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Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC 209

In Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Civil Procedure — Costs.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2023] SGHC 209
  • Title: Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
  • Suit No: Suit No 477 of 2015
  • Date of Judgment: 3 August 2023
  • Judge: Tan Siong Thye SJ
  • Plaintiff/Applicant: Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd (“Crescendas”)
  • Defendant/Respondent: Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd (“JPW”)
  • Procedural Posture: Ex tempore judgment on costs following conclusion of liability and damages phases (save for costs)
  • Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs
  • Statutes Referenced: First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (as to costs framework)
  • Length: 55 pages; approximately 15,500 words
  • Prior Related Decisions: Liability Judgment (HC) [2019] SGHC 4; Liability Judgment (CA) [2019] SGCA 63; Damages Judgment (HC) [2021] SGHC 189; Damages Judgment (AD) [2023] SGHC(A) 9
  • Cases Cited (as provided): [2019] SGCA 63; [2019] SGHC 4; [2020] SGHC 140; [2021] SGHC 189; [2023] SGHC 209

Summary

Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd [2023] SGHC 209 concerns the determination of costs after a long-running construction dispute between a property developer (Crescendas) and a general building contractor (JPW). The High Court had previously determined liability in a first tranche of the trial, and then assessed damages in a second tranche. Appeals were taken to the Court of Appeal (on liability) and to the Appellate Division of the High Court (on damages). By the time of the costs hearing, the substantive dispute was essentially concluded, leaving only the question of costs incurred at various stages.

The court applied the general principle that “costs follow the event”, while also considering when it is appropriate to depart from that rule. Although both parties had partial wins in the liability phase, the court concluded that Crescendas was the successful party overall for the first tranche and therefore entitled to costs for both the first and second tranches. The parties agreed that Crescendas was entitled to costs for the second tranche, but disagreed on the quantum. The court then assessed the appropriate quantum of legal costs and disbursements for each tranche and for various interlocutory applications.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

The underlying dispute arose from a project to build Biopolis 3, a seven-storey multi-tenanted business park development at Biopolis Drive/Biomedical Grove in One-North. Crescendas, a property developer, engaged JPW, a general building contractor, under a four-page Letter of Intent dated 26 June 2008 (the “LOI”), signed on 30 June 2008. The LOI contemplated JPW acting as management contractor for the Project.

After the LOI was signed, the parties’ relationship deteriorated due to disagreements about their respective obligations and the scope of responsibilities under the LOI. The Project experienced substantial delays, and it was certified as completed on 12 January 2011. It was undisputed that completion took longer than the 18-month period stipulated in the LOI for JPW to complete the construction.

Crescendas commenced Suit No 477 of 2015 against JPW. JPW counterclaimed against Crescendas. The trial was bifurcated into two tranches. The first tranche addressed liability: which party was responsible for the delays and whether certain contractual claims and counterclaims succeeded. The second tranche addressed the assessment of general damages payable for the delay attributable to JPW, particularly because the contractual liquidated damages mechanism was rendered inoperative by Crescendas’ acts of prevention.

In the first tranche, the High Court issued a liability judgment (Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd v Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC 4). Both parties were dissatisfied and appealed. The Court of Appeal largely affirmed the High Court’s findings, subject to corrections on arithmetic computation of delay days and on the treatment of capping beams work (Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd v Crescendas Bionics Pte Ltd and another appeal [2019] SGCA 63). The net effect was that JPW was found responsible for 161 days of delay, while Crescendas was responsible for 173 days of delay. The High Court had found that Crescendas’ acts of prevention rendered the liquidated damages clause inoperative.

The costs issues before the High Court were not about liability or damages; they were about how costs should be allocated and quantified after a bifurcated trial and appellate proceedings. The court had to decide, first, who the “successful party” was for the first tranche of the trial, given that both parties had obtained some favourable findings in the liability phase. Second, the court had to determine the quantum of costs payable to Crescendas for the first tranche and for the second tranche, including both legal costs and disbursements.

Although the parties agreed that Crescendas was entitled to costs for the second tranche, they disagreed on the amount. The court therefore had to apply the costs framework in the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969, and to consider whether any adjustments were warranted based on the complexity, conduct, and outcome of the proceedings. Additionally, the court had to address costs for various interlocutory applications, which typically require separate consideration of the event and the nature of each application.

Underlying these issues was the broader legal question of whether the general rule that costs follow the event should be applied strictly, or whether it was appropriate to depart from it due to the mixed outcomes in the liability phase. The court’s analysis therefore required careful mapping of each party’s wins and losses across the procedural stages.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court began by situating the costs determination within the procedural history. It summarised the outcomes of the first tranche and second tranche, and the appellate decisions. This was important because costs are ordinarily assessed by reference to the “event” in each stage: what was actually decided, and who prevailed on the substantive issues that mattered to the litigation. The court emphasised that the dispute had “finally concluded, save for costs”, meaning that the costs exercise should reflect the final substantive result rather than isolated interim findings.

For the first tranche, the court noted that each party claimed it had won and was therefore entitled to costs. The court examined the key liability issues and the appellate outcome. In particular, Crescendas had succeeded in resisting JPW’s claim on the “Preliminaries Sum” (a dispute over whether $12.3 million was fixed or tentative), and JPW had succeeded on a separate counterclaim relating to shared savings (the first $5 million of shared savings). There was also a delay-allocation dispute: the High Court had found Crescendas responsible for 173 days of delay and JPW responsible for 133 days, but the Court of Appeal corrected the computation and the treatment of capping beams work, resulting in JPW responsibility for 161 days of delay.

Despite these mixed outcomes, the court held that Crescendas was the successful party for the first tranche. The court’s reasoning was anchored in the practical effect of the liability findings: the litigation’s central thrust was whether JPW was liable for delay and whether Crescendas’ prevention acts would affect the damages regime. The Court of Appeal’s corrections did not undermine the overall liability outcome that JPW was liable for a substantial portion of delay, and Crescendas’ prevention acts remained pivotal. The court therefore rejected JPW’s submission that JPW was the successful party for the first tranche, finding it “not convincing”.

Having determined the entitlement to costs, the court then turned to quantum. For the first tranche, it assessed the appropriate legal costs to award Crescendas, taking into account the work done and the complexity of the issues. The court also considered disbursements and the extent to which they were reasonably incurred. The judgment reflects a structured approach: first identifying the successful party, then determining the relevant costs categories and applying the costs framework, and finally adjusting for the particular circumstances of the case.

For the second tranche, the parties agreed that Crescendas was entitled to costs. The court therefore focused on the quantum of legal costs and disbursements. The second tranche involved assessment of general damages for the 161 days of delay for which JPW was responsible. Because the liquidated damages clause was inoperative due to Crescendas’ acts of prevention, the damages assessment required a different analytical approach, which typically entails expert evidence and detailed accounting. The court addressed Crescendas’ entitlement to disbursements, including general disbursements and expert-related costs. The judgment specifically dealt with expert fees for multiple experts, including an expert fee for Assoc Prof Tay and joint expert fees for Dr Woo and Mr Yeo, as well as an expert fee for Mr Toh. This indicates the court’s attention to whether disbursements were properly attributable to the issues that Crescendas succeeded on.

Finally, the court addressed costs for various interlocutory applications. While the main costs question concerned the trial tranches, interlocutory applications often involve separate “events” for costs purposes. The court’s analysis therefore had to ensure that costs orders for interlocutory matters were consistent with the overall outcome and with the principle that costs should reflect the party who succeeded on the relevant application.

What Was the Outcome?

The court ordered that Crescendas was the successful party and was entitled to costs for both the first tranche and the second tranche of the trial. This included costs relating to liability and the assessment of damages. The court also determined the quantum of costs payable to Crescendas for each tranche, and it addressed Crescendas’ entitlement to disbursements, including expert-related fees and other reasonably incurred expenses.

In practical terms, the decision resolved the remaining financial consequences of the litigation by converting the substantive appellate outcomes into a final costs position. The effect was to shift the burden of the relevant costs to JPW, subject to the court’s quantified assessment of legal costs and disbursements for each stage and for interlocutory applications.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case is a useful authority on how Singapore courts approach costs after bifurcated trials and appeals, particularly where the liability phase yields mixed wins. The decision illustrates that “costs follow the event” does not necessarily mean that each party receives costs for the portions of the case they won in isolation. Instead, the court looks at the overall event that matters for the litigation’s outcome and the practical success of each party’s position.

For practitioners, the judgment highlights the importance of framing costs submissions around the substantive “events” that drove the litigation, rather than around discrete issues. JPW’s argument that it was the successful party for the first tranche was rejected because the court assessed success in a holistic manner. This approach is especially relevant in construction disputes, where multiple claims and counterclaims may be pleaded, and where delay allocation and prevention issues can dominate the litigation’s significance.

From a procedural standpoint, the case also demonstrates how courts quantify costs where expert evidence and disbursements are substantial. The court’s treatment of expert fees and joint expert costs underscores that disbursements must be tied to the issues that were determinative. Finally, the decision reinforces the role of the First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 in structuring the costs analysis, while still allowing the court to adjust outcomes based on the case’s particular circumstances.

Legislation Referenced

  • First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969

Cases Cited

  • [2019] SGCA 63
  • [2019] SGHC 4
  • [2020] SGHC 140
  • [2021] SGHC 189
  • [2023] SGHC 209

Source Documents

This article analyses [2023] SGHC 209 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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