Case Details
- Title: BLG & Anor v BLI & 2 Ors
- Citation: [2018] SGHC 86
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date of Decision: 12 April 2018
- Judgment Reserved: 27 November 2017
- Judge: Lai Siu Chiu SJ
- Proceeding: Bill of Costs No 189 of 2016 (Summons No 5386 of 2017)
- Applicants: BLG and BLH
- Respondents: BLI, BLJ and BLK
- Legal Area: Legal Profession / Bill of Costs; taxation and review of costs
- Statutes Referenced: Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed) (“MCA”)
- Other Key Rules/Instrument Referenced: Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1997 Rev Ed), in particular O 59; Supreme Court Practice Directions on costs scheduling (paras 99A and 99B)
- Earlier Procedural History (high level): Originating Summons (Family) No 71 of 2011; Senior District Judge decision dated 11 December 2012 ([2012] SGDC 489); Registrars’ Appeals Nos 223 and 224 of 2012; High Court decision in Re BKR [2013] 4 SLR 1257; Court of Appeal decision in Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81
- Length of Judgment: 21 pages; 5,265 words
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2012] SGDC 489; [2015] SGHC 129; [2018] SGHC 86
Summary
This High Court decision concerns a review of costs arising from a long-running family dispute under the Mental Capacity Act. The underlying substantive litigation involved an application by two sisters (BLG and BLH) for a declaration that their sister (BLK) lacked capacity to manage her property and affairs, and for the sisters to be appointed as deputies. The State Courts granted the application, but the decision was overturned on appeal, and costs were later ordered by the Court of Appeal against the respondents on an indemnity basis. The present proceedings are not about capacity itself; they are about the taxation and review of the applicants’ bill of costs.
After the Senior Assistant Registrar (“SAR”) taxed down the applicants’ amended bill of costs substantially, the applicants sought further procedural relief: they filed Summons No 5386 of 2017 to compel the respondents to produce a breakdown of the hours spent by their lawyers in connection with specified proceedings. The High Court dismissed the applicants’ summons. In doing so, the court emphasised the limits of what can be sought at the stage of a review, the procedural consequences of earlier decisions not to appeal, and the availability of other comparative materials relevant to taxation.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The dispute has its origins in Originating Summons (Family) No 71 of 2011 (“the OS”). BLG and BLH (the applicants) applied to the State Courts under s 20 of the Mental Capacity Act for a declaration that BLK (the third respondent) was unable to make decisions for herself relating to her property and affairs. They also sought the appointment of the applicants as deputies to act in relation to BLK’s property and affairs.
BLK opposed the application. In addition, two other family members opposed: BLI (the first respondent), BLK’s younger daughter, and BLJ (the second respondent), who is the husband of BLI. For convenience, the first and second respondents were treated collectively as “the first two respondents”. The State Courts found that BLK lacked capacity and granted the MCA application. That decision was made by a Senior District Judge on 11 December 2012 ([2012] SGDC 489).
Unhappy with the outcome, the respondents appealed to the High Court in Registrars’ Appeals Nos 223 and 224 of 2012. The High Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Senior District Judge’s decision (as reflected in the subsequent chain of decisions culminating in Re BKR). The applicants then appealed to the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No 27 of 2014. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reserved costs. After further submissions on costs, the Court of Appeal made detailed costs orders on 24 November 2015. Those orders required the first two respondents to pay costs (taxed on an indemnity basis unless otherwise indicated) in relation to the appeal and all proceedings below, including costs to the third respondent and costs and expenses of the Public Trustee acting as litigation representative.
In compliance with the Court of Appeal’s costs orders, the applicants’ solicitors prepared an original bill of costs. The bill included multiple components: the OS, the Registrars’ Appeals, an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal appeal itself, an application for service out of jurisdiction, applications by the third respondent to withdraw funds for living and legal expenses, and a Registrar’s Appeal relating to the Senior District Judge’s handling of that application. The bill was later amended. After a lengthy taxation hearing in 2017, the SAR reduced the applicants’ Section 1 costs dramatically—from $3,530,226.65 to $878,600.00—and reduced certain disbursements. The applicants and respondents were dissatisfied and filed separate summonses for review of different sections of the bill.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The immediate legal issue in this High Court decision was procedural and evidential: whether, at the stage of a review of the SAR’s taxation, the applicants were entitled to compel the respondents to produce a breakdown of the total number of hours spent by their lawyers in connection with specified proceedings. The applicants framed their request as necessary for the taxation review(s), relying on the multifactorial approach to taxation under the Rules of Court and on authorities dealing with the scope of what the court should consider.
A second issue concerned the effect of earlier procedural steps. The applicants had previously sought similar disclosure from the SAR under O 59 r 13(d) of the Rules of Court. The SAR declined to order production of the respondents’ solicitor-and-client bills and also declined to draw an adverse inference against the respondents’ solicitors for refusing to produce those bills. The applicants did not appeal the SAR’s decision on those points. The respondents argued that the applicants could not now use Summons No 5386 of 2017 to circumvent that omission.
Related to these issues was the question of whether the applicants had adequate comparative materials for the review. The respondents pointed out that there were objective comparators available to the applicants, including Appendix G of O 59 and the applicants’ own costs schedule for the Court of Appeal proceedings (CA 27/2014). The court therefore had to consider whether the requested breakdown was truly necessary and whether the applicants’ request was, in substance, an attempt to re-open matters already decided at the taxation stage.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by situating the application within the broader procedural framework of taxation and review. The applicants’ summons sought an order compelling production of a document (or documents) setting out a breakdown of the total number of hours spent by each of the respondents’ lawyers arising from or in connection with the specified proceedings. Although the applicants did not seek the respondents’ solicitor-and-client bills themselves, they sought information that would allow the court to assess the reasonableness of the hours and, by extension, the costs claimed.
In support of their request, the applicants’ counsel relied on O 59 of the Rules of Court, emphasising that taxation involves a multifactorial approach and that the court must take into account non-exhaustive factors. The applicants also relied on Court of Appeal and High Court authorities—Lin Jian Wei and Likpin International, and the High Court decision in Susan Lim—to support the proposition that the court should have sufficient information to perform its evaluative function during taxation and review. The applicants further argued that, because the respondents had not filed costs schedules for the relevant proceedings (save for CA 27/2014), the court lacked a comparative baseline, making the requested breakdown necessary.
The court, however, accepted the respondents’ counter-position that the applicants’ request was not the only route to obtaining comparators. The respondents pointed to Appendix G of O 59 and to the applicants’ own costs schedule for CA 27/2014. More importantly, the court considered the applicants’ earlier conduct: at the taxation stage, the applicants had made a request under O 59 r 13(d) for production of the respondents’ solicitor-and-client bills. The SAR declined. The applicants did not appeal the SAR’s decision on that refusal. The respondents therefore argued that the applicants were barred from re-litigating the same issue indirectly.
On this point, the court referred to O 59 r 35(1) of the Rules of Court, which provides that, unless the judge otherwise directs, no further evidence shall be received on the hearing of the review of the Registrar’s decision by the judge. The court also relied on the principle articulated in Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam (alias Toh Jeanette), namely that parties should not be permitted to circumvent procedural omissions by re-framing the request at the review stage. The underlying rationale is that review is not a fresh hearing; it is a mechanism to scrutinise the Registrar’s decision on the material properly before the Registrar, subject to the limited scope for further evidence.
The court also addressed the applicants’ argument that the respondents’ failure to file costs schedules deprived the court of comparative information. The applicants’ counsel suggested that the Supreme Court Practice Directions on costs scheduling required the respondents to file costs schedules for the relevant proceedings and that the absence of such schedules justified the order sought. The court examined the Practice Directions provisions, including paras 99A and 99B, which set out when costs scheduling is required and for which types of proceedings. The court noted that the costs scheduling regime took effect on 15 July 2014 by way of Amendment No 3 of 2014 to the Practice Directions, and it corrected an apparent misstatement by counsel regarding the date of Susan Lim relative to the costs scheduling regime.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the applicants’ summons was not an appropriate vehicle to obtain the information they sought. The court’s reasoning reflected both procedural fairness and the proper boundaries of review. The applicants had already sought disclosure at the taxation stage and had not appealed the SAR’s refusal. The court therefore treated the present application as an attempt to obtain, at the review stage, what had been refused earlier. Additionally, the court considered that the applicants had other available materials and that the requested breakdown of hours was not strictly necessary to enable the court to conduct the review in the manner contemplated by the Rules of Court.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the applicants’ summons (Summons No 5386 of 2017). As a result, the respondents were not ordered to produce the requested breakdown of lawyers’ hours for the specified proceedings. The dismissal meant that the applicants’ attempt to obtain additional disclosure to support the taxation review(s) did not succeed.
The court’s decision also preserved the procedural integrity of the taxation and review process. The applicants remained able to pursue the substantive reviews of the SAR’s taxed costs (Sections 1 and 2, and Section 3, were already the subject of separate review summonses), but they could not obtain the additional disclosure sought through this particular procedural application.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the limits of what can be sought during a review of a bill of costs. Even where a party argues that disclosure is necessary to enable meaningful taxation review, the court will scrutinise whether the request is consistent with the procedural framework of O 59. In particular, the decision underscores that review is not a mechanism to re-open evidential disputes already decided at taxation, especially where the party did not appeal the Registrar’s refusal to order disclosure.
For lawyers preparing bills of costs and responding to taxation reviews, the case highlights the importance of strategic procedural choices at the taxation stage. If a party seeks disclosure and the Registrar refuses, the party should consider whether to appeal that refusal promptly. Otherwise, the party may face arguments that it is attempting to circumvent the consequences of its earlier omission. This is a practical lesson for litigation teams managing costs disputes across multiple levels of court.
Finally, the decision is relevant to the implementation of the Supreme Court Practice Directions on costs scheduling. While costs scheduling can provide objective comparators and assist the court in assessing reasonableness, the court will not automatically treat the absence of a schedule as justifying broad disclosure orders. Practitioners should therefore ensure compliance with the costs scheduling regime where applicable, and should be prepared to justify why additional information is necessary for the review rather than merely helpful.
Legislation Referenced
- Mental Capacity Act (Cap 177A, 2010 Rev Ed), s 20
- Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 1997 Rev Ed), O 59 (including rr 13(d), 35(1))
- Supreme Court Practice Directions on costs scheduling (including paras 99A and 99B)
Cases Cited
- [2012] SGDC 489
- Re BKR [2013] 4 SLR 1257
- Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81
- Lin Jian Wei and another v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2011] 3 SLR 1052
- Likpin International Ltd v Swiber Holdings Ltd and another [2016] 4 SLR 1079
- Singapore Medical Council v Lim Mey Lee Susan [2015] SGHC 129
- Lassiter Ann Masters v To Keng Lam (alias Toh Jeanette) [2004] 2 SLR (R) 392
- [2018] SGHC 86
Source Documents
This article analyses [2018] SGHC 86 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.