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CEX v CEY & Anor

In CEX v CEY & Anor, the High Court of the Republic of Singapore addressed issues of .

Case Details

  • Citation: [2020] SGHC 100
  • Title: CEX v CEY & Anor
  • Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
  • Date: 18 May 2020
  • Originating Process: Originating Summons No 933 of 2019
  • Judge: Lee Seiu Kin J
  • Applicant/Plaintiff: CEX
  • Respondents/Defendants: CEY & Anor
  • Legal Area: Building and Construction Law (Security of Payment / performance bond restraint)
  • Statutory Provision(s) Referenced: Section 31(1)(D) of the Arbitration Act (Cap 10, Rev Ed 2002)
  • Statutory Provision(s) Referenced (as per extract): Section 6(5) of the Building Control Act (Cap 29, 1999 Rev Ed)
  • Security Instrument: Performance guarantee (DBPB17S019663) dated 15 June 2017 for S$1,063,000.00 issued by Ergo Insurance Pte Ltd in favour of CEY Development Pte Ltd
  • Underlying Contract Context: Letter of award dated 4 May 2017 for proposed erection of strata landed housing development comprising 6 units of strata detached houses with attic and basement (each with roof terrace and swimming pool at attic level) on lots 01497V & 01494C MK 02 at Jalan Harom Setangkai, CEY Park Road (Tanglin Planning Area)
  • Key Procedural/Remedial Issue: Whether the court should restrain an on-demand performance bond call on the ground of unconscionability
  • Judgment Length: 37 pages, 10,154 words
  • Cases Cited (as provided): [1996] SGHC 136; [1999] SGHC 201; [2001] SGHC 334; [2009] SGHC 7; [2013] SGHC 86; [2018] SGHC 249; [2018] SGHC 33; [2018] SGHC 145; [2018] SGHC 163; [2019] SGHC 267

Summary

This decision of the High Court in CEX v CEY & Anor ([2020] SGHC 100) concerns an application to restrain a call on an on-demand performance bond issued in the context of a strata landed housing development. The developer (CEY) had called on the performance bond after the main contractor (CEX) was terminated for alleged failure to proceed with due diligence and due expedition. The contractor sought an injunction to prevent the call, relying primarily on the “unconscionability exception” to the general principle that performance bonds are payable on demand.

The court accepted that the bond was an on-demand instrument and that the demand was not technically defective. The central question therefore was whether the call was unconscionable in the circumstances. The judge concluded that CEY had acted unconscionably by letting impatience get the better of it and by pushing CEX to proceed with illegal construction works, then terminating CEX when it did not comply. On that basis, the court granted an injunction restraining CEY from calling on the performance bond.

What Were the Facts of This Case?

CEX became the main contractor for the project on 9 May 2017 after accepting a letter of award dated 4 May 2017. Under clause 9.1 of the letter of award, CEX procured a performance bond in favour of CEY. The performance bond was issued by Ergo Insurance Pte Ltd in favour of CEY Development Pte Ltd, with a stated sum of S$1,063,000.00 (performance guarantee DBPB17S019663 dated 15 June 2017). The dispute arose against a background of significant construction delays.

CEY attributed the delays to CEX’s alleged persistent failure to carry out the contract works with due diligence and expedition. CEX, in turn, argued that many delays were beyond its control. A key factual episode concerned the architectural qualified person for the project, Mr John Seah. Mr Seah fell ill and was hospitalised on 7 January 2019. On the same day, he attempted to authorise another person, Mr Ng Hoe Theong, to “cover [his] duties”. Mr Ng then issued a “Notice to Proceed with due diligence and due expedition” to CEX.

Mr Seah later died on 24 January 2019. The record indicated that no new architectural qualified person was formally appointed until 27 February 2019. Despite Mr Seah’s death, Mr Ng issued a termination certificate on 19 February 2019 “on behalf of [Mr Seah]”, stating that CEX had “failed and [was] still failing to proceed with due diligence or expedition in its Works”. Relying on that termination certificate and on CEY’s view of CEX’s persistent failure, CEY issued a notice of termination on 20 February 2019.

Following termination, CEX denied breach and promptly served a notice of arbitration on 21 February 2019, including claims that its employment had been wrongfully terminated. CEY later sought to recover losses said to arise from CEX’s alleged breaches. CEY collated complaints and issued a letter of demand seeking S$3,921,039.68, described as CEY’s estimated expenses for hiring a replacement contractor. CEX refused to pay. CEY then called on the performance bond on 19 July 2019, prompting CEX to apply for injunctive relief to restrain the call.

The judgment identified two principal issues. The first concerned statutory interpretation: the court had to consider s 6(5) of the Building Control Act (Cap 29, 1999 Rev Ed). Specifically, the question was whether the holder of a permit to carry out structural works ceases to be a qualified person if the permit holder takes ill and becomes otherwise incapacitated. This issue was relevant to whether it was illegal for CEX to continue construction works when Mr Seah took ill on 7 January 2019.

The second issue concerned the performance bond call. The court accepted that the performance bond was an on-demand instrument and that there was no contention that the demand was technically defective. The legal question was therefore whether the court should restrain the call on the ground of unconscionability. This required the court to apply the established framework for the unconscionability exception, which is distinct from fraud and is intended to prevent abusive or oppressive calls in construction-related disputes.

How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?

The court began by situating the unconscionability exception within Singapore’s performance bond jurisprudence. It noted that earlier authorities had created uncertainty as to whether unconscionability was merely loose language for fraud or a separate ground. That dichotomy was resolved by the Court of Appeal in GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd and another ([1999] 3 SLR(R) 44), which held unequivocally that unconscionability is a separate and distinct ground for granting an injunction to restrain enforcement of a performance bond.

After GHL, the jurisprudence developed to clarify the threshold. The court emphasised that nothing short of a strong prima facie case suffices. It referred to later decisions such as Dauphin Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of HRR Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan and BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd to explain that the court’s discretion is constrained by the need to preserve the commercial autonomy of performance bonds. The policy rationale is threefold: (a) respecting the intention of the parties; (b) upholding the autonomy principle; and (c) preventing abusive and oppressive calls, particularly in the construction industry.

To operationalise the doctrine, the judge adopted a structured framework for assessing unconscionability. First, the court must identify the nature of the performance bond, applying principles from Master Marine AS v Labroy Offshore Ltd and others ([2012] 3 SLR 125). Second, it must ascertain whether the call falls within the terms of the bond, drawing on cases such as York International Pte Ltd v Voltas Ltd ([2013] 3 SLR 1142) and BWN v BWO ([2019] 5 SLR 215). Third, it must evaluate whether the overall tenor and entire context of the parties’ conduct support a strong prima facie case of unconscionability. The court noted that unconscionability is broadly associated with unfairness and lack of good faith, while refusing to provide an exhaustive definition.

In describing how unconscionability commonly manifests, the court highlighted recurring categories: (i) calls for excessive sums; (ii) calls based on contractual breaches that the beneficiary itself is responsible for; (iii) calls tainted by unclean hands, such as inflated estimates of damages or selective/incomplete disclosures; (iv) calls made for ulterior motives; and (v) calls based on inconsistent positions taken by the beneficiary prior to calling the bond. Importantly, the judge clarified that the list is not closed and that the present case involved a factor not neatly captured by those categories.

Although the judgment identified an “Interpretation Issue” under the Building Control Act, the court’s ultimate decision rested primarily on unconscionability. The judge’s reasoning, as reflected in the introduction and conclusion, focused on CEY’s conduct in relation to the construction works. The court characterised CEY as having pushed CEX to proceed with illegal construction works and then terminating CEX for failing to comply. The judge found that CEY’s impatience and frustration with delays had led it to act unconscionably when it called on the performance bond.

In reaching this conclusion, the court also took account of the factual timeline surrounding the architectural qualified person. Mr Seah’s illness and death, and the interim authorisation by Mr Ng, formed part of the dispute about whether CEX was in breach of obligations to proceed with due diligence and expedition. CEY relied on a termination certificate issued “on behalf of [Mr Seah]” to justify termination. However, the court’s unconscionability analysis went beyond technicalities of breach and termination: it assessed the broader context, including CEY’s role in the circumstances that led to delays and its insistence on illegal works.

Accordingly, the court treated the call as abusive in the sense that CEY sought to obtain payment under the bond while its own conduct undermined the fairness of the call. This approach aligns with the policy of preventing oppressive calls while still respecting the autonomy of performance bonds. The court’s reasoning thus reflects the balancing exercise inherent in the unconscionability exception: the bond remains payable on demand in ordinary cases, but where the beneficiary’s conduct is sufficiently unfair and lacks good faith, the court will intervene.

What Was the Outcome?

The court granted CEX an injunction restraining CEY from calling on the performance bond. Although CEX had brought the application on both fraud and unconscionability grounds, the judge based the decision primarily on unconscionability. The practical effect is that CEY was prevented from realising the S$1,063,000.00 performance bond pending the resolution of the underlying dispute (including the arbitration proceedings already initiated by CEX).

By restraining the call, the court reinforced the principle that on-demand performance bonds are not immune from judicial supervision where a strong prima facie case of unconscionability is established. The decision therefore provides immediate relief to the contractor and preserves the status quo, preventing the beneficiary from converting an ongoing contractual dispute into immediate financial advantage through the bond mechanism.

Why Does This Case Matter?

CEX v CEY is significant for practitioners because it illustrates how the unconscionability exception is applied in a construction setting where delays, termination, and performance bond calls often intersect. While the autonomy principle remains the baseline, the court’s structured framework shows that unconscionability is assessed through the “overall tenor and entire context” of the parties’ conduct, not merely through whether the demand is technically compliant.

For developers and employers, the case is a cautionary reminder that calling a performance bond can be restrained where the beneficiary’s own conduct is implicated in the circumstances giving rise to the call. In particular, the judgment signals that attempts to obtain bond proceeds while pressing the contractor to proceed with illegal works (or otherwise acting in a manner lacking good faith) may satisfy the strong prima facie threshold for unconscionability.

For contractors, the decision is useful as an example of how to frame an injunction application. The court’s reasoning indicates that even where the bond terms are clear and the demand is not technically defective, the contractor can still succeed by demonstrating a compelling contextual unfairness. The case also underscores that courts will not treat the unconscionability categories as closed; novel or fact-specific conduct may still qualify if it supports a strong prima facie case of unconscionability.

Legislation Referenced

  • Arbitration Act (Cap 10, Rev Ed 2002), s 31(1)(D)
  • Building Control Act (Cap 29, 1999 Rev Ed), s 6(5)
  • Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, 2006 Rev Ed) (referenced in the judgment’s subject classification)

Cases Cited

  • [1996] SGHC 136
  • [1999] SGHC 201
  • [2001] SGHC 334
  • [2009] SGHC 7
  • [2013] SGHC 86
  • [2018] SGHC 249
  • [2018] SGHC 33
  • [2018] SGHC 145
  • [2018] SGHC 163
  • [2019] SGHC 267
  • Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd and others v Attorney-General [1995] 2 SLR(R) 262
  • New Civilbuild Pte Ltd v Guobena Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 SLR(R) 732
  • Dauphin Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of His Royal Highness Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan [1999] SGHC 201
  • Min Thai Holdings Pte Ltd v Sunlabel Pte Ltd and another [1998] 3 SLR(R) 961
  • Raymond Construction Pte Ltd v Low Yang Tong and another [1996] SGHC 136
  • GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd and another [1999] 3 SLR(R) 44
  • Dauphin Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of HRR Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan [2000] 1 SLR(R) 117
  • BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd [2012] 3 SLR 352
  • JBE Properties Pte Ltd v Gammon Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 47
  • Master Marine AS v Labroy Offshore Ltd and others [2012] 3 SLR 125
  • York International Pte Ltd v Voltas Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 1142
  • BWN v BWO [2019] 5 SLR 215

Source Documents

This article analyses [2020] SGHC 100 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.

Written by Sushant Shukla

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