BYL & Anor v BYN

"Accordingly, I assess the Defendant’s reasonable costs to be S$82,500 as set out in [14] above." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 21

Case Information

• Citation: [2020] SGHC(I) 12 (Para 0)
• Court: Singapore International Commercial Court — Originating Summons No 9 of 2019 (Para 0)
• Date of hearing: 17 February 2020 and 13 April 2020; judgment reserved on 11 May 2020 (Para 0)
• Coram: Anselmo Reyes IJ (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Davinder Singh SC, David Fong and Sivanathan Jheevanesh (Instructed), Kabir Singh and Tan Tian Yi (Cavenagh Law LLP) (Para 23)
• Counsel for the Defendant: Thio Shen Yi SC, Niklas Wong and Kevin Elbert (TSMP Law Corporation) (Para 23)
• Case number: Originating Summons No 9 of 2019 (Para 0)
• Area of law: Arbitration — Costs (Para 0)
• Judgment length: Not stated in the extraction (Para 0)

Summary

This judgment concerns the costs consequences of an unsuccessful application to set aside an ICC partial award. The Plaintiffs had already failed on the merits in an earlier judgment, and this decision addresses only the quantum of the Defendant’s recoverable costs. The central dispute was stark: the Plaintiffs said the Defendant should recover no more than S$15,000 by reference to Appendix G, while the Defendant claimed S$235,000 inclusive of disbursements. The court rejected both positions and fixed reasonable costs at S$82,500. (Para 1) (Para 2) (Para 21)

"This is my judgment on the costs of the Plaintiffs’ abortive setting aside application." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 1

The court’s analysis turned on the interaction between the High Court costs regime and the SICC’s “reasonable costs” approach in transfer cases. The judge explained that, in principle, once the setting-aside application had been transferred to the SICC, costs should be assessed under Order 110 rule 46, especially because the SICC was exercising jurisdiction under section 18D(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act in relation to an unsuccessful setting-aside application. Appendix G was not ignored, but it was treated as only a rough-and-ready reference point and not a determinative tariff. (Para 3) (Para 16) (Para 17)

"In principle, the setting aside application having been transferred to the SICC, I ought to assess pre- and post-transfer costs in accordance with Order 110, rule 46." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 16

On the facts, the court scrutinised the Defendant’s claimed items individually. It considered the Defendant’s proposed case management plan, the parties’ estimates at the case management conference, the breakdown of TSMP’s fees, the fees of foreign counsel [BBB] and [AAA], and the absence of details for disbursements. The judge concluded that the Defendant had not justified the full amount claimed, but had shown enough to warrant a substantial award above Appendix G. The result was a carefully calibrated figure of S$82,500, with simple interest at 5.33% per annum from the date of judgment until payment. (Para 5) (Para 7) (Para 8) (Para 14) (Para 23)

Why Was the Court Dealing Only With Costs After the Plaintiffs Lost Their Setting-Aside Application?

The judgment begins from the premise that the substantive setting-aside application had already been dismissed. The judge stated that on 3 March 2020 he had dismissed the Plaintiffs’ application to set aside an ICC Partial Award dated 30 April 2019 in an ICC arbitration. This costs judgment therefore followed the merits decision and addressed only the financial consequences of that failure. The court also made clear that there was no dispute as to incidence of costs: the Defendant had prevailed, and the Plaintiffs accepted that they should pay the Defendant’s costs. The only live issue was quantum. (Para 1) (Para 2)

"On 3 March 2020, by my judgment in BYL and another v BYN [2020] SGHC(I) 06, I dismissed the Plaintiffs’ application to set aside an International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Partial Award dated 30 April 2019 (“ICC Award”) pursuant to an arbitration before the ICC (“ICC arbitration”)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 1

That procedural posture matters because it explains why the court’s task was not to revisit the merits of the setting-aside application, but to determine what costs were reasonably incurred in resisting it. The judge expressly described the application as “abortive,” signalling that the unsuccessful challenge had generated costs consequences for the losing party. The court also noted that the issue of costs was to be determined on the basis of written submissions, without attendance of solicitors and without oral argument, which underscores that the court was dealing with a focused post-judgment costs assessment rather than a full adversarial hearing on the merits. (Para 1) (Para 2)

"The issue of costs to be determined on the basis of the parties’ written submissions and without the attendance of solicitors and oral argument." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 1

The practical significance of this framing is that the court had to decide quantum on the papers, using the materials supplied by the parties. That in turn made the adequacy of the parties’ cost breakdowns especially important. The judge later emphasised that a court cannot simply speculate about the justification for a lump sum; it needs enough detail to understand the work done and to assess whether the amount claimed is reasonable. (Para 13)

"It is obviously essential that the court is provided with a sufficient breakdown of the costs so that the paying party can make appropriate comments on the reasonableness of the costs and understand the work carried out for those costs." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 13

How Did the Transfer to the SICC Affect the Costs Regime?

The transfer of the setting-aside application to the SICC was central to the costs analysis. The Deputy Registrar had transferred the application on 29 November 2019 and left open the question of the applicable costs regime. That unresolved issue became the first analytical step for the judge. The court noted that the direction in the relevant practice materials recognises a distinction between High Court civil proceedings, where costs are assessed by reference to Order 59 of the Rules of Court and Appendix G, and SICC proceedings, where costs are assessed under Order 110 rule 46. (Para 3)

"When the Deputy Registrar transferred the Plaintiffs’ setting aside application to the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) on 29 November 2019, he left open the question:" — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 3

The judge then stated the governing principle in terms that are important for transfer cases generally. In principle, because the setting-aside application had been transferred to the SICC, pre- and post-transfer costs should be assessed in accordance with Order 110 rule 46. The judge added that this approach was especially apt where the SICC was exercising jurisdiction under section 18D(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act in relation to an unsuccessful setting-aside application. This is the legal foundation for the court’s rejection of a rigid Appendix G approach. (Para 16)

"The latter regime requires that, unless the SICC otherwise orders, an unsuccessful party must pay the “reasonable costs” of the successful party (see CPIT Investments Ltd v Qilin World Capital Ltd and another [2018] 4 SLR 38 (“CPIT”), which provides guidance on applying the “reasonable costs” standard, especially in transfer cases)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 3

At the same time, the court did not treat Appendix G as irrelevant. The judge expressly said that the transfer to the SICC did not necessarily mean Appendix G should be ignored. Instead, Appendix G could still serve as a reality test or rough guide, but not as a binding measure that mechanically capped the award. That nuanced approach is the core doctrinal point of the case: transfer to the SICC changes the governing costs framework, but the court may still look to Appendix G for context where useful. (Para 17) (Para 18)

"That does not necessarily mean that the SICC should ignore Appendix G when assessing costs in transfer cases." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 17

What Did Each Side Argue About the Proper Quantum of Costs?

The Plaintiffs’ position was that Appendix G should guide the assessment and that, for a one-day originating summons hearing, Appendix G specified costs of S$15,000. They therefore contended that the Defendant’s reasonable costs should be no more than that amount. The Defendant took the opposite view, arguing that Appendix G should be ignored because S$15,000 was “excessively low given the circumstances of the case.” The Defendant claimed S$235,000 inclusive of disbursements. The gulf between the parties’ positions was therefore enormous, and the court had to decide where within that range reasonable costs lay. (Para 6) (Para 2)

"The Plaintiffs submit that I should have regard to Appendix G in assessing what the Defendant’s reasonable costs should be. For a one day originating summons hearing, Appendix G specifies costs of S$15,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 6

The judge recorded the parties’ positions in a way that shows how sharply they diverged. The Plaintiffs said the Defendant’s costs should be no more than S$15,000, while the Defendant said they should be S$235,000 inclusive of disbursements. The court’s task was not to split the difference mechanically, but to assess what was reasonable in light of the work actually done and the circumstances of the case. That required a granular examination of the evidence and the claimed items. (Para 2) (Para 7)

"The Defendant counters that I should ignore Appendix G, because the amount of S$15,000 is “excessively low given the circumstances of the case”." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 6

The court’s eventual reasoning shows that neither side’s position was fully accepted. The Plaintiffs were wrong to insist on a strict Appendix G figure as though it were determinative in a transferred SICC matter. But the Defendant was also wrong to assume that a large claimed sum could be recovered without a detailed and persuasive breakdown. The judge’s approach was to test the claimed costs against the available evidence, the nature of the work, and the overall context of the litigation. (Para 13) (Para 18) (Para 21)

What Evidence Did the Court Use to Assess Reasonable Costs?

The court relied on several categories of material. First, it considered the Defendant’s Proposed Case Management Plan submitted just before the case management conference. In that plan, the Defendant estimated its costs as at the time of the conference at US$72,000, or about S$103,680, and estimated that its overall costs inclusive of the substantive hearing would be in the region of US$250,000, or about S$360,000. Second, the court considered the parties’ own estimates at the case management conference. Third, it examined the Defendant’s itemised claim for S$235,000 and the absence of detailed disbursement information. (Para 5) (Para 7) (Para 8)

"In its Proposed Case Management Plan (the “Defendant’s Plan”) submitted just before the CMC, the Defendant estimated its costs as at the time of the CMC to be US$72,000 (about S$103,680). It indicated that its overall costs inclusive of the substantive hearing of the Plaintiffs’ application would be in the region of US$250,000 (about S$360,000)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 5

The Plaintiffs’ own estimate was also part of the factual matrix. By a letter dated 14 February 2020, the Plaintiffs’ solicitors in the ICC arbitration estimated that the Plaintiffs’ costs of the setting-aside application would come to between S$800,000 and S$900,000, and that the Plaintiffs’ costs as at the case management conference were between S$400,000 and S$500,000. The judge used these figures to show that the litigation was already expensive and that Appendix G’s S$15,000 figure sat far below the actual scale of the dispute. (Para 5) (Para 18)

"By a letter dated 14 February 2020 (the “February letter”) to the SICC, the Plaintiffs’ solicitors in the ICC arbitration estimated that the Plaintiffs’ costs of the setting aside application would come to between S$800,000 and S$900,000 and that the Plaintiffs’ costs as at the CMC were between S$400,000 and S$500,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 5

The court also examined the Defendant’s breakdown of its claimed S$235,000. The claim comprised TSMP’s fees of S$133,400, [BBB]’s fees of US$58,240, [AAA]’s fees of INR78,650, and disbursements of approximately S$15,700. The judge noted that no details of the disbursements had been provided. That omission mattered because, without particulars, the court could not assess whether the disbursements were reasonable or even what they covered. (Para 7) (Para 8)

"The Defendant has broken down its claim for S$235,000 as follows: (a) Fees of TSMP Law Corporation (“TSMP”) (the Defendant’s Singapore counsel): S$133,400. (b) Fees of [BBB] (the Defendant’s counsel in the ICC arbitration): US$58,240 (about S$84,300). (c) Fees of [AAA] (the Defendant’s Indian law counsel): INR78,650 (about S$l,500). (d) Disbursements: approximately S$15,700." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7

The absence of disbursement detail was not a minor technicality. The judge expressly stated that no details of the disbursements claimed had been provided. That deficiency fed into the court’s overall assessment that the Defendant had not justified the full amount claimed. The court was willing to make allowances where the work was apparent, but it was not prepared to accept unsupported figures at face value. (Para 8) (Para 13)

"No details of the disbursements claimed have been provided." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 8

Why Did the Court Say Appendix G Was Not Very Helpful Here?

The judge’s treatment of Appendix G is one of the most important aspects of the decision. He accepted that Appendix G could be considered, but he concluded that in the circumstances of this case it was not of real assistance even as a rough-and-ready guide. The reason was practical and contextual: the amounts already incurred by both sides were far above the Appendix G figure for a one-day originating summons hearing. The judge observed that the S$15,000 figure “pales in significance” by comparison with the parties’ actual expenditure. (Para 18)

"But, in the circumstances of this case, I doubt that Appendix G can be of real assistance even as a rough-and-ready guide on the appropriate magnitude of costs." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 18

The court’s reasoning was not that Appendix G is legally irrelevant, but that it is not a useful proxy where the litigation has become much more complex and expensive than the ordinary case contemplated by the guideline. The judge pointed to the scale of the parties’ own estimates and the fact that the dispute involved a very large arbitration award. In that setting, a standard tariff for a one-day originating summons hearing would not capture the real costs of the work required. (Para 18)

"The S$15,000 in Appendix G pales in significance by comparison with those numbers." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 18

The judge also drew support from his own earlier observation in BXS v BXT (Costs), where he had said that Appendix G and the reasonable costs approach in CPIT can serve as reality tests against which results obtained by employing one or the other method can be validated. That earlier statement was used here to reinforce the idea that Appendix G is a benchmark, not a straightjacket. The court therefore used Appendix G as a contextual reference, but not as the controlling measure of recovery. (Para 17)

"Appendix G and the reasonable costs approach in CPIT can serve as reality tests against which results obtained by employing one or the other method can be validated." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 17

How Did the Court Break Down the Defendant’s Claimed Costs Item by Item?

The court’s assessment was highly granular. The judge stated that, doing the best he could with the available information, he would assess the Defendant’s reasonable costs for the entirety of the Plaintiffs’ setting-aside application by allocating amounts to each component of the claim. He allowed TSMP’s legal fees up to the case management conference at S$17,880, TSMP’s legal fees post-CMC at S$29,720, [BBB]’s fees for preparing [N]’s affidavit at S$28,100, [AAA]’s fees for advising on the Indian law affidavit at S$1,500, and disbursements at S$5,300. These items totalled S$82,500. (Para 14)

"Doing the best that I can with the available information, I would therefore assess the Defendant’s reasonable costs for the entirety of the Plaintiffs’ setting aside application as follows:" — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 14

This breakdown is significant because it shows that the court did not simply accept the Defendant’s lump sum or reject it wholesale. Instead, the judge identified which categories of work were justified and to what extent. The court accepted that there had been work by Singapore counsel before and after the case management conference, work by foreign counsel in relation to the affidavit evidence, and some disbursements. But the court did not accept the full claimed amounts, and the final figure was substantially lower than the S$235,000 sought. (Para 14) (Para 21)

"TSMP’s legal fees up to the CMC S$17,880 TSMP’s legal fees post-CMC S$29,720 [BBB]’s fees for preparing [N]’s affidavit S$28,100 [AAA]’s fees for advising on the Indian law affidavit S$1,500 Disbursements S$5,300 The latter items add up to S$82,500." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 14

The judge’s treatment of the TSMP fees is especially instructive. He observed that there may be valid justifications for the S$85,800 claimed under TSMP’s fees, but those justifications had to be articulated by the Defendant and could not be left to the court’s speculation. That statement reflects a broader principle of costs assessment: the paying party must be able to understand the work done, and the court must be able to test whether the amount claimed is reasonable. The absence of sufficient breakdown therefore led to a substantial reduction. (Para 13)

"There may be valid justifications for the S$85,800. But these have to be articulated by the Defendant and cannot be left to the court’s speculation." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 13

The court’s willingness to allow [BBB]’s and [AAA]’s fees in part also shows that it was not hostile to the involvement of foreign counsel where the matter required it. Rather, the issue was whether the amounts claimed were properly supported and proportionate. The judge accepted that [BBB] had prepared an affidavit and that [AAA] had advised on the Indian law affidavit, but he still fixed the recoverable amounts at levels he considered reasonable on the available material. (Para 14)

What Was the Court’s Final Legal Approach to “Reasonable Costs” in a Transfer Case?

The court’s final legal approach can be stated simply but precisely: in a transferred setting-aside application before the SICC, costs should in principle be assessed under Order 110 rule 46, which requires the unsuccessful party to pay the successful party’s reasonable costs unless the court orders otherwise. Appendix G may still be consulted as a reality check, but it is not determinative. The judge expressly linked this approach to the SICC’s jurisdiction under section 18D(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. (Para 3) (Para 16) (Para 17)

"Such approach is especially apt when (as here) the SICC is exercising its jurisdiction under Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) section 18D(2) in relation to an unsuccessful setting aside application." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 16

The court also relied on CPIT Investments Ltd v Qilin World Capital Ltd and another for guidance on applying the “reasonable costs” standard, especially in transfer cases. The significance of that citation is that the SICC’s costs jurisdiction is not a mechanical tariff exercise; it is an evaluative process that requires the court to consider the circumstances of the case and the evidence of work actually done. The judge’s reasoning in this case is therefore consistent with a flexible, fact-sensitive approach to costs. (Para 3)

"The latter regime requires that, unless the SICC otherwise orders, an unsuccessful party must pay the “reasonable costs” of the successful party." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 3

That approach explains the outcome. The court did not accept the Plaintiffs’ attempt to confine recovery to Appendix G’s S$15,000 figure, because that would have ignored the actual scale and complexity of the dispute. Nor did it accept the Defendant’s S$235,000 claim, because the Defendant had not provided enough detail to justify that amount. The final award of S$82,500 reflects a middle path grounded in the evidence and the court’s assessment of reasonableness. (Para 18) (Para 21)

Why Did the Court Reject the Defendant’s Full Claim of S$235,000?

The court rejected the full claim because the Defendant had not supplied enough information to justify it. The judge emphasised that a sufficient breakdown is essential so that the paying party can comment on reasonableness and understand the work carried out. In the absence of such detail, the court could not simply accept the claimed total. This was particularly true for the TSMP fees and the disbursements, where the court had to work with limited information. (Para 13) (Para 8)

"It is obviously essential that the court is provided with a sufficient breakdown of the costs so that the paying party can make appropriate comments on the reasonableness of the costs and understand the work carried out for those costs." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 13

The judge’s reasoning also shows that the court was concerned with proportionality. The Defendant’s own earlier estimate at the case management conference was US$72,000 at that stage and US$250,000 overall, while the Plaintiffs’ own costs were estimated at S$800,000 to S$900,000. Those figures demonstrated that the litigation was expensive, but they did not prove that the Defendant’s claimed S$235,000 was reasonable in full. The court therefore used the surrounding context as a check, not as a substitute for proof. (Para 5) (Para 18)

"The Plaintiffs say that the Defendant’s costs should be no more than S$15,000, while the Defendant says that their costs should be S$235,000 (inclusive of disbursements)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 2

Ultimately, the court’s rejection of the full claim was not a rejection of the Defendant’s entitlement to substantial costs. It was a rejection of unsupported excess. The final figure of S$82,500 shows that the court accepted that meaningful work had been done, but insisted on evidence-based moderation. That is the practical lesson of the case for litigants seeking costs in the SICC after transfer. (Para 14) (Para 21)

What Orders Did the Court Make on Costs and Interest?

The court ordered the Plaintiffs to pay the Defendant’s costs of S$82,500. It also ordered simple interest at 5.33% per annum on that amount from the date of judgment until payment. This was the formal dispositive order of the judgment and it replaced the Defendant’s much larger claim. The order reflects the court’s conclusion that S$82,500 was the reasonable amount recoverable on the facts. (Para 23)

"The Plaintiffs are to pay the Defendant’s costs of S$82,500. Simple interest at 5.33% per annum is to run on the amount of S$82,500 from the date of this judgment until payment by the Plaintiffs." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 23

The court had already stated the same conclusion in the body of the judgment, making clear that the final figure was not accidental or tentative. The judge said, “Accordingly, I assess the Defendant’s reasonable costs to be S$82,500 as set out in [14] above.” That sentence is the ratio decidendi on quantum. It is the binding holding that resolves the costs dispute. (Para 21)

"Accordingly, I assess the Defendant’s reasonable costs to be S$82,500 as set out in [14] above." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 21

The order for interest is also practically important. It ensures that the successful party is compensated for delay in payment after judgment. Although the extraction does not explain the basis for the 5.33% rate, the judgment clearly directs that simple interest at that rate should run from the date of judgment until payment. That makes the costs order immediately enforceable and complete. (Para 23)

Why Does This Case Matter for Arbitration Costs in the SICC?

This case matters because it clarifies how the SICC may approach costs after a transferred application to set aside an arbitral award. The judgment confirms that the court will not treat Appendix G as automatically controlling in such a case. Instead, the court will apply the “reasonable costs” standard under Order 110 rule 46, while still allowing Appendix G to serve as a contextual reality test where appropriate. That is a significant practical point for arbitration practitioners litigating in the SICC. (Para 3) (Para 16) (Para 17)

"That does not necessarily mean that the SICC should ignore Appendix G when assessing costs in transfer cases." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 17

The case also demonstrates the importance of proper costs substantiation. A party seeking a substantial costs award must provide enough detail for the court and the paying party to understand what work was done and why it was reasonable. The court’s criticism of unsupported disbursements and insufficient breakdowns is a warning against lump-sum claims unsupported by evidence. In practice, this means that counsel should keep careful records and be prepared to justify each component of a costs claim. (Para 8) (Para 13)

"There may be valid justifications for the S$85,800. But these have to be articulated by the Defendant and cannot be left to the court’s speculation." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 13

Finally, the case is useful because it shows how the SICC may calibrate costs in a high-value arbitration-related dispute without simply adopting either a tariff or a claimed lump sum. The court’s item-by-item approach, coupled with its willingness to use Appendix G only as a rough guide, provides a practical model for future transfer cases. It also reinforces the broader principle that costs awards in the SICC are grounded in reasonableness, not formula. (Para 14) (Para 21)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed), section 18D(2) (Para 16) [CDN] [SSO]
• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed), Order 59 (Para 3)
• Rules of Court, Order 110 rule 46 (Para 3) (Para 16) [CDN] [SSO]
• Supreme Court Practice Directions, Appendix G (Para 3) (Para 6) (Para 17) (Para 18)
• SICC Practice Directions, paragraph 152 (Para 3)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2020] SGHCI 12 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.