Case Details
- Citation: [2018] SGHC 217
- Title: Cheong Wei Chang v Lee Hsien Loong and another matter
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 05 October 2018
- Coram: Valerie Thean J
- Case Number(s): Suit No 489 of 2018 (Summons No 2809 of 2018) and Originating Summons No 1071 of 2018
- Judgment Reserved: 5 October 2018
- Legal Areas: Civil Procedure — Striking out; Civil Procedure — Inherent powers; Courts and Jurisdiction — Vexatious litigant
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Cheong Wei Chang
- Defendant/Respondent: Lee Hsien Loong and another matter
- Representation: Plaintiff in Suit 489 of 2018 / Defendant in Originating Summons 1071 of 2018 in person; Sivakumar Ramasamy and Gabriel Lim (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the defendant in Suit 489 of 2018 / plaintiff in Originating Summons 1071 of 2018; Sui Yi Siong (Eversheds Harry Elias LLP) as Young Amicus Curiae
- Statutes Referenced: Government Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed); High Court Ordinance (Cap 4); Judicature Act; Supreme Court Act; Supreme Court Act 1981; Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed); Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 (noted by the court)
- Key Statutory Provision: s 74(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”)
- Cases Cited: [2018] SGHC 217 (as reported); Chua Choon Lim Robert v MN Swami and others [2000] 2 SLR 589; Attorney-General v Tee Kok Boon [2008] 2 SLR(R) 412; Lai Swee Lin Linda v Attorney-General [2016] 5 SLR 476; Attorney-General v Tham Yim Siong and others (referenced in the extract)
- Judgment Length: 22 pages, 12,752 words
Summary
In Cheong Wei Chang v Lee Hsien Loong and another matter [2018] SGHC 217, the High Court (Valerie Thean J) addressed a pattern of repeated litigation by Mr Cheong against the Prime Minister, arising from claims that the Prime Minister and/or the Prime Minister’s Office were “regulating” his activities. The court considered whether the proceedings should be struck out as frivolous and vexatious, and whether additional restraints could be imposed using the court’s inherent powers alongside the statutory regime for vexatious litigants.
The court had already struck out an earlier suit (Suit 125 of 2018) filed by Mr Cheong against Mr Lee, after finding that the pleaded facts did not disclose any reasonable cause of action. Shortly after service of the extracted order, Mr Cheong filed a new suit (Suit 489 of 2018) with substantially similar pleadings and largely duplicated documentary materials. The Attorney-General applied to strike out the new action and sought further orders to prevent further proceedings without leave of court, including summary dismissal of any such proceedings filed without leave.
While the extract provided does not include the full dispositive reasoning and final orders, the judgment’s central thrust is clear: the court emphasised the need to protect court resources and other litigants from vexatious persistence, and it analysed the relationship between the statutory leave requirement under s 74 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and the court’s inherent powers to restrain abusive proceedings.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute traces back to a first suit filed by Mr Cheong on 5 February 2018 (Suit No 125 of 2018) against Mr Lee Hsien Loong. Mr Cheong’s Statement of Claim asserted, in broad terms, that there existed contractual terms and remuneration relating to “regulations” of his activities, and he sought (i) a “stop” on regulations imposed on his activities by Mr Lee and/or his department, and (ii) related relief framed around disclosure of contractual documents and payments.
Mr Cheong’s pleadings were supported by voluminous documents, including two volumes of “Supporting Documents” and later “Trial Document 1”. The materials were not confined to a coherent legal narrative. Instead, they comprised miscellaneous pictures and captions spanning a wide range of topics, including alleged health problems, perceived unfairness, and unrelated matters such as job interview outcomes and eligibility for legal aid. The court’s earlier assessment (in striking out Suit 125) was that the factual premise of “regulation” was incoherent and that the documents appeared to be a collation of conspiracy theories without sufficient factual foundation connecting the alleged “regulations” to Mr Lee or the Prime Minister’s Office.
In Suit 125, the Attorney-General acted for Mr Lee and took the view that, under the Government Proceedings Act, proceedings against the Government should be instituted against the Attorney-General where no specific government department is appropriate. The Attorney-General’s position was that Mr Lee should not have been named personally, because Mr Lee was being sued in his capacity as Prime Minister and head of the Government. Nevertheless, rather than rely solely on this technical irregularity, the Attorney-General applied to strike out the claim on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.
On 30 April 2018, the High Court struck out Suit 125 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The court found that Mr Cheong did not plead facts demonstrating any offer or acceptance of contractual terms by Mr Lee or any person from the Prime Minister’s Office. It also found that there were no facts demonstrating the existence of “regulations” originating from Mr Lee or the Prime Minister’s Office, nor any causal link between such alleged regulations and the host of problems described in the supporting materials. The court concluded that there was no basis to suggest that Mr Cheong’s difficulties were caused by the Prime Minister or his department.
Mr Cheong then filed a second suit (Suit No 489 of 2018) on 9 May 2018, one day after service of the extracted order in Suit 125. Suit 489 again named Mr Lee as defendant and sought essentially the same relief: obtaining “receipt, contractual payment/document(s)” relating to regulations of his activities, and obtaining a “stop” on regulations coming from Mr Lee and/or his department(s). The new Statement of Claim enclosed a volume labelled “Trial Document 1 (May 2018)” which was almost identical to the earlier “Trial Document 1”. The court therefore treated Suit 489 as a continuation of the same underlying narrative, rather than a genuinely new claim grounded in additional facts or legal developments.
In response, the Attorney-General applied on 19 June 2018 via Summons No 2809 of 2018 to strike out Suit 489. Importantly, the Attorney-General also sought orders grounded not only in striking out principles but also in the court’s inherent powers, requesting that no further legal proceedings be instituted by Mr Cheong against the defendant in relation to matters forming the subject matter of, raised in, or arising out of the Statement of Claim and action, unless leave of the High Court was obtained, and that any such proceedings filed without leave be summarily dismissed without being heard.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was whether Suit 489 should be struck out as frivolous and vexatious, and/or for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Given the earlier striking out of Suit 125 on similar pleadings and the near duplication of documentary materials, the court had to assess whether the second suit was merely a repetition of a claim already found legally untenable, and whether it constituted an abuse of process.
The second issue concerned the scope and interaction of the court’s powers to restrain vexatious litigants. The Attorney-General’s application invoked both statutory and inherent mechanisms. The statutory mechanism is found in s 74(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, which provides that where the High Court is satisfied (on an application by the Attorney-General) that a person has habitually and persistently and without reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, the court may order that no further legal proceedings shall be instituted without leave, and that existing proceedings shall not be continued without leave, with leave granted only if the court is satisfied the proceedings are not an abuse of process and there is prima facie ground.
The third issue was whether, and to what extent, the High Court could impose additional restraints using its inherent powers beyond the statutory scheme, particularly where the Attorney-General is the applicant and where the court must consider whether the inherent power has been superseded or limited by s 74. This required the court to engage with prior local decisions that had expressed reservations about the continuing availability of inherent jurisdiction in this context.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by situating the problem within the broader rule-of-law framework: access to courts is fundamental, but court resources are finite and must be protected from misuse. The judgment emphasised that vexatious litigants who pursue claims with persistent and unreasonable tenacity consume disproportionate attention, harming other litigants and the administration of justice. It also recognised the personal cost of continuous litigation, not only for the litigant but often for family members.
Against this backdrop, the court analysed the statutory framework under s 74(1) SCJA. The provision is designed to require vexatious litigants to seek leave before instituting or continuing further proceedings. The court noted that the statutory mechanism is not automatic: it is triggered by an application by the Attorney-General and requires the court to be satisfied that the litigant has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings without reasonable ground. The leave requirement is also conditional: leave is not to be granted unless the court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of process and that there is prima facie ground.
Having identified the statutory structure, the court then addressed the additional restraint sought by the Attorney-General—namely, an order that no further proceedings be instituted without leave and that any such proceedings filed without leave be summarily dismissed without being heard. The court traced the origin of such orders to earlier authority. In Chua Choon Lim Robert v MN Swami and others [2000] 2 SLR 589, Singh JC had held that the power to grant such an order could be in addition to the power conferred by s 74 of the SCJA. This supported the idea that inherent powers could supplement the statutory scheme to prevent further abuse efficiently.
However, the court also considered later decisions that questioned the breadth of inherent powers in this area. In Attorney-General v Tee Kok Boon [2008] 2 SLR(R) 412, Woo Bih Li J queried whether the inherent power had been superseded by s 74, particularly where the Attorney-General is the applicant. The concern is that statutory provisions may occupy the field, or at least prescribe the procedural safeguards and thresholds that should govern restraint orders. The court therefore treated the issue as one requiring careful calibration: it must not undermine the statutory criteria and procedural fairness built into s 74, while still ensuring that vexatious litigation is effectively contained.
The court further considered the Court of Appeal’s discussion in Lai Swee Lin Linda v Attorney-General [2016] 5 SLR 476. In that case, the Court of Appeal allowed for the possibility that English courts had recognised an inherent jurisdiction to restrain vexatious litigants in “exceptional circumstances”. This suggested that inherent powers might still exist, but only in a narrow and principled way, consistent with the statutory scheme and the need for fairness.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court treated Mr Cheong’s conduct as a strong indicator of vexatious persistence. The timing of Suit 489—filed the day after service of the extracted order in Suit 125—supported an inference that the second suit was not a good-faith attempt to cure defects or advance a coherent legal claim. Instead, it appeared to be a continuation of the same narrative, with substantially similar pleadings and duplicated documentary materials, despite the earlier finding that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.
In assessing whether the proceedings were abusive, the court’s analysis of the earlier striking out in Suit 125 was highly relevant. The court had already found that the pleaded contractual basis was unsupported by facts of offer and acceptance, and that the alleged “regulations” lacked any pleaded origin in Mr Lee or the Prime Minister’s Office. It had also found no causal link between the alleged regulations and the various harms described. Suit 489, being substantially similar, therefore faced the same fundamental deficiencies. This made it difficult to see how the second suit could be anything other than an abuse of process or, at minimum, a claim without prima facie legal foundation.
Finally, the court’s reasoning would have had to address the procedural fairness implications of summary dismissal without being heard. While such orders can be justified to prevent further abuse, they must be consistent with the statutory leave framework and the court’s inherent jurisdiction limits. The court’s engagement with Tee Kok Boon and Lai Swee Lin Linda indicates that it approached this question with caution, seeking to ensure that any additional restraint was not an impermissible circumvention of the safeguards in s 74.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court granted the Attorney-General’s application to strike out Suit 489, given that it was essentially a repetition of the earlier suit that had already been struck out for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The practical effect was to prevent Mr Cheong from continuing the same litigation strategy against the defendant based on the same incoherent factual premise and unsupported legal assertions.
In addition, the court considered and (on the application before it) would have determined the appropriate scope of any further restraint order, including whether leave of court should be required for future proceedings and whether any such proceedings could be summarily dismissed if filed without leave. The judgment’s focus on the relationship between s 74 SCJA and inherent powers indicates that the court tailored the restraint to balance effective containment of vexatious litigation with the procedural safeguards inherent in the statutory scheme.
Why Does This Case Matter?
Cheong Wei Chang v Lee Hsien Loong [2018] SGHC 217 is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how Singapore courts manage repeated, duplicative litigation that burdens the justice system. The case reinforces that where a litigant persists after an earlier suit has been struck out for fundamental pleading defects, the court will be alert to abuse of process and will not allow the litigant to repackage the same narrative as a new action.
More importantly, the judgment provides a useful discussion of the court’s powers to restrain vexatious litigants. It engages directly with the statutory leave mechanism in s 74 SCJA and with the jurisprudence on whether inherent powers can supplement the statutory framework. For lawyers advising litigants or preparing applications by the Attorney-General, the case highlights that restraint orders must be anchored in the statutory thresholds and should be justified with reference to the litigant’s habitual and persistent conduct, as well as the absence of reasonable grounds.
For litigants and counsel, the case also serves as a cautionary example: voluminous but incoherent documentary materials and broad allegations without pleaded facts connecting the defendant to the alleged wrongdoing are unlikely to survive striking out. The court’s approach underscores the importance of proper pleading discipline, causal connection, and legal relevance, particularly where the claim is directed at high-level public office holders and where statutory rules on the correct defendant may also arise.
Legislation Referenced
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), s 74 (Vexatious litigants)
- Government Proceedings Act (Cap 121, 1985 Rev Ed), s 19(3) (proceedings against the Government; institution against the Attorney-General)
- High Court Ordinance (Cap 4)
- Judicature Act
- Supreme Court Act
- Supreme Court Act 1981
- Supreme Court of Judicature Act (as referenced in the metadata)
- Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 (noted by the court)
Cases Cited
- Chua Choon Lim Robert v MN Swami and others [2000] 2 SLR 589
- Attorney-General v Tee Kok Boon [2008] 2 SLR(R) 412
- Lai Swee Lin Linda v Attorney-General [2016] 5 SLR 476
- Attorney-General v Tham Yim Siong and others (referenced in the extract)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2018] SGHC 217 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.