Case Details
- Title: AW CHEE PENG v AW CHEE LOO
- Citation: [2023] SGHCR 6
- Court: High Court (Registrar)
- Date: 5 June 2023
- Proceedings: General Division of the High Court; Suit No 468 of 2021 (Taking of Accounts and Inquiries No 1 of 2023)
- Judge/Registrar: AR Gan Kam Yuin
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Aw Chee Peng
- Defendant/Respondent: Aw Chee Loo
- Parties: Brothers
- Legal Areas: Land; co-ownership; taking of accounts; evidence; civil procedure
- Statutes Referenced: Conveyancing and Law of Property Act; Evidence Act 1893 (including s 105); Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed)
- Key Statutory Provision: s 73A of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act
- Cases Cited: [2005] SGCA 4; [2023] SGHCR 6
- Prior Related Decision: Aw Chee Peng v Aw Chee Loo [2022] 5 SLR 451
- Hearing Dates: 17–19 January 2023
- Judgment Reserved: Yes
- Judgment Length: 34 pages; 9,818 words
Summary
This High Court Registrar’s decision concerns a “taking of accounts and inquiries” (“TAI”) between two brothers who are co-owners of two family properties in Singapore: 12 Jalan Gelenggang (“No 12”) and 12A Jalan Gelenggang (“No 12A”). The dispute arose after an earlier High Court decision held that the defendant brother was liable to account to the plaintiff brother for receiving more than his share of rents or profits from the properties under s 73A of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (“CLPA”). The present TAI therefore focused on quantifying the rental income to be accounted for and determining whether the defendant could set off certain expenses against the plaintiff’s entitlement.
The Registrar held that the defendant must account for the full rental income actually received for No 12 from 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2022, rejecting the defendant’s attempt to reduce the accountable amount by reference to an alleged shortfall in a security deposit return. For No 12A, the Registrar accepted the plaintiff’s evidence for the rental paid by the tenants and rejected the defendant’s attempt to deduct an “internet” charge based on insufficient proof and inadequate pleading. The Registrar also addressed adverse inference reasoning in relation to the defendant’s earlier position that there was no rental income for No 12A, and determined the appropriate treatment of expenses claimed by the defendant, including expenses said to relate to the separate “Dedap Residence”.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The parties are brothers and co-owners of two properties, No 12 and No 12A, which are located at 12 Jalan Gelenggang and 12A Jalan Gelenggang respectively. No 12 is the ground floor unit, while No 12A is the upper unit. The earlier judgment (Aw Chee Peng v Aw Chee Loo [2022] 5 SLR 451) established the defendant’s liability to account personally to the plaintiff under s 73A CLPA for rents or profits arising from the properties that the defendant had received in excess of his share. The earlier judge also held that the defendant’s liability to account commenced on 1 January 2021, entitling the plaintiff to an account for rental income received from that date onwards.
In the TAI proceedings, the central task was to compute how much rental income the defendant received from each property during the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2022, and then determine what deductions, if any, were permissible. The plaintiff’s entitlement was quantified on the basis of ownership: the plaintiff was a one-third owner of the properties, with the defendant and their father being the other two owners. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s share of rental income was one-third of the accountable net rental receipts (subject to any allowable set-offs).
For No 12, the parties were largely aligned on the rental framework. The property was rented from at least 1 January 2021 at a monthly rental of $7,950 until 9 May 2021. After that, a new tenancy agreement was entered into between the defendant and the same tenant at a reduced monthly rental of $7,600, ending on 9 May 2024. The parties agreed that the total rental income received for the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2022 was $183,800, spanning both tenancy agreements.
However, the defendant sought to reduce the amount he had to account for by claiming that the security deposit under the first tenancy was $23,850 (three months’ rental at $7,950) and that under the second tenancy it was $22,800 (three months’ rental at $7,600). The defendant argued that the difference of $1,050 should be treated as returned to the tenant, and therefore the accountable rental should be reduced by that amount. The Registrar treated this as a matter requiring proof by the defendant.
For No 12A, the rental arrangements were more contested. The property was rented to multiple occupants, including PW2 and PW4 (a couple), and PW1 and another tenant, Huang. PW1, PW2 and PW4 testified under subpoena at the plaintiff’s behest. Huang did not testify because he had left Singapore and returned to China shortly before the TAI hearing began. The parties agreed on certain rental totals for specified periods, but disagreed on the precise start date of Huang’s tenancy and on whether certain “internet” charges should be deducted from the amounts the defendant had to account for.
In addition, the defendant raised a separate line of argument concerning expenses. Although there was no rental income to account for in relation to a third property, 75 Dedap Road (the “Dedap Residence”), the Dedap Residence was relevant to the TAI because the defendant claimed he had incurred renovation and maintenance expenses there and should be allowed to set off those expenses against the plaintiff’s share of rental income from No 12 and No 12A.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The TAI required the Registrar to determine, first, the amount of rental income received from No 12 for the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2022. Second, the Registrar had to determine the amount of rental income received from No 12A for the same period. These were primarily evidential and accounting questions, but they also engaged legal principles about who bears the burden of proof for deductions and how documentary and oral evidence should be assessed.
Third, the Registrar had to decide whether the defendant could set off expenses incurred in connection with the properties (No 12 and No 12A) against the plaintiff’s entitlement, and if so, in what amount. This required the Registrar to identify which expenses were sufficiently connected to the production or management of rental income and whether the evidence supported the claimed amounts.
Fourth, the Registrar had to decide whether the defendant could set off expenses incurred in connection with the Dedap Residence against the account for rental income from the properties. This issue raised a more conceptual question: whether expenses relating to a different property and different living arrangements could properly be treated as deductible from rents or profits arising from the co-owned rental properties under the s 73A accounting framework.
Finally, the Registrar addressed costs for the TAI proceedings, which is often consequential in accounting disputes where parties may succeed on some issues but fail on others.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Registrar’s analysis proceeded issue by issue, with a consistent focus on evidential sufficiency and the allocation of burdens. For Issue (1) (No 12 rental income), the Registrar accepted the parties’ agreed total rental receipts of $183,800. The dispute was whether the defendant could deduct $1,050 by treating it as a returned portion of the security deposit difference between the two tenancies. The Registrar held that it was for the defendant to prove that the difference had indeed been returned to the tenant. This approach reflects a general evidential principle: where a party seeks to reduce an accountable sum by asserting a factual event (here, the return of a deposit), that party must adduce credible evidence to establish the fact.
In rejecting the defendant’s deduction, the Registrar relied on the absence of documentary evidence and the lack of clear testimony. The Registrar noted that there was no documentary evidence supporting the return of the $1,050. The defendant did not actually state that he had returned the difference in May 2021 (or at any other time). The only reference was an “equivocal” line item in the defendant’s calculations table: “(S$7,600.00 – S$1,050.00 (return of deposit))”. The Registrar held that this did not suffice to establish the return as a fact. In doing so, the Registrar also referenced the principle that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the deduction, citing Chua Kok Tee David v DBS Bank Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 231 at [23] and s 105 of the Evidence Act 1893. Section 105 concerns the burden of proving particular facts, and the Registrar’s application underscores that accounting deductions are not presumed; they must be proven.
For Issue (2) (No 12A rental income), the Registrar accepted evidence from tenants who testified under subpoena. The Registrar found PW1’s testimony credible and accepted the plaintiff’s position on the rental amounts paid by PW1 for the relevant months. The defendant argued that PW1 had paid a total of $13,600 rather than $13,640, and that the $40 difference related to internet fees of $10 per month for September to December 2022. The defendant’s theory was that PW1 paid the internet fee to the defendant due to a dispute between PW1 and PW2, and that the defendant then handed it to PW2. The Registrar rejected this argument on two grounds: first, there was no evidence adduced about the alleged dispute or why the defendant acted as a go-between; second, the defendant had not put this case to PW1 or PW2 during their oral testimonies, depriving them of an opportunity to respond.
The Registrar also examined the documentary exhibit relied on by the defendant (exhibit P1, a handwritten note stating “Internet $10”). The Registrar held that the exhibit showed only that an internet charge existed, but did not establish to whom the charge was payable or that it should be deducted from the defendant’s accountable rental receipts. This reasoning illustrates a careful distinction between proving that a charge exists and proving that it has the legal and accounting effect claimed by the defendant. In an accounting context, the defendant must show not only the existence of an item but also its relevance to the computation of rents or profits to be accounted for.
With respect to Huang, the Registrar addressed the plaintiff’s invitation to draw adverse inferences against the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s earlier consistent position—starting from his accounting affidavit and continuing through answers to interrogatories and correspondence—was that there was no rental income for No 12A. The plaintiff further explained that the tenants were tracked down and compelled to testify, and that the defendant’s position changed only late in the proceedings, in his AEIC filed on 13 January 2023. The Registrar’s approach to adverse inferences reflects the evidential significance of inconsistent positions and late changes in pleaded or sworn accounts, particularly where those positions affect the availability of evidence and the fairness of the accounting process.
Although the extract provided is truncated, the Registrar’s reasoning in relation to adverse inference is clear in principle: where a party maintains a factual position that is later contradicted by credible testimony from third parties, the court may infer that the earlier position was not accurate. Such inferences are not automatic, but they are a tool for assessing credibility and the reliability of the party’s account, especially when the party’s earlier stance would have discouraged or prevented the plaintiff from obtaining evidence at the relevant time.
For the set-off issues (Issues (3) and (4)), the Registrar considered whether expenses claimed by the defendant were properly connected to the properties for which rents were being accounted. The Dedap Residence issue was particularly sensitive because the Dedap Residence was where the parties lived together with other family members and there was no rental income to account for. The defendant’s argument was that renovation and maintenance expenses for the Dedap Residence should be set off against the plaintiff’s share of rental income from No 12 and No 12A. The Registrar’s task was to determine whether such expenses could legally and logically fall within the accounting framework under s 73A CLPA, which is concerned with rents or profits arising from the co-owned property and the liability of a co-owner who receives more than his share.
In addressing these set-off questions, the Registrar’s analysis would necessarily involve both legal relevance and evidential proof. Expenses must be shown to have been incurred, quantified, and sufficiently connected to the generation, receipt, or management of the rents or profits in question. The Registrar’s approach demonstrates that set-off is not a matter of broad discretion; it depends on the statutory accounting scheme and the evidence supporting the claimed deductions.
What Was the Outcome?
The Registrar concluded that the defendant must account for rental income received from No 12 for the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2022 in the full agreed amount of $183,800, rejecting the defendant’s attempt to deduct $1,050 for an alleged return of the security deposit difference due to insufficient proof. For No 12A, the Registrar accepted the plaintiff’s evidence for the rental amounts paid by the tenants and rejected the defendant’s deduction arguments relating to internet charges, again due to lack of evidential support and inadequate case presentation.
On the set-off issues, the Registrar determined the extent to which expenses could be deducted, including whether expenses connected to the Dedap Residence could be set off against the rental account. The Registrar also made consequential orders on costs for the TAI proceedings, reflecting the mixed nature of the parties’ successes across the various sub-issues.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for practitioners dealing with co-ownership disputes and statutory accounting under s 73A CLPA. While the earlier judgment established liability and the commencement date for the duty to account, this TAI decision provides practical guidance on how courts quantify rental income and how strictly they require proof for deductions. The Registrar’s insistence that a party seeking to reduce an accountable sum must prove the factual basis for the deduction is particularly relevant for defendants who attempt to offset security deposits, utilities, or other items against rent.
The case also illustrates evidential discipline in accounting proceedings. The Registrar’s rejection of the internet-fee deduction demonstrates that courts will not accept speculative or unsupported explanations, especially where the deduction is not properly pleaded or put to witnesses. For litigators, this underscores the importance of ensuring that any deduction theory is clearly articulated in submissions and put to witnesses during oral testimony, so that the evidential record is complete and fair.
Finally, the decision is a useful reference point on adverse inferences and credibility assessment in civil disputes. Where a party’s sworn positions evolve late in the proceedings, and where earlier positions are inconsistent with later evidence from third-party tenants, the court may draw inferences that affect the outcome of the accounting. This is a reminder that credibility and consistency are not merely rhetorical; they can materially influence the court’s findings on contested facts.
Legislation Referenced
- Conveyancing and Law of Property Act (Singapore) — s 73A
- Evidence Act 1893 (Singapore) — s 105 (burden of proving particular facts)
- Evidence Act 1893 (2020 Rev Ed) (as referenced in the judgment)
Cases Cited
- Chua Kok Tee David v DBS Bank Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 231
- Aw Chee Peng v Aw Chee Loo [2022] 5 SLR 451
- [2005] SGCA 4
- [2023] SGHCR 6
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGHCR 6 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.