Case Details
- Citation: [2023] SGHC 291
- Title: Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of decision: 13 October 2023
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Judgment reserved: 4 October 2023
- Suit number: Suit No 833 of 2020
- Summonses: Summonses Nos 2331 and 2424 of 2023
- Plaintiffs/Applicants: (1) Arokiasamy Steven Joseph, Administrator of Estate of Salvin Foster Steven, the deceased; (2) Tan Kin Tee
- Defendants/Respondents: (1) Lee Boon Chuan Nelson; (2) Gomathinayagam Kandasami; (3) Institute of Mental Health
- Legal area: Civil Procedure – Costs
- Core issue: Quantum of costs to be awarded to successful litigants-in-person
- Statutes referenced: Rules of Court 2014 (O 59 r 18A); Rules of Court 2021 (O 21 r 7)
- Cases cited: [2023] SGHC 230; [2023] SGHC 291; [2023] SGHC 52
- Judgment length: 7 pages; 1,706 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerns costs arising from two dismissed summonses filed by Arbiters Inc Law Corporation (“Arbiters”). The summonses were brought in the context of an earlier suit (Suit 833 of 2020) in which the plaintiffs had succeeded against the defendants on the relevant applications. In the present decision, the court’s earlier orders were already clear: Arbiters was to pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants. The only remaining question was the quantum of those costs, and whether any costs should be awarded to the plaintiffs as litigants-in-person.
The court rejected Arbiters’ attempt to shift liability for costs to the plaintiffs. It held that Arbiters had no authority to file the summonses after being discharged, and that the applications were without merit. The court therefore fixed costs payable by Arbiters to the 1st and 3rd defendants, and also addressed the separate question of costs payable to the plaintiffs, who appeared in person.
In doing so, the court provided useful guidance on how Singapore courts should approach costs for litigants-in-person. While it acknowledged that the UK Civil Procedure Rules cap litigant-in-person costs at two-thirds of what would be awarded if represented, the court declined to adopt a strict formula. Instead, it emphasised that quantum remains discretionary and fact-sensitive under Singapore’s Rules of Court, and that costs should not be treated as a separate “taxation” exercise for self-represented parties.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The litigation arose out of Suit 833 of 2020. The present decision does not revisit the underlying merits of the substantive dispute; rather, it deals with costs consequences flowing from two summonses (SUM 2331 and SUM 2424) filed by Arbiters. Those summonses had been dismissed in an earlier judgment dated 25 August 2023: Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters [2023] SGHC 230. In that earlier judgment, the court had ordered Arbiters to pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants, with the quantum to be fixed if the parties could not agree.
After the dismissal of the summonses, the parties were unable to agree on the amount of costs. Written submissions were therefore filed for the court to determine the quantum. The plaintiffs, who were litigants-in-person at the costs stage, sought costs of $4,000 in total for the two summonses. Their position was that they should be compensated for having to attend court and respond to the applications.
By contrast, the 1st defendant’s solicitors (Donaldson & Burkinshaw LLP) sought costs of $13,000 in total plus disbursements of $142.83. The 3rd defendant’s solicitors (Legal Clinic LLC) sought costs of $16,000 all in. Arbiters rejected these claims and proposed a different allocation: it argued that the plaintiffs should each pay $4,000 to Arbiters for SUM 2331 (total $8,000), and that the plaintiffs and the 1st and 3rd defendants should each pay $2,000 to Arbiters for SUM 2424 (total $8,000). Arbiters also advanced an alternative position that, if costs were not awarded to it, then no costs should be awarded to the plaintiffs and only a nominal sum of $250 each should be awarded to the 1st and 3rd defendants.
The background to why Arbiters’ summonses failed is central to the costs analysis. The court explained that SUM 2331 was filed after Arbiters had been discharged, meaning Arbiters lacked authority to make the application. The court further indicated that the proper procedure would have been to apply for leave of court for the solicitors to be discharged, but this was not done. When Arbiters later realised the authority problem, it filed SUM 2424 in an attempt to rectify matters by joining Arbiters as a party and continuing with the earlier application. However, the court dismissed both summonses for the reasons already given in the earlier judgment.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first issue was straightforward: what quantum of costs should be fixed in accordance with the earlier orders that Arbiters pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants? This required the court to assess the appropriate amount having regard to the nature of the summonses, the time spent in court, the complexity of the issues, and the extent to which the parties were compelled to attend and respond.
The second issue was whether any costs should be awarded to Arbiters itself, or whether Arbiters could shift costs liability onto the plaintiffs. Arbiters argued that the plaintiffs and certain defendants should bear costs to Arbiters for the dismissed summonses, including by reference to an “equitable lien for costs”. The court had to decide whether Arbiters had any entitlement to costs given its lack of authority and the lack of merit in the applications.
The third issue, and the most legally significant, concerned the quantum of costs to be awarded to successful litigants-in-person. The plaintiffs sought $4,000 total. The court had to determine how Singapore’s Rules of Court govern costs for self-represented parties and whether it should adopt a strict cap or formula similar to the UK approach. The decision therefore engages with the principles and methodology for fixing costs where the successful party is not represented by counsel.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by addressing the solicitors’ submissions, because they were described as “more straightforward”. It emphasised that both summonses filed by Arbiters “could not be graced by even an iota of merit and thus failed utterly”. That assessment was linked to the procedural flaw identified in the earlier judgment: Arbiters had been discharged before filing the summonses, so it lacked authority. As a result, the parties who were served and compelled to attend court were entitled to costs, and Arbiters was not entitled to costs against any party.
On Arbiters’ attempt to justify costs through an equitable lien theory, the court rejected the submission. The court held that Arbiters was “found wanting on the equity scale”. The reasoning was practical and fairness-oriented: there was “no basis to withhold the full compensation from the plaintiffs”, and the court considered the estimated fees claimed by Arbiters to be excessive in the circumstances. The court also took into account that the two summonses were heard in about two hours in total and that the issues were not complicated. These factors supported a moderate costs award rather than the higher sums sought by the defendants’ solicitors.
Applying these considerations, the court fixed costs payable to the 1st defendant at $8,000 inclusive of disbursements, to be paid by Arbiters. For the 3rd defendant, the court fixed costs at $10,000 all in, again to be paid by Arbiters. The court noted that the main thrust of submissions in both applications was advanced by senior counsel for the 3rd defendant, which justified a higher figure than for the 1st defendant, but still within the costs guidelines for summonses. The court thus treated the costs assessment as guided by established tariff-like considerations for summons work, tempered by the specific circumstances of the case.
The court then turned to the plaintiffs’ claim for costs as litigants-in-person. It acknowledged a traditional approach: historically, costs were not awarded to litigants-in-person because party-and-party costs are designed to defray solicitor-and-client costs. However, modern procedural rules allow costs to be awarded even to self-represented parties. The court observed that in rare cases where such costs had been awarded, they were typically much lower than what would have been awarded as party-and-party costs if the litigant had been represented.
In addressing methodology, the court discussed the UK Civil Procedure Rules, which cap litigant-in-person costs at two-thirds of what would have been ordered if represented. The court referenced Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others [2023] SGHC 52 at [7]–[9], where the High Court had adopted that two-thirds cap. The present judge stated there was “no disagreement” with Mah Kiat Seng, but cautioned that it was not appropriate to lay down strict formulae for litigant-in-person costs in Singapore. The court’s key point was that Singapore’s Rules of Court 2014 (O 59 r 18A) and Rules of Court 2021 (O 21 r 7) do not provide any cap on quantum. Therefore, the UK cap could only be a “useful guide”, not a binding rule.
The court further explained why strict formulae are undesirable. Quantum of costs is always discretionary and fact-sensitive. Costs are not meant as punishment for the losing party, nor are they meant to provide full compensation, because money is rarely adequate compensation even in successful litigation. In litigant-in-person cases, the court also recognised that self-represented litigants may labour excessively due to anxiety or lack of legal knowledge, which can complicate the assessment. Conversely, some litigants-in-person may be knowledgeable and may outperform counsel, making it potentially unjust to apply a rigid cap that would limit their recovery to a fixed fraction of represented-party costs.
Accordingly, the court articulated a practical approach: costs for a litigant-in-person should not be “taxed separately” as if they were a distinct category with a separate calculation method. Instead, the trial judge should fix costs because the judge is best placed to adjust discretionary quantification based on the facts and merits. The court also stressed that the issues in the summonses were legal issues that, “bereft of counsel”, the plaintiffs were unable to help themselves with. The plaintiffs were more concerned about the fees claimed by Arbiters and the other solicitors, but that did not negate the fact that they were compelled to attend court for multiple occasions regarding the summonses.
In this case, the plaintiffs produced affidavit evidence that assisted the court. The court also noted that both plaintiffs were not employed, so there was no loss of income to claim as disbursements. Taking these factors together, the court fixed costs payable by Arbiters to each plaintiff at $500 (all in). This reflected the court’s view that litigant-in-person costs should be modest, but not illusory, given the time and effort required to attend and provide evidence.
What Was the Outcome?
The court ordered Arbiters to pay costs to the 1st defendant in the sum of $8,000 inclusive of disbursements, and to pay costs to the 3rd defendant in the sum of $10,000 all in. These amounts were fixed having regard to the lack of merit in the summonses, the short hearing time, and the complexity (or lack thereof) of the issues.
As for the plaintiffs, the court ordered Arbiters to pay each plaintiff $500 (all in) for the two summonses. The effect of the decision is that Arbiters bore the costs consequences of filing and pursuing the dismissed applications without authority and without merit, while the self-represented plaintiffs received a limited but tangible costs award reflecting their compelled attendance and affidavit evidence.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies how Singapore courts should approach costs where the successful party is a litigant-in-person. While the court acknowledged the UK-inspired two-thirds cap approach discussed in Mah Kiat Seng, it declined to treat that cap as a rigid rule. Instead, it reaffirmed that quantum is discretionary and fact-sensitive under Singapore’s Rules of Court, and that courts should avoid mechanical formulae.
For lawyers advising clients, the decision underscores that costs awards for litigants-in-person are generally lower than solicitor-and-client or party-and-party costs for represented parties, but they are not automatically denied. The court’s reasoning shows that the award will depend on what the litigant actually did—such as attending court and providing affidavit evidence—and on whether the issues were ones the litigant could reasonably handle without counsel.
The decision also serves as a cautionary tale for law firms and representatives. Arbiters’ lack of authority to file the summonses after discharge was central to the court’s refusal to award it costs. The court’s strong language (“failed utterly”) and the rejection of equitable lien arguments highlight that procedural defects and authority issues can have immediate and adverse cost consequences.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2014 (O 59 r 18A)
- Rules of Court 2021 (O 21 r 7)
Cases Cited
- [2023] SGHC 230
- [2023] SGHC 52
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGHC 291 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.