection was the doctrinal centrepiece. Future litigants will likely focus on the same cluster of issues: governing law of the arbitration agreement, the effect of CJEU judgments, the role of the Withdrawal Agreement, and the extent to which a third-state court should defer to EU autonomy arguments. (Paras 9, 25, 34, 35)

"The State raises five objections to the ECT Award: (a) Jurisdictional Objection 1: the Intra-EU Objection; (b) Jurisdictional Objection 2: the Subject-Matter Objection; (c) Jurisdictional Objection 3: the Fork-in-the-Road Objection; (d) breach of public policy; and (e) breach of natural justice." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 9

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "Joint judgment of Andre Maniam J,..."

This article analyses [2026] SGHCI 1 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.