Case Details
- Title: CHEONG WEI CHANG v LEE HSIEN LOONG
- Citation: [2018] SGHC 217
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 2018-10-05
- Judges: Valerie Thean J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Cheong Wei Chang
- Defendant/Respondent: Lee Hsien Loong
- Other Parties (related proceedings): Attorney-General as plaintiff in Originating Summons No 1071 of 2018
- Suit No: 489 of 2018
- Summons No: 2809 of 2018
- Originating Summons No: 1071 of 2018
- Legal Areas: Civil Procedure; Striking out; Vexatious litigant; Inherent powers; Courts and Jurisdiction
- Statutes Referenced: Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”); Government Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed) (“GPA”) (as discussed)
- Cases Cited: [2018] SGHC 217 (as provided in metadata/extract)
- Judgment Length: 43 pages, 13,629 words
Summary
In Cheong Wei Chang v Lee Hsien Loong ([2018] SGHC 217), the High Court confronted a pattern of repeated litigation by Mr Cheong against the Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, arising from claims that the defendant (and/or his department) was “regulating” the plaintiff’s activities and withholding information. The court had to determine whether the plaintiff’s new suit should be struck out for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and whether the court should restrain further proceedings by invoking its inherent powers and/or the statutory regime for vexatious litigants.
The court struck out the suit, finding that the pleadings failed to disclose any coherent legal basis for relief. The court also addressed the broader procedural problem: when a litigant persists with claims that are not merely weak but conceptually incoherent and repetitious, the court’s resources are diverted from other litigants. The judgment therefore considered the reach and limits of the court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of process, alongside the statutory mechanism in s 74 of the SCJA that requires leave before further proceedings are instituted by a vexatious litigant.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The factual background begins with Mr Cheong’s earlier litigation. On 5 February 2018, Mr Cheong filed Suit No 125 of 2018 against Mr Lee. Mr Cheong’s Statement of Claim asserted, in substance, that there existed a contractual or document-based basis for “remuneration” relating to “regulations” of his activities, and that he wanted a “stop” to every regulation imposed on him by the defendant and/or the Prime Minister’s Office. The Statement of Claim did not articulate a conventional contract claim with pleaded offer, acceptance, consideration, or specific contractual terms. Instead, it relied on broad assertions that the defendant’s “regulations” affected his health and activities, and that the defendant failed to address his concerns and continued regulating him even during emergencies.
Mr Cheong’s pleadings were accompanied by extensive documentary materials, including two volumes of “Supporting Documents” and later a further set of “Trial Document 1”. The documents were described as miscellaneous and wide-ranging, covering topics that did not appear to connect to the legal claim against the Prime Minister. The court gave illustrative examples. One example involved a picture captioned as evidence of internal bleeding and a suspicion that something remained in the body after consuming food products. Another example involved an email exchange with a Citibank Singapore employee about arranging an interview, with the caption suggesting that the interview was a “regulated setting” and that he was not selected. A further example involved a letter from the Legal Aid Bureau informing him he was not eligible for legal aid, captioned as “Regulations at legal aid bureau”, with the plaintiff asserting that the criteria “do not make sense”.
In Suit 125, the Attorney-General acted for Mr Lee. The Attorney-General’s position was that, under s 19(3) of the GPA, proceedings against “Government” should be instituted against the Attorney-General where no specific Government department is appropriate. The Attorney-General therefore took the view that Mr Lee should not have been named in his personal capacity, but rather the Attorney-General should have been the defendant. Rather than rely solely on this technical irregularity, the Attorney-General applied to strike out the claim on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.
On 30 April 2018, the High Court struck out Suit 125 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The court’s reasoning, as summarised in the present judgment, was that Mr Cheong did not plead facts showing any offer or acceptance of contractual terms by Mr Lee or the Prime Minister’s Office. The court also found the factual premise incoherent: Mr Cheong did not plead facts demonstrating the existence of any “regulations” originating from Mr Lee or the Prime Minister’s Office, nor how such “regulations” caused the various problems described in the supporting materials. The court characterised the documents as a collation of conspiracy theories without supporting facts, and found no basis to suggest that the vicissitudes of life faced by Mr Cheong were caused by the Prime Minister or his department.
Despite the striking out order, Mr Cheong filed a new suit on 9 May 2018—Suit No 489 of 2018—again naming Mr Lee as the defendant. The substance of the new Statement of Claim was similar: Mr Cheong sought “receipt, contractual payment/document(s)” relating to regulations of his activities, and sought a stop to regulations coming from the defendant and/or his departments. The new suit again included a volume of “Trial Document 1 (May 2018)” that was almost identical to the earlier “Trial Document 1”. The court therefore treated the new suit as a continuation of the same litigation pattern.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was whether Suit 489 should be struck out because it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. This required the court to assess whether the pleadings contained sufficient factual and legal substance to ground a claim for relief, rather than merely repeating incoherent allegations and documentary materials that did not connect to the pleaded cause of action.
The second key issue concerned abuse of process and the court’s ability to restrain further litigation. The Attorney-General sought not only striking out, but also an order that no further legal proceedings be instituted by Mr Cheong without leave of the High Court, in relation to matters that formed the subject matter of, were raised in, or arose out of the proceedings. The court therefore had to consider how far it could go using its inherent powers to regulate vexatious litigants, and how that inherent power interacts with the statutory framework in s 74 of the SCJA.
A further issue, reflected in the judgment’s discussion, was the procedural and institutional question of whether the statutory mechanism in s 74 is the appropriate route in all circumstances, or whether the court’s inherent powers can be used more directly—particularly where the Attorney-General is the applicant and the litigation is clearly abusive and repetitive.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by situating the case within the fundamental tension that underpins vexatious litigant jurisprudence: access to the courts is a core aspect of the rule of law, but court resources are limited and must be preserved for genuine disputes. The judgment emphasised that vexatious persistence imposes disproportionate burdens on the court system and on other litigants, while also exacting financial, emotional, and mental costs on the vexatious litigant and often his family. This framing matters because it informs the court’s willingness to intervene early to prevent further abuse.
On the striking out application, the court applied the familiar principle that a pleading must disclose a reasonable cause of action. The court’s analysis drew heavily on the earlier striking out in Suit 125. Suit 489 did not meaningfully cure the defects identified in the earlier suit. Mr Cheong again sought contractual documents and remuneration tied to “regulations” of his activities, and again sought to stop regulations imposed by the Prime Minister and/or his department. Yet the pleadings again failed to articulate the basic contractual elements that would be necessary to sustain a contract-based claim. There were no pleaded facts demonstrating any offer, acceptance, or contractual terms, and no coherent legal mechanism by which the Prime Minister’s Office could be said to have entered into a contract with Mr Cheong on the pleaded basis.
Similarly, the factual premise remained incoherent. The court reiterated that Mr Cheong did not plead facts demonstrating the existence of any “regulations” originating from Mr Lee or the Prime Minister’s Office. Even more importantly, Mr Cheong did not plead how any such “regulations” caused or contributed to the wide range of problems described in the supporting materials. The court’s earlier observation that the documents appeared to be a collation of conspiracy theories without supporting facts remained applicable. The court therefore concluded that the new suit was not merely unsuccessful; it was legally and factually incapable of grounding the relief sought.
Having determined that the suit should be struck out, the court then turned to the broader question of restraint. The judgment canvassed the English position on the inherent power to prevent vexatious proceedings, and compared approaches in other common law jurisdictions such as Australia, Hong Kong, and Canada. This comparative discussion served a practical purpose: it helped the court identify the principles that govern when and how inherent powers may be used to restrain litigants, and what procedural safeguards should be observed.
In Singapore, the judgment focused on the statutory mechanism in s 74 of the SCJA. Section 74(1) provides that, if on an application by the Attorney-General the High Court is satisfied that a person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, the court may order that no further legal proceedings shall be instituted without leave, and that previously instituted proceedings shall not be continued without leave. Leave is not to be given unless the court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of process and that there is prima facie ground. The court also noted that no appeal lies from an order refusing leave for institution or continuance, and that orders are published in the Gazette.
The court’s analysis therefore had to reconcile two tools: (1) the statutory s 74 regime, which is expressly designed to manage vexatious litigants through a leave requirement; and (2) the court’s inherent powers, which include the ability to prevent abuse of process and to control its own proceedings. The judgment considered whether inherent powers could be used to restrain further litigation even where the statutory mechanism might also be available, and it examined the “substantive need” presented by the case—namely, the clear repetitiveness and the lack of any reasonable ground for the new suit after the earlier striking out.
Crucially, the judgment addressed the question “What if the AG is the applicant?”. This reflects a concern that the statutory mechanism in s 74 is triggered by an application made by the Attorney-General. Where the Attorney-General is already before the court, the court may be better positioned to apply the statutory framework or to use inherent powers in a manner consistent with the statutory design. The court ultimately concluded on the use of inherent power in light of the statutory scheme, emphasising that the court should not undermine the legislative criteria and procedural structure in s 74. At the same time, the court recognised that the inherent power remains available to regulate proceedings and prevent abuse, especially where the litigation is clearly vexatious and wasteful.
In applying these principles, the court treated Suit 489 as part of a continuing pattern. The near-identical documentary materials, the repetition of the same incoherent allegations, and the immediate filing of a new suit shortly after the earlier striking out order supported the conclusion that Mr Cheong’s persistence was habitual and without reasonable ground. The court therefore found a sufficient basis to restrain further proceedings, subject to the appropriate leave mechanism.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court struck out Suit 489 of 2018 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The court’s decision reflected both the deficiencies in the pleadings and the continuing failure to address the defects identified in the earlier Suit 125.
In addition, the court granted relief aimed at preventing further like actions by Mr Cheong. The practical effect was that Mr Cheong could not simply file further proceedings against the defendant (and/or in relation to the same subject matter) without first obtaining leave from the High Court, thereby curbing vexatious persistence and protecting judicial resources.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how Singapore courts manage vexatious litigation through a combination of striking out powers and restraint orders. While s 74 of the SCJA provides a structured statutory pathway, the judgment demonstrates that courts also rely on inherent powers to prevent abuse of process and to control their own proceedings. The decision therefore offers a roadmap for how courts may respond when a litigant repeatedly files conceptually incoherent claims that have already been struck out.
From a procedural standpoint, the case highlights the importance of pleading coherence and legal relevance. Even where a litigant submits voluminous documents, the court will examine whether the pleaded facts connect to the legal cause of action and whether the defendant is properly identified. The court’s approach in this case underscores that documentary “support” that does not establish the pleaded elements will not rescue a claim from striking out.
For litigators acting for defendants or for the Attorney-General, the judgment also reinforces the utility of seeking both striking out and restraint. The court’s reasoning shows that where a litigant persists immediately after an adverse decision, the evidential and practical basis for restraint becomes stronger. For litigants, the case serves as a caution that repeated filings can lead to restrictions on access to the courts, even where the litigant frames the dispute in broad terms such as “regulations” and “contractual remuneration” without a legally sustainable foundation.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 74 (Vexatious litigants) [CDN] [SSO]
- Government Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed), s 19(3) (as discussed in relation to proper defendants) [CDN] [SSO]
Cases Cited
- [2018] SGHC 217 (as provided in the supplied metadata/extract)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2018] SGHC 217 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.