Submit Article
Legal Analysis. Regulatory Intelligence. Jurisprudence.
Singapore

Chief Assessor and another v Skyventure VWT Singapore Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 10

In Chief Assessor and another v Skyventure VWT Singapore Pte Ltd, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of Revenue Law — Property tax.

Case Details

  • Citation: [2020] SGHC 10
  • Case Title: Chief Assessor and another v Skyventure VWT Singapore Pte Ltd
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Decision Date: 16 January 2020
  • Coram: Choo Han Teck J
  • Case Number: Tax Appeal No 7 of 2019
  • Judges: Choo Han Teck J
  • Plaintiff/Applicant: Chief Assessor and another (Comptroller of Property Tax)
  • Defendant/Respondent: Skyventure VWT Singapore Pte Ltd
  • Legal Area: Revenue Law — Property tax
  • Statutes Referenced: Interpretation Act; Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed)
  • Key Provision: s 2(2) Property Tax Act (annual value exemption for premises with specified machinery)
  • Tribunal/Court Below: Valuation Review Board (VRB)
  • VRB Composition: Majority and minority decisions (majority in favour of taxpayer; minority partly agreeing)
  • Counsel for Appellants: Quek Hui Ling, Pang Mei Yu and Shawn Joo Jian Hua (Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore)
  • Counsel for Respondent: Tan Hee Joek (Tan See Swan & Co)
  • Judgment Length: 4 pages, 1,869 words
  • Outcome: High Court allowed the appeal; wind tunnel value to be included in annual value (no s 2(2) exemption)

Summary

This High Court decision concerns the scope of the property tax exemption in s 2(2) of the Property Tax Act. Skyventure VWT Singapore Pte Ltd operated an indoor “iFly Singapore” attraction at 43 Siloso Beach Walk, using a vertical wind tunnel to suspend visitors in mid-air. The Chief Assessor included the wind tunnel’s value in assessing the annual value of the premises for property tax purposes, increasing the annual value for the relevant periods.

The taxpayer appealed, arguing that the wind tunnel was “machinery” used for purposes falling within s 2(2), and therefore the enhanced value attributable to that machinery should not be taken into consideration when computing annual value. The Valuation Review Board (VRB) reached a split decision: the majority held that the wind tunnel was machinery and that it fell within s 2(2)(b) and (c), while the minority accepted machinery but held that s 2(2) was confined to industrial purposes and could not extend to leisure or recreational industries. The Chief Assessor and Comptroller appealed against the VRB majority’s conclusion.

Choo Han Teck J allowed the appeal. While the judge accepted that the wind tunnel was machinery in the ordinary sense and that it primarily functioned to generate aerodynamic conditions for indoor skydiving, he held that the statutory scheme must be interpreted in its entirety, including the industrial purpose limitation that emerges from the Court of Appeal’s earlier decisions. He further rejected the taxpayer’s attempt to fit the wind tunnel’s operation within s 2(2)(c) by characterising the “effect” of pressurised air as something “adapted for sale”. The result was that the wind tunnel’s value remained includable in the annual value for property tax assessment.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

Skyventure VWT Singapore Pte Ltd owns and operates “iFly Singapore”, an attraction offering a simulated skydiving experience. The core technology is a vertical wind tunnel installed at the premises. The tunnel generates a high-speed, high-pressure flow of air (“the Wind Tunnel” or “wind tunnel”), allowing visitors to be suspended in mid-air and experience controlled flight within the chamber. The attraction is commercial and draws customers for leisure and entertainment rather than for industrial production.

For property tax purposes, the amount payable is calculated as a percentage of the property’s annual value. In this case, the relevant tax rate was 10%. The Chief Assessor assessed the annual value of the premises for the period from 19 April 2011 to 31 December 2013. In doing so, the Chief Assessor included the value of the wind tunnel, which materially increased the annual value compared to what it would have been without the wind tunnel component.

The inclusion of the wind tunnel increased the annual value from $808,000 to $1,091,000 for the period from 19 April 2011 to 31 December 2011; from $946,000 to $1,245,000 for the period from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012; and from $846,000 to $991,000 for the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013. The taxpayer’s challenge therefore had direct fiscal consequences, as the exemption would reduce the taxable base by excluding the enhanced value attributable to the specified machinery.

Skyventure appealed to the VRB. The taxpayer’s central contention was that the wind tunnel should be treated as “machinery” within s 2(2) of the Property Tax Act, and that it was used for purposes that bring the premises within the exemption. The Chief Assessor’s position was narrower: the wind tunnel did not fall within s 2(2) because it was not “machinery” and, in any event, it was not used for industrial purposes. The VRB majority disagreed with the Chief Assessor on both points, whereas the minority agreed that the wind tunnel was machinery but insisted that the statutory exemption was limited to industrial purposes.

The appeal turned on the interpretation of s 2(2) of the Property Tax Act. The provision addresses how annual value is assessed where premises contain “machinery used” for specified purposes, namely: (a) making articles or parts; (b) altering, repairing, ornamenting or finishing articles; and (c) adapting for sale any article. Where the conditions are met, “the enhanced value given to the premises by the presence of such machinery shall not be taken into consideration”. The statutory definition also includes “steam engines, boilers and other motive power belonging to that machinery”.

Although both the VRB majority and minority accepted that the wind tunnel was “machinery” in the ordinary sense, the High Court had to decide whether the wind tunnel’s use fell within s 2(2) in a way that justified excluding its value from annual value. This required the court to determine whether the statutory language should be read broadly (as the VRB majority effectively did) or whether it is constrained by the legislative purpose and by the industrial context recognised in earlier appellate authority.

Two sub-issues were particularly important. First, whether the wind tunnel’s function could be characterised as “altering” or “adapting” an “article” for the purposes listed in s 2(2)(b) and (c). Second, whether the exemption extends beyond industrial manufacturing and processing to leisure, sports, or recreational uses. The VRB split reflected these competing approaches: the majority focused on the machinery’s function, while the minority emphasised industrial purpose.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

Choo Han Teck J began by addressing the “machinery” question and the taxpayer’s attempt to characterise the wind tunnel as merely a “setting” for the business. The judge noted that the wind tunnel includes a horizontal portion containing four fans with a total capacity of 1,800 horsepower. Applying the “dominant function test” from Pan-United Marine Ltd v Chief Assessor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 569 at [69], the judge agreed with the VRB that the primary purpose of the wind tunnel was to generate the aerodynamic conditions necessary for indoor skydiving. It was therefore not simply a static receptacle; it was an active system producing the conditions that enable the attraction’s core experience.

However, the judge then turned to the more difficult interpretive question: how s 2(2) should be construed in light of its legislative purpose and the appellate guidance in earlier cases. The taxpayer relied on First DCS Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2007] 3 SLR(R) 326 (“First DCS (HC)”) and the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chief Assessor v First DCS Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 724 (“First DCS (CA)”), which had adopted a purposive approach. In First DCS, the issue involved district cooling machinery that chilled water and supplied it to neighbouring buildings for air-conditioning. The Court of Appeal had interpreted “adapting for sale” broadly, focusing on the real subject of sale (the chilling effect) rather than insisting that the physical article itself be transferred.

In the present case, the taxpayer argued that the wind tunnel should similarly be treated as machinery used for purposes within s 2(2), and that the court should focus on the function of the machinery rather than narrow the exemption to industrial settings. The taxpayer also contended that any industrial limitation would amount to “judicial gloss” not warranted by the statutory text. The judge, however, emphasised that he was bound by the Court of Appeal’s approach in First DCS (CA), including the recognition that the legislative purpose was to promote investments in manufacturing machinery and industrial processes.

Crucially, Choo Han Teck J distinguished between “industrial” and “leisure” purposes. While he accepted that the wind tunnel is machinery in the plain sense, he held that the provision must be considered “in its entirety” by taking “machinery” and “industrial purposes” into account. He observed that there was no dispute that the wind tunnel was used for social events and not for any industrial purpose. This meant that even if the wind tunnel altered air (by increasing velocity and pressure and decreasing temperature), the statutory exemption could not be applied without regard to the industrial context that earlier appellate authority had treated as central to s 2(2).

On the taxpayer’s attempt to fit the wind tunnel within s 2(2)(b) and (c), the judge engaged with the conceptual distinction between “making” and “altering” or “adapting”. He noted that in First DCS (CA), the Court of Appeal had explained that “making” produces a new article from raw material, whereas “altering” or “adapting” changes an article while leaving it essentially the same article. The judge also referenced the Court of Appeal’s illustrative examples (such as the difference between an egg and a banana) to show that “altering” and “adapting” are not limitless concepts. Although the parties here did not dispute that air was not “made”, the judge was not persuaded that the taxpayer’s broad reading would be consistent with the statutory purpose.

Indeed, the judge accepted the taxpayer’s concern about absurdity in principle. If any machinery that produces even the smallest alteration to air were exempt, then common equipment such as air-conditioning units could qualify. That would be unreasonable given the legislative intent to encourage investment in industrial machinery rather than to create a general exemption for any premises where air is modified. The judge therefore agreed that a wide interpretation must be constrained to avoid undermining the property tax scheme.

As to s 2(2)(c), the taxpayer’s alternative argument was that the “effect” of pressurised air is sold to customers, and thus the air was “adapted for sale”. The judge expressed reservations about the correctness of the reasoning in First DCS (HC) that treated the sale of the chilling effect as a “sale” within s 2(2)(c). He suggested that where ownership of the article does not pass, the arrangement may resemble a hire agreement rather than a sale. Nonetheless, he did not decide the broader correctness of First DCS on that point because he focused on the statutory purpose.

In the judge’s view, even if one could characterise the chilling effect in First DCS as the real subject of sale, extending that logic to the wind tunnel would not further the legislative purpose. The sale of the effect of pressurised air for recreational skydiving did not promote manufacturing or industrial investment in the way contemplated by the statutory scheme. Accordingly, he held that the air was not “adapted for sale” within the meaning of s 2(2)(c) in this context.

What Was the Outcome?

The High Court allowed the appeal. The practical effect was that the wind tunnel’s value remained includable in the annual value of the premises for property tax assessment for the relevant period. The taxpayer therefore did not obtain the s 2(2) exemption that would have excluded the enhanced value attributable to the wind tunnel.

Costs were not immediately fixed in the judgment; the court indicated that costs would be determined later if the parties could not agree.

Why Does This Case Matter?

This decision is significant for property tax practitioners because it clarifies that s 2(2) is not a purely functional exemption that automatically applies whenever machinery alters or adapts some physical “article”. Even where machinery is clearly sophisticated and performs a technical function, the exemption must still be interpreted in light of the legislative purpose and the industrial context recognised by the Court of Appeal in First DCS (CA). In other words, the “industrial purposes” limitation is not merely a background consideration; it can be determinative where the premises are used for leisure or recreational activities.

For taxpayers operating attractions, entertainment venues, or other non-industrial businesses, the case provides a cautionary framework. The court accepted that the wind tunnel is “machinery” but still denied the exemption because the use was not industrial. This suggests that future claims under s 2(2) will likely require evidence not only of machinery and the relevant “altering/adapting” mechanics, but also of the industrial nature of the underlying business purpose.

From a statutory interpretation perspective, the judgment also illustrates how purposive interpretation operates within binding appellate authority. While the court acknowledged that the Interpretation Act now requires a purposive approach, it treated the Court of Appeal’s earlier statements about legislative purpose as controlling. The decision therefore reinforces the hierarchy of precedent: even if a taxpayer argues that earlier language amounts to “judicial gloss”, the High Court will follow the appellate construction where it is binding.

Legislation Referenced

  • Property Tax Act (Cap 254, 2005 Rev Ed): s 2(2)
  • Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed): s 9A (purposive interpretation)

Cases Cited

  • Pan-United Marine Ltd v Chief Assessor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 569
  • First DCS Pte Ltd v Chief Assessor [2007] 3 SLR(R) 326
  • Chief Assessor v First DCS Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 724
  • Chief Assessor and another v Skyventure VWT Singapore Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 10 (this case)

Source Documents

This article analyses [2020] SGHC 10 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

More in

Legal Wires

Legal Wires

Stay ahead of the legal curve. Get expert analysis and regulatory updates natively delivered to your inbox.

Success! Please check your inbox and click the link to confirm your subscription.