Case Details
- Citation: [2023] SGHC 291
- Title: Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and another v Lee Boon Chuan Nelson and others and other matters
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Date of decision: 13 October 2023
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Judgment reserved: 4 October 2023
- Suit number: Suit No 833 of 2020
- Summonses: Summonses Nos 2331 and 2424 of 2023
- Plaintiffs/Applicants: (1) Arokiasamy Steven Joseph (administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased) and (2) Tan Kin Tee
- Defendants/Respondents: (1) Lee Boon Chuan Nelson; (2) Gomathinayagam Kandasami; (3) Institute of Mental Health
- Legal area: Civil Procedure – Costs
- Core issue: Quantum and principles for costs awarded to successful litigants-in-person following dismissal of two summonses filed by solicitors
- Prior related decision referenced: [2023] SGHC 230
- Cases cited (as per metadata): [2023] SGHC 230; [2023] SGHC 52; [2023] SGHC 291
- Judgment length: 7 pages, 1,706 words
Summary
This High Court decision concerns the assessment of costs arising from two dismissed summonses brought by Arbiters Inc Law Corporation (“Arbiters”). The summonses were filed in the course of Suit No 833 of 2020, and the court had earlier dismissed them in a separate judgment dated 25 August 2023 ([2023] SGHC 230). In the present decision ([2023] SGHC 291), the only remaining issue was the quantum of costs to be paid following the court’s clear earlier orders that Arbiters should pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants.
The court rejected an attempt by Arbiters to shift liability for costs onto the plaintiffs (including the plaintiffs’ liability for costs to Arbiters). The judge held that the summonses could not be “graced by even an iota of merit” and failed utterly. As a result, the parties compelled to attend court were entitled to costs, and Arbiters was not entitled to costs against any party.
Most importantly for practitioners, the court also addressed how costs should be quantified where the successful parties are litigants-in-person. While acknowledging that English Civil Procedure rules cap litigant-in-person costs at two-thirds of solicitor costs, the judge emphasised that Singapore’s Rules of Court do not impose a strict cap. Instead, quantum remains discretionary and fact-sensitive, to be fixed by the trial judge based on the circumstances, including whether the litigant had to attend court and whether there were disbursements or loss of income.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The underlying dispute in Suit No 833 of 2020 involved multiple parties, including the plaintiffs (Arokiasamy Steven Joseph as administrator of the estate of Salvin Foster Steven, deceased, and Tan Kin Tee) and the defendants (Lee Boon Chuan Nelson, Gomathinayagam Kandasami, and the Institute of Mental Health). The present decision does not revisit the merits of the underlying suit. Instead, it focuses on costs arising from two interlocutory summonses—SUM 2331 and SUM 2424 of 2023—brought by Arbiters.
In the earlier judgment dated 25 August 2023 ([2023] SGHC 230), the court dismissed both summonses. The judge had ordered that Arbiters pay costs to the plaintiffs and to the 1st and 3rd defendants. The present matter arose because the parties could not agree on the amount of costs payable. The court therefore fixed the quantum of costs, after receiving written submissions from all parties.
Arbiters’ counsel, Mr Vijay Kumar Rai (“Mr Rai”), advanced a position that was effectively contrary to the earlier costs orders. He submitted that the plaintiffs and the 1st and 3rd defendants should be held liable for costs to Arbiters for the dismissed summonses. The judge treated this submission as misconceived, noting that the earlier orders were “clear and unambiguous” and that Arbiters’ summonses had failed completely.
Procedurally, the judge explained that SUM 2331 was flawed because it was filed after Arbiters had been discharged by the plaintiffs and after Red Lion Circle Advocates & Solicitors (“Red Lion Circle”) had been discharged as well. Without proper authority, Arbiters had no standing to make the application. The judge further indicated that the correct procedure would have been to apply for leave of court for the discharge of solicitors, but that was not done. When Mr Rai later became aware of the authority problem, he filed SUM 2424 to join Arbiters as a party and to continue with the earlier application. That attempt also failed, and both summonses were dismissed with costs.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was straightforward: given that Arbiters’ summonses were dismissed, what costs should be awarded and against whom? The court had already determined liability for costs in the earlier judgment, but the present decision required the court to quantify the amounts payable to each relevant party.
The second issue—more nuanced and of wider practical importance—was how to quantify costs where the successful parties are litigants-in-person. The plaintiffs, who were successful in resisting the dismissed summonses, represented themselves in the costs proceedings. They sought costs of $4,000 in total for both summonses. Other parties sought higher amounts, and Arbiters resisted the plaintiffs’ claims while also proposing alternative cost allocations.
Finally, the court had to consider whether Singapore should adopt a strict formula for litigant-in-person costs analogous to the English Civil Procedure approach. The judge referenced Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General and others ([2023] SGHC 52) and the English cap of two-thirds, but the court needed to decide whether such a cap should be treated as binding or merely as a guide in Singapore’s discretionary costs framework.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The judge began by addressing the solicitors’ submissions, describing them as “more straightforward.” The court’s earlier finding that the summonses lacked merit was central. Because SUM 2331 and SUM 2424 were dismissed and were not even arguable, the court reasoned that the parties who were compelled to attend court because of being served with the summonses must be entitled to costs. This reflects a basic costs principle: where a party’s interlocutory application is dismissed, the default position is that the applicant should bear the costs of the respondent’s attendance and preparation, unless there is some special reason to depart.
Accordingly, the judge held that Arbiters was not entitled to costs against any party. The judge rejected Mr Rai’s attempt to construct an “equitable lien for costs” as a basis to withhold full compensation from the plaintiffs. The court considered Arbiters “found wanting on the equity scale,” and also found the claimed fees excessive in the circumstances. The practical context mattered: the two summonses were heard in about two hours in total, the issues were not complicated, and the court was not persuaded that the claimed costs reflected the work actually required.
On quantum for the 1st and 3rd defendants, the judge fixed costs to the 1st defendant at $8,000 inclusive of disbursements, payable by Arbiters. For the 3rd defendant, the judge fixed costs at $10,000 all in, payable by Arbiters. The judge considered these amounts to fall within the costs guidelines for summonses. This part of the analysis demonstrates the court’s reliance on established costs guidance and proportionality, rather than on the applicant’s claimed figures.
The analysis then shifted to the plaintiffs’ claim for costs as litigants-in-person. The judge explained that traditionally, costs were not awarded to litigants-in-person because party-and-party costs are intended to defray solicitor-and-client costs. However, modern Singapore procedure allows costs to be awarded even to litigants-in-person. The judge noted that in rare cases where such costs were awarded, they were typically much lower than what would have been awarded if the litigant had been represented by counsel.
In addressing the quantum, the judge discussed the English Civil Procedure Rules, which cap litigant-in-person costs at two-thirds of what would have been ordered if represented. The judge agreed with Mah Kiat Seng ([2023] SGHC 52) insofar as it adopted that approach, but emphasised that it is not appropriate to lay down strict formulae. The judge’s reasoning was grounded in the discretionary nature of costs in Singapore and the fact-sensitive character of costs assessments. Unlike the English rules, Singapore’s Rules of Court 2014 (O 59 r 18A) and Rules of Court 2021 (O 21 r 7) do not provide for any cap on quantum.
Thus, the judge treated the two-thirds cap as at most a “useful guide.” The court stressed that costs are not meant as punishment for the losing party, nor are they meant to provide full compensation for the emotional and practical burdens of litigation. Money is rarely adequate compensation even for successful litigation. The court also highlighted that litigants-in-person may labour excessively due to anxiety or lack of legal knowledge, but may also sometimes outperform counsel. Because of this variability, the trial judge is best placed to adjust the discretionary quantification based on the actual circumstances.
Applying these principles, the judge found that the issues in the summonses were legal issues that the plaintiffs, without counsel, were unable to help themselves with. The plaintiffs were more concerned about the fees claimed by Arbiters and Red Lion Circle, but that did not alter the fact that they were compelled to attend court for two or three occasions regarding the summonses. The plaintiffs produced affidavit evidence that assisted the court. The judge also took into account that both plaintiffs were not employed, so there was no loss of income to claim as disbursements.
Balancing these factors, the judge fixed costs to each plaintiff at $500, payable by Arbiters, for the two summonses. This figure reflects the court’s view that litigant-in-person costs should be modest, particularly where the work done was limited and where there were no disbursements or income loss.
What Was the Outcome?
The court ordered that Arbiters pay costs to the 1st defendant in the sum of $8,000 inclusive of disbursements, and pay costs to the 3rd defendant in the sum of $10,000 all in. These costs were fixed as fair and proportionate given the short hearing time, the lack of complexity, and the failure of the summonses.
For the plaintiffs, who were litigants-in-person, the court ordered that Arbiters pay each plaintiff $500 (all in) in costs. The practical effect is that Arbiters bore the costs consequences of filing and pursuing dismissed summonses without proper authority and without merit, while the self-represented plaintiffs received only modest costs reflecting the discretionary and fact-sensitive approach to litigant-in-person costs.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is significant for Singapore practitioners because it clarifies how costs should be quantified when successful parties appear in person. While the court acknowledged the persuasive value of the English two-thirds approach and the earlier Singapore case of Mah Kiat Seng, it refused to treat any formula as rigid. Instead, the court reaffirmed that Singapore’s costs regime is discretionary and fact-sensitive, and that quantum should be fixed by the trial judge based on the actual work required, the time spent, the complexity of issues, and the presence (or absence) of disbursements or income loss.
For litigators, the case also reinforces a strong procedural message: where an applicant’s summons is dismissed, the applicant should expect to pay costs to those compelled to attend. The court’s rejection of Arbiters’ attempt to shift costs liability onto the plaintiffs underscores that costs follow the event and that creative arguments (such as equitable lien theories) will not succeed where the court has already found the applications to be without merit and procedurally defective.
Finally, the decision provides practical guidance on proportionality. The judge considered the hearing duration (about two hours), the simplicity of the issues, and the extent of assistance provided by litigants-in-person through affidavit evidence. This approach is useful for lawyers preparing costs submissions: it suggests that courts will scrutinise claimed amounts against the actual procedural footprint and will not automatically accept solicitors’ fee estimates, especially where the applications were dismissed and the work appears limited.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2014, O 59 r 18A
- Rules of Court 2021, O 21 r 7
Cases Cited
- [2023] SGHC 230
- [2023] SGHC 52
- [2023] SGHC 291
Source Documents
This article analyses [2023] SGHC 291 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.