Case Details
- Citation: [2021] SGHC 167
- Title: Chiong Chin May Selena v Attorney-General and another
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 30 June 2021
- Coram: Sundaresh Menon CJ; Andrew Phang Boon Leong JCA; Chao Hick Tin SJ
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 1 of 2021
- Tribunal/Court: Court of Three Judges
- Applicant: Chiong Chin May Selena
- Respondents: Attorney-General and another
- Second Respondent: The Law Society of Singapore
- Legal Area: Legal Profession — Reinstatement
- Key Statutory Provision: Section 102 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed)
- Judgment Length: 5 pages, 2,646 words
- Counsel: The applicant in person; Jeyendran s/o Jeyapal and Enoch Wong Lok Hang (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the first respondent; Rajan Sanjiv Kumar and Mehaerun Simaa d/o Ravichanran (Allen & Gledhill LLP) for the second respondent
- Proceedings: Application for reinstatement to the Roll of advocates and solicitors
- Prior Disciplinary Outcome: Applicant struck off the Roll on 20 August 2014
- Underlying Misconduct: Criminal breach of trust (“CBT”) involving client monies
- Criminal Proceedings: Conviction on several counts of CBT; sentence of nine months’ imprisonment; appeal allowed on sentence (reduced to a day’s imprisonment and some fines)
- Medical/Personal Context: Long history of depression and bipolar disorder
- Disciplinary Proceedings Context: Multiple disciplinary issues prior to striking off; mental illness was a recurring theme
Summary
In Chiong Chin May Selena v Attorney-General and another [2021] SGHC 167, the High Court (per a coram of three judges) dismissed an application by a former advocate and solicitor for reinstatement to the Roll under s 102 of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed). The applicant had been struck off the Roll on 20 August 2014 after convictions for several counts of criminal breach of trust (“CBT”), which involved the retention of client monies instead of placing them into the required client account.
The court reiterated that reinstatement is not automatic even after a substantial passage of time. It emphasised that the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating full and complete rehabilitation, and that the court must also consider whether reinstatement would undermine the protection of the public interest and the reputation of the legal profession. Although the court accepted that the interval between striking off and the reinstatement application was substantially adequate in the particular circumstances, it found that the applicant failed to show that her psychiatric condition had been adequately resolved and that she could reliably cope with the stresses of legal practice.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The applicant, Selena Chiong Chin May, was struck off the Roll on 20 August 2014 following her conviction in 2013 on several counts of CBT. The CBT offences involved an element of dishonesty: she retained client monies rather than placing the sums in question into the client account as required. She was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment. She appealed against both conviction and sentence; the High Court dismissed her appeal on conviction but allowed the appeal on sentence, reducing her imprisonment to a day and imposing some fines. In doing so, the High Court was sympathetic to her mental condition, noting her long history of bipolar disorder and that it could have adversely affected her judgment.
Before the striking off order, the applicant had faced two sets of disciplinary proceedings. A common theme across her disciplinary history was her mental illness. The court, when ordering striking off, expressly considered that her acts should be viewed through the prism of her mental illness and that her culpability may have been reduced. The court also observed that she “needs help and attention of professionals” to resolve her mental issues, and that if and when her issues were behind her, the court might view a reinstatement application sympathetically even if brought earlier than is customarily expected.
After the criminal appeal was disposed of in March 2014, disciplinary proceedings ensued. The court struck her off because the CBT offences involved dishonesty. However, it again took note of her mental illness and the possibility of earlier reinstatement in an appropriate case. The applicant then voluntarily ceased practice in July 2010, about four years before the striking off order. Police reports were made in July 2010, which later culminated in criminal proceedings. At the Law Society’s request, she surrendered her Practising Certificate (“PC”). This voluntary cessation of practice became relevant later to the court’s assessment of the adequacy of the interval.
In January 2021, the applicant made the reinstatement application that led to this decision. The Attorney-General and the Law Society opposed the application. The central question became whether, during the interval since striking off, the applicant had been fully and completely rehabilitated—particularly in light of her psychiatric history—and whether reinstatement would be consistent with the public interest and the integrity of the legal profession.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The High Court framed the legal inquiry around the settled principles for reinstatement under s 102 of the Legal Profession Act. The court identified three crucial factors: (a) whether an adequate period of time has passed between the striking off order and the reinstatement application (the “interval”); (b) whether the applicant has been fully and completely rehabilitated; and (c) whether allowing reinstatement would undermine or prejudice the protection of the public interest and the reputation of the legal profession.
Although all three factors were relevant, the case turned primarily on the second factor—rehabilitation. The court had to decide whether the applicant’s psychiatric condition had been adequately addressed and whether the evidence showed that the risk of relapse or recurrence of misconduct could be discounted. The court also had to consider, as part of rehabilitation, whether the applicant could cope with the stresses and rigours of legal practice, given that legal work can involve significant emotional and time pressures.
Procedurally and evidentially, the court also had to assess the reliability and sufficiency of the medical evidence presented. In particular, it considered a supplementary psychiatric report submitted on the eve of the hearing without leave and without being properly filed in affidavit form, and it evaluated whether that report meaningfully advanced the applicant’s case.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
Interval: The court began with the adequacy of time. Approximately seven years had passed between the striking off order (20 August 2014) and the reinstatement application (January 2021). The court noted that, as a general rule, a period significantly longer than five years should have passed before an application will be considered favourably, and that seven years may not typically be sufficient. However, the Attorney-General and the Law Society did not take issue with the interval in this case, and the court agreed that the interval was substantially and adequately in excess of five years for two reasons.
First, at the time of striking off, the court had already indicated that it might view reinstatement sympathetically if brought earlier than usual because the CBT offences were committed when the applicant was suffering from psychiatric illness that reduced culpability. Second, the applicant had voluntarily ceased practice in July 2010, surrendering her PC at the Law Society’s request. The court treated this as relevant to the effective period during which she was not practising. While the court cautioned that voluntary suspension is not automatically credited in full—because it is ultimately not for the lawyer to determine her own punishment—it accepted, on the evidence, that the voluntary suspension was borne out of genuine remorse and contrition. This allowed the court to recognise that, in the circumstances, the interval was adequate.
Rehabilitation: The court then turned to the core issue: whether the applicant had been fully and completely rehabilitated. It reiterated that the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating rehabilitation by reference to conduct during the interval. Objective evidence of what she had been involved in, and references—particularly from members of the legal fraternity—are key. Having considered the evidence, the court was not satisfied that the applicant had discharged this burden.
The court’s first reason was that it was not satisfied that the applicant had adequately resolved her psychiatric issues. The applicant relied on a psychiatrist’s report certifying that she was “fit to return to work as an Advocate and Solicitor”, provided she maintained strict adherence to medication and follow-up appointments. However, the court observed that the same report also stated that before the CBT offences, she had been assessed as fit to return to work as a lawyer so long as she complied with appointments and medication. In other words, the present medical assessment was not materially different from the earlier assessment that existed before the misconduct. The court found that the report did not explain how or in what way the risk of recurrence of misconduct could be adequately managed or addressed.
The court further held that compliance with treatment could not be assumed. It noted that the report itself indicated that the applicant had been somewhat irregular in keeping medical appointments in the past. The applicant argued that her grown children could intervene if she relapsed. The court rejected this as an adequate answer because such intervention would come too late; the real question remained what steps had been taken, and would be taken, to assure ongoing compliance with the treatment regimen. The court thus found that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that relapse risk had been effectively mitigated.
Supplementary report and relapse risk: For completeness, the court considered a supplementary psychiatric report submitted on the eve of the hearing. The court criticised the manner of submission: it was provided without leave, without an explanation, and not filed as part of an affidavit. The court nonetheless considered it, but found it did not help the applicant. The supplementary report, when read alongside the applicant’s prior records with the Institute of Mental Health, confirmed that there was a real risk of relapse. It identified relapse triggers including major changes in life, over-exertion, insufficient rest, emotional stress, and poor attention to one’s health. The court again found that there was nothing before it to satisfy it that these concerns had been adequately addressed by the applicant prior to making the application.
Stress of legal practice: The court’s second point on rehabilitation was that the applicant had not put forward evidence demonstrating that she would be able to cope with the stresses and rigours of legal practice. This was important for at least two reasons. First, the supplementary psychiatric report identified major changes and over-exertion as potential triggers for relapse, and legal practice would involve new and particular stresses. Second, evidence on coping capacity would help establish the restoration of mental balance and stability. In the truncated extract provided, the court’s reasoning is cut off after this point, but the thrust is clear: rehabilitation requires more than a medical opinion of “fitness” conditioned on medication; it requires credible evidence that the applicant’s condition is stable and that she can reliably function in the demanding environment of legal work without relapse.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the application for reinstatement. While the court accepted that the interval was substantially adequate in the particular circumstances—taking into account the earlier voluntary surrender of the PC and the court’s prior sympathy to the role of mental illness in reducing culpability—it held that the applicant failed to demonstrate full and complete rehabilitation.
Practically, the effect of the decision is that the applicant remained struck off and was not reinstated to the Roll. The decision underscores that reinstatement applications will be closely scrutinised where the underlying misconduct is linked to mental illness, and where the evidence does not show that relapse risk has been effectively managed and that the applicant can cope with the stresses of practice.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners and law students because it illustrates how the reinstatement framework under s 102 of the Legal Profession Act is applied in a mental-illness context. The court’s analysis shows that even where the underlying offences were committed when the applicant’s psychiatric condition reduced culpability, reinstatement still requires a rigorous showing of full rehabilitation. The decision reinforces that the court will not treat a conditional medical “fitness to return” opinion as sufficient if it does not meaningfully address relapse risk and the applicant’s capacity to comply with treatment in practice.
From a precedent and doctrinal standpoint, the case reiterates the three-factor test (interval, rehabilitation, and public interest/reputation) and clarifies that the second factor is often decisive. It also highlights evidential expectations: applicants should provide objective evidence of rehabilitation during the interval, credible assurances of treatment compliance, and—where relevant—evidence from the legal community or other sources that supports the conclusion that the applicant can safely resume professional duties.
For lawyers advising clients who are seeking reinstatement after striking off, the case suggests practical steps: medical reports should explain how the risk of recurrence has been addressed since the time of the misconduct; applicants should provide evidence of stable compliance patterns; and they should be prepared to show how they will manage the specific triggers identified by clinicians in the context of legal practice. Where supplementary reports are to be filed, they should be properly and procedurally presented to avoid undermining credibility.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed), s 102
Cases Cited
- Nathan Edmund v Law Society of Singapore [2013] 1 SLR 729
- Knight Glenn Jeyasingam v Law Society of Singapore [2007] 3 SLR(R) 704
- Law Society of Singapore v Chia Choon Yang [2018] 5 SLR 1068
- Re Lim Cheng Peng [1987] SLR(R) 582
- Kalpanath Singh s/o Ram Raj Singh v Law Society of Singapore [2009] 4 SLR(R) 1018
Source Documents
This article analyses [2021] SGHC 167 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.