"In short, for the reasons given, I think that this is a case where, on pre-transfer costs, I should exercise the discretion to depart from a strict application of the guideline in Appendix G. I award pre-transfer costs of S$25,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 10
Case Information
- Citation: [2021] SGHC(I) 9 (Para 0)
- Court: Singapore International Commercial Court (Para 0)
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 5 of 2021 (Para 0)
- Coram: Anselmo Reyes IJ (Para 0)
- Hearing Dates: 21 April, 7 June, 13 July 2021 (Para 0)
- Decision Date: 27 August 2021 (Para 0)
- Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Francis Xavier s/o Subramaniam Xavier Augustine, Chia Xin Ran Alina and Gani Hui Ying Tracy of Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP (Para 0)
- Counsel for the Defendant: Vergis S Abraham, Asiyah binte Ahmad Arif and Zhuo Jiaxiang of Providence Law Asia LLC (Para 0)
- Area of Law: Civil Procedure — Costs (Para 0)
- Judgment Length: Not answerable from the extraction (not stated in the provided material)
Summary
This was a costs decision delivered after the court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ application to set aside an arbitral award, including their attempt to amend the originating summons. The judgment expressly states that it is the court’s decision on costs following that earlier dismissal. The defendant, having prevailed, sought an all-in costs order of S$85,000, made up of pre-transfer costs, post-transfer costs, and disbursements. The plaintiffs accepted that they were liable for costs in principle, but they disputed the amount claimed. (Para 1) (Para 2)
"At the end of my judgment, I directed that the parties file written submissions on costs. This is my decision on costs." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 1
The central issue was quantum. For pre-transfer costs, the court had to decide whether to apply Appendix G strictly or depart from it in light of the circumstances. For post-transfer costs, the court had to determine what amount constituted the defendant’s “reasonable costs” under the SICC costs regime. The court accepted that the record was unusually large and that the matter involved substantial foreign law material, and it treated those features as materially affecting the work required of counsel. (Para 2) (Para 3) (Para 7)
"There is also no dispute that the costs scale in O 59 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) and Appendix G (“Appendix G”) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions are relevant to pre-transfer costs. The parties further agree that, as to post-transfer costs, the defendant is entitled to its “reasonable costs” in accordance with O 110 r 46 ROC, the general rule governing costs before the SICC." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 2
The court ultimately awarded S$25,000 for pre-transfer costs and S$45,000 for post-transfer costs, and it made an order that the plaintiffs pay S$85,000 all-in. The judgment explains that the defendant’s actual post-transfer costs were substantially higher, but the amount sought had already been discounted significantly, and the court considered the resulting figure wholly reasonable in light of the work done by a Senior Counsel and two assisting lawyers. (Para 10) (Para 15) (Para 16) (Para 17)
"I will award post-transfer costs of S$45,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 16
What Was the Procedural Setting and Why Was the Court Dealing Only With Costs?
The procedural setting was narrow but important. The court had already dismissed the plaintiffs’ application to set aside an arbitral award, including a summons to amend the originating summons. The present judgment arose only because, after that substantive dismissal, the court directed the parties to file written submissions on costs. The judgment therefore does not revisit the merits of the setting-aside application; instead, it addresses the financial consequences of the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful challenge. (Para 1)
"In CJM and others v CJT [2021] SGHC(I) 4 I dismissed the plaintiffs’ application to set aside an arbitral award (including a Summons to amend the Originating Summons filed by the plaintiffs)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 1
The defendant’s position was straightforward: because it had succeeded, it should recover its costs. The defendant quantified those costs at S$85,000 all-in, broken down into pre-transfer costs, post-transfer costs, and disbursements. The plaintiffs did not resist the proposition that costs should follow the event in principle, and they did not dispute disbursements, but they argued that the amounts claimed were too high. That meant the court’s task was not to decide entitlement from first principles, but to calibrate the proper amount. (Para 2)
"Having prevailed, the defendant contends that the plaintiffs should be ordered to pay costs of S$85,000 (all-in) to the defendant as follows: (a) costs of S$25,000 prior to the transfer of the matter to the SICC (“pre-transfer costs”); (b) costs of S$45,000 following the transfer of the matter to the SICC (“post-transfer costs”); and (c) disbursements of S$15,000" — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 2
The court framed the dispute as one about quantum, not liability. The plaintiffs said pre-transfer costs should be only S$5,000 and post-transfer costs no more than S$20,000, creating a S$45,000 gap between the parties. That framing mattered because it showed the court was not deciding whether the defendant was entitled to costs at all, but whether the claimed figures were justified by the nature of the work and the applicable costs regime. (Para 2)
"Where the parties disagree is on the quantum of costs. The plaintiffs say that pre-transfer costs of S$5,000 should suffice and post-transfer costs should be no more than S$20,000. There is accordingly a difference of S$45,000 between the parties." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 2
How Did the Court Approach Pre-Transfer Costs Under Appendix G?
The court began by identifying the governing framework for pre-transfer costs. Appendix G of the Supreme Court Practice Directions provides a guideline for costs, and the judgment specifically notes that Appendix G gives a guideline of S$12,000 per day for contentious originating summonses not involving cross-examination. But the court also emphasized that Appendix G is not rigid: it allows a discretion to depart from the guideline when the circumstances justify it. That was the legal hinge on which the pre-transfer costs issue turned. (Para 3)
"Appendix G gives a guideline of S$12,000 per day for contentious originating summonses not involving cross-examination. But Appendix G allows the court a discretion to depart from that guideline when appropriate in the circumstances of the case." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 3
The defendant argued that a departure was justified because its Singapore counsel had not been involved in the underlying consolidated arbitration. That meant counsel had to come to the matter afresh, rather than simply building on prior familiarity with the record. The plaintiffs resisted that submission and maintained that there was no reason to depart from Appendix G, adding that S$25,000 was excessive. The court therefore had to decide whether the case was sufficiently unusual to justify an uplift beyond the ordinary guideline. (Para 4) (Para 5)
"The defendant submits that I should deviate from the guideline. The defendant argues that such step is justified because its Singapore counsel was not involved in the underlying consolidated arbitration." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 4
"The plaintiffs counter that there is no reason to depart from Appendix G and, in any event, S$25,000 for pre-transfer costs is excessive." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 5
The court accepted the defendant’s broad point that the matter was not a routine one. It noted that the plaintiffs’ supporting factual affidavit was only 57 pages, but that the exhibits ran to thousands of pages and could not be ignored. The court also took account of the 700-page award and the 4,170-page affidavit in support, together with a 51-page foreign law affidavit. These features meant that counsel had to spend real time identifying what was relevant, what was not, and how the material should be deployed. (Para 6) (Para 7)
"The plaintiffs’ supporting factual affidavit only ran for 57 pages, the reality of the exhibits to the affidavit running to thousands of pages cannot be ignored." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7
The court’s reasoning was practical rather than abstract. It observed that it was unrealistic to expect the defendant’s lawyers to conclude, without carefully reviewing the plaintiffs’ several thousand pages of exhibits, that the application was commonplace and unexceptional. The court also noted that the plaintiffs’ own foreign law affidavit was 51 pages long, which reinforced the point that the matter involved more than a simple domestic record. On that basis, the court held that the circumstances justified departing from a strict application of Appendix G and awarded S$25,000 for pre-transfer costs. (Para 7) (Para 8) (Para 10)
"It is unrealistic to expect defendant’s lawyers to have concluded, without taking the time to review the plaintiffs’ several thousands of pages of exhibits in depth, that the application was commonplace and unexceptional." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7
"In short, for the reasons given, I think that this is a case where, on pre-transfer costs, I should exercise the discretion to depart from a strict application of the guideline in Appendix G. I award pre-transfer costs of S$25,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 10
Why Did the Court Consider the Record and Foreign Law Material So Important?
The court treated the size and complexity of the record as central to the costs analysis. It did not accept the plaintiffs’ attempt to characterize the matter as routine merely because the formal affidavit was short. Instead, it looked behind the page count of the affidavit itself and focused on the exhibits, which were said to run to thousands of pages. That approach shows that the court was concerned with the actual burden placed on counsel, not just the face value of the pleadings. (Para 7)
"The plaintiffs’ supporting factual affidavit only ran for 57 pages, the reality of the exhibits to the affidavit running to thousands of pages cannot be ignored." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7
The court also considered the scale of the arbitral materials. The award itself was 700 pages long, and the affidavit in support was 4,170 pages. In addition, there was a 51-page foreign law affidavit. Those figures were not treated as mere background detail; they were part of the reason the court concluded that counsel had to spend substantial time reviewing, sorting, and understanding the record before they could responsibly advise or prepare submissions. (Para 6) (Para 7)
"The award itself was 700 pages long, the affidavit in support was 4,170 pages long, and there was a 51-page foreign law affidavit." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 6
The court’s reasoning also addressed the plaintiffs’ suggestion that voluminous filings are common in setting-aside proceedings and therefore should not justify a significant uplift. The judgment does not deny that such proceedings can be document-heavy, but it rejects the idea that volume alone makes the matter ordinary. The court’s point was that counsel still had to do the work of reviewing the material in depth, and that work had real cost consequences. (Para 5) (Para 7)
"It is unrealistic to expect defendant’s lawyers to have concluded, without taking the time to review the plaintiffs’ several thousands of pages of exhibits in depth, that the application was commonplace and unexceptional." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7
How Did the Court Deal With the Plaintiffs’ Reliance on CBX v CBZ?
The plaintiffs relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in CBX and another v CBZ and others [2021] SGCA(I) 4. The extraction states that the plaintiffs accepted that, under that authority, a voluminous record is a factor that may be considered in deciding whether to give an uplift on pre-transfer costs, but not a reason for disregarding Appendix G completely. That concession is important because it shows the plaintiffs were not arguing for a rigid rule against any uplift; rather, they were arguing against a large departure from the guideline. (Para 5)
"The plaintiffs accept that, in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s decision in CBX and another v CBZ and others [2021] SGCA(I) 4, a voluminous record is a factor that may be considered in deciding whether to give an up-lift on pre-transfer costs, but it is not a reason for disregarding Appendix G completely." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 5
The judgment’s treatment of that submission is consistent with its overall approach. The court did not say that Appendix G was irrelevant; on the contrary, it expressly recognized Appendix G as the starting point. But it also recognized that the guideline is flexible and that the facts of the case may justify departure. The court’s conclusion was therefore not a rejection of the guideline, but an application of the discretion built into it. (Para 3) (Para 10)
"Appendix G allows the court a discretion to depart from that guideline when appropriate in the circumstances of the case." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 3
In practical terms, the court appears to have treated CBX v CBZ as supportive of the proposition that volume matters, but not as imposing a ceiling on the court’s discretion. The judgment’s own reasoning shows that the court was persuaded by the combination of volume, foreign law material, and the need for careful review by counsel who had not been involved in the underlying arbitration. That combination, rather than any single factor, justified the uplift. (Para 4) (Para 6) (Para 7)
"The defendant argues that such step is justified because its Singapore counsel was not involved in the underlying consolidated arbitration." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 4
Why Did the Court Award S$45,000 for Post-Transfer Costs?
For post-transfer costs, the governing principle was different. The parties agreed that the defendant was entitled to its “reasonable costs” under O 110 r 46 ROC, which the judgment identifies as the general rule governing costs before the SICC. The issue was therefore not whether the defendant should recover post-transfer costs, but whether the amount claimed was reasonable in light of the work actually done. (Para 2)
"The parties further agree that, as to post-transfer costs, the defendant is entitled to its “reasonable costs” in accordance with O 110 r 46 ROC, the general rule governing costs before the SICC." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 2
The defendant’s actual post-transfer costs were broken down in detail. The judgment records costs for attending the case management conference, reviewing the plaintiffs’ further reply affidavits and preparing the defendant’s further reply affidavit, drafting submissions, preparing for and attending the hearing, and preparing cost submissions. The total actual amount was higher than the S$45,000 sought, but the defendant had already discounted its actual costs by more than half. The court treated that discount as significant evidence of reasonableness. (Para 11) (Para 12) (Para 13)
"The defendant’s actual post-transfer costs have been broken down as follows: (a) attending CMC: S$3,600; (b) reviewing plaintiffs’ further reply affidavits and preparing defendant’s further reply affidavit: S$5,800; (c) drafting submissions: S$23,100; (d) preparing for and attending hearing: S$59,700; (e) preparing cost submissions: S$5,600." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 11
The court also considered the composition of the legal team. It noted that the work was done by a Senior Counsel and two assisting lawyers, and it held that S$45,000 for that work was wholly reasonable. The judgment’s reasoning suggests that the court viewed the combination of seniority, complexity, and document volume as justifying the amount claimed, especially given the substantial reduction from the defendant’s actual costs. (Para 14) (Para 15)
"In that context, S$45,000 for the work done by a Senior Counsel and his two assisting lawyers must be regarded as wholly reasonable." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 15
The court’s conclusion on post-transfer costs was therefore not a mechanical application of a tariff. It was a contextual assessment of what was reasonable in the circumstances. The judgment indicates that the court was satisfied that the amount sought reflected the real work required to prepare for and conduct the post-transfer phase, and that the figure was not inflated when viewed against the actual costs incurred. (Para 12) (Para 15) (Para 16)
"I will award post-transfer costs of S$45,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 16
What Exact Orders Did the Court Make on Costs and Disbursements?
The final order was that the plaintiffs pay the defendant S$85,000 all-in. That figure comprised S$25,000 in pre-transfer costs and S$45,000 in post-transfer costs, with disbursements of S$15,000 noted as part of the defendant’s original claim. The judgment states that there was no dispute over disbursements, which means the court did not need to engage in a separate analysis of that component. (Para 2) (Para 17)
"There will be an order that the plaintiffs pay the defendant costs of S$85,000 (all-in)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 17
The structure of the order is significant. It shows that the court accepted the defendant’s overall costs position, while still exercising judgment on the two principal components of the claim. The court did not simply rubber-stamp the defendant’s figures; it reduced the pre-transfer amount to S$25,000 by departing from Appendix G, and it then accepted S$45,000 as reasonable post-transfer costs. The result was the same total sought by the defendant, but the route to that total was reasoned and component-specific. (Para 10) (Para 16) (Para 17)
"I award pre-transfer costs of S$25,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 10
"I will award post-transfer costs of S$45,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 16
The judgment also makes clear that the parties had already agreed on the relevance of the applicable costs regimes. For pre-transfer costs, the court looked to O 59 and Appendix G; for post-transfer costs, it looked to O 110 r 46 ROC. That framework allowed the court to resolve the dispute without needing to decide any broader doctrinal question about entitlement to costs in arbitral set-aside proceedings. (Para 2) (Para 3)
"There is also no dispute that the costs scale in O 59 of the Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) and Appendix G (“Appendix G”) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions are relevant to pre-transfer costs." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 2
What Does This Judgment Say About the Relationship Between Appendix G and Judicial Discretion?
The judgment is a clear illustration of how Appendix G operates as a guideline rather than an inflexible rule. The court expressly stated that Appendix G gives a guideline of S$12,000 per day for contentious originating summonses not involving cross-examination, but it also emphasized that the court may depart from that guideline when appropriate. The decision therefore reinforces the idea that costs assessment remains contextual and fact-sensitive. (Para 3)
"Appendix G gives a guideline of S$12,000 per day for contentious originating summonses not involving cross-examination. But Appendix G allows the court a discretion to depart from that guideline when appropriate in the circumstances of the case." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 3
On the facts here, the court found that the circumstances were sufficiently unusual to justify departure. The volume of exhibits, the length of the award, the size of the supporting affidavit, and the presence of foreign law material all pointed in the same direction. The court’s reasoning shows that it was not enough for the plaintiffs to say that such volume is common in arbitration-related litigation; the court wanted to know what the volume meant for the actual work required of counsel. (Para 6) (Para 7) (Para 8)
"to discern what is relevant and what is not in a mass of several thousand pages requires considerable attention and thought on counsel’s part." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 15
That observation is important because it links the factual record directly to the costs outcome. The court was not awarding costs because the case was novel in a doctrinal sense; it was awarding costs because the practical burden of handling the material was substantial. In that sense, the judgment is a useful reminder that costs assessment in the SICC can turn on the real demands placed on counsel, not merely on the formal category of the proceeding. (Para 7) (Para 15) (Para 16)
"In that context, S$45,000 for the work done by a Senior Counsel and his two assisting lawyers must be regarded as wholly reasonable." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 15
Why Does This Case Matter for Practitioners?
This case matters because it gives a concrete example of how the SICC may approach costs after an unsuccessful arbitral set-aside application. Practitioners can see that the court will look closely at the actual record, including exhibits and foreign law materials, when deciding whether Appendix G should be departed from. The decision therefore has practical value for lawyers preparing costs submissions in document-heavy international commercial disputes. (Para 3) (Para 7) (Para 10)
"It is unrealistic to expect defendant’s lawyers to have concluded, without taking the time to review the plaintiffs’ several thousands of pages of exhibits in depth, that the application was commonplace and unexceptional." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7
The case also matters because it shows that a substantial post-transfer costs award can be upheld where the work is performed by a senior legal team and the amount sought is already discounted from actual costs. That is a useful signal for practitioners: the court will not necessarily equate “reasonable costs” with a low or nominal figure, especially where the work required is substantial and the claimed amount is supported by a breakdown. (Para 11) (Para 15) (Para 16)
"The defendant’s actual post-transfer costs have been broken down as follows: (a) attending CMC: S$3,600; (b) reviewing plaintiffs’ further reply affidavits and preparing defendant’s further reply affidavit: S$5,800; (c) drafting submissions: S$23,100; (d) preparing for and attending hearing: S$59,700; (e) preparing cost submissions: S$5,600." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 11
Finally, the judgment is significant because it demonstrates disciplined judicial reasoning in a costs dispute. The court identified the applicable regimes, isolated the real points of disagreement, considered the factual burden on counsel, and then made a reasoned award. For litigators, the lesson is that costs submissions should be anchored in the actual scale and complexity of the record, and should explain why the work done justifies the amount sought. (Para 2) (Para 3) (Para 7) (Para 15)
"There will be an order that the plaintiffs pay the defendant costs of S$85,000 (all-in)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 17
Cases Referred To
| Case Name | Citation | How Used | Key Proposition |
|---|---|---|---|
| CJM and others v CJT | [2021] SGHC(I) 4 | Referred to as the earlier substantive decision in which the plaintiffs’ application to set aside the arbitral award was dismissed. | The present judgment is the follow-on costs decision after dismissal of the setting-aside application. (Para 1) |
| CBX and another v CBZ and others | [2021] SGCA(I) 4 | Cited by the plaintiffs on the relevance of a voluminous record to pre-transfer costs. | A voluminous record may justify an uplift on pre-transfer costs, but does not justify disregarding Appendix G entirely. (Para 5) |
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), Order 59 (Para 2)
- Supreme Court Practice Directions, Appendix G (Para 2) (Para 3)
- Rules of Court (2014 Rev Ed), Order 110 rule 46 (Para 2)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGHCI 9 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.