BXS v BXT

"For the foregoing reasons, I assess the Defendant’s reasonable costs at S$40,000 all-in." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 21

Case Information

• Citation: [2019] SGHC(I) 14 (Para title page)
• Court: Singapore International Commercial Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para title page)
• Date: 15 August 2019 (Para title page)
• Coram: Anselmo Reyes IJ (Para title page)
• Case Number: Singapore International Commercial Court — Originating Summons No 1 of 2019 (Summons No 1035 of 2019) (Para title page)
• Area of Law: Civil Procedure — Costs (Para title page)
• Counsel for the Plaintiff: Koh Choon Guan Daniel, Er Hwee Lee Danna Dolly (Yu Huili), Ng Wei Ying (Eldan Law LLP) (Para 23)
• Counsel for the Defendant: Tan Beng Hwee Paul, Pang Yi Ching, Alessa and David Isidore Tan Huang Loong (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP) (Para 23)
• Judgment Reserved: 11 September 2019 (Para title page)

Summary

This was a costs judgment arising after the court had already determined the substantive challenge to an arbitral award and related interlocutory applications. The judge identified three costs questions: who should bear the costs of OS 1, SUM 1035, and SUM 5770; what the amount of those costs should be; and what interest should run on them. The court held that the Plaintiff should bear the Defendant’s costs of all three applications, because the Defendant had prevailed in OS 1 and SUM 1035 and SUM 5770 had been ordered to be “in the cause.” (Para 1, Para 3, Para 4)

The central dispute was quantum. The Defendant sought S$70,000 all-in as reasonable costs, while the Plaintiff argued for a much lower figure, suggesting S$15,800 or S$15,000 depending on how the applications were treated. The court treated Appendix G to the Supreme Court Practice Directions as the proper starting point, and also referred to the “reasonable costs” approach in CPIT Investments Limited v Qilin World Capital Limited and another [2018] SGHC(I) 2. After considering the amount at stake, the volume of work, the number of authorities, the number of attendances, and the parties’ conduct, the court concluded that S$70,000 was excessive and fixed reasonable costs at S$40,000 all-in. (Para 5, Para 6, Para 7, Para 13, Para 15, Para 16, Para 20, Para 21)

The court also ordered simple interest at 5.33% per annum on the costs sum from the date of judgment until payment. In doing so, it expressly relied on paragraph 77(7) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions as the default rate applicable to costs in ordinary Singapore court proceedings. The result was a conventional but carefully reasoned costs order that balanced the guideline framework against the particular circumstances of the case. (Para 22, Para 23)

What were OS 1, SUM 1035, and SUM 5770, and how did they shape the costs dispute?

The judgment begins by identifying the three applications whose costs were in issue. OS 1 was the Plaintiff’s application to set aside the Final Award. SUM 1035 was the Defendant’s application to strike out OS 1. SUM 5770 was the Defendant’s application, pending the provision by the Plaintiff of security for costs ordered by the Singapore court and pending the hearing of SUM 1035, for an extension of time to file an affidavit in response in OS 1. Those descriptions matter because the costs analysis turned on the procedural posture of each application and on which party had succeeded in them. (Para 1)

"OS 1 was the Plaintiff’s application to set aside the Final Award. SUM 1035 was the Defendant’s application to strike out OS 1. SUM 5770 was the Defendant’s application, pending the provision by the Plaintiff of security for costs ordered by the Singapore court and pending the hearing of SUM 1035, for an extension of time to file an affidavit in response in OS 1." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 1

The court then recorded that the parties agreed, by letter dated 4 July 2019, to file sequential submissions on the costs of the three applications. That procedural agreement is important because it shows that the costs issue was not determined after an oral hearing on costs, but on written submissions. The judgment also notes that the parties later agreed that the court could decide costs on the written submissions alone. The court therefore resolved the matter on the papers, with the benefit of the parties’ competing positions and the earlier substantive judgment. (Para 2, Para 23)

On the merits of who should bear costs, the court treated the outcome of the earlier applications as decisive. It stated that the Defendant had prevailed in OS 1 and SUM 1035, and that the Plaintiff had not really disputed that it should bear the Defendant’s costs of those two applications. As to SUM 5770, the court relied on the Assistant Registrar’s directions of 30 January 2019 that its costs be “in the cause,” and therefore held that the Plaintiff should also bear the Defendant’s costs of that application. The costs question was thus resolved in the Defendant’s favour across all three applications. (Para 3, Para 4)

"By letter to the court dated 4 July 2019 the parties agreed to file sequential submissions on the costs of the three applications mentioned." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 2

"The Defendant having prevailed in OS 1 and SUM 1035, it is clear (and the Plaintiff has not really disputed) that the Plaintiff should bear the Defendant’s costs of those two applications." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 3

"Given the Assistant Registrar’s directions on 30 January 2019 that the costs of SUM 5770 be in the cause, the Plaintiff should also bear the Defendant’s costs of that application." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 4

How did the parties frame the costs dispute, and what amounts did each side seek?

The parties’ positions were sharply divided on quantum. The Defendant asked for S$70,000 all-in as its reasonable costs of the three applications. The Plaintiff said that amount was excessive and suggested that S$15,800 would be more appropriate. The court’s task was therefore not merely to decide whether costs should follow the event, but to determine what amount was “reasonable” in the circumstances. (Para 5)

"The Defendant asks for S$70,000 all-in as its reasonable costs of the three applications. The Plaintiff says that this amount is excessive and suggests that S$15,800 would be more appropriate." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 5

The Defendant’s submissions were built around culpability, scale, and work done. It argued that the Plaintiff behaved in a “highly culpable” manner by raising unmeritorious arguments in OS 1 and SUM 1035, constantly attempting to “derail timelines and/or frustrate the Singapore proceedings,” and generally conducting itself in a manner that “generated unnecessary costs.” It also submitted that the amount at stake was substantial, because the Final Award required the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant THB 91,153,182.62, approximately S$4,010,740.04, together with costs of US$647,112.51 and interest. In addition, the Defendant pointed to the volume of work: 3,278 pages of documents, 105 authorities, and seven court attendances. (Para 7)

"The Defendant submits that S$70,000 is reasonable for the following reasons: (a) The Plaintiff behaved in a “highly culpable” manner by raising unmeritorious arguments in OS 1 and SUM 1035, constantly attempting to “derail timelines and/or frustrate the Singapore proceedings,” and generally conducting itself in a manner that “generated unnecessary costs”." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7

"The amount of S$70,000 is proportionate to the sum at stake, since the Final Award required the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant THB 91,153,182.62 (approximately S$4,010,740.04), together with costs of US$647,112.51 and interest." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7

"A significant amount of work had to be done by the Defendant, including the filing of 3,278 pages of documents, the submission of 105 authorities, and seven court attendances (that is, pre-trial conferences, a case management conference, and the substantive hearing of OS 1 and SUM 1035)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 7

The Plaintiff’s position was that Appendix G should govern the assessment, and that the Defendant’s reasonable costs, including disbursements, should be a total of either S$15,000 or S$15,800. The Plaintiff proposed a granular allocation: for SUM 5770, either no order as to costs or at most S$800 because the application was uncontested; for SUM 1035, S$7,000; and for OS 1, S$8,000. The court ultimately did not accept that low a figure, but the Plaintiff’s submission framed the lower boundary of the dispute and anchored the court’s analysis in the guideline regime. (Para 13)

"The Plaintiff submits that, applying Appendix G, the Defendant’s reasonable costs (including disbursements) should be a total of either S$15,000 or S$15,800, comprising: (a) for SUM 5770, either no order as to costs or at most S$800, as that application was uncontested; (b) for SUM 1035, the amount of S$7,000; and (c) for OS 1, the amount of S$8,000." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 13

Why did the court treat Appendix G as the starting point, and what role did CPIT play?

The court’s legal framework was anchored in Order 110 rule 46 of the Rules of Court. It quoted the rule that “the unsuccessful party must pay the reasonable costs of the proceedings to the successful party, unless the court orders otherwise,” and also the provision that the court may take into account such circumstances as it considers relevant, including the conduct of the case. This established that the inquiry was one of reasonable costs, not automatic indemnity or a mechanical tariff. (Para 6)

"the unsuccessful party must pay the reasonable costs of the proceedings to the successful party, unless the court orders otherwise (O 110 r 46(1) of the ROC)" — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 6

"the court may, in particular ... take into account such circumstances as the court considers relevant, including the conduct of the case (O 110 r 46(3))" — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 6

The parties both referred the court to CPIT Investments Limited v Qilin World Capital Limited and another [2018] SGHC(I) 2. The judgment does not reproduce CPIT’s full reasoning, but it uses CPIT as part of the costs methodology discussion. The court observed that Appendix G and the reasonable costs approach in CPIT can serve as “reality tests” against which results obtained by employing one or the other method can be validated. That observation is significant because it shows that the court did not treat Appendix G as a rigid ceiling or CPIT as a free-standing invitation to award whatever sum seemed broadly fair. Instead, the court used both as cross-checks. (Para 6, Para 20)

"The parties have both referred me to CPIT Investments Limited v Qilin World Capital Limited and another [2018] SGHC(I) 2 (“CPIT”)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 6

"Appendix G and the reasonable costs approach in CPIT can serve as reality tests against which results obtained by employing one or the other method can be validated." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 20

The court also quoted paragraph 3 of Appendix G, which stresses that the precise amount of costs awarded remains at the discretion of the judicial officer making the award, who may depart from the amounts set out in the Costs Guidelines depending on the particular circumstances of each case. That passage is central to the judgment’s reasoning because it explains why the court could start from Appendix G and still adjust upward or downward in light of the case-specific facts. The court’s approach was therefore discretionary but structured. (Para 14)

"Paragraph 3 of Appendix G stresses that: The precise amount of costs awarded remains at the discretion of the judicial officer making the award, who may depart from the amounts set out in these Costs Guidelines depending on the particular circumstances of each case ..." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 14

Applying that framework, the court said it would be prepared to assess the costs of OS 1, SUM 1035 and SUM 5770 on the higher end of the ranges identified by the Costs Guidelines. The reason was factual: until the substantive hearing of OS 1 and SUM 1035, it seemed as if the Plaintiff intended to take every conceivable point in challenging the Final Award. That conduct justified a higher-end assessment within the guideline framework, but not the much larger sum sought by the Defendant. (Para 15)

"Taking Appendix G then as a starting point, I would be prepared to assess the costs of OS 1, SUM 1035 and SUM 5770 on the higher end of the ranges identified by the Costs Guidelines." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 15

"That is because, until the substantive hearing of OS 1 and SUM 1035, it seemed as if the Plaintiff intended to take every conceivable point in challenging the Final Award." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 15

Why did the court reject the Defendant’s S$70,000 claim as unreasonable?

The court’s rejection of the S$70,000 claim was direct and quantitative. It said that, taking Appendix G as a starting point, the amount obtained by applying the guideline ranges was S$40,000, and that S$70,000 was 175% more than that figure. On that basis, the court concluded that S$70,000 was “too high and thus unreasonable.” This was not a rejection of the Defendant’s entitlement to substantial costs; it was a rejection of the scale of the claim relative to the guideline benchmark and the circumstances of the case. (Para 16)

"Plainly, the S$70,000 claimed by the Defendant, being 175% more than the S$40,000 obtained through applying Appendix G, is too high and thus unreasonable." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 16

The court then addressed the Defendant’s arguments for departing from Appendix G. It did not accept that the use of three solicitors, or the fact that the Defendant instructed Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP through Allen & Gledhill LLP, justified a departure. Nor did it accept that the Plaintiff’s alleged culpable conduct in connection with the separate applications warranted a higher costs award in this costs assessment. The court’s reasoning was that any culpable conduct in those separate applications would already have been considered by the courts undertaking taxation of those applications. In other words, the costs assessment for the present applications should not be inflated by re-litigating conduct already relevant elsewhere. (Para 18, Para 19)

"Nor do I think that it would be appropriate to depart from Appendix G because the Defendant opted to instruct R&T through A&O rather than directly." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 18

"Any culpable conduct in connection with those separate applications will no doubt have been considered by the courts undertaking the taxation of those applications." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 19

The court’s treatment of these arguments shows a disciplined approach to costs. It accepted that conduct can matter under Order 110 rule 46(3), but it refused to let conduct in related proceedings become a vehicle for double counting. It also refused to treat the choice of legal team structure as a basis for moving away from the guideline framework. The result was a costs award that recognized the Defendant’s success and the work involved, but kept the award tethered to the court’s own assessment of reasonableness. (Para 6, Para 18, Para 19)

How did the court arrive at S$40,000 all-in instead of the Plaintiff’s much lower figure?

The court’s final figure was not a compromise between the parties’ positions in a purely arithmetic sense. Rather, it was the product of the court’s own assessment after using Appendix G as a starting point and then calibrating upward to reflect the case’s complexity and the Plaintiff’s litigation posture. The court expressly said that it would assess the costs on the higher end of the guideline ranges. That meant the Plaintiff’s proposed S$15,000 to S$15,800 was far too low to reflect the work done and the nature of the challenge to the Final Award. (Para 13, Para 15)

At the same time, the court did not accept the Defendant’s attempt to transform the case into one warranting a very substantial uplift. The court’s statement that S$70,000 was 175% more than the S$40,000 obtained through applying Appendix G is the clearest indication of its reasoning. The court was willing to recognize that the Defendant had to file thousands of pages, deal with many authorities, and attend multiple hearings, but it did not see those features as justifying a figure nearly double the guideline-derived amount. The award of S$40,000 therefore reflects a middle position grounded in the court’s own evaluation of proportionality. (Para 7, Para 16, Para 21)

"For the foregoing reasons, I assess the Defendant’s reasonable costs at S$40,000 all-in." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 21

The court’s reasoning also shows that it was attentive to the structure of the proceedings. SUM 5770 was not treated as a stand-alone contest requiring a separate and substantial costs award; instead, it was folded into the overall assessment of the three applications. The court’s reference to the Assistant Registrar’s direction that SUM 5770 costs be “in the cause” meant that the application contributed to the overall costs picture, but did not independently drive the award to the level sought by the Defendant. The final figure thus reflects a holistic assessment rather than a line-by-line taxation exercise. (Para 4, Para 15, Para 21)

What did the court say about interest on costs, and why was 5.33% applied?

After fixing the principal amount of costs, the court turned to interest. It ordered simple interest at 5.33% per annum on the amount of S$40,000 from the date of judgment until payment by the Plaintiff. The judgment explains that 5.33% is the default rate applicable to costs in ordinary Singapore court proceedings, citing paragraph 77(7) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions. The interest order therefore followed the standard procedural rate rather than any bespoke commercial or punitive rate. (Para 22, Para 23)

"5.33% is the default rate applicable to costs in ordinary Singapore court proceedings (see paragraph 77(7) of the Supreme Court Practice Directions)." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 22

The final order was concise and complete. The Plaintiff was ordered to pay the Defendant’s costs of S$40,000, and simple interest at 5.33% per annum was to run on that amount from the date of judgment until payment. The court did not add any further qualification or staged mechanism. The order therefore closed the costs dispute in a straightforward way, while preserving the ordinary consequences of non-payment through interest. (Para 23)

"The Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant’s costs of S$40,000. Simple interest at 5.33% per annum is to run on the amount of S$40,000 from the date of this judgment until payment by the Plaintiff." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 23

What is the significance of the court’s treatment of Appendix G and CPIT for future SICC costs arguments?

The practical significance of the judgment lies in its method. The court did not choose between Appendix G and CPIT as if they were mutually exclusive regimes. Instead, it treated Appendix G as the starting point and CPIT as a reality check. That approach gives practitioners a clear lesson: in SICC costs disputes, a party seeking a substantial departure from guideline-based figures must show why the case-specific circumstances truly justify it. Merely asserting complexity, culpability, or the amount at stake will not necessarily move the court far beyond the guideline range. (Para 14, Para 15, Para 20)

"Appendix G and the reasonable costs approach in CPIT can serve as reality tests against which results obtained by employing one or the other method can be validated." — Per Anselmo Reyes IJ, Para 20

The judgment also signals that the court will scrutinize claims for enhanced costs where the claimed amount appears disproportionate to the guideline benchmark. The court’s statement that S$70,000 was 175% more than the S$40,000 figure obtained through Appendix G is a warning against overreaching. At the same time, the court’s willingness to assess costs on the higher end of the guideline ranges shows that a party who has had to meet a broad and aggressive challenge may still recover meaningful costs without proving exceptional conduct. (Para 15, Para 16, Para 21)

For practitioners, the case is also a reminder that conduct-based arguments must be carefully tied to the correct proceeding. The court declined to inflate the present costs award by reference to alleged culpable conduct in separate applications, noting that such conduct would have been considered in the taxation of those applications. That means parties should not assume that every criticism of the opponent’s litigation behaviour can be recycled across multiple costs hearings. The court will look for a proper procedural and substantive basis before allowing conduct to drive the award upward. (Para 19)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Rules of Court, Order 110 rule 46(1) — the unsuccessful party must pay the reasonable costs of the proceedings to the successful party, unless the court orders otherwise (Para 6) [CDN] [SSO]
• Rules of Court, Order 110 rule 46(3) — the court may take into account such circumstances as it considers relevant, including the conduct of the case (Para 6) [CDN] [SSO]
• Supreme Court Practice Directions, paragraph 77(7) — default rate of 5.33% applicable to costs in ordinary Singapore court proceedings (Para 22)
• Appendix G to the Supreme Court Practice Directions — costs guideline framework used as the starting point for assessment (Para 14, Para 15, Para 20)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2019] SGHCI 14 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.