Case Details
- Citation: [2020] SGHC 56
- Title: CBB v Law Society of Singapore
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 19 March 2020
- Judge: Aedit Abdullah J
- Coram: Aedit Abdullah J
- Case Number: Originating Summons No 1382 of 2018 (HC/OS 1382/2018)
- Proceeding Type: Supplementary grounds of decision on costs arising from an earlier substantive judgment
- Applicant/Plaintiff: CBB
- Respondent/Defendant: Law Society of Singapore
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure — Costs
- Related (“Main”) Judgment: CBB v Law Society of Singapore [2019] SGHC 293 (“the main judgment”)
- Counsel for Applicant: Sarjit Singh Gill SC, Jamal Siddique Peer, Leong Woon Ho and Suah Boon Choong (Shook Lin & Bok LLP)
- Counsel for Respondent: Tan Wee Kheng Kenneth Michael SC (Kenneth Tan Partnership)
- Judgment Length: 5 pages, 2,027 words
- Key Procedural Context: Supplementary grounds explaining why no costs were awarded after the court quashed the Council’s decision not to apply for leave and ordered the Council to perform its duty
Summary
CBB v Law Society of Singapore [2020] SGHC 56 concerns the High Court’s decision on costs following an earlier substantive ruling in CBB v Law Society of Singapore [2019] SGHC 293. In the main judgment, the court found that the Law Society Council’s administrative decision was irrational (in the Wednesbury sense) and granted relief that quashed the Council’s decision not to apply for leave and required the Council to perform its statutory duty. After that outcome, the applicant sought a substantial costs order against the Law Society.
In the supplementary decision, Aedit Abdullah J declined to award costs. The judge reasoned that, although the applicant succeeded on an important point, the “event” was not wholly against the Law Society, and the final orders were narrower than what the applicant had sought. The court also engaged with the principle that regulatory bodies performing public functions are generally not to be made to pay adverse costs, a principle synthesised in Ang Pek San Lawrence v Singapore Medical Council [2015] 2 SLR 1179. Applying either the general costs approach or the Baxendale-Walker/Ang Pek San framework, the court concluded that no costs order was just and reasonable.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute arises from disciplinary-related administrative decision-making by the Law Society Council. The applicant, CBB, challenged the Council’s decision not to seek leave to refer alleged improper conduct to the relevant inquiry process. The challenge was brought by way of an originating summons (HC/OS 1382/2018). The substantive decision on that originating summons was delivered in the main judgment, CBB v Law Society of Singapore [2019] SGHC 293, and the present case provides supplementary grounds explaining the costs outcome.
In the main judgment, the High Court quashed the Council’s decision not to apply for leave and ordered the Council to perform its duty. The court’s reasoning in the main judgment included a finding that the administrative decision was irrational or unreasonable. However, the relief ultimately granted did not extend to all the remedies the applicant had pursued. In particular, the court did not order the Council to seek leave of court to refer the complaint to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel. Instead, the effect of the orders was that the complaint would be properly considered by the Council in accordance with its statutory obligations.
After the main judgment, the applicant sought costs of S$30,000 plus disbursements of approximately S$8,000. The applicant’s position was that costs can be awarded in judicial review proceedings and that regulatory bodies are not automatically immune from adverse costs orders. The applicant relied on authorities including Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 1 SLR 797 and Regina (Hunt) v North Somerset Council [2015] 1 WLR 3575, and also argued that the Law Society could not claim blanket immunity merely because it performs a regulatory function.
The Law Society resisted the costs application. Its central submission was that it performs a public regulatory function and that, consistent with the Baxendale-Walker principle (as discussed in subsequent Singapore authority), adverse costs should generally not be ordered against regulatory bodies acting in that capacity. The Law Society also emphasised that the applicant did not succeed on most of the arguments advanced in the proceedings, and that the conduct complained of did not reach the level that would justify departing from the default position on costs.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The primary issue was whether the High Court should depart from the default costs position and award costs against the Law Society despite the applicant’s partial success. This required the court to determine what the “event” was for costs purposes, and whether the outcome in OS 1382/2018 was sufficiently in the applicant’s favour to justify an adverse costs order.
A second issue concerned the applicability and weight of the regulatory-function principle. The parties disputed whether the Baxendale-Walker principle—developed in the context of regulatory bodies and public functions—applied to judicial review proceedings challenging disciplinary-related administrative decisions. The court also had to consider how the synthesis in Ang Pek San Lawrence v Singapore Medical Council should be applied, including the factors relevant to whether costs should be ordered against a regulatory body.
Finally, the court had to assess whether the Law Society’s conduct, including the way it defended the Council’s decision and the breadth of issues raised, warranted a costs order as a matter of fairness and justice. This included evaluating the applicant’s argument that the Law Society’s conduct necessitated broad submissions and that the Law Society’s resistance impeded the administration of justice.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The judge began by situating the costs decision within the procedural framework of Singapore civil procedure. The general principle is that costs follow the event, as reflected in O 59 r 3(2) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed). However, the court emphasised that the “event” is not determined mechanically. Instead, it depends on the substantive outcome of the proceedings and the scope of the orders granted.
Applying the general approach, Aedit Abdullah J observed that the event was not substantively against the Law Society or wholly in favour of the applicant. The main judgment granted only limited relief: it quashed the Council’s decision not to apply for leave and ordered the Council to perform its duty. The court did not grant the more expansive relief sought by the applicant, namely an order compelling the Council to seek leave to refer the complaint to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel. In the judge’s view, this narrowed scope mattered for costs, because it meant the applicant did not obtain the full measure of success that would justify shifting costs to the respondent.
The judge also considered the applicant’s litigation strategy and the extent of failure on other grounds. The applicant had advanced multiple arguments, including arguments relating to limitation periods under the Legal Profession Act and arguments alleging illegality and procedural impropriety in the Council’s decision-making. While the applicant argued that it was necessary to canvass all relevant arguments at first instance because new points would generally not be allowed on appeal, the court accepted that this might be true in principle. Nevertheless, it did not follow that costs should be awarded when most of those points failed at first instance.
Given the limited scope of the ultimate order and the lack of success on substantial portions of the applicant’s case—especially the limitation point which consumed a significant part of the submissions—the judge concluded that the fairest order was for parties to bear their own costs. This reasoning reflects a pragmatic approach: where the applicant’s success is real but not decisive across the litigation, the costs outcome should reflect that mixed result.
Turning to the regulatory-function principle, the judge addressed the parties’ dispute over the applicability of Top Ten Entertainment and Baxendale-Walker. The respondent relied on the principle that regulatory bodies performing public functions should generally not be subject to adverse costs orders. The judge found the guidance and synthesis in Ang Pek San particularly useful. Ang Pek San had incorporated Baxendale-Walker and set out a framework for deciding when costs may be ordered against a regulatory body despite its public function.
Although the applicant argued that Baxendale-Walker was confined to disciplinary challenges and not judicial review, the judge was not persuaded that such a distinction should be decisive. The judge reasoned that it may be a matter of happenstance whether the challenge is brought by judicial review or under the relevant statute, because in either case the challenge concerns the procedure or outcome of disciplinary proceedings carried out by the relevant body. This approach underscores that the substance of the dispute, not the procedural label, should guide the costs analysis.
At the same time, the judge accepted that there may be judicial review cases where costs can be ordered against a regulatory body. The Ang Pek San framework requires a holistic assessment of multiple factors, including: (a) the ultimate objective of a just and reasonable costs order; (b) the fact that the “event” is only one factor; (c) the regulatory function of the entity is also only one factor, though often important; (d) whether the decision to bring charges was made honestly, reasonably, and on grounds that reasonably appeared sound in the exercise of public duty; (e) the financial prejudice to the applicant; and (f) any other relevant circumstances. The judge also noted that egregious conduct or bad faith is not necessarily required for costs to be ordered, but the overall standard of conduct remains relevant.
Applying a similar approach to the present case, the judge considered the regulatory function of the Law Society, the prejudice or financial burden borne by the applicant, and the outcome of the proceedings. The judge concluded that no costs order should be made for the same reasons as under the general approach. This indicates that the regulatory-function principle did not operate as a rigid bar; rather, it reinforced the conclusion that costs shifting would not be just and reasonable in the circumstances.
Importantly, the judge addressed the applicant’s reliance on the finding of Wednesbury irrationality or unreasonableness. The court had found that the Council’s decision was irrational, but the judge clarified that such a finding does not automatically imply conduct so poor as to justify a costs order. Wednesbury unreasonableness is concerned with taking into account irrelevant matters or failing to take into account relevant matters; it does not, by itself, impute abuse, contumeliousness, or the kind of blameworthiness that would typically warrant adverse costs. The judge therefore treated the irrationality finding as relevant to the merits but insufficient, on its own, to displace the default position on costs.
Overall, the court’s analysis demonstrates a structured yet flexible approach: it first assesses the costs event and the degree of success, then considers whether the regulatory-function principle should affect the costs outcome, and finally evaluates whether the respondent’s conduct reaches a threshold that makes an adverse costs order fair.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court ordered that no costs be awarded. This included the court’s decision on the applicant’s costs application following OS 1382/2018 and the supplementary reasons explaining why the court declined to make an adverse costs order against the Law Society.
Practically, the effect was that each party bore its own costs, despite the applicant’s success in obtaining quashing relief and an order requiring the Council to perform its duty. The decision therefore signals that partial success, even when grounded in a finding of irrationality, does not necessarily translate into a costs award against a regulatory body.
Why Does This Case Matter?
CBB v Law Society of Singapore [2020] SGHC 56 is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how costs should be approached in judicial review or statutory challenges involving regulatory bodies and disciplinary-related administrative decisions. The case reinforces that the “costs follow the event” principle remains the starting point, but it must be applied in a nuanced way that reflects the scope of relief granted and the extent of overall success.
More importantly, the decision illustrates how the Baxendale-Walker principle, as synthesised in Ang Pek San, operates in Singapore. The court confirms that regulatory-function considerations are not confined to disciplinary challenges brought under specific statutory routes; they may apply where the substance of the dispute concerns disciplinary procedures or outcomes. At the same time, the court does not treat regulatory status as an automatic shield against costs. Instead, it requires a holistic assessment of factors such as the applicant’s financial prejudice and the nature of the respondent’s conduct.
For lawyers advising clients, the case provides practical guidance on litigation risk. Even where a court finds Wednesbury irrationality, the applicant should not assume that costs will follow. Costs may be withheld where the applicant fails on substantial issues, where the final orders are narrower than sought, or where the respondent’s conduct does not amount to abuse or contumeliousness. Conversely, respondents should recognise that regulatory function does not guarantee immunity; costs may still be ordered in appropriate cases, but the threshold is assessed through the Ang Pek San factors.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), O 59 r 3(2)
- Legal Profession Act (Cap 161, 2009 Rev Ed)
Cases Cited
- CBB v Law Society of Singapore [2019] SGHC 293
- Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General [2013] 1 SLR 797
- Regina (Hunt) v North Somerset Council [2015] 1 WLR 3575
- Ang Pek San Lawrence v Singapore Medical Council [2015] 2 SLR 1179
- Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni [2007] SLR (R) 95
- Law Society of Singapore v Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd [2011] 2 SLR 1279
- Baxendale-Walker v Law Society [2008] 1 WLR 426
- Yong Kheng Leong and another v Panweld Trading Pte Ltd and another [2013] 1 SLR 173
Source Documents
This article analyses [2020] SGHC 56 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.