"I decided that neither s 23(1) of the Evidence Act nor binding local case authority limits the common law in that regard: the privilege protects the whole of “without prejudice” communications, not only admissions." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 6
Case Information
- Citation: [2023] SGHC 24 (Para 0)
- Court: In the General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
- Date of hearing: 8 August 2022; date of decision: 8 February 2023 (Para 0)
- Coram: Andre Maniam J (Para 0)
- Case number: Originating Summons No 268 of 2022 (Registrar’s Appeal No 219 of 2022) (Para 0)
- Counsel for the plaintiff: Wong Soon Peng Adrian, Ang Leong Hao, Wayne Yeo and Sia Bao Huei (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP) (Para 0)
- Counsel for the first defendant: Toh Chen Han, Ang Wee Jian and Glenn Sim Sze Nyuang (MPillay) (Para 0)
- Counsel for the second defendant: Tan Hong Liang, Kwek Yuan Justin and Tan Hao Ting Valerie (JWS Asia Law Corporation) (Para 0)
- Area of law: Civil procedure — Privileges — Without prejudice privilege; Evidence — Admissibility of evidence; Evidence — Proof of evidence — Admissions (Para 0)
- Judgment length: Not answerable from the extraction (Para 0)
Summary
This appeal concerned whether parts of five emails exchanged in settlement discussions could be relied upon in evidence, and whether those emails were protected by without prejudice privilege. The plaintiff argued that the emails were privileged and therefore inadmissible, while the first defendant sought to rely on selected portions to rebut the plaintiff’s assertions about why a letter of credit was not extended and why retention money was disputed. The court held that the broad common law approach to without prejudice privilege applies in Singapore, meaning the whole of the settlement communications was privileged, not merely the admissions within them. (Para 18) (Para 26) (Para 48) (Para 59) (Para 92) (Para 93)
The court further held that s 23(1) of the Evidence Act did not displace that common law position, because the statutory and common law rules share the same policy foundation and are not inconsistent. The court also considered the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ernest Ferdinand and concluded that it did not preclude the broad approach. On the facts, however, the Delay/Acquiescence Exception allowed the first defendant to refer to limited portions of the emails to rebut the plaintiff’s assertions, because fuller evidence was needed to give the court a fair picture of the delay and apparent acquiescence. (Para 60) (Para 67) (Para 69) (Para 72) (Para 34) (Para 94)
The result was a nuanced one: the registrar’s appeal was dismissed, but the first defendant was confined to the relevant portions of the disputed emails for the limited purpose of rebutting the plaintiff’s assertions. The rest of the emails remained protected by without prejudice privilege. The judgment is significant because it confirms the broad approach to without prejudice privilege in Singapore and explains how the Delay/Acquiescence Exception operates in practice. (Para 95) (Para 93) (Para 94)
What dispute brought the parties before the High Court?
The dispute arose out of a construction-related supply arrangement. The first defendant was engaged as the contractor for a project, and it in turn engaged the plaintiff to supply equipment for that project under a supply contract. The second defendant was the bank that issued a guarantee in favour of the first defendant, while the first defendant also procured a letter of credit in favour of the plaintiff. (Para 7) (Para 8)
Disputes later arose between the plaintiff and the first defendant over whether provisional acceptance had occurred under the supply contract and what further payments the plaintiff was entitled to. The first defendant called on the guarantee on or around 18 March 2022, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to fulfil its obligations and that provisional acceptance had not been achieved. Those underlying commercial disputes formed the backdrop to the evidential controversy over the emails. (Para 9) (Para 10)
"The first defendant was engaged as the contractor for a project. In turn, the first defendant engaged the plaintiff to supply equipment for the project, pursuant to a supply contract." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 7
"Disputes arose between the plaintiff and the first defendant, including as to whether provisional acceptance had occurred under the supply contract, and what further payments the plaintiff was entitled to." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 9
"On or around 18 March 2022, the first defendant called on the guarantee, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to fulfil its obligations under the supply contract, and that provisional acceptance under the supply contract had not been achieved." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 10
The immediate evidential issue was not the merits of the underlying supply dispute, but whether the first defendant could rely on parts of settlement communications to answer the plaintiff’s case. The court therefore had to decide both the scope of without prejudice privilege and whether any exception permitted limited use of the communications. (Para 18) (Para 26) (Para 48)
How did the disputed emails arise, and what did they say?
The disputed material consisted of five emails exchanged between 17 and 21 February 2020. They were exhibited by the first defendant in its reply affidavit and were referred to as the “Disputed Emails”. Each email carried the subject header “Settlement/Gentlemen Agreement”, which the court treated as significant in understanding the context in which they were sent. (Para 17)
The court recorded that the emails were part of settlement discussions about extending the letter of credit and resolving outstanding payment issues. The first defendant’s position was that it had sought the plaintiff’s agreement to extend the letter of credit and had also taken issue with the release of retention money. The plaintiff, by contrast, maintained that the emails were protected by without prejudice privilege and could not be used. (Para 17) (Para 18)
"This entailed reference to five emails in the period of 17 to 21 February 2020 (the “Disputed Emails”), which the first defendant referred to and exhibited in its reply affidavit." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 17
"Each of those emails had the subject header “Settlement/Gentlemen Agreement”, and individually they made the following points" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 17
"The plaintiff contended that the Disputed Emails were covered by “without prejudice” privilege, and so the first defendant could not put them into evidence, or refer to their contents." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 18
The court later identified the relevant portions as those dealing with the first defendant’s proposal to extend the letter of credit, the plaintiff’s rejection of that proposal unless negotiations concluded in a contract amendment, and the first defendant’s disagreement with the plaintiff’s claim for remaining payments. Those were the portions the first defendant wanted to use to rebut the plaintiff’s assertions. (Para 83) (Para 94)
What were the main issues the court had to decide?
The court framed the appeal around two immediate questions: whether the Delay/Acquiescence Exception applied, and whether the relevant portions of the disputed emails were privileged in the first place. It also set out a broader set of doctrinal questions about the scope of the broad approach, the effect of s 23(1) of the Evidence Act, the impact of Ernest Ferdinand, and the existence of exceptions to the broad approach. (Para 26) (Para 48)
That framing mattered because the appeal was not simply about whether the emails were settlement communications. It was about whether Singapore law protects only admissions within such communications, or whether it protects the whole communication; and if the latter, whether any exception allowed limited reliance on the emails to rebut the plaintiff’s case. (Para 48) (Para 59) (Para 92)
"I address the following main issues: (a) whether the Delay/Acquiescence Exception applies in this case; and (b) whether the Relevant Portions of the Disputed Emails were privileged in the first place." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 26
"I thus address: (a) whether the Broad Approach (of protecting the whole of “without prejudice” communications, and not just admissions) is the position at common law; (b) whether the Broad Approach is precluded by s 23(1) of the Evidence Act; (c) whether the Broad Approach is precluded by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ernest Ferdinand; (d) what are the exceptions to the Broad Approach; in particular, whether the Delay/Acquiescence Exception is an exception; and (e) whether the Relevant Portions of the Disputed Emails would have been privileged in the first place, even if the privilege only covered admissions." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 48
The court’s structure shows that it treated the privilege question as foundational. If the broad approach applied, the whole of the emails would be privileged unless an exception applied. If the narrow admissions-only approach applied, the first defendant might still argue that some portions were never privileged because they were not admissions. The judgment therefore addressed both the general rule and the specific exception in detail. (Para 48) (Para 72) (Para 93)
What did each side argue about the disputed emails?
The plaintiff’s position was straightforward: the disputed emails were covered by without prejudice privilege, and the first defendant could not place them in evidence or refer to their contents. The plaintiff therefore sought to exclude the emails entirely. The first defendant resisted that position and argued that the relevant portions were either never privileged or could be used to rebut the plaintiff’s assertions. (Para 18) (Para 19) (Para 78)
The first defendant’s case was that the relevant portions were communications of facts unconnected to settlement negotiations, and therefore outside the privilege. It also argued that the emails were relevant to show that it had earlier sought an extension of the letter of credit and had objected to the release of retention money. Those points were said to be necessary to answer the plaintiff’s narrative. (Para 17) (Para 78) (Para 83)
"The first defendant also contended that the Relevant Portions of the Disputed Emails were never privileged because they were communications of facts unconnected to settlement negotiations." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 78
"the first defendant’s proposal to extend the LC; (b) the plaintiff’s rejection of that proposal because the plaintiff would only agree to extend the LC if the negotiations concluded in agreement on a contract amendment; and (c) the first defendant’s disagreement with the plaintiff’s claim for remaining payments" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 83
The assistant registrar accepted the first defendant’s position in substance, holding that the first defendant could put portions of the emails into evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s assertions and that the relied-upon portions were never covered by without prejudice privilege. The High Court then had to review that approach and decide whether it was correct in law. (Para 19)
How did the court approach without prejudice privilege at common law?
The court held that the broad approach is the position at common law. Under that approach, the whole of without prejudice communications is protected, not merely the admissions within them. The court explained that this approach furthers the objective of encouraging settlements and avoids the artificial exercise of dissecting communications into admissible and inadmissible fragments. (Para 59) (Para 72)
In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on a line of authorities including Cutts v Head, Rush & Tompkins, Sin Lian Heng, Unilever, and others. The court treated those authorities as supporting the proposition that settlement communications should be protected in their entirety so that parties can negotiate freely without fear that their words will later be parsed and used against them. (Para 59) (Para 69) (Para 72)
"The Broad Approach furthers the objective of encouraging settlements, as a matter of policy and principle; and it is the position at common law." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 59
"the court does not “dissect out identifiable admissions and withhold protection from the rest of without prejudice communications”" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 4
"It follows that a communication may be “without prejudice” in nature even if some parts of it are not admissions, but instead statements about the other party’s wrongdoing and the consequences thereof." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 72
The court’s reasoning was not limited to a formalistic reading of the words “without prejudice”. It emphasized the policy of settlement and the practical difficulty of separating admissions from surrounding negotiation language. That is why the broad approach protects the whole communication, even where some parts are not themselves admissions. (Para 59) (Para 72)
Why did the court say s 23(1) of the Evidence Act did not displace the broad approach?
The court held that s 23(1) of the Evidence Act did not preclude the broad common law approach. Section 23(1) addresses admissions made on an express condition that evidence of them is not to be given, or in circumstances from which an agreement not to give evidence can be inferred. The court reasoned that the statutory rule and the common law rule share the same rationale, namely public policy and party agreement, and therefore are not inconsistent. (Para 3) (Para 60) (Para 67)
The court also referred to s 2(2) of the Evidence Act, which repeals only common law rules inconsistent with the Act. Because the broad approach was not inconsistent with s 23(1), it survived. The court therefore rejected the argument that the statute confined privilege to admissions only. (Para 60) (Para 67)
"Admissions in civil cases when relevant 23.—(1) In civil cases, no admission is relevant if it is made — (a) upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given; or (b) upon circumstances from which the court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 3
"Section 2(2) of the Evidence Act provides that “[a]ll rules of evidence not contained in any written law, so far as such rules are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, are repealed”." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 60
"Given that s 23 and the common law “without prejudice” principle have the same rationale (ie, public policy and agreement of parties), the common law principle (and the Broad Approach) is not inconsistent with s 23." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 67
This part of the judgment is important because it clarifies that the Evidence Act does not narrow the common law privilege to admissions only. Instead, the statutory provision and the common law rule operate consistently, both serving the same settlement-protective purpose. (Para 67) (Para 92)
How did Ernest Ferdinand fit into the analysis?
The court considered whether the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ernest Ferdinand precluded the broad approach. It concluded that it did not. Rather, the court read Ernest Ferdinand as consistent with the broad approach and with the proposition that without prejudice communications arise in genuine settlement negotiations. (Para 48) (Para 69) (Para 92)
The court quoted the formulation that the communications must arise in genuine negotiations to settle a dispute and must constitute or involve an admission against the maker’s interest. But the court did not treat that formulation as excluding the broad approach; instead, it treated it as part of the doctrinal framework within which the broad approach operates. (Para 69)
"“the communications (in respect of which privilege is claimed) must arise in the course of genuine negotiations to settle a dispute”; and (b) “the communication must constitute or involve an admission against the maker’s interest”" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 69
"The Broad Approach is the position at common law, and it is not precluded by s 23(1) of the Evidence Act, or by binding authority (in particular, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ernest Ferdinand)." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 92
The court’s treatment of Ernest Ferdinand is significant because it avoids reading that decision as having silently narrowed the scope of without prejudice privilege. Instead, the High Court treated the broad approach as still available in Singapore law, subject to recognized exceptions. (Para 69) (Para 92)
What is the Delay/Acquiescence Exception, and why did it matter here?
The court held that the Delay/Acquiescence Exception is a real exception to the broad approach. It allows reference to without prejudice communications where fuller evidence is needed to give the court a fair picture of the rights and wrongs of delay, inaction, or apparent acquiescence. The court relied on authorities such as Unilever, McFadden v Snow, Pitts v Adney, and Muller v Linsley & Mortimer in explaining the practical basis for the exception. (Para 34) (Para 48)
On the facts, the exception mattered because the plaintiff’s assertions created a narrative that the first defendant had simply delayed or acquiesced. The court accepted that the first defendant should be allowed to refer to the relevant portions of the emails to rebut that narrative and to explain why the letter of credit was not extended and why the plaintiff’s claim to remaining payments was disputed. But that permission was limited: only the relevant portions could be used, not the whole of the emails. (Para 34) (Para 83) (Para 94)
"This was, however, a case where (as Walker LJ put it in Unilever) fuller evidence was needed to give the court a fair picture of the rights and wrongs of the delay (or inaction, I would add)." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 34
"However, an exception – the Delay/Acquiescence Exception – applied to allow the first defendant to refer to the Relevant Portions of the Disputed Emails to rebut the plaintiff’s Assertions" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 94
The court’s treatment of the exception shows that privilege is not absolute in every context. Where a party’s conduct is put in issue in a way that would be misleading without the settlement communications, the court may permit limited use of those communications to ensure fairness. (Para 34) (Para 94)
Why did the court reject the argument that the relevant portions were never privileged?
The first defendant argued that the relevant portions were never privileged because they were communications of facts unconnected to settlement negotiations. The court rejected that contention as inconsistent with the broad approach. It held that a communication may still be without prejudice in nature even if some parts are not admissions, including statements about wrongdoing and consequences. (Para 78) (Para 72)
In other words, the court did not accept a fragmented analysis that would strip protection from parts of a settlement email simply because those parts were not express admissions. The whole email remained privileged if it formed part of genuine settlement negotiations, subject only to any applicable exception. (Para 59) (Para 72) (Para 93)
"The first defendant also contended that the Relevant Portions of the Disputed Emails were never privileged because they were communications of facts unconnected to settlement negotiations." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 78
"Applying the Broad Approach, the whole of the five Disputed Emails were protected by “without prejudice” privilege in the first place." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 93
The court’s answer was therefore twofold: the emails were privileged as a whole, but the Delay/Acquiescence Exception justified limited reference to the relevant portions. That distinction preserved the general rule while accommodating fairness in the particular circumstances. (Para 93) (Para 94)
How did the court use the factual context to limit the permissible use of the emails?
The court identified the relevant portions as those dealing with the first defendant’s proposal to extend the letter of credit, the plaintiff’s refusal unless the negotiations ended in a contract amendment, and the first defendant’s disagreement with the plaintiff’s claim for remaining payments. Those portions were relevant because they directly rebutted the plaintiff’s assertions about the commercial history and the parties’ positions. (Para 83)
But the court was careful not to open the door to unrestricted use of the emails. It limited the first defendant to the parts necessary to rebut the plaintiff’s assertions, leaving the rest of the communications protected. That approach reflects the court’s effort to balance the policy of settlement confidentiality with the need for fairness in litigation. (Para 94) (Para 95)
"the first defendant’s proposal to extend the LC; (b) the plaintiff’s rejection of that proposal because the plaintiff would only agree to extend the LC if the negotiations concluded in agreement on a contract amendment; and (c) the first defendant’s disagreement with the plaintiff’s claim for remaining payments" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 83
"I thus dismissed the registrar’s appeal, save that I limited the portions of the Disputed Emails that the first defendant could refer to, to the parts relevant to rebutting the plaintiff’s Assertions." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 95
This limitation is practically important. It shows that even where an exception applies, the court will confine the use of privileged material to what is necessary for the specific rebuttal purpose. The privilege is not abandoned wholesale; it is pierced only to the extent required by fairness. (Para 94) (Para 95)
What did the court say about the policy behind without prejudice privilege?
The court repeatedly emphasized that the broad approach is justified by policy and principle because it encourages settlements. If parties know that the whole of their settlement communications is protected, they can negotiate candidly without fear that their words will later be dissected and used against them. The court treated this policy as central to the common law rule. (Para 59) (Para 72)
The judgment also drew on the idea that settlement negotiations often involve mixed statements: admissions, denials, proposals, and criticisms. A narrow admissions-only rule would require courts to parse those communications line by line, which would undermine the very confidentiality that the privilege is meant to secure. The broad approach avoids that problem. (Para 4) (Para 59) (Para 72)
"The Broad Approach furthers the objective of encouraging settlements, as a matter of policy and principle; and it is the position at common law." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 59
"the court does not “dissect out identifiable admissions and withhold protection from the rest of without prejudice communications”" — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 4
That policy analysis also explains why the court was unwilling to accept the first defendant’s attempt to isolate parts of the emails as unprivileged facts. The court preferred a rule that protects the integrity of settlement communications, while still allowing narrow exceptions where fairness requires them. (Para 72) (Para 94)
What was the final outcome of the appeal?
The High Court dismissed the registrar’s appeal. It held that the broad approach applied, that s 23(1) of the Evidence Act did not displace it, and that the whole of the disputed emails was privileged. However, the court also held that the Delay/Acquiescence Exception applied, so the first defendant could refer to the relevant portions of the emails for the limited purpose of rebutting the plaintiff’s assertions. (Para 92) (Para 93) (Para 94)
The practical result was therefore a partial success for both sides. The plaintiff succeeded in preserving privilege over the emails as a whole, while the first defendant succeeded in obtaining permission to use limited portions of them to answer the plaintiff’s case. The rest of the emails remained protected. (Para 95)
"I thus dismissed the registrar’s appeal, save that I limited the portions of the Disputed Emails that the first defendant could refer to, to the parts relevant to rebutting the plaintiff’s Assertions." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 95
"The rest of those emails remained protected by “without prejudice” privilege." — Per Andre Maniam J, Para 95
The judgment therefore ends with a carefully calibrated order rather than an all-or-nothing ruling. That calibration is one of the case’s most important practical lessons for litigators dealing with settlement communications. (Para 95)
Why does this case matter?
This case matters because it confirms that Singapore follows the broad common law approach to without prejudice privilege. That means settlement communications are protected as a whole, not merely to the extent that they contain admissions. For practitioners, the case is a strong reminder that emails marked or treated as settlement communications are likely to attract broad protection. (Para 59) (Para 92) (Para 93)
The case also matters because it clarifies the relationship between the Evidence Act and the common law. The court held that s 23(1) does not narrow the privilege to admissions only, and that the common law broad approach is not inconsistent with the statute. That is a significant point for evidential strategy in civil litigation. (Para 60) (Para 67) (Para 92)
Finally, the case is important because it explains the Delay/Acquiescence Exception in a concrete setting. Even where settlement communications are privileged, a court may allow limited reference to them if fuller evidence is needed to give a fair picture of delay or acquiescence. The decision therefore gives litigators both a shield and a warning: privilege is robust, but not absolute. (Para 34) (Para 94) (Para 95)
Cases Referred To
| Case Name | Citation | How Used | Key Proposition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quek Kheng Leong Nicky and another v Teo Beng Ngoh and others and another appeal | [2009] 4 SLR(R) 181 | Cited for the general rule and for acceptance of Unilever exceptions (Para 4) | Generally, without prejudice communications are not admissible; exceptions in Unilever are accepted (Para 4) |
| Mariwu Industrial Co (S) Pte Ltd v Dextra Asia Co Ltd and another | [2006] 4 SLR(R) 807 | Used for policy rationale and statutory/common law relationship (Para 59) (Para 67) | s 23 is a statutory enactment of the common law principle; settlement policy supports privilege (Para 59) (Para 67) |
| Cutts v Head | [1984] Ch 290 | Used for policy and broad approach (Para 59) | Parties should be encouraged to settle; settlement communications should be protected (Para 59) |
| Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council | [1989] AC 1280 | Used to affirm policy and broad approach (Para 59) | Settlement policy supports protection of communications in litigation settlement discussions (Para 59) |
| Sin Lian Heng Construction Pte Ltd v Singapore Telecommunications Ltd | [2007] 2 SLR(R) 433 | Used to support broad approach and policy rationale (Para 59) | Without prejudice privilege applies to settlement negotiations, including quantum discussions (Para 59) |
| Unilever Plc v Procter & Gamble Co | [2000] 1 WLR 2436 | Central authority on broad approach and exceptions (Para 4) (Para 34) | The whole communication is protected; delay/acquiescence is an exception (Para 4) (Para 34) |
| Soon Peng Yam and another (trustees of the Chinese Swimming Club) v Maimon bte Ahmad | [1995] 1 SLR(R) 279 | Considered on scope of delay/acquiescence exception (Para 34) | Did not decide contents admissibility; only fact of negotiations (Para 34) |
| McFadden v Snow | (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 8 | Analogy for delay/acquiescence and fairness (Para 34) | Fuller evidence may be needed to avoid a misleading inference about delay (Para 34) |
| Pitts v Adney | [1961] NSWR 535 | Followed McFadden (Para 34) | Supports the same fairness-based approach to delay/acquiescence (Para 34) |
| Muller v Linsley & Mortimer | [1996] PNLR 74 | Used for practical difficulty and fact-based exceptions (Para 34) | Communications may be relevant for the fact that they were made (Para 34) |
| Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compañia De Navegación Palomar, SA and others and other appeals | [2018] 1 SLR 894 | Considered on whether broad approach is precluded (Para 48) (Para 92) | Does not preclude the broad approach; supports the framework of genuine settlement negotiations (Para 69) (Para 92) |
| Schering Corporation v CIPLA Ltd | [2004] EWHC 2587 (Ch) | Supporting authority for broad approach (Para 59) | The whole negotiating document may be privileged (Para 59) |
| Greenline-Onyx Envirotech Phils, Inc v Otto Systems Singapore Pte Ltd | [2007] 3 SLR(R) 40 | Considered and distinguished (Para 78) | Admissions of debt / open communications may fall outside privilege (Para 78) |
| Bradford & Bingley plc v Rashid | [2006] 1 WLR 2066 | Cited via Greenline-Onyx (Para 78) | Without prejudice does not apply to open communications about admitted liability (Para 78) |
| Field v Commissioner for Railways for NSW | (1957) 99 CLR 285 | Example of statement unconnected with settlement (Para 78) | An admission to a doctor was not properly connected with settlement negotiations (Para 78) |
| L Capital Jones Ltd and another v Maniach Pte Ltd | [2017] 1 SLR 312 | Cited on appeal structure (Para 95) | An appeal may be affirmed on an additional ground (Para 95) |
| Walker v Wilsher | (1889) 23 QBD 335 | Historical source for narrow delay/acquiescence formulation (Para 34) | Supports the fairness-based use of settlement communications where delay is in issue (Para 34) |
| Hoghton v Hoghton | (1852) 15 Beav 278 | Quoted in Unilever (Para 59) | The without prejudice rule is “sacred” in settlement negotiations (Para 59) |
| Krishna Kumaran s/o K Ramakrishnan v Kuppusamy s/o Ramakrishnan | [2014] 4 SLR 232 | Used to show common law principle applied to mediator/messenger (Para 69) | Approved in Ernest Ferdinand as part of the privilege framework (Para 69) |
| Phoa Estate v Ley | [2020] AJ No 555 (Alta) | Cited as another common law jurisdiction accepting broad approach (Para 59) | The broad approach is accepted in other common law jurisdictions (Para 59) |
| Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd and Others v Alstom Power Ltd | [2009] SASC 377 | Cited for Australia (Para 59) | Broad approach accepted in Australian authority (Para 59) |
| Poon Loi Tak (the administrator of the late Poon Nuen, deceased) v Poon Loi Cheung Desmond | [2020] 1 HKLRD 511 | Cited for Hong Kong (Para 59) | Broad approach accepted in Hong Kong authority (Para 59) |
Legislation Referenced
- Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed), s 23(1) (Para 3) (Para 67)
- Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed), s 2(2) (Para 60) [CDN] [SSO]
Source Documents
- Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
- Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
- View in judgment: "The rest of those emails remained..."
- View in judgment: "Andre Maniam Judge of the High..."
This article analyses [2023] SGHC 24 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.