Case Details
- Citation: [2023] SGHC 51
- Title: Cheung Phei Chiet v Jujun Tanu and another matter
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of Decision: 2 March 2023
- Originating Summons No 808 of 2021: OS 808
- Originating Summons No 809 of 2021: OS 809
- Judges: Tan Siong Thye J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Cheung Phei Chiet (Mr Cheung)
- Defendant/Respondent: Jujun Tanu (Mr Tanu) and (in OS 809) Cheong Yoke Ling @ Zhang Yuling and Chang Chih-Tung, Charles (Executors of the Estate of Cheong Kim Koek, deceased)
- Legal Area: Land — Strata titles
- Statutes Referenced: First Schedule to the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (BMSMA)
- Statutes Referenced: First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act
- Statutes Referenced: First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969
- Other Procedural/Contextual References (from judgment text): MCST 508 (Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No. 508)
- Development: Upper East Coast Road; four commercial units (ground floor) and four residential units (above)
- Units: Unit 53A (Mr Cheung); Unit 55 (Mr Tanu); Unit 53 (Mdm Cheong and Mr Chang as executors/trustees)
- Judgment Length: 134 pages; 38,248 words
- Cases Cited: [2020] SGDC 295; [2023] SGHC 51
Summary
In Cheung Phei Chiet v Jujun Tanu and another matter ([2023] SGHC 51), the High Court dealt with a long-running, highly acrimonious dispute between two opposing groups of subsidiary proprietors in a small strata development managed by MCST 508. The applicant, Mr Cheung, brought two originating summonses (OS 808 and OS 809) seeking declarations and a wide range of consequential orders. These included declarations that certain motions proposed and/or passed by the respondents were unlawful or void, orders restraining the respondents from exercising rights to table motions, and orders to secure compliance with statutory requirements under the Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (BMSMA). The court also addressed whether it could order the removal of council members, and whether the court could grant declarations concerning wet-ink signatures on official documents.
The court’s approach was structured and incremental. It first considered the propriety of declaratory relief and the court’s discretion to grant it. It then analysed specific categories of relief: (i) legality of proposed resolutions and motions; (ii) statutory compliance requirements for MCST governance; (iii) restraints relating to installation of kitchen exhaust systems on common property; (iv) restraints on engaging solicitors; (v) declarations about wet-ink signatures; and (vi) orders seeking removal of council members and related declarations of breach of duties. The court ultimately granted certain restraining and compliance orders, but it also made clear limits on its powers—particularly in relation to removal of council members.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute arose within a small strata development along Upper East Coast Road comprising four commercial units on the ground floor and four residential units above. The management corporation, MCST 508, was governed by a council whose composition became the focal point of conflict. The applicant, Mr Cheung, was a subsidiary proprietor of Unit 53A. The respondents included Mr Tanu (Unit 55) and, in OS 809, Mdm Cheong Yoke Ling and Mr Chang Chih-Tung Charles, who held Unit 53 as executors and trustees for the estate of Mr Cheong Kim Koek, with the unit transferred to them in January 2021.
Before the 2021 council was formed, Mr Cheung and Mr Param were the only council members from 2017 to 2020. At the 2020 AGM held on 30 December 2020, Mr Tanu participated by proxy. The AGM was described as extremely acrimonious. Mr Tanu’s proxy was allegedly not allowed to speak or vote because he was in arrears. When the meeting considered the formation of a new council for 2021, Mr Cheung and Mr Param took the position that Mr Tanu did not qualify due to alleged arrears, and that Mdm Cheong did not qualify because she was allegedly only an executor. Despite these objections, Mr Tanu and Mdm Cheong eventually became council members for the 2021 council.
However, the 2021 council was effectively deadlocked. It was a split council, with Mr Cheung and Mr Param on one side and Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu on the other. The judgment records that attempts to hold council meetings—whether physically or by correspondence—were futile, and the 2021 council never held its first council meeting. As a result, there were no collective decisions made by MCST 508 in 2021. In the absence of collective governance, Mr Cheung and Mr Param proceeded to make decisions for MCST 508 on their own accord, including appointing and instructing their own solicitors, Aequitas Law LLP, to act for MCST 508 in earlier proceedings.
Mr Cheung’s and Mr Param’s resignation from the council in November 2021 left Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu as the only council members. This shift intensified the dispute. Mr Cheung then brought OS 808 and OS 809 in 2021, seeking numerous prayers that largely overlapped. The prayers can be grouped into categories: (a) declarations that various motions sought to be passed by the respondents were unlawful, unenforceable, invalid, and/or void; (b) orders restraining the respondents from tabling motions relating to installation of structures on common areas; (c) orders curtailing the respondents’ power to appoint Legal Solutions LLC as solicitors; (d) declarations imposing a duty to append wet-ink signatures on MCST official documents; (e) orders seeking removal of Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu as council members for alleged breaches of duties; and (f) orders restricting Mdm Cheong and Mr Chang regarding allegedly unauthorised alterations in respect of Unit 53. The applicant also initially sought orders relating to access to documents held with Aequitas Law LLP, but those were not pursued at oral submissions.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The case raised multiple legal issues, but they were anchored around MCST governance under the BMSMA and the court’s jurisdiction to grant declaratory and injunctive relief in strata disputes. First, the court had to determine whether it should grant declarations that certain motions/resolutions were unlawful or void, and whether declaratory relief was appropriate given the procedural posture and the court’s discretion. This required the court to consider whether the relief sought would be meaningful and not merely academic, and whether the court should intervene in internal MCST processes.
Second, the court had to decide whether the respondents’ proposed actions—particularly those involving motions to install structures on common property and the engagement of solicitors—were constrained by statutory requirements and/or the proper exercise of council powers. This included whether the respondents were required to comply with specific statutory formalities when conducting MCST business, and whether non-compliance justified restraining orders.
Third, the court addressed the scope of its powers regarding council membership. Mr Cheung sought orders removing Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu as council members, along with declarations that they had breached their duties. The key issue here was whether the High Court, in the context of an originating summons under the strata framework, had the power to order removal of council members, and if not, what alternative relief could be granted.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by situating the applications within the broader context of repeated litigation between the parties. The judgment notes that the disputes had spanned many years and involved at least twelve cases filed before all levels of the Singapore courts. This history mattered because it framed the court’s concern about governance breakdown and the practical need for enforceable orders rather than purely rhetorical declarations. The court also emphasised the “small development” context, underscoring that the strata governance framework is designed to provide orderly decision-making and compliance, not to facilitate ongoing factional conflict.
On declaratory relief, the court analysed its discretion to grant declarations. While declarations can clarify legal rights and obligations, the court considered whether the relief sought would serve a practical purpose and whether the court should intervene at the stage of proposed motions rather than after completed actions. The court’s analysis reflected a balancing exercise: on one hand, subsidiary proprietors should be able to challenge unlawful motions; on the other hand, the court should avoid overstepping into internal management where statutory mechanisms and proper procedural steps exist. The court therefore approached the declarations category-by-category, rather than granting broad declarations wholesale.
For the restraining orders, the court examined the statutory framework governing MCST decision-making and the formal requirements for council and general meeting processes. The judgment indicates that the applicant sought orders restraining the respondents from exercising rights to table motions relating to installation of structures on common areas. The court’s reasoning in this part focused on whether the proposed motions were consistent with the BMSMA’s requirements and whether the respondents could lawfully proceed without meeting statutory conditions. The court also considered the practical consequences of allowing installations to proceed, particularly where the installations would affect common property and potentially require compliance with technical, procedural, and approval requirements.
The court further addressed orders securing compliance with statutory requirements. This included analysis of specific prayers (labelled in the judgment as the “Third Prayer” and “Fourth Prayer”), and the court’s reasoning suggests that it treated statutory compliance as a threshold issue. Where the applicant alleged that the respondents had not complied with statutory requirements, the court considered what orders would effectively ensure compliance going forward. This is consistent with the strata management objective of ensuring that MCSTs operate lawfully and transparently, and that subsidiary proprietors are protected against governance irregularities.
In relation to restraining the respondents from installing kitchen exhaust systems on common property, the court again focused on the legality and procedural propriety of the proposed installations. The court’s analysis distinguished between actions that may be within the scope of permissible maintenance or alterations and actions that require compliance with statutory processes and approvals. The court’s reasoning also reflected the need to prevent irreversible or fait accompli outcomes, where allowing installation to proceed could render subsequent legal challenges ineffective.
On the “wet-ink signatures” issue, the court considered whether it could grant a declaration imposing a duty on the council members to append wet-ink signatures on MCST official documents. This required the court to interpret the relevant statutory and schedule provisions referenced in the judgment metadata, and to consider whether the legal framework required wet-ink signatures for MCST documents. The court’s analysis indicates that it treated this as a matter of compliance with formalities rather than a mere technicality, because signature requirements can affect the validity of corporate governance records and decisions.
Finally, the court addressed the removal of council members. Mr Cheung sought orders removing Mdm Cheong and Mr Tanu as council members for alleged breaches of duties. The court analysed its powers to make “Removal Orders” and concluded that it did not have the power to order the removal of the management corporation’s council members. This is a significant doctrinal point: even where breaches of duty are alleged, the court may be constrained by the statutory scheme and the remedies expressly provided. The court therefore separated (i) the question of whether it could order removal, from (ii) the question of whether it could make declarations about alleged breaches. The judgment indicates that while removal was not available as an order, the court could still consider declarations as to breaches of duties, subject to the legal framework and evidential basis.
In addition, the court dealt with orders relating to reinstatement of portions of Unit 53, including reinstatement of rear windows and removal of a front wall with reinstatement of the façade. This part of the judgment shows that the court’s analysis was not confined to governance mechanics; it also addressed substantive disputes about alterations and compliance with strata rules and common property boundaries.
What Was the Outcome?
The court granted a set of orders and declarations that reflected a partial success for the applicant. It issued restraining orders in relation to proposed resolutions and actions that were not consistent with statutory requirements, including orders securing compliance with the BMSMA’s statutory requirements and restraining certain installations on common property. The court also addressed the wet-ink signature issue through declaratory relief, and it made findings on alleged breaches of duties, though within the limits of what it could order.
Crucially, the court declined to grant the removal orders sought against the council members. While it accepted that the applicant could seek declarations concerning alleged breaches, it held that it did not have the power to order the removal of the management corporation’s council members. The practical effect is that the applicant obtained enforceable restraints and compliance measures, but the governance composition of the council could not be altered by the High Court through removal orders in this procedural context.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is important for practitioners dealing with strata disputes because it illustrates how the High Court manages overlapping and multi-prayer applications arising from factional MCST governance. The judgment demonstrates that courts will scrutinise the legality of proposed motions and the procedural compliance of MCST actions, and will grant restraining and compliance orders where statutory requirements are implicated. For subsidiary proprietors and council members alike, the case reinforces that strata governance is governed by statute and formalities, and that internal disputes can quickly become legally actionable.
Equally significant is the court’s clarification of the limits of judicial power in relation to council membership. By holding that it did not have the power to order removal of council members, the judgment signals that remedies for breaches of duty may not always translate into direct structural changes to the council. Practitioners should therefore consider the statutory pathways and remedies available under the BMSMA and related frameworks, rather than assuming that the High Court can fashion any remedy it considers appropriate.
Finally, the case serves as a cautionary tale about governance deadlock and the escalation of disputes in small developments. The court’s emphasis on the prolonged and emotionally charged nature of the conflict underscores the need for councils to maintain lawful processes, keep proper records, and avoid actions that could be challenged as invalid. For law students and litigators, the judgment provides a detailed example of how declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and statutory compliance issues are analysed in the strata context.
Legislation Referenced
- Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act (BMSMA) — First Schedule
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act — First Schedule
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 — First Schedule
Cases Cited
- [2020] SGDC 295
- [2023] SGHC 51
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGHC 51 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.