CXN v CXO & Anor

"Taking the totality of the evidence into account, I find the first defendant negligent for failing to keep a proper look-out for oncoming vehicles and for failing to give way to the second defendant’s car, which was going straight and had the right of way." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 24

Case Information

• Citation: [2022] SGHC 311 (Para 0)
• Court: In the General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date: 13 December 2022 (Para 0)
• Coram: Teh Hwee Hwee JC (Para 0)
• Case Number: Suit No 1000 of 2021 (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Tort — Negligence — Duty of care; Tort — Negligence — Breach of duty; Tort — Negligence — Apportionment of liability (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Plaintiff: Not answerable from the supplied extraction (Para 0)
• Counsel for the First Defendant: Not answerable from the supplied extraction (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Second Defendant: Not answerable from the supplied extraction (Para 0)
• Judgment Length: The supplied extraction does not state the full judgment length (Para 0)

What Was the Core Negligence Question Before the Court?

The court identified the dispute as a straightforward but fact-sensitive negligence claim arising from a road traffic collision. The plaintiff’s case was that both drivers had breached duties owed to him: the first defendant, who was executing a U-turn, failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to give way; the second defendant was travelling at excessive speed and thereby contributed to the collision and the plaintiff’s injuries. The court framed the matter as one requiring findings on breach and, if both defendants were liable, apportionment between them. (Para 13)

"The only issues to be determined are as follows: (a) whether either or both of the defendants breached the duty of care owed to the plaintiff; and (b) if both defendants breached that duty of care, the apportionment of liability between the two." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 13

The court’s analysis therefore proceeded in two stages. First, it examined whether the first defendant, as the turning driver, had complied with the road rules and the common law standard of care. Second, it considered whether the second defendant’s speed was so excessive that it amounted to negligence and materially affected both the occurrence of the collision and the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries. The court then turned to the comparative responsibility of each defendant. (Para 13)

This structure mattered because the case was not simply about who caused the collision in a narrow sense. It was also about how the law should treat a turning driver’s obligations, the evidential significance of guilty pleas in related traffic offences, and the extent to which a speeding driver’s conduct can dominate the apportionment analysis even where another driver initiated the dangerous manoeuvre. (Para 13)

How Did the Collision Happen, and Why Were the Facts So Important?

The collision occurred on 23 October 2020 at about 8.10pm along Woodlands Avenue 12 towards the Seletar Expressway. The first defendant was driving a panel van, and the plaintiff, who was 8 years old, was in the rear cargo compartment. That compartment had neither seats nor seat belts. The first defendant attempted a U-turn, and before that turn could be completed, the second defendant’s car collided with the van. The impact was severe enough to spin the van and eject the plaintiff and another passenger from the rear cargo compartment. (Para 1, Para 3)

"This matter concerns a collision between the panel van (the “first defendant’s van” or the “van”) driven by the first defendant, and the motor car (the “second defendant’s car” or the “car”) driven by the second defendant, which occurred on 23 October 2020 at about 8.10pm along Woodlands Avenue 12 towards Seletar Expressway (“SLE”)." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 1

"The plaintiff, who was then 8 years of age, was on board the van in the rear cargo compartment, which had neither seats nor seat belts." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 1

The court placed substantial weight on the video footage and the physical sequence of events. It noted that the second defendant’s car could be seen “racing down the road,” and that the van was struck with “tremendous force” before the U-turn was completed. The passengers in the rear cargo compartment, including the plaintiff, were seated on the floor and were not secured by seat belts. They were flung out of the van. These facts were central because they linked the first defendant’s failure to secure the plaintiff and the second defendant’s speed to the seriousness of the injuries. (Para 3)

"Before the U-turn could be completed, the second defendant’s car, which could be seen in the video footage to be racing down the road, collided with the first defendant’s van with a tremendous force." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 3

"The passengers in the rear cargo compartment, namely the plaintiff and [K], who were seated on the floor of the rear cargo compartment and not secured by seat belts, were flung out of the van" — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 3

Those facts were not merely background. They formed the basis for the court’s later conclusion that the first defendant’s conduct affected the plaintiff’s vulnerability to injury, while the second defendant’s speed affected both the collision itself and the severity of the harm. The court’s apportionment analysis therefore had to account for causation in a broader sense than simply identifying the vehicle that struck first. (Para 3, Para 52, Para 53)

What Were the Traffic Offences and Why Did the Guilty Pleas Matter?

Both defendants had already pleaded guilty to traffic offences arising from the same incident. The first defendant pleaded guilty to driving without reasonable consideration for other road users by failing to keep a proper lookout while performing an authorised U-turn, resulting in a collision and causing hurt. The second defendant pleaded guilty to speeding at 124km/h in a 70km/h zone. Those convictions and the associated statements of facts were admissible in evidence and became important pieces of the civil negligence analysis. (Para 4, Para 5, Para 21)

"The first defendant pleaded guilty to one charge of driving without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road by failing to keep a proper look-out while performing an authorised U-turn, resulting in a collision and causing hurt, which was an offence under s 65(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed) (the “RTA”) punishable under s 65(4)(a) of the RTA." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 4

"The second defendant pleaded guilty to one charge of speeding for travelling at a speed of 124km/h, such speed being in excess of the imposed speed limit of 70km/h, which was an offence under s 63(4) of the RTA." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 5

The court treated the guilty pleas, the charges, and the statements of facts as relevant and admissible under the Evidence Act. It relied on authority for the proposition that such materials are “extremely significant pieces of evidence” in civil proceedings arising from the same incident. The court also noted that the burden shifted to the second defendant to prove that he had not been travelling at least 124km/h. That burden-shifting mattered because the second defendant’s speed was a central factual issue and was not left to speculation. (Para 21, Para 42)

"Pursuant to ss 45A(1) and (5) of the Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “EA”), the first defendant’s conviction upon a plea of guilty, the charge he was convicted of, and the statement of facts, are admissible in evidence" — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 21

"Under s 45A(3) of the EA, the burden has shifted to the second defendant to prove that he had not been travelling at a speed of at least 124km/h." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 42

In practical terms, the criminal pleas narrowed the factual dispute. The court did not have to start from a blank slate on whether the first defendant had failed to keep a proper lookout or whether the second defendant had been speeding. Instead, it assessed how those admitted facts translated into civil liability and comparative responsibility. That is why the evidential treatment of the pleas was a major part of the judgment’s reasoning. (Para 21, Para 42)

Why Did the Court Hold the First Defendant Negligent?

The court held that the first defendant, as the driver executing the U-turn, owed a duty to keep a proper lookout, give way to oncoming traffic, and exercise prudent judgment in completing the manoeuvre. The court relied on rule 13(2)(b) and (c) of the Road Traffic Rules, which expressly require a driver making a U-turn to give way to oncoming vehicles and wait for a safe opportunity to complete the turn. The first defendant’s conduct fell short of that standard. (Para 14, Para 24)

"(2) A driver or rider of any vehicle making a U-turn under paragraph (1) shall — … (b) give way to any on-coming vehicle; and (c) wait for a safe opportunity to complete the turn." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 14

The court rejected the first defendant’s attempt to suggest that his view of the second defendant’s car was obstructed. It found the bare assertions of the first defendant and another witness, J, made for the first time at trial, to be neither reliable nor credible. On the evidence as a whole, the court concluded that the first defendant failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to give way to a vehicle that was going straight and had the right of way. That was the core breach. (Para 24)

"I do not find the bare assertions of the first defendant and [J] that were made for the first time at trial reliable or credible" — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 24

The court’s reasoning was not limited to a formal breach of the road rule. It also treated the first defendant’s conduct as causative of the collision because his failure to observe and yield to oncoming traffic directly created the dangerous situation in which the van was struck before the U-turn was completed. The court therefore held that the first defendant was negligent and that his negligent driving contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. (Para 24)

"The first defendant’s negligent driving, as described above, contributed to causing the collision, which led to the plaintiff’s injuries." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 24

Why Did the Court Also Find the Second Defendant Negligent Despite His Right of Way?

The second defendant argued that the first defendant was wholly or substantially responsible because the van was turning across his path. The court accepted, however, that right of way does not excuse a driver from the duty to exercise due care. The second defendant’s speed was central. The court found, on the evidence, that he was travelling at around 140km/h in the six seconds before emergency braking, which was far above the 70km/h limit. (Para 11, Para 44)

"Based on the evidence, I find the second defendant’s travelling speed to be around 140km/h in the six seconds prior to emergency braking." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 44

The court accepted expert evidence from Ms Leong and Dr Richardson. It found that the second defendant was travelling at a speed higher than 99km/h, and more specifically at more than 140km/h in the six seconds before braking and at more than 100km/h at impact. The court reasoned that at such a speed, the second defendant’s ability to keep a proper lookout and exercise due care would have been compromised. Speed was therefore not just a traffic offence; it was a direct contributor to negligence. (Para 44, Para 45)

"I accept Ms Leong’s evidence that the second defendant was travelling at a speed higher than 99km/h. I also accept Dr Richardson’s evidence that the second defendant was travelling at a speed of more than 140km/h in the six seconds prior to emergency braking and at a speed greater than 100km/h at the point of impact." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 44

"At the speed which the second defendant was found to be travelling, the second defendant’s ability to keep a proper look-out and to exercise due care would have been compromised." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 45

The court therefore held that the second defendant breached the duty of care owed to the plaintiff, contributed to causing the collision, and was liable in negligence for the plaintiff’s injuries. The court’s conclusion was not that the second defendant was the sole cause, but that his excessive speed was a legally significant cause of the accident and the resulting harm. (Para 45)

"I therefore find the second defendant to be in breach of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff, to have contributed to causing the collision, and the second defendant to be liable in negligence for the plaintiff’s injuries." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 45

How Did the Court Treat the Plaintiff’s Unsecured Position in the Rear Cargo Compartment?

A major feature of the case was that the plaintiff was not seated in a passenger cabin but in the rear cargo compartment of the van, which had no seats or seat belts. The court treated this as highly relevant to the severity of the injuries. It found that the first defendant’s failure to ensure that the plaintiff was properly seated and secured was a key contributing factor to the extent and severity of the injuries suffered when the collision occurred. (Para 1, Para 3, Para 52)

"the first defendant’s failure to ensure that the plaintiff was properly seated and secured with a seat belt is a key contributing factor to the extent and severity of the plaintiff’s injuries." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 52

This aspect of the reasoning is important because it shows that liability in negligence can extend beyond the immediate mechanics of impact. The first defendant’s omission did not merely create a risk of collision; it also exposed the plaintiff to a much greater risk of being thrown from the vehicle and suffering severe injury. The court therefore treated the failure to secure the child passenger as part of the causal chain relevant to apportionment. (Para 3, Para 52, Para 54)

The court’s approach also explains why the first defendant’s responsibility was ultimately assessed as greater than the second defendant’s, even though the second defendant’s speed was extreme. The first defendant had control over the plaintiff’s physical safety inside the van, and his omission made the plaintiff especially vulnerable to the consequences of any collision. That factor weighed heavily in the apportionment exercise. (Para 52, Para 59)

What Legal Principles Did the Court Apply on Duty, Breach, and Causation?

The court restated the basic elements of negligence: duty of care, breach, causal connection, and remoteness. It did so in the context of a road traffic accident where the existence of a duty was not seriously in dispute, but breach and causation were contested. The court’s focus was therefore on whether each defendant’s conduct fell below the required standard and whether that conduct caused the plaintiff’s damage. (Para 12)

"Given that the plaintiff’s claim is in negligence, the following must be established … (a) the existence of a duty of care; (b) breach of the duty of care; (c) a causal connection between the breach and the plaintiff’s damage; and (d) the plaintiff’s damage was not so unforeseeable as to be too remote." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 12

On the first defendant, the court linked the road rule requiring a U-turning driver to give way with the common law duty to keep a proper lookout. On the second defendant, the court linked excessive speed with impaired ability to observe, react, and avoid collision. In both instances, the court treated the breach as inseparable from causation: the breaches were not abstract wrongs but operative causes of the collision and the injuries. (Para 14, Para 24, Para 45)

The court’s reasoning also reflected the practical reality that causation in road traffic cases often involves multiple contributing acts. The first defendant’s turning manoeuvre and the second defendant’s speed were both part of the same causal sequence. The court therefore did not ask which driver was “more at fault” in the abstract; it asked how each driver’s conduct contributed to the collision and the resulting harm. (Para 24, Para 45, Para 54)

How Did the Court Approach Apportionment Between the Two Defendants?

Once the court found both defendants negligent, it turned to apportionment under s 16(1) of the Civil Law Act. The court stated that the exercise requires regard to the extent of each defendant’s individual responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries so as to arrive at a just and equitable apportionment. It also relied on the principle that apportionment involves comparing the relative significance of the parties’ acts or omissions in causing the injuries and their relative culpability. (Para 54)

"In making this determination, regard must be had to the extent of the first defendant’s and the second defendant’s individual responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries so as to arrive at a just and equitable apportionment (s 16(1) of the Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed))." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 54

"This is an exercise involving the comparison of the relative significance of the acts or omissions of the parties in causing the plaintiff’s injuries, and of the relative culpability of the parties" — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 54

The court observed that each tortfeasor’s causal responsibility will commonly be the same where each act or omission forms part of a continuous causal chain leading to the loss. But the court did not treat causal responsibility as the only consideration. It also examined blameworthiness. The first defendant’s conduct was more blameworthy because he initiated the dangerous manoeuvre and failed to secure the plaintiff, but the second defendant’s extreme speed was also a major factor. (Para 60, Para 59)

"Each tortfeasor’s causal responsibility will commonly be the same because each of their acts/omissions will be equally important forming one part of the continuous causal link resulting in the eventual loss." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 60

Ultimately, the court concluded that the first defendant should bear the larger share of responsibility. It found that the first defendant was more blameworthy, though not by a wide margin, and that the second defendant’s speed was sufficiently extreme to justify a substantial share of liability. The result was an apportionment of 65% to the first defendant and 35% to the second defendant. (Para 59, Para 76)

"I find that the first defendant should be held responsible for a higher percentage of the plaintiff’s injuries." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 59

"On the facts of the present case, I find that the actions/omissions of the first defendant and the second defendant had equal causative potency insofar as the collision is concerned." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 76

Why Did the Court Reject the First Defendant’s Attempt to Shift Primary Blame to the Second Defendant?

The first defendant argued that the second defendant’s excessive speed played a major part in causing the collision and sought a 55/45 apportionment in his favour. The court accepted that speed was a major factor, but it did not accept that this displaced the first defendant’s own negligence. The first defendant’s duty as the turning driver remained primary in the sense that he had to ensure the manoeuvre could be completed safely. (Para 10, Para 14, Para 24)

"The first defendant argued that the second defendant’s excessive speed played a major part in causing the collision." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 10

"In the circumstances, the first defendant sought a 55% to 45% apportionment against himself and the second defendant respectively." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 10

The court’s answer was that the first defendant’s negligence was not limited to the decision to turn. It included the failure to keep a proper lookout and the failure to give way to oncoming traffic. Those omissions were compounded by the fact that the plaintiff was unsecured in the rear cargo compartment. The first defendant therefore could not reduce his responsibility merely by pointing to the second defendant’s speed. (Para 24, Para 52, Para 59)

At the same time, the court did not absolve the second defendant. It recognised that the second defendant’s speed was so excessive that even a careful turning driver would have had little time to react. That finding prevented the apportionment from becoming one-sided. The court’s final split reflected a nuanced assessment of both causative potency and blameworthiness. (Para 69, Para 76)

How Did the Court Compare This Case with Other Road Traffic Authorities?

The court referred to several authorities to explain the duties of turning drivers, the significance of speed, and the principles of apportionment. It relied on Chai Yew Cian v Yeoh Yeow Yee and others for the proposition that a turning vehicle is prima facie more likely to be the primary cause of an accident, and on Ting Jun Heng v Yap Kok Hua and another for the proposition that right of way does not absolve a driver from the duty to exercise due care. (Para 15, Para 27)

"the turning vehicle is prima facie more likely to be the primary cause of the accident" — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 15

"motorists must still exercise due care" — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 27

The court also referred to SBS Transit Ltd v Stafford Rosemary Anne Jane and Cheong Ghim Fah and another v Murugian s/o Rangasamy for the propositions that speed and lookout are closely linked, and that speeding is a strong indication of negligent driving. It further referred to Page v Richards and Draper for the proposition that a driver must not go faster than permits stopping or deflecting the vehicle’s course. These authorities supported the conclusion that the second defendant’s speed was not merely excessive in the abstract but negligent in the circumstances. (Para 27, Para 28, Para 29)

"speeding indicates dangerous/negligent driving" — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 28

"a driver must not go faster than permits stopping or deflecting course" — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 29

For apportionment, the court relied on Cheng William v Allister Lim & Thrumurgan and another and another appeal, as well as Ng Li Ning v Ting Jun Heng and another. Those cases were used to reinforce that apportionment is fact-sensitive and depends on comparative blameworthiness and causative potency. The court also noted that in Ng Li Ning, a 65/35 split had been upheld in a different speeding and right-of-way context, though it did not treat that case as mechanically controlling. (Para 30, Para 54, Para 67, Para 71–75)

Why Did the Court Say the Second Defendant’s Speed Reduced His Ability to React?

The court’s reasoning on speed was not confined to the numerical excess over the limit. It found that at around 140km/h, the second defendant’s ability to keep a proper lookout and exercise due care would have been compromised. That finding was important because it connected speed to the mechanics of negligence: a driver travelling at such a rate has less time to perceive hazards, less time to brake, and less ability to avoid or mitigate a collision. (Para 44, Para 45)

"At the speed which the second defendant was found to be travelling, the second defendant’s ability to keep a proper look-out and to exercise due care would have been compromised." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 45

The court also observed that even a driver keeping a proper lookout would have had little time and opportunity to register and respond to the oncoming van because of the second defendant’s excessive speed. This was a critical part of the apportionment analysis because it meant the second defendant’s conduct had substantial causative potency even though the first defendant was the turning driver. (Para 69)

"In the circumstances of this case, even a driver who was keeping a proper look-out would have had little time and opportunity to register and respond to the second defendant’s oncoming car because of the second defendant’s excessive speed." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 69

The court’s treatment of speed therefore served two functions. First, it established breach. Second, it explained why the second defendant deserved a substantial, though not predominant, share of liability. The court’s analysis shows that speed can be both a direct cause of collision and an aggravating factor in the severity of injury. (Para 45, Para 53, Para 76)

Why Was the First Defendant’s Responsibility Greater Than the Second Defendant’s?

Although the court found both defendants negligent, it concluded that the first defendant should bear a higher percentage of the plaintiff’s injuries. The reason was not that the second defendant’s conduct was minor; rather, the first defendant’s conduct combined several serious failings. He was the driver making the U-turn, he failed to keep a proper lookout, he failed to give way, and he failed to ensure that the child plaintiff was properly seated and secured. (Para 24, Para 52, Para 59)

"the first defendant is more blameworthy but not by a wide margin." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 76

The court’s apportionment reflects a layered assessment of responsibility. The first defendant’s omissions were more blameworthy because they involved both the creation of the collision risk and the exposure of the plaintiff to severe injury. The second defendant’s speed was extreme and materially contributed to the accident, but the first defendant had direct control over the plaintiff’s safety in the van and over the execution of the U-turn. (Para 52, Para 59, Para 76)

That is why the court settled on 65% against the first defendant and 35% against the second defendant. The split was not arbitrary; it was the product of the court’s evaluation of the relative significance of each defendant’s conduct and the relative culpability attached to that conduct. (Para 54, Para 76)

What Was the Final Outcome of the Civil Claim?

The court found both defendants liable in negligence. It held that the first defendant breached his duty by failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to give way during the U-turn, and that the second defendant breached his duty by travelling at excessive speed and thereby contributing to the collision and the plaintiff’s injuries. The court then apportioned liability 65% to the first defendant and 35% to the second defendant. (Para 24, Para 45, Para 76)

"I therefore find the second defendant to be in breach of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff, to have contributed to causing the collision, and the second defendant to be liable in negligence for the plaintiff’s injuries." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 45

The judgment excerpt supplied does not include the full formal orders section, but the reasoning makes the result clear. The court’s findings on breach, causation, and apportionment are sufficient to identify the operative outcome: both defendants were liable, with the first defendant bearing the larger share. (Para 59, Para 76)

Because the supplied extraction is limited to liability and apportionment, it does not answer questions about damages quantum or costs. Those matters are therefore not addressed here. The legally significant point is the court’s allocation of responsibility in a collision involving both a turning driver and a speeding driver, with an unsecured child passenger suffering serious injury. (Para 0, Para 76)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it demonstrates how Singapore negligence law handles overlapping wrongdoing in road traffic accidents. A driver with the right of way can still be negligent if he is speeding so excessively that his ability to react is compromised. Conversely, a turning driver cannot escape liability by pointing to the other driver’s speed if he failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to give way, and failed to protect a vulnerable passenger. (Para 24, Para 45, Para 69)

"Accordingly, I find that the second defendant also contributed significantly to the extent and severity of the plaintiff’s injuries." — Per Teh Hwee Hwee JC, Para 53

The case is also important because it shows the evidential value of guilty pleas and statements of facts in subsequent civil proceedings. The court treated those materials as highly significant, which means practitioners should pay close attention to the downstream civil consequences of traffic pleas. The judgment also illustrates how expert reconstruction evidence can be used to quantify speed and support findings of negligence. (Para 21, Para 42, Para 44)

Finally, the case is notable for its treatment of passenger safety. The court did not treat the plaintiff’s unsecured position as a mere background fact. It treated it as a key causal factor in the severity of the injuries and as part of the first defendant’s responsibility. That makes the case especially relevant in claims involving child passengers, cargo compartments, and the duty to secure vulnerable occupants. (Para 3, Para 52)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Road Traffic Rules (Cap 276, R 20, 1999 Rev Ed), rule 13(2)(b)–(c) (Para 14)
• Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed), ss 45A(1), 45A(3), 45A(5) (Para 21, Para 42)
• Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed), s 65(1)(b) (Para 4)
• Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed), s 65(4)(a) (Para 4)
• Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed), s 63(4) (Para 5)
• Road Traffic Act (Cap 276, 2004 Rev Ed), s 131(2)(a) (Para 20)
• Civil Law Act 1909 (2020 Rev Ed), s 16(1) (Para 54)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 311 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.