Case Details
- Citation: [2019] SGHCR 09
- Title: Bae Junho v Daimwood, Samuel Lathan and another
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore
- Date: 06 June 2019
- Coram: Jean Chan Lay Koon AR
- Case Number: Suit No 1261 of 2018 (Summons No 355 of 2019 & Summons No 796 of 2019)
- Tribunal/Court: High Court
- Decision/Procedural Stage: Applications to strike out (O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of Court)
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Bae Junho
- Defendant/Respondent: Daimwood, Samuel Lathan and another
- 1st Defendant: Samuel Lathan Daimwood
- 2nd Defendant: London School of Business & Finance Pte Ltd
- Judicial Officer: Jean Chan Lay Koon AR
- Counsel for Plaintiff: Anil Narain Balchandani (Red Lion Circle)
- Counsel for 1st Defendant: Yeo Yan Hui Mark, Lew Shaun Marc, Charmaine Lim (Engelin Teh Practice LLC)
- Counsel for 2nd Defendant: Bhargavan Sujatha (Gavan Law Practice LLC)
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure – Pleadings (Striking out)
- Statutes Referenced: Rules of Court (Cap. 332, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed), in particular O 18 r 19(1)(a)
- Cases Cited (as provided): [2019] SGHCR 9; Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100; NTUC Foodfare Co-operative Ltd v SIA Engineering Co Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 588; Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; Anwar Patrick Adrian v Ng Chong & Hue LLC [2014] 3 SLR 761; AYW v AYX [2016] 1 SLR 1183; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1; ACB ([4] supra) (mentioned in extract); David Tan & Goh Yihan, “The Promise of Universality: The Spandeck Formulation Half a Decade On” (2013) 25 SAcLJ 510; Andrew Robertson, “Justice, Community Welfare and the Duty of Care” (2011) 127 LQR 370
- Judgment Length: 10 pages, 5,732 words
- Parties (as described): Junho Bae — Samuel Lathan Daimwood — London School of Business & Finance Pte Ltd
Summary
Bae Junho v Daimwood, Samuel Lathan and another [2019] SGHCR 09 concerned two applications to strike out a plaintiff’s negligence-based claim arising from an alleged extra-marital affair. The plaintiff, a husband, alleged that he suffered a recognisable psychiatric injury after discovering, through surveillance footage, that his wife had engaged in consensual sexual relations with the 1st defendant, an English language lecturer employed by the 2nd defendant educational institution. The plaintiff sought to frame the claim in tort: against the 1st defendant directly for breach of a duty of care, and against the 2nd defendant through vicarious liability and/or a non-delegable duty of care.
The High Court (per Jean Chan Lay Koon AR) applied the established Singapore approach to striking out pleadings under O 18 r 19(1), focusing on whether the statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action. Central to the analysis was the duty of care framework derived from Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100, as summarised in NTUC Foodfare Co-operative Ltd v SIA Engineering Co Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 588. The court emphasised that, even at the striking out stage, it must seriously consider whether the pleaded facts remotely disclose an actionable tort, particularly where the duty of care is novel or the pleaded duties are framed too specifically.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The plaintiff, Bae Junho, was lawfully married to Jenna, a South Korean national. Both spouses moved to Singapore and were, at the relevant time, undergoing divorce proceedings or had already been formally divorced. It was undisputed that the marital breakdown was primarily caused by an affair between Jenna and the 1st defendant. The plaintiff’s pleaded case therefore arose from the emotional and psychiatric consequences of discovering the alleged affair.
At all material times, the 1st defendant was an English language lecturer employed by the 2nd defendant, London School of Business & Finance Pte Ltd. The 2nd defendant ran various business and finance courses and also conducted preparatory courses in English for students who were not proficient in English. In January 2018, the plaintiff helped to enrol Jenna in the preparatory course in English (“PCE”). Jenna commenced the PCE on 31 January 2018. The 1st defendant and Jenna came to know each other through the PCE classes held at the 2nd defendant’s premises.
According to the plaintiff’s statement of claim, the plaintiff began experiencing marital problems in March 2018 and suspected that Jenna might be having an affair. Before leaving for a business trip to Bangkok in May 2018, the plaintiff installed a surveillance camera in the living room of the matrimonial home and engaged a private investigation firm to ascertain whether the 1st defendant and Jenna were having an affair. Between 13 May 2018 and 18 May 2018, while the plaintiff was away, the plaintiff alleged that the 1st defendant and Jenna had multiple occasions of consensual sex in the matrimonial home. The plaintiff claimed these sexual acts were captured on surveillance footage, which he later viewed on his mobile phone and laptop.
After returning to Singapore, the plaintiff confronted Jenna, chased her out of the matrimonial home, cancelled her dependant’s pass, and commenced divorce proceedings in South Korea. The plaintiff’s pleaded injury was not limited to emotional distress; he alleged that he developed clinical depression and sought psychiatric treatment. A medical report by Dr Lim Yun Chin, a consultant in psychological medicine at Raffles Hospital, dated 24 August 2018, was attached to the statement of claim. Dr Lim opined that the plaintiff was suffering from depression associated with anxiety as a result of his wife’s extra-marital affair.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The principal issue on the two striking out applications was whether the statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action against both defendants. The court framed the “main issue” as whether the pleaded facts, if proven at trial, could establish the elements necessary for a negligence claim, particularly the existence of a duty of care.
In negligence, duty of care is assessed using the two-stage (or multi-factor) approach articulated in Spandeck and later refined in cases such as NTUC Foodfare. The court therefore had to consider whether it was factually foreseeable that the defendants’ conduct might cause psychiatric harm, whether there was sufficient legal proximity between the parties, and whether policy considerations would militate against imposing a duty of care. In this case, the proximity inquiry was especially significant because the plaintiff sought to extend negligence principles to a relationship mediated by an employment context and an alleged sexual relationship between an employee and a student.
For the 2nd defendant, the legal issues also included whether the plaintiff could properly plead vicarious liability for the 1st defendant’s wrongdoing and/or an alternative non-delegable duty of care. However, these routes depended on the existence of a duty of care and on the adequacy of the pleaded negligence framework in the first place.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by reiterating the striking out framework under O 18 r 19(1). While the extract does not reproduce the full procedural discussion, the court’s approach was consistent with Singapore authority: striking out is appropriate where the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action, and the court must avoid deciding novel questions of law definitively at an early stage. Nonetheless, the court must “seriously consider” whether the pleaded facts remotely form the basis of an actionable tort. This balance was highlighted by reference to AYW v AYX [2016] 1 SLR 1183, where the High Court allowed a school’s strike-out challenge in part and emphasised that duty of care questions should generally be litigated fully at trial, but that the pleadings must still disclose a remotely arguable duty.
In applying the duty of care analysis, the court relied on the Court of Appeal’s summary in NTUC Foodfare of the Spandeck test. The court set out the three limbs: (a) factual foreseeability of harm; (b) sufficient legal proximity; and (c) policy considerations. The extract particularly focuses on proximity, describing it as the “closeness of the relationship between the parties” and the crux of whether the plaintiff was so closely and directly affected by the defendant’s actions that the defendant ought to have had the plaintiff in contemplation.
Proximity in Singapore negligence law is not purely factual; it is normative. The court referenced Spandeck’s incorporation of physical, circumstantial and causal proximity, and the twin criteria of voluntary assumption of responsibility and reliance. It also referenced Anwar Patrick Adrian v Ng Chong & Hue LLC, which developed proximity by considering “proximity factors” such as the defendant’s knowledge in relation to the plaintiff (including knowledge of the risk of harm, reliance, or vulnerability) and the defendant’s control over the situation giving rise to the risk of harm, together with the plaintiff’s corresponding vulnerability.
Against this doctrinal background, the plaintiff’s pleaded case required the court to assess whether the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff husband in respect of psychiatric injury arising from the discovery of an affair. The plaintiff attempted to establish proximity by arguing that the 1st defendant knew Jenna was married to the plaintiff, and that it was reasonably foreseeable that if the 1st defendant engaged in an illicit sexual relationship with Jenna, the plaintiff would most certainly sustain psychiatric injury upon learning of the affair. The plaintiff further submitted that the 1st defendant stood in a proximate relationship with him because of this knowledge and the foreseeability of psychiatric harm.
For the 2nd defendant, the plaintiff’s pleadings were more complex. He relied primarily on vicarious liability, asserting that the 1st defendant’s wrongdoing occurred during the course of employment. He also pleaded an alternative non-delegable duty of care. In addition, the plaintiff’s written submissions (as described in the extract) attempted to articulate how proximity existed between the defendants and the plaintiff, and the duties claimed against the 2nd defendant were summarised as: (a) not to impair or damage the marital relationship; (b) not to cause physical or psychiatric harm to Jenna and/or the plaintiff; (c) to provide a safe environment for Jenna so as to assure the plaintiff that Jenna was safe; and (d) to censure and reprimand employees for wrongdoing brought to the 2nd defendant’s attention. The court noted that these duties “should have been properly pleaded” in the statement of claim in the first place, signalling a pleading quality concern.
Although the extract is truncated and does not show the court’s final application of these principles to the specific facts, the reasoning trajectory is clear. The court’s analysis would necessarily focus on whether the pleaded facts could establish the required legal proximity. In particular, the court would examine whether the plaintiff’s psychiatric injury was sufficiently connected to the defendants’ conduct in a way that the law recognises as giving rise to a duty. The court would also consider whether the duties pleaded were framed too specifically (for example, as duties “not to impair or damage the marital relationship” or “to assure” the plaintiff of Jenna’s safety), rather than as a general duty to take reasonable care. This concern is consistent with AYW v AYX, where the High Court emphasised that negligence duties are framed generally as duties to take reasonable care, not duties to act in particular ways.
Finally, the court would have to consider policy considerations. Even where foreseeability and proximity might be argued, courts may refuse to impose a duty where doing so would be undesirable for broader reasons, such as opening floodgates of claims, undermining personal autonomy, or extending negligence into areas better governed by other legal doctrines. In a case involving intimate relationships and psychiatric injury, policy concerns are often acute because the causal chain between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s psychiatric harm may be mediated by personal decisions and private discovery of facts.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court granted the striking out applications. In practical terms, this meant that the plaintiff’s statement of claim was not allowed to proceed to trial against either the 1st or the 2nd defendant, because it failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action on the pleaded facts.
As a result, the plaintiff’s negligence-based claim—whether framed directly against the lecturer and/or indirectly against the educational institution through vicarious liability and non-delegable duty—was dismissed at the pleadings stage. The decision underscores that, even with attached medical evidence of psychiatric injury, a claimant must still plead facts capable of establishing the legal elements of duty of care, including sufficient legal proximity and the absence of policy barriers.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it illustrates the Singapore courts’ approach to striking out negligence claims at an early stage, particularly where the claim depends on a novel or contested duty of care. The decision reinforces that the court will not simply accept labels such as “recognisable psychiatric injury” or “duty of care” as sufficient. Instead, it will scrutinise whether the pleaded facts, taken at their highest, can satisfy the Spandeck/NTUC Foodfare duty framework.
From a duty of care perspective, the case is also a reminder that proximity is the crux of negligence analysis in many contexts. Where the alleged harm arises from intimate conduct and the plaintiff’s injury is triggered by discovery and personal emotional reaction, claimants must plead a legally meaningful relationship between the parties—often involving knowledge, reliance, vulnerability, and/or control over the risk. If those proximity factors are not adequately pleaded or cannot plausibly be made out, the claim may fail even if psychiatric harm is medically documented.
For educational institutions and employers, the case provides practical guidance on pleading and risk management. Claims framed through vicarious liability or non-delegable duty will still be constrained by the underlying negligence duty analysis. For claimants, it signals the importance of careful pleading: duties should be framed consistently with the general duty to take reasonable care, and the statement of claim must properly articulate the factual basis for proximity rather than relying on broad assertions about marital harm or “safe environments” without a legally cognisable duty.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court (Cap. 332, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) — O 18 r 19(1)(a) (striking out pleadings where they disclose no reasonable cause of action)
Cases Cited
- Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100
- NTUC Foodfare Co-operative Ltd v SIA Engineering Co Ltd [2018] 2 SLR 588
- Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562
- Andrew Robertson, “Justice, Community Welfare and the Duty of Care” (2011) 127 LQR 370 (cited in extract)
- ACB ([4] supra) (mentioned in extract)
- Anwar Patrick Adrian v Ng Chong & Hue LLC [2014] 3 SLR 761
- AYW v AYX [2016] 1 SLR 1183
- Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 60 ALR 1
- David Tan & Goh Yihan, “The Promise of Universality: The Spandeck Formulation Half a Decade On” (2013) 25 SAcLJ 510 (cited in extract)
- Bae Junho v Daimwood, Samuel Lathan and another [2019] SGHCR 9 (the case itself)
Source Documents
This article analyses [2019] SGHCR 09 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.