Case Details
- Citation: [2017] SGHC 152
- Title: Constance Tan Gek Suan & Anor v Lau Kean Wah
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 5 July 2017
- Judgment Reserved: 11 May 2017
- Judges: Choo Han Teck J
- Registrar’s Appeal No: 114 of 2017
- Suit No: 1226 of 2016
- Plaintiffs/Applicants: Constance Tan Gek Suan & Jessie Tan Gek Choo
- Defendant/Respondent: Lau Kean Wah
- Procedural Posture: Appeal by defendant against the Assistant Registrar’s decision on striking out parts of the statement of claim
- Legal Areas: Civil procedure; pleadings; striking out; wrongful death; damages
- Statutes Referenced: Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed)
- Key Provisions Discussed: Sections 10, 20, 21, 22(4) of the Civil Law Act
- Rules of Court Referenced: O 18 r 19 (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed)
- Length of Judgment: 10 pages; 2,919 words
- Cases Cited: [2017] SGHC 152 (as provided in metadata)
Summary
This High Court decision concerns a medical negligence action brought by the daughters of a deceased elderly patient against the cardiologist who treated her at Gleneagles Hospital. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the defendant was negligent in the provision of professional care, failed to obtain informed consent, and carried out a dangerous diagnostic procedure. The defendant applied to strike out parts of the statement of claim on the basis that the pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.
The Assistant Registrar struck out the pleaded failure to obtain informed consent, holding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded facts establishing a cause of action in negligence for lack of informed consent and that, in any event, the plaintiffs were not the administrators of the deceased’s estate. On appeal, the High Court focused on the scope of the wrongful death cause of action under s 20 of the Civil Law Act. The court held that s 20 is not a general gateway for dependants to claim any form of damages merely because the deceased’s death was wrongful. Rather, the dependants must plead and be able to prove an actual loss suffered by them as dependants arising from the deceased’s death. Where the plaintiffs admitted they were not financially dependent on the deceased and pleaded no other credible loss, their claims for general and aggravated damages under s 20 could not stand.
The court therefore struck out the plaintiffs’ claims for general and aggravated damages and struck out additional irrelevant or improperly particularised paragraphs. The decision underscores the disciplined structure required in pleadings, the distinction between estate claims and dependency claims, and the need to align the pleaded cause of action with the statutory scheme for wrongful death damages.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The plaintiffs, Constance Tan Gek Suan and Jessie Tan Gek Choo, were the daughters of Tan Geok Lian (“the deceased”), who was 94 years old. On 22 November 2013, the deceased was admitted to the Accident & Emergency Department of Gleneagles Hospital. At the time of admission, her heart rate had fallen to 30 beats per minute and her condition was described as “very serious”.
The defendant, Dr Lau Kean Wah, was the cardiologist who attended to the deceased. He performed temporary cardiac pacing and a diagnostic coronary angiography. After these interventions, Dr Arthur Tan, the deceased’s regular cardiologist, took over her treatment. Importantly, the judgment records that Dr Lau had no further involvement in the deceased’s treatment or management after Dr Arthur Tan assumed care.
The deceased died under Dr Arthur Tan’s care on the next day. There was no criticism of Dr Tan in the pleadings as presented in the judgment extract. Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that Dr Lau was negligent in failing to provide adequate professional care, failing to obtain the deceased’s consent, and carrying out a dangerous diagnostic procedure.
Procedurally, the plaintiffs’ statement of claim was described as long and rambling, spanning 19 pages. The plaintiffs sought multiple categories of damages, including damages, aggravated damages, damages for bereavement, and funeral expenses. Dr Lau’s solicitors applied to strike out parts of the statement of claim under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court, arguing that the pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The Assistant Registrar struck out paragraph 13 and other references to failure to obtain informed consent. The plaintiffs did not appeal that aspect. The appeal before the High Court therefore concentrated on the scope of s 20 of the Civil Law Act and whether the plaintiffs’ pleaded damages claims were legally sustainable.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was whether the plaintiffs’ claims for general and aggravated damages could be maintained under s 20 of the Civil Law Act, given their admissions about dependency. The plaintiffs argued that s 20 was broader than a pure loss-of-dependency claim and permitted dependants to bring claims that the deceased might have brought, including claims in tort for professional negligence, so long as some loss could be shown as arising from the wrongful death.
The second issue concerned the proper relationship between wrongful death claims under s 20 and estate claims under s 10 of the Civil Law Act. The court had to clarify whether dependants, who are not executors or administrators, could use s 20 to pursue losses that are properly characterised as estate losses, or whether s 20 is confined to losses personally suffered by dependants as a result of the death.
A further issue, reflected in the court’s approach to striking out, was pleading discipline: whether the statement of claim properly pleaded the cause of action and the particulars that justify it, rather than using vague or irrelevant allegations. While the extract focuses on s 20, the court’s reasoning also reiterates that “damages” is a relief, not a cause of action, and that pleadings must be clear and legally coherent.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The High Court began by emphasising foundational principles of civil litigation. The court observed that the “basic rule” is to have the correct parties named, and the next requirement is to plead the correct cause of action. Vague and ambiguous pleadings serve no purpose and prolong litigation by forcing parties to fight over what the issues are rather than over the issues themselves. In that context, the court made a pointed remark that “damages” is not a cause of action; it is a relief. The statement of claim should plead the cause of action, the particulars supporting it, and the relief sought—no more.
Turning to the statutory framework, the court analysed s 20 of the Civil Law Act in detail. Section 20(1) creates a right of action for wrongful acts causing death, allowing the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued to be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the person injured. Section 20(2) provides that every such action is “for the benefit of the dependants” of the deceased. Section 20(3) provides that the action shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator, subject to limited procedural exceptions.
The plaintiffs’ argument was that s 20 is not restricted to loss of dependency. They contended that dependants can bring claims beyond dependency, including claims that overlap with what the deceased might have brought if alive, and that they only needed to show they were dependants within the meaning of s 20(8). They further argued that the court should not treat s 20 as requiring proof of financial dependency, because they were not claiming loss of dependency damages.
The court rejected this submission. It drew a distinction between “estate claims” and “dependency claims” under the Act. Section 10(1) allows causes of action vested in a person to survive after death for the benefit of the estate, but such actions must be brought by the estate through the executor or administrator. By contrast, s 20 serves a different role: it allows dependants to claim losses personally suffered by them as a result of the deceased’s death. This is why s 20(2) requires that the action be for the benefit of the dependants. The court also explained that s 20(3)’s procedural requirement that the action be brought by the executor or administrator does not merge the substantive nature of the claims under ss 10 and 20. Even if the same person brings both types of claims in the same suit, the causes of action remain distinct in substance.
On the facts, the plaintiffs had admitted they were not financially dependent on their 94-year-old mother. They also pleaded no other credible loss. The court therefore concluded that, to have a reasonable cause of action, the plaintiffs needed to plead an actual loss suffered by them as dependants arising from the deceased’s death. The court noted that the statement of claim’s “Damages” section largely alleged how the defendant caused the deceased’s death, but did not set out a proper head of claim or particulars of loss suffered by the plaintiffs as dependants.
The court further reasoned that s 20, derived from Lord Campbell’s Act 1846 (the Fatal Accidents Act in the United Kingdom), was intended to create a specific cause of action for those who were financially dependent on the deceased. The purpose was to compensate dependants for the loss of financial support upon the deceased’s death. The court linked this to the common law rule that an injured plaintiff could claim damages for loss of future earnings, but where the tortfeasor causes death, the deceased (through the estate) cannot claim those future earnings because the deceased is dead. The Act’s structure reflects this: s 10(3)(a)(ii) preserves the idea that certain earnings-related losses do not survive in the same way, and s 20 provides a mechanism to compensate dependants for the specific loss of financial support.
Seen through that lens, the court found it difficult to identify what other losses the plaintiffs could reasonably plead if they were not financially dependent on the deceased. The court therefore struck out the claims for general and aggravated damages as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. It also struck out paragraph 15, which was titled “The Defendants Aggravation” and contained accusations about the defendant’s character and lack of repentance. The court held that this was unwarranted and irrelevant because aggravated damages were not available to the plaintiffs in the circumstances.
In addition, the court struck out paragraphs 21 to 24, which were under the heading “Damages” but did not contain particulars of damages suffered by the plaintiffs. Instead, they described how the defendant wrongfully caused the deceased’s death, which the court considered irrelevant to the pleaded heads of damages under s 20 without a pleaded and provable loss by the dependants.
Although the extract is truncated before the court’s full treatment of bereavement and funeral expenses, the reasoning visible in the judgment indicates that the court accepted that certain statutory heads of damages may be available even where dependency loss is not established. The Assistant Registrar had held that, even if no other loss were proven, the plaintiffs would at least be entitled to claim damages for bereavement and funeral expenses under ss 21 and 22(4) of the Civil Law Act. The High Court’s analysis of s 20 therefore focused on the plaintiffs’ inability to sustain general and aggravated damages in the absence of dependency loss or other pleaded, credible dependant loss.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court allowed Dr Lau’s appeal in part by striking out the plaintiffs’ claims for general and aggravated damages under s 20 of the Civil Law Act. The court held that, on the plaintiffs’ own admissions and the absence of pleaded credible loss, the statement of claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action for those heads of damages.
In addition to striking out the damages claims, the court struck out paragraph 15 and paragraphs 20 to 24 of the statement of claim. The practical effect was to narrow the pleadings to those parts that could potentially be supported by the statutory wrongful death framework, while removing irrelevant allegations and improperly particularised or unsupported claims.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is a useful authority for practitioners dealing with wrongful death pleadings under the Civil Law Act. It clarifies that s 20 is not a general substitute for estate claims under s 10, and it is not a mechanism for dependants to pursue any and all losses that might be framed as arising from the deceased’s death. The court’s insistence on the distinction between estate and dependency claims is particularly important where plaintiffs attempt to characterise what is, in substance, an estate loss as a dependant loss.
For lawyers drafting statements of claim, the decision also reinforces pleading discipline. The court’s remarks about “damages” not being a cause of action, and about the need for clear and non-rambling pleadings, are not merely rhetorical. They reflect a substantive approach to striking out: where the pleaded facts do not support the legal characterisation of the claim, the court will remove the offending parts to prevent the litigation from becoming a dispute over issues rather than over evidence.
From a litigation strategy perspective, the case highlights the evidential and pleading consequences of admissions about dependency. Where dependants admit they are not financially dependent on the deceased, plaintiffs must be prepared to plead and prove an actual loss suffered by them as dependants within the statutory scheme. Otherwise, claims for broader damages categories may be struck out at an early stage. At the same time, the decision indicates that certain statutory heads such as bereavement and funeral expenses may remain available, depending on the statutory provisions and the pleadings.
Legislation Referenced
- Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed), ss 10, 20, 21, 22(4)
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 18 r 19
Cases Cited
- [2017] SGHC 152
Source Documents
This article analyses [2017] SGHC 152 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.