Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHC(A) 41
- Title: Chen Aun-Li Andrew v Ha Chi Kut (suing as the sole executrix of the estate of Khoo Ee Liam, deceased)
- Court: Appellate Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 1 December 2022
- Case Type: Civil appeal against decision of the General Division High Court on registration and setting aside of a foreign judgment under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed)
- Judges: Kannan Ramesh JAD, Debbie Ong Siew Ling JAD and Aedit Abdullah J
- Appellant/Defendant in Originating Summons: Chen Aun-Li Andrew
- Respondent/Plaintiff in Originating Summons: Ha Chi Kut (suing as the sole executrix of the estate of Khoo Ee Liam, deceased)
- Originating Summons: Originating Summons No 618 of 2021 (Registrar’s Appeal No 337 of 2021)
- Civil Appeal No: Civil Appeal No 31 of 2022
- Lower Court Decision: Ha Chi Kut (suing as the sole executrix of the estate of Khoo Ee Liam, deceased) v Chen Aun-Li Andrew [2022] SGHC 149
- Judgment Length: 13 pages, 3,354 words
- Legal Area: Conflict of Laws; Foreign judgments; Enforcement; Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
- Statutes Referenced: Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed) (“REFJA”); legislative history and amendments including the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Amendment) Act 2019 (Act 25 of 2019)
- Key Statutory Theme: The REFJA extinguishes the option of enforcement at the common law to which the Act
- Cases Cited: [2022] SGHC 149; Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (trading as Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 SLR 1129 (Court of Appeal)
Summary
This appeal concerned the registration in Singapore of a Hong Kong judgment dealing with costs arising from Hong Kong proceedings. The “Collective Judgment” comprised two components: (a) a 30 April 2013 Hong Kong Court of First Instance order (“Cost Order”) that costs of the main action and counterclaim be paid to the late Mr Khoo and taxed if not agreed; and (b) a cost certificate dated 13 May 2020 (“Cost Certificate”) issued after taxation, which quantified the costs at HK$15,280,877.12. The respondent, as sole executrix of Mr Khoo’s estate, registered the Collective Judgment in Singapore under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed) (“REFJA”).
The appellant, Chen Aun-Li Andrew, sought to set aside registration on the basis that the relevant “date of the judgment” for the six-year registration window should be 30 April 2013 (the Cost Order), rather than 13 May 2020 (the Cost Certificate). The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, holding that the relevant judgment for REFJA purposes was the Collective Judgment that became final and conclusive as to the amount payable only upon issuance of the Cost Certificate. Accordingly, registration was made within time and there was no basis to set aside.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The appellant, Mr Chen Aun-Li Andrew, was the director and sole shareholder of Aachen (Asia Pacific) Consultants Limited (“ACL”), a company incorporated in Hong Kong. ACL commenced legal proceedings in Hong Kong against Mr Khoo, identified in the Singapore proceedings as the late Mr Khoo Ee Liam. In those Hong Kong proceedings, ACL’s claims were dismissed and Mr Khoo’s counterclaim succeeded. The Hong Kong Court of First Instance thus found in favour of Mr Khoo on the merits of the counterclaim and dismissed ACL’s claims.
After the substantive outcome, Mr Khoo obtained an order joining the appellant as a party to the Hong Kong action for the purpose of costs. This joinder was granted as part of the Hong Kong “Cost Order” dated 30 April 2013. The Cost Order provided that the costs of the main action (Action No 4354 of 2003) and the counterclaim were to be paid to Mr Khoo, to be taxed if not agreed. In other words, the Cost Order established the entitlement to costs and the mechanism for quantification, but did not itself fix the amount payable.
Because the parties were unable to agree on the costs, the matter proceeded to taxation. Mr Khoo subsequently passed away. His estate was represented by the respondent, Mdm Ha Chi Kut, who obtained an order to be made a party to the Hong Kong action in her capacity as sole executrix. The costs were then taxed, and the taxing master issued the Cost Certificate dated 13 May 2020, quantifying the costs at HK$15,280,877.12. This Cost Certificate therefore converted the earlier entitlement to costs into a quantified sum.
On 21 June 2021, pursuant to s 4(1) of the REFJA, the respondent applied to register the Collective Judgment in Singapore. The Collective Judgment was registered on 22 June 2021. The appellant then applied to set aside the registration under s 5(1) of the REFJA. Both the assistant registrar and, on appeal, the General Division judge upheld the registration. The present appeal to the Appellate Division focused on the single issue of the relevant “date of the judgment” for the six-year registration period under s 4(1)(a).
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The central legal issue was how to determine the “date of the judgment” for the purposes of s 4(1)(a) read with s 5(1)(a)(i) of the REFJA. The appellant argued that the relevant date should be 30 April 2013, being the date of the Cost Order. He characterised the Cost Order as a “money judgment” because it obliged payment of costs, even though the quantum was not yet fixed. On that approach, the registration application would have been made outside the six-year window.
By contrast, the respondent contended that the judgment capable of registration under the REFJA was the Collective Judgment, and that it only became final and conclusive as to the amount payable when the Cost Certificate was issued on 13 May 2020. Under that approach, the registration application was within time. The dispute thus required the court to decide whether, for REFJA purposes, the relevant “judgment” was the earlier costs order or the later costs quantification certificate.
A related issue was interpretive: whether the 2019 amendments to the REFJA altered the legislative purpose or the approach to determining what constitutes a “money judgment” and the timing of finality. The appellant argued that the court should not rely on pre-2019 common law concepts and legislative history, because Parliament intended to depart from the common law position when enacting the 2019 Amendment. The Appellate Division therefore had to consider the effect of the 2019 Amendment and whether it changed the substantive requirements relevant to this case.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Appellate Division began by addressing the appellant’s argument that the 2019 Amendment changed the legislative object and purpose of the REFJA. The court noted that the appellant provided little evidential or textual support for the proposition that Parliament intended to depart from the common law position on enforcement of foreign judgments. Importantly, the court observed that there was no explanation or evidence, such as parliamentary debate material, demonstrating that Parliament intended to oust the common law approach in the manner suggested by the appellant.
Turning to the legislative history, the court relied on parliamentary debates to conclude that the 2019 Amendment was aimed at supplementing and strengthening the existing regime rather than replacing it. The court cited the statement in the Singapore Parliamentary Debates (2 September 2019) that the amendment sought to “supplement the existing regime, to further strengthen Singapore’s value proposition for litigants considering where to resolve their disputes”. The court further emphasised that the amendment was not intended to replace or oust the common law regime, but to expand and modernise the framework by adding additional types of judgments in civil proceedings into the REFJA’s scope.
In this context, the court analysed how the REFJA’s substantive requirements relate to the common law action on foreign judgments. Under the common law, an in personam final and conclusive foreign judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction could be enforced by an action for the amount due under it, where the judgment was for a fixed sum of money. The court referred to Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (trading as Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 SLR 1129 (Court of Appeal) for the proposition that the common law required a final and conclusive judgment and, in the fixed-sum context, a judgment for a fixed sum of money.
The Appellate Division then explained that the REFJA retained core elements of the common law approach. The requirement that the foreign judgment be final and conclusive between the parties was present in the REFJA both before and after the 2019 Amendment (as reflected in the relevant statutory provisions). The requirement that the foreign judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction also remained. The key substantive change introduced by the 2019 Amendment was the expansion of the REFJA’s scope to include judgments where a sum of money was not payable (for example, freezing orders and injunctions). In other words, the amendment shifted the definitional and scope aspects (including the placement of the “money judgment” concept), but did not alter the fundamental requirement that the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive between the parties.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court focused on when the Hong Kong costs entitlement became final and conclusive as to the amount payable. The Cost Order of 30 April 2013 established that costs were to be paid and that they would be taxed if not agreed. However, it did not itself fix the quantum. The Cost Certificate of 13 May 2020, issued after taxation, quantified the costs and therefore made the amount payable final and conclusive. The court thus treated the Collective Judgment as the operative “judgment” for REFJA purposes, because it was only upon issuance of the Cost Certificate that the amount payable was determined.
In rejecting the appellant’s attempt to treat the Cost Order as the relevant “money judgment” date, the Appellate Division implicitly drew a distinction between an order that creates an entitlement to costs subject to future quantification and an order (or certificate) that fixes the amount payable. The court’s reasoning aligned with the REFJA’s emphasis on finality and conclusiveness. If the amount is not yet determined, the judgment cannot be said to be final and conclusive as to the sum due, and therefore the six-year period should not be measured from a date when the judgment is not yet capable of enforcement in the practical sense contemplated by the REFJA.
Finally, the court affirmed that the General Division judge had correctly determined the relevant date as 13 May 2020. Since the respondent applied for registration within six years of that date, the registration was not in contravention of ss 3 or 4 of the REFJA. Consequently, the statutory basis for setting aside registration under s 5(1)(a)(i) was not made out.
What Was the Outcome?
The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal. It upheld the General Division’s decision to register the Collective Judgment in Singapore and refused to set aside registration. The court confirmed that the relevant date of the judgment for the six-year registration period under s 4(1)(a) was 13 May 2020, the date of the Cost Certificate, because that was when the costs became final and conclusive as to the amount payable.
Practically, the dismissal meant that the respondent, as judgment creditor, could proceed with enforcement in Singapore based on the registered foreign judgment quantified by the Cost Certificate, rather than being limited by the earlier Cost Order date proposed by the appellant.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners dealing with reciprocal enforcement of foreign judgments, particularly where the foreign judgment is not a single, self-contained monetary award but instead comprises components that quantify liability at different times. The case clarifies that, for REFJA purposes, the “date of the judgment” may depend on when the foreign decision becomes final and conclusive as to the amount payable. Orders that establish entitlement but leave quantification to a later taxation or assessment process may not be sufficient to trigger the six-year window.
The case also provides guidance on the interpretive approach to the 2019 amendments. The Appellate Division rejected the appellant’s attempt to treat the amendments as a departure from the common law framework. Instead, the court emphasised that the 2019 Amendment was designed to expand and modernise the REFJA’s coverage, while retaining the core substantive requirements associated with finality and conclusiveness. This is useful for lawyers who may otherwise argue that post-2019 statutory language should be construed in isolation from earlier common law concepts.
For litigators, the decision underscores the importance of carefully identifying the operative “judgment” for registration purposes and not assuming that the earliest related order is always the relevant date. Where foreign proceedings involve costs orders, taxation, or certificates, counsel should examine the foreign procedural steps to determine when the amount became fixed and final. This affects not only timing under s 4(1)(a) but also the risk of a successful challenge under s 5(1)(a)(i).
Legislation Referenced
- Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed) (“REFJA”)
- Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Amendment) Act 2019 (Act 25 of 2019)
Cases Cited
- Chen Aun-Li Andrew v Ha Chi Kut [2022] SGHC 149
- Poh Soon Kiat v Desert Palace Inc (trading as Caesars Palace) [2010] 1 SLR 1129
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHCA 41 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.