AVIATION HUB PTE LTD v DANIAL HIGGINS

"In the absence of a valid defence, I find that the defendant has been in trespass of the Property from 1 September 2021, which was when the Licence was revoked by MAJ’s sale of the Property to the plaintiff." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 25

Case Information

• Citation: [2022] SGHC 281 (Para 0)
• Court: In the General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date: 3 November 2022 and 4 November 2022 (Para 0)
• Coram: Goh Yihan JC (Para 0)
• Case Number: Originating Summons No 326 of 2022 (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Civil Procedure — Injunctions; Land — Licences — Contractual; Tort — Trespass (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Plaintiff: Yeap Poh Leong Andre SC and Wayne Yeo (Yang Weien) of Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP (Para 0)
• Counsel for the Defendant: The defendant was absent and unrepresented (Para 0)
• Judgment Length: Ex tempore judgment delivered over two dates, 3 and 4 November 2022 (Para 0)

Summary

This was an ex tempore decision concerning an aircraft left on land that the plaintiff had purchased from the original owner, MAJ. The court held that the defendant’s contractual licence to keep the aircraft on the property was revoked when MAJ sold the property to the plaintiff, and that the continued presence of the aircraft therefore amounted to trespass. The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover accrued hangarage fees assigned to it by MAJ and to damages for continuing trespass at the contractual monthly rate until removal of the aircraft. (Para 2) (Para 25) (Para 36) (Para 40)

The court’s reasoning proceeded in two stages. First, it asked whether the plaintiff had established actionable trespass, and concluded that it had because the licence was personal, revocable, and not binding on the purchaser merely by notice. Second, it considered the remedies sought and drew a careful distinction between removal of the aircraft, which could be ordered by way of self-help and declaratory relief, and destruction or disposal of the aircraft, which was not available as of right and would require a proper injunction on evidence. (Para 11) (Para 12) (Para 13) (Para 18) (Para 21) (Para 32)

On the monetary side, the court accepted that the plaintiff could recover the accrued hangarage fees for the period before it acquired the property, because those fees had been validly assigned to it by deed. It also accepted that damages for the continuing trespass after acquisition could be measured by the reasonable hire or user value of the property, which in this case was the same monthly rate of $2,900. The court therefore granted the plaintiff substantial relief, but only partially granted the most drastic remedy sought in relation to the aircraft itself. (Para 9) (Para 36) (Para 39) (Para 40)

What Were the Facts Leading to the Dispute Over the Aircraft?

The dispute began with a contract dated 15 May 2014 between MAJ and the defendant, under which MAJ agreed to provide annual aircraft servicing and hangarage for the defendant’s aircraft. The monthly hangarage fee was $2,900, and the contract was recorded in an email from MAJ to the defendant. The court reproduced the email terms as the contractual foundation for the dispute. (Para 4) (Para 17)

"On 15 May 2014, MAJ entered into a contract with the defendant for MAJ to provide annual aircraft servicing and hangarage in respect of the Aircraft (“the Contract”)." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 4

The defendant defaulted on payment in December 2014, and no payment was received despite demands. The court treated this as the starting point for the accrued hangarage fees later claimed by the plaintiff. The factual chronology mattered because it established both the existence of a contractual debt and the long period during which the aircraft remained on the property without payment. (Para 4) (Para 36)

"In December 2014, the defendant defaulted on his obligation to pay the Hangarage Fees." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 4

MAJ later sold the property to the plaintiff on 1 September 2021. After the purchase, the plaintiff demanded that the defendant remove the aircraft, and warned that if no response was received by a specified date it would assume the aircraft had been abandoned and would proceed to dispose of it so that renovation works could continue. The defendant did not comply. These facts framed the plaintiff’s claim for trespass and for relief relating to removal or disposal of the aircraft. (Para 7) (Para 2)

"On 1 September 2021, the plaintiff acquired the Property from MAJ." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 7

MAJ then executed a deed of assignment on 24 January 2022, assigning the hangarage fees and all associated rights, title, claims, demands, benefits, and interests to the plaintiff free and clear of any other claims. That assignment was central to the plaintiff’s monetary claim, because it allowed the plaintiff to pursue the pre-acquisition arrears even though those arrears had accrued while MAJ still owned the property. (Para 9) (Para 36)

"On 24 January 2022, by way of a Deed of Assignment, MAJ assigned the Hangarage Fees and all rights, title, claims, demands, benefits, and interest under and in respect of the Fees to the plaintiff free and clear of any other claims, rights, or interest of any person whatsoever." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 9

How Did the Court Frame the Issues?

The court identified two broad issues. The first was whether the plaintiff had established actionable trespass on the facts. The second, assuming trespass was established, was whether the plaintiff was entitled to the remedies it sought. The court expressly noted that the second issue encompassed the requests for removal, destruction or disposal, the monetary claim for $234,900, and damages for continuing trespass. (Para 11) (Para 12) (Para 13)

"Having set out the background facts, there are, to my mind, two broad relevant issues." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 11

"First, I need to determine if the plaintiff has established an actionable trespass on the facts." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 12

"Second, assuming that the plaintiff is able to prove an actionable trespass, I will then need to consider if the plaintiff is entitled to the remedies it has prayed for" — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 13

This framing is important because it shows that the court did not treat the case as a simple debt claim or a simple possession dispute. Instead, it separated the proprietary/tortious question from the remedial question, and then dealt with each remedy individually. That structure explains why the court could accept trespass but still refuse the plaintiff’s broadest request to destroy or dispose of the aircraft as of right. (Para 11) (Para 13) (Para 32)

Why Did the Court Hold That the Defendant Was in Trespass?

The court held that the plaintiff had established actionable trespass because the aircraft remained on the property after the licence had been revoked by the sale of the property from MAJ to the plaintiff. The court stated that, leaving aside the detailed terms of the contract, the licence was revoked upon the sale. It therefore concluded that the defendant’s continued presence on the land through the aircraft was a direct interference with the plaintiff’s possession. (Para 14) (Para 18) (Para 25)

"In my view, the plaintiff has established an actionable trespass caused by the defendant’s Aircraft being present on the Property." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 14

"In my view, leaving aside the terms of the Contract, which do not matter for this analysis, the Licence was revoked upon the sale of the Property from MAJ to the plaintiff." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 18

The court set out the elements of trespass to land and applied them to the facts. It stated that the plaintiff had to show an act of interference with the land, that the act was voluntary and direct, and that the land was in the plaintiff’s possession. The aircraft’s continued presence satisfied those requirements because it was a direct physical interference with the property after the licence had ended. (Para 15) (Para 25)

"in order to establish a tortious action in trespass to land, the plaintiff must show that: (a) the defendant committed an act of interference with the plaintiff’s land; (b) the act was voluntary and direct; and (c) the land was in the possession of the plaintiff." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 15

The court also relied on the proposition that a licence can be a complete defence to trespass, but only while the licence remains valid. Once the licence was revoked, that defence fell away. The court therefore treated the defendant’s failure to remove the aircraft after the sale as the operative trespass. It ultimately stated that, in the absence of a valid defence, trespass had been established from 1 September 2021. (Para 16) (Para 25)

"This would be a complete defence to trespass (see the High Court decision in Tan Hin Leong v Lee Teck Im [2000] 1 SLR(R) 891 at [16])." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 16

"In the absence of a valid defence, I find that the defendant has been in trespass of the Property from 1 September 2021, which was when the Licence was revoked by MAJ’s sale of the Property to the plaintiff." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 25

Why Did the Sale of the Property End the Licence, and Did Notice Matter?

The court reasoned that the licence was contractual and therefore its scope and revocability had to be determined by construing the contract. It accepted that the contract created a licence in respect of the aircraft’s presence on the property, but held that the sale of the property revoked that licence. The court relied on authority stating that a licensor’s sale of title effectively revokes the licence. (Para 16) (Para 19)

"Where such a licence is conferred by way of a contract, its scope and revocability is necessarily determined by construing the terms of the contract" — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 16

"The licensor’s act of selling his title in the land effectively revoked the licence." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 19

The court then addressed whether the licence could bind the plaintiff as purchaser. It noted the historical view associated with Lord Denning MR that a contractual licence might bind third parties with notice, but explained that this view had been disapproved by the English Court of Appeal in Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold. The court also referred to Singapore authority and observed that the modern position is that a contractual licence does not generally create an interest in land and does not bind a purchaser merely because the purchaser had notice. (Para 21)

"Lord Denning MR’s view, expressed in cases such as Errington v Errington [1952] 1 KB 290 and Binions v Evans [1972] Ch 359, that a contractual licence could bind third parties with notice" — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 21

"the English Court of Appeal in Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold [1989] Ch 1 (“Ashburn Anstalt”) has since disapproved of this view, holding that a contractual licence did not create an interest in land." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 21

The court further noted that the Singapore High Court in UJT v UJR and another matter had recognised the same position, and that the Court of Appeal in Guy Neale had endorsed Ashburn Anstalt by way of obiter dicta. The practical consequence was that the plaintiff, as purchaser, was not bound by the defendant’s licence merely because it knew of the arrangement. The court also observed that a constructive trust might arise if the transferee’s conscience were affected, but no such basis was established on the facts before it. (Para 21)

"Valerie Thean J in the High Court decision of UJT v UJR and another matter [2018] 4 SLR 931 held (at [73]) that while there is no Singapore decision which dealt with whether a contractual licence is capable of binding third parties" — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 21

"the Court of Appeal in Guy Neale and others v Ku De Ta SG Pte Ltd [2015] 4 SLR 283 (“Guy Neale”) had, by way of obiter dicta, endorsed the position taken in Ashburn Anstalt." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 21

What Did the Court Say About the Plaintiff’s Requested Right to Remove, Destroy, or Dispose of the Aircraft?

The plaintiff argued that because the aircraft was trespassing, it should be entitled not only to remove it but also to destroy or dispose of it. The court rejected that broader proposition. It held that self-help remedies do not ordinarily extend to destruction of property as the norm, and that the plaintiff’s reliance on authority about eviction did not justify the destruction or disposal of the aircraft. (Para 29) (Para 32)

"I do not think that such self-help remedies go as far as allowing the destruction of property as the norm (see, eg, the English Court of Appeal decision in Arthur and another v Anker and another [1997] QB 564, where the vehicles in trespass were wheel-clamped instead)." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 29

The court distinguished between ordinary self-help eviction and the more drastic step of destroying or disposing of a trespassing chattel. It referred to McPhail v Persons Unknown as an example of the common law self-help remedy of evicting a trespasser using ordinary force, but it did not accept that this principle extended to destruction. The court therefore held that the plaintiff could not rely on trespass alone to justify disposal of the aircraft. (Para 31) (Para 32)

"it was for the quite different common law self-help remedy that a landowner has to evict a trespasser using ordinary force (see, eg, the English Court of Appeal decision in McPhail v Persons Unknown [1973] Ch 447)." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 31

"Accordingly, I do not think that the plaintiff is correct in arguing that a right to destroy or dispose of the Aircraft arises simply on proof of an actionable trespass." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 32

Instead, the court held that mandatory injunctions may be granted in the court’s discretion requiring the defendant to remove the subject matter of trespass from the plaintiff’s land. But that remedy is not automatic, and the court cited authority showing that a mandatory injunction may be refused if the burden on the defendant is extremely onerous and out of proportion to the benefit to the plaintiff. The court therefore left open the possibility of a future application for an injunction to destroy or dispose of the aircraft, but only on proper evidence. (Para 32)

"Mandatory injunctions may, in the court’s discretion, be granted requiring the defendant to remove the subject matter of trespass from the plaintiff’s land." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 32

"It was held in Tay Tuan Kiat v Pritnam Singh Brar [1985-1986] SLR(R) 763 that a mandatory injunction would not be granted if the obligation imposed on the defendant to rectify the state of affairs resulting from his tort was extremely onerous and out of all proportion to the benefit to be gained by the plaintiffs." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 32

What Relief Did the Court Grant in Relation to the Aircraft Itself?

The court granted prayer (a) only in part. It declared that the plaintiff was entitled to remove the aircraft from the property to a safe and secure location within Singapore from which the aircraft could be retrieved by the defendant if he wished. The court also required the plaintiff to take reasonable care of the aircraft and held that the reasonable costs of removal were to be borne by the defendant. This was a narrower remedy than the plaintiff had sought, because it preserved the defendant’s ability to recover the aircraft. (Para 35)

"Accordingly, in relation to prayer (a), I only declare that the plaintiff is entitled to remove the Aircraft from the Property to a safe and secure location within Singapore from which the Aircraft can be retrieved by the defendant if he so wishes." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 35

"The reasonable costs of the removal are to be borne by the defendant." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 35

The court’s approach reflects a careful balancing of property rights and practical necessity. The plaintiff was not left powerless to clear its land, but it was also not given carte blanche to destroy or dispose of the aircraft. The court’s solution allowed the land to be freed while protecting the defendant’s residual interest in the aircraft, at least until a further application might justify a more drastic order. (Para 35) (Para 32)

The court expressly stated that if the plaintiff wished to pursue destruction or disposal, it could reapply for an injunction on proper evidence. That statement is significant because it shows the court was not foreclosing the possibility of such relief altogether; it was simply insisting that the remedy be justified through the ordinary equitable process rather than assumed from the tort alone. (Para 35) (Para 32)

How Did the Court Deal With the $234,900 Claim for Hangarage Fees?

The court granted prayer (b) in full and awarded the plaintiff $234,900. It calculated that sum as 81 months multiplied by $2,900 per month, covering the period from December 2014 to 1 September 2021. The court accepted that the hangarage fees had accrued before the plaintiff acquired the property, but that they had been validly assigned to the plaintiff by MAJ. (Para 36) (Para 38)

"I find that the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $234,900, being the accrued Hangarage Fees accrued between December 2014 and 1 September 2021 (ie, 81 months x $2,900 per month)." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 36

"Accordingly, I grant order in terms in respect of prayer (b)." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 38

The assignment was critical because it transferred not only the fees themselves but also all rights, title, claims, demands, benefits, and interests under and in respect of those fees. The court therefore treated the plaintiff as the proper claimant for the arrears, notwithstanding that the fees had originally accrued to MAJ. The judgment does not suggest any dispute about the validity of the assignment, and the court relied on it as part of the basis for granting the monetary relief. (Para 9) (Para 36)

The court’s treatment of the arrears also shows that the contractual debt and the trespass claim were analytically distinct. The arrears were recoverable because of the assignment and the underlying contract, while the trespass damages arose because the aircraft remained on the property after the licence had been revoked. The court therefore gave effect to both the contractual and tortious dimensions of the dispute. (Para 9) (Para 25) (Para 36)

How Were Damages for Continuing Trespass Assessed?

For the period after 1 September 2021, the court awarded damages at the monthly rate of $2,900 until the aircraft is removed from the property. The court accepted the plaintiff’s submission that the measure of damages for trespass could be based on the reasonable hire of the property, which it described as a form of user damages. It relied on authority supporting that approach and applied the contractual monthly rate as the appropriate measure. (Para 39) (Para 40)

"I agree with the plaintiff that the measure of damages for trespass can be based on the reasonable hire of the property in question, which is really a form of user damages (see the High Court decision of Paul Patrick Baragwanath and another v Republic of Singapore Yacht Club [2016] 1 SLR 1295 at [19] and [24]" — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 39

"Accordingly, I grant order in terms in respect of prayer (c) with damages to be calculated at a monthly rate of $2,900 per month from 1 September 2021 until such date as the Aircraft is removed from the Property." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 40

This aspect of the judgment is practically important because it confirms that a landowner may recover ongoing damages for the continued occupation of land by a trespassing chattel, and that the measure may be tied to the reasonable rental or hire value of the space occupied. The court’s adoption of the same monthly rate used in the contract also reflects a straightforward and commercially sensible method of quantification. (Para 39) (Para 40)

The damages award was therefore not a one-off sum only. It was structured to continue until the aircraft is actually removed, which means the defendant’s liability remains ongoing so long as the trespass continues. That feature reinforces the court’s view that the continued presence of the aircraft was a continuing wrong, not merely a historical one. (Para 25) (Para 40)

What Did the Court Say About the Defendant’s Absence and the Evidential Record?

The defendant did not appear at the hearing despite being notified and served with the relevant papers. The court therefore proceeded on the plaintiff’s evidence, which included the contract email, the sale of the property, the deed of assignment, and the correspondence demanding removal and payment. The absence of any defence meant that the plaintiff’s factual case went unchallenged. (Para 2) (Para 7) (Para 9) (Para 17)

"The defendant was absent at the hearing before me despite being notified of the hearing date and served with all the relevant papers." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 2

The court’s reliance on the documentary record is visible throughout the judgment. It reproduced the email containing the contract terms and relied on the deed of assignment to establish the plaintiff’s entitlement to the arrears. It also referred to the plaintiff’s email warning that it would assume abandonment and proceed to dispose of the aircraft if no response was received. These documents formed the evidential backbone of the case. (Para 7) (Para 9) (Para 17)

Because the defendant was absent, the court repeatedly prefaced its conclusions with the absence of a valid defence. That does not mean the court treated the matter as uncontested in a purely formal sense; rather, it still analysed the legal basis for trespass and remedies. But the absence of opposition clearly made it easier for the court to accept the plaintiff’s version of events and to grant relief in the terms ultimately ordered. (Para 25) (Para 32) (Para 38)

Why Does This Case Matter?

This case matters because it clarifies the effect of selling land on a contractual licence to keep a chattel on that land. The court held that the licence was revoked by the sale and that the purchaser was not bound merely because it had notice of the arrangement. That is a useful statement of principle for disputes involving hangarage, storage, parking, and other land-based licences where the licensor transfers the underlying property. (Para 18) (Para 21) (Para 25)

"A licence in respect of land, which is personal in nature, will generally not bind a purchaser of land even if that purchaser had notice of the licence" — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 21

The case also draws a sharp line between removing a trespassing chattel and destroying or disposing of it. The court accepted that a landowner may seek removal, but refused to treat trespass as a licence for self-help destruction. That distinction is important in practice because it prevents overreach by landowners while still allowing them to clear their land through lawful means. (Para 29) (Para 31) (Para 32) (Para 35)

"Accordingly, I do not think that the plaintiff is correct in arguing that a right to destroy or dispose of the Aircraft arises simply on proof of an actionable trespass." — Per Goh Yihan JC, Para 32

Finally, the judgment is significant for its treatment of damages and assignment. It confirms that accrued contractual fees can be assigned separately and recovered by the assignee, and that continuing trespass damages may be assessed by reference to reasonable hire or user value. For practitioners, that makes the case a useful authority on both the proprietary and monetary consequences of leaving a chattel on land after a licence has ended. (Para 9) (Para 36) (Para 39) (Para 40)

Cases Referred To

Legislation Referenced

• Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5), Order 7, Rule 2 (Para 0)

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN
• View in judgment: "On 1 September 2021, the plaintiff..."
• View in judgment: "In the matter of Order 7,..."
• View in judgment: "The reasonable costs of the removal..."
• View in judgment: "Accordingly, I grant order in terms..."
• View in judgment: "In the matter of Order 7,..."

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 281 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.