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DEBENHO PTE LTD & Anor v ENVY GLOBAL TRADING PTE. LTD. & Anor

that there was little risk of a multiplicity of proceedings to justify a stay. This was because the plaintiffs had confirmed that they would not be applying for leave to continue 42 Ng’s 1st Affidavit at para 17(b). 43 PWS at para 6(c). Version No 1: 14 Jan 2022 (11:33 hrs) Debenho Pte Ltd v

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"Accordingly, in my view, it will not suffice for the defendant, in seeking a stay of the civil action to merely point to some advantage which the Prosecution will enjoy in the criminal proceedings if the civil action is not stayed." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 62

Case Information

  • Citation: [2022] SGHC 7 (Para 0)
  • Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
  • Date of Judgment: 14 January 2022; hearing on 26 October 2021 (Para 0)
  • Coram: Ang Cheng Hock J (Para 0)
  • Case Number: Suit No 307 of 2021 (Registrar’s Appeal No 246 of 2021) (Para 0)
  • Area of Law: Civil Procedure — Stay of proceedings (Para 0)
  • Counsel: Not fully answerable from the extraction provided; the names of counsel are not expressly stated in the text shown (Para 0)
  • Judgment Length: Not answerable from the extraction provided (Para 0)

Summary

This registrar’s appeal concerned whether a civil suit brought by Debenho Pte Ltd and another against Envy Global Trading Pte Ltd and Mr Ng should be stayed while related criminal proceedings against Mr Ng were pending. The dispute arose out of a nickel trading investment scheme, and the court was asked to consider both the overlap between the civil claims and the criminal charges and the risk of prejudice to Mr Ng if the civil action continued. The court ultimately refused to stay the suit, holding that the defendant had not shown a real danger of prejudice in the criminal proceedings and that the mere possibility of some advantage to the Prosecution was not enough. (Para 11, Para 17, Para 27, Para 62)

The court also dealt with the position of EGT, noting that the plaintiffs had confirmed they would not proceed against EGT without first obtaining leave of court, because the suit against EGT had already been stayed. On that basis, the court concluded that a case-management stay was unnecessary and directed the plaintiffs to discontinue their action against EGT and amend the statement of claim accordingly. The judgment therefore resolved both the procedural management of the civil action and the interaction between civil litigation and parallel criminal proceedings. (Para 15, Para 30, Para 32)

At a broader level, the judgment restated the governing principle that a stay is not granted merely because the civil case may assist the Prosecution in the criminal case. The defendant must show a real danger that continuation of the civil proceedings will cause injustice in the criminal proceedings, and the court must balance that against the plaintiff’s ordinary entitlement to have its claim heard. The court also examined the scope of the right of silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, explaining why those doctrines did not justify an automatic stay on the facts before it. (Para 34, Para 35, Para 67, Para 70)

What Was the Commercial and Factual Background Behind the Stay Application?

The dispute arose from a nickel trading investment scheme that was said to have operated first through EAM and later through EGT. The plaintiffs entered into five contracts between November 2020 and January 2021, and the court recorded that they collectively paid $20,108,944.95 as purchase prices under those contracts. The plaintiffs’ pleaded case was that they had been induced by representations said to have been made by Mr Ng, and they sought recovery of the sums paid and related profits. (Para 7, Para 11)

"In total, the plaintiffs collectively paid $20,108,944.95 as the purchase prices under the Contracts to EGT." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 7

The court accepted the factual significance of the IJM Report, which stated that the nickel trading investment scheme was a complete fiction and that EAM and EGT never made any purchase of nickel from any sellers, nor entered into any transaction for the sale of nickel to any buyers like Raffemet. The judgment further noted that, on the evidence before the court, the Corresponding Contracts never existed. That factual premise was important because the plaintiffs’ allegations against Mr Ng were tied to representations said to have been made in relation to those non-existent Corresponding Contracts. (Para 14)

"The IJM Report stated that the nickel trading investment scheme was a complete fiction as EAM and EGT never made any purchase of nickel from any sellers, nor did they enter into any transaction for the sale of nickel to any buyers like Raffemet." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 14

The procedural posture also mattered. The plaintiffs commenced the present suit on 31 March 2021 and made claims against EGT and, in the alternative, against Mr Ng. By the time of the appeal, the suit as against EGT had already been stayed since 27 April 2021, and the plaintiffs were no longer able to pursue claims against EGT without first obtaining leave of court. The court treated that procedural history as central to whether any further stay was needed. (Para 11, Para 15)

"The plaintiffs commenced the present suit on 31 March 2021 and made claims against EGT and, in the alternative, against Mr Ng." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 11
"The suit as against EGT has been stayed since 27 April 2021, and the plaintiffs are no longer able to pursue their claims in the suit against EGT without first obtaining leave of court to do so." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 15

What Criminal Charges Were Pending Against Mr Ng, and Why Did They Matter to the Stay Application?

Mr Ng faced a total of 70 criminal charges at the time of the hearing. The judgment specifically identified two cheating charges as the ones most relevant to the stay application: the 16th charge and the 17th charge. Those charges alleged that Mr Ng deceived Mr Low and Debenho into believing they were purchasing a portion of receivables that EGT was to receive from Raffemet under the Corresponding Contracts, when he knew that to be false. The alleged deception was said to have induced the plaintiffs to enter into the contracts and pay the purchase prices. (Para 17)

"At the time of the hearing before me, Mr Ng faced a total of 70 criminal charges." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 17
"Two of these cheating charges allege that Mr Ng had cheated Mr Low (the 16th charge) and Debenho (the 17th charge) (collectively “the Charges”) by deceiving them into believing that they were purchasing a portion of the receivables which EGT was to receive from Raffemet under the Corresponding Contracts, a fact which Mr Ng knew to be false, and which induced Mr Low and Debenho to enter into the Contracts and pay the purchase prices, which they otherwise would not have done had they not been so deceived." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 17

The criminal proceedings mattered because the civil suit and the criminal charges arose from the same factual matrix. The court therefore had to decide whether allowing the civil suit to continue would create a real danger of prejudice to Mr Ng in the criminal case. The judgment framed the issue not as whether there was overlap in the facts, but whether that overlap justified a stay under the governing legal principles. (Para 17, Para 27, Para 35)

How Did the Court Frame the Issues on the Registrar’s Appeal?

The court identified two main issues only. First, it asked whether the suit should be stayed until any application by the plaintiffs to proceed with their claims against EGT had been determined. Second, it asked whether the suit should be stayed until the final determination of the criminal proceedings, including any appeals arising from them. That framing controlled the structure of the judgment and the sequence in which the court addressed the arguments. (Para 27)

"There are thus two main issues in the Registrar’s Appeal: (a) whether the suit should be stayed until any application by the plaintiffs to proceed with their claims against EGT has been determined; and/or (b) whether the suit should be stayed until the final determination of the Criminal Proceedings, including any appeals arising therefrom." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 27

The first issue was essentially a case-management question. The court had to decide whether the continued presence of EGT in the suit created a sufficient procedural reason to halt the action. The second issue was the more substantial one: whether the continuation of the civil proceedings would impermissibly interfere with Mr Ng’s position in the criminal proceedings. The court treated those as distinct inquiries, even though both arose from the same litigation background. (Para 27, Para 30, Para 34)

Why Did the Court Refuse a Case-Management Stay Pending Any Application Against EGT?

The court held that a case-management stay ought not to be granted. It gave two reasons. First, the proper ventilation of the issues in the plaintiffs’ claim against Mr Ng did not depend on the resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim against EGT. Second, the plaintiffs had confirmed that they would not proceed against EGT, so there was no realistic need to hold the entire suit in abeyance while waiting for some future application. The court therefore treated the overlap with EGT as insufficient to justify a stay. (Para 30, Para 31)

"I find that a case management stay ought not be granted for two reasons. First, this is not a case where the proper ventilation of issues in the plaintiffs’ claim against Mr Ng is dependent on the resolution of the plaintiffs’ claim against EGT." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 30

The court’s reasoning was also shaped by the procedural reality that the suit against EGT had already been stayed. Because the plaintiffs could not proceed against EGT without leave, and because they had indicated they would not do so, the court saw no practical utility in keeping the whole action suspended on that basis. The court therefore directed the plaintiffs to discontinue their action against EGT and amend the statement of claim accordingly. That order removed the procedural uncertainty and narrowed the litigation to the claims that remained live. (Para 15, Para 32)

"Hence, I hereby direct the plaintiffs to take steps to discontinue their action against EGT and amend their statement of claim accordingly." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 32

In substance, the court treated the EGT issue as one of case management rather than one of substantive prejudice. The fact that the claims against EGT and Mr Ng arose from the same background facts did not mean that the plaintiffs’ case against Mr Ng could not be properly tried on its own. The court’s approach shows that overlap alone is not enough; there must be some real procedural necessity for a stay, and that necessity was absent here. (Para 30, Para 32)

What Was the Governing Test for Staying Civil Proceedings Because of Parallel Criminal Proceedings?

The court set out the governing principle in clear terms: the burden lies on the defendant to show a real danger that continuation of the civil action will result in injustice in the criminal proceedings, such that it is just and convenient to interfere with the plaintiff’s ordinary right to have the claim heard. The court also stressed that notional dangers are insufficient. This was the central legal standard applied to Mr Ng’s application. (Para 35)

"The burden is on the defendant to show that there is a real danger that the continuance of the civil action against him will result in injustice in the criminal proceedings, so that it is just and convenient that the plaintiff’s ordinary rights of having his claim heard and decided are interfered with." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 35
"It will not suffice for the defendant to merely point to notional dangers." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 35

The court also explained that the stay question requires a balancing exercise. On one side is the defendant’s right of silence in the criminal proceedings and the risk of prejudice if the civil case continues. On the other side is the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to proceed in the ordinary course of the court’s business. The court’s task is to decide whether the balance of justice requires a stay, not whether the civil and criminal proceedings are merely related. (Para 34, Para 35)

"The court may stay the civil proceedings if it is of the view that the balance of justice so requires, having regard to the concurrent criminal proceedings and taking into account the defendant’s right of silence which he enjoys in those proceedings, as well as after due consideration of the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to have his action proceed in the ordinary course of procedure and business of the court." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 34

That formulation mattered because it rejected any automatic rule of suspension. The court did not accept that the mere existence of criminal charges, even serious ones, automatically displaces the civil plaintiff’s right to proceed. Instead, the defendant must demonstrate a concrete and real risk of injustice. The judgment then applied that test to the specific arguments advanced by Mr Ng. (Para 34, Para 35)

Why Did the Court Reject Mr Ng’s Argument That the Civil Suit Would Prejudice the Criminal Proceedings?

Mr Ng argued that he would suffer a real danger of prejudice if the civil suit continued, because he would be required to file affidavits in opposition to any summary judgment application and to provide affidavits of evidence-in-chief in the suit. The court rejected that submission. It held that requiring him to defend the civil action did not, by itself, undermine his privilege against self-incrimination or justify a stay. The court’s reasoning was that the privilege does not translate into a right to halt civil proceedings whenever a defendant faces parallel criminal exposure. (Para 67)

"I reject Mr Ng’s submission that requiring him to file affidavits in opposition to any summary judgment proceedings, or affidavits of evidence-in-chief in the suit, will undermine his privilege against self-incrimination and therefore constitute a sufficient reason for the suit to be stayed." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 67

The court also rejected the broader proposition that any advantage to the Prosecution would amount to a real danger of prejudice. It held that the possibility that the Prosecution might gain some tactical benefit from the civil proceedings was not enough. The defendant had to show more than a speculative or abstract disadvantage. The court therefore refused to treat the mere existence of overlap as a sufficient basis for a stay. (Para 62, Para 70)

"I also do not accept Mr Ng’s submission that any advantage which might accrue to the Prosecution if he were required to defend the suit would constitute a real danger of prejudice to him in the Criminal Proceedings and so justify a stay of the suit." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 70

The court’s analysis was anchored in the distinction between a tactical advantage to the Prosecution and actual injustice to the accused. That distinction was decisive. The judgment makes clear that the civil court does not stay proceedings merely because the Prosecution may benefit from the defendant’s civil pleadings or evidence. The defendant must show that continuation of the civil case would create a real danger of injustice in the criminal proceedings, and that threshold was not met. (Para 62, Para 67, Para 70)

How Did the Court Deal with the Right of Silence and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?

The court considered the right of silence and the privilege against self-incrimination in some detail. It referred to the established categories of the right of silence and to the scope of the privilege in civil proceedings. The judgment explained that the privilege protects a person from being compelled to answer questions that may incriminate him, but it does not create an automatic entitlement to stay a civil suit. The court’s treatment of these doctrines was therefore careful and limited to the stay context. (Para 39, Para 47, Para 67)

"Sections 134(1)‒(2) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (“the Evidence Act”) provide as follows: Witness not excused from answering on ground that answer will criminate 134.—(1) A witness is not excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit, or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or may tend, directly or indirectly, to criminate, such witness, or that it will expose, or tend, directly or indirectly, to expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind, or that it will establish or tend to establish that the witness owes a debt or is otherwise subject to a civil suit at the instance of the Government or of any other person." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 47

The court also referred to the statutory and doctrinal framework governing the privilege, including the Evidence Act and the Criminal Procedure Code. It noted that the privilege against self-incrimination is not absolute in the sense suggested by Mr Ng’s argument. The court’s reasoning was that civil litigation often requires a defendant to take positions and file evidence, but that does not automatically amount to compulsion of the kind that justifies a stay. (Para 47, Para 71)

"s 165(1) of the CPC" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 71

In practical terms, the court rejected the idea that the need to defend the civil suit would force Mr Ng to choose between silence and self-protection in a way that required the civil action to be frozen. The judgment instead treated the privilege as one factor in the balancing exercise, not as a trump card. That approach is consistent with the court’s repeated insistence that the defendant must show a real danger of injustice, not merely a theoretical or tactical concern. (Para 34, Para 35, Para 67, Para 70)

What Did the Court Say About the Relationship Between the Civil Pleadings and the Criminal Charges?

The court noted that Mr Ng had already filed his defence, and the gist of that defence was that the plaintiffs dealt with one Jordan Chua, not with him, in relation to the contracts, and that he was not responsible for making the representations. That fact was relevant because it showed that the civil proceedings had already advanced to a stage where the defendant’s position was on record. The court did not accept that this alone created a sufficient risk of prejudice to justify a stay. (Para 66)

"Mr Ng has already filed his defence, the gist of which is that the plaintiffs dealt with one Jordan Chua (and not him) in relation to the Contracts and that he was not responsible for making the Representations" — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 66

The court’s treatment of the pleadings also reflected its view that the civil and criminal proceedings, though factually related, were not legally identical. The civil suit concerned the plaintiffs’ claims for repayment and related relief, while the criminal proceedings concerned charges of cheating, forgery, and fraudulent trading. The overlap in background facts did not mean that the civil suit had to be stayed. The court therefore focused on whether the continuation of the civil action would create a real danger of injustice in the criminal case, and it concluded that it would not. (Para 16, Para 17, Para 35, Para 70)

That conclusion was reinforced by the court’s rejection of the argument that the Prosecution’s potential advantage was enough. The court made clear that the defendant’s burden is not discharged by showing that the civil case may produce material useful to the criminal prosecution. The question is whether the defendant has shown a real danger of prejudice amounting to injustice, and the court found that he had not. (Para 62, Para 70)

How Did the Court Use the Authorities on Stays, Silence, and Self-Incrimination?

The judgment surveyed a range of authorities on stays of civil proceedings in the face of parallel criminal proceedings. It referred to older authorities such as Smith and wife v Selwyn, Wells v Abrahams, and Velstra Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Dexia Bank Belgium, as well as modern authorities including McMahon v Gould, Panton and others v Financial Institutions Services Ltd, Jefferson Ltd v Bhetcha, and others. These authorities were used to explain the evolution from older, more rigid approaches to a modern discretionary balancing exercise. (Para 34, Para 35, Para 39)

"The court may stay the civil proceedings if it is of the view that the balance of justice so requires, having regard to the concurrent criminal proceedings and taking into account the defendant’s right of silence which he enjoys in those proceedings, as well as after due consideration of the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to have his action proceed in the ordinary course of procedure and business of the court." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 34

The court also referred to authorities on the privilege against self-incrimination, including Law Society of Singapore v Shanmugam Manohar, Riedel-de-Haen AG v Liew Keng Pang, Reid v Howard and others, VTFL v Clough DIG, and Cameron’s Unit Services Pty Ltd v Kevin R Whelpton Associates (Australia) Pty Ltd and another. Those authorities were used to support the proposition that the privilege has a defined scope and does not automatically entitle a defendant to halt civil proceedings. (Para 47, Para 67)

In addition, the court referred to cases such as State of Queensland v Shaw, Craig Robert White v Australian Securities and Investments Commission and others, Winters v Fogarty (No 2), Qing Zhao and another v The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Burgess, McLachlan v Browne (No 9), and Re AWB Ltd (No 1). These were used to illustrate how courts have approached the question of real danger, notional disadvantage, and the circumstances in which a stay may or may not be justified. (Para 70)

Why Did the Court Conclude That the Plaintiffs Should Discontinue Their Action Against EGT?

The court concluded that the plaintiffs should discontinue their action against EGT because the suit against EGT had already been stayed and the plaintiffs had indicated that they would not proceed against EGT without leave. In those circumstances, the continued presence of EGT in the pleadings served no useful purpose and risked unnecessary procedural complexity. The court therefore directed discontinuance and amendment of the statement of claim. (Para 15, Para 32)

"The suit as against EGT has been stayed since 27 April 2021, and the plaintiffs are no longer able to pursue their claims in the suit against EGT without first obtaining leave of court to do so." — Per Ang Cheng Hock J, Para 15

The direction to discontinue was not a merits determination against the plaintiffs. Rather, it was a procedural clean-up measure consistent with the court’s conclusion that the claims against EGT were no longer being actively pursued. By narrowing the suit to the live controversy, the court removed the basis for any argument that the action should remain suspended pending some future step against EGT. (Para 30, Para 32)

This aspect of the judgment is important because it shows that a court dealing with a stay application may also make case-management orders to align the pleadings with the actual posture of the litigation. The court did not merely refuse the stay; it also ensured that the record reflected the plaintiffs’ position regarding EGT. (Para 32)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it clarifies the threshold for staying civil proceedings in Singapore when there are parallel criminal proceedings. The judgment confirms that overlap between civil and criminal matters is not enough. The defendant must show a real danger of injustice, and the court will not grant a stay merely because the Prosecution may gain some advantage from the civil case. That principle is likely to be important in future cases where defendants seek to pause civil claims on the basis of pending criminal charges. (Para 34, Para 35, Para 62, Para 70)

The case is also significant for its treatment of the right of silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. The court made clear that those doctrines do not automatically entitle a defendant to avoid defending civil proceedings. Instead, they are part of the balancing exercise, which must also respect the plaintiff’s prima facie right to have the claim heard. That is a practical and important clarification for litigants facing concurrent exposure in civil and criminal forums. (Para 34, Para 47, Para 67)

Finally, the judgment is notable for its procedural management of the claims against EGT. By directing discontinuance and amendment, the court ensured that the civil suit reflected the actual litigation posture and avoided unnecessary procedural drift. For practitioners, the case is a reminder that stay applications may be resolved together with broader case-management directions designed to streamline the proceedings. (Para 15, Para 32)

Cases Referred To

Case Name Citation How Used Key Proposition
Rex International Holding Ltd and another v Gulf Hibiscus Ltd [2019] 2 SLR 682 Used on case-management stay principles A court may grant a limited stay to ensure efficient and fair resolution where overlapping issues create a real risk. (Para 34)
BNP Paribas Wealth Management v Jacob Agam and another [2017] 3 SLR 27 Used with Rex on case-management stay Supports the court’s inherent jurisdiction to manage proceedings. (Para 34)
Smith and wife v Selwyn [1914] 3 KB 98 Historical common-law authority Illustrates the older rule that civil actions could be stayed pending criminal prosecution. (Para 34)
Wells v Abrahams (1872) 7 QB 554 Historical authority Referred to in the discussion of the old felonious tort rule. (Para 34)
Velstra Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Dexia Bank Belgium [2003] 4 SLR(R) 592 Historical/common-law discussion Discussed the old rule and its treatment in Singapore. (Para 34)
Wonder Heat Pty Ltd v Bishop [1960] VR 489 Historical justification Cited for the policy behind the felonious tort rule. (Para 34)
McMahon v Gould (1982) 7 ACLR 202 Core authority on stay discretion Endorsed the modern discretionary approach and relevant factors. (Para 34)
Panton and others v Financial Institutions Services Ltd [2003] UKPC 86 Modern approach Balancing justice and the defendant’s right of silence. (Para 34)
Jefferson Ltd v Bhetcha [1979] 1 WLR 898 Leading test Set out the “real danger” test and relevant factors. (Para 35)
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and others v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2016] FCAFC 97 Australian application of McMahon guidelines Referred to as an example of the guidelines’ use. (Para 34)
Balfron Trustees Ltd v Peterson and others (No 2) [2001] Lexis Citation 1677 Burden of proof on stay applicant Notional dangers are insufficient. (Para 35)
R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, Ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1 Defines right of silence Lord Mustill’s categories of the right of silence. (Para 39)
Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 Singapore approval of Smith categories Referred to with approval on the right of silence. (Para 39)
Law Society of Singapore v Shanmugam Manohar [2021] SGHC 201 Defines privilege against self-incrimination Cited for the scope of the privilege. (Para 47)
Riedel-de-Haen AG v Liew Keng Pang [1989] 1 SLR(R) 417 Privilege against self-incrimination in civil proceedings Used for Anton Piller / interrogatories and s 134. (Para 47)
Reid v Howard and others (1995) 131 ALR 609 Privilege against self-incrimination Used to show resistance to interrogatories. (Para 47)
VTFL v Clough DIG [2001] EWCA Civ 1509 Civil pleading and privilege Used to show pleading a defence usually does not undermine privilege. (Para 67)
Cameron’s Unit Services Pty Ltd v Kevin R Whelpton Associates (Australia) Pty Ltd and another (1984) 4 FCR 428 Civil/criminal overlap Referred to for the proposition that civil defence does not justify silence. (Para 67)
State of Queensland v Shaw [2003] QSC 436 Distinguishable authority Used by Mr Ng; the court distinguished it. (Para 70)
Craig Robert White v Australian Securities and Investments Commission and others [2013] QCA 357 Rejection of unconditional stay argument Used against the proposition that related criminal proceedings automatically justify a stay. (Para 70)
Winters v Fogarty (No 2) [2020] FCA 220 Example of real danger found Cited as a case where more than notional advantage existed. (Para 70)
Qing Zhao and another v The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police [2014] VSCA 137 Example of real danger found Cited similarly. (Para 70)
Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd v Burgess [2018] SASC 134 Example of real danger found Cited similarly. (Para 70)
McLachlan v Browne (No 9) [2019] NSWSC 10 Example of real danger found Cited similarly. (Para 70)
Re AWB Ltd (No 1) (2008) 252 ALR 566 Critique of McMahon guidelines Mentioned as questioning the adequacy of the guidelines. (Para 34)
DPR Futures Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 778 Privilege and stay balancing Used for the proposition that stay is not automatic and for undertakings. (Para 34)

Legislation Referenced

Source Documents

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 7 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla
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