ANPEX PTE. LTD. v CHENG YONG SUN & Anor

"For the reasons above, I find that the first and second defendants conspired to misappropriate funds from the plaintiff, and knowingly caused the plaintiff to lose $578,347.30." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 11

Case Information

• Citation: [2022] SGHC 115 (Para 0)
• Court: General Division of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore (Para 0)
• Date: 20 May 2022; judgment reserved after hearing on 5 April and 11 May 2022 (Para 0)
• Coram: Choo Han Teck J (Para 0)
• Case Number: Suit No 415 of 2021 (Para 0)
• Area of Law: Tort – Conspiracy – Unlawful Conspiracy to Injure (Para 0)
• Counsel for the plaintiffs: Rakesh s/o Pokkan Vasu and Farhan Tyebally (Gomez & Vasu LLC) (Para 0)
• Counsel for the 2nd defendant: Ng Boon Gan (VanillaLaw LLC) (Para 0)
• Judgment length: Single-judge written judgment; the extraction does not provide a page count, so the length cannot be stated more precisely without inventing facts (Para 0)

Summary

The plaintiff, a Singapore company providing delivery, logistics and transport services, alleged that the defendants misappropriated funds by diverting payments meant for drivers and subcontractors into accounts belonging to the first and second defendants and other unknown persons. The court accepted that suspicious payments had been discovered from the plaintiff’s account over a lengthy period, and that further investigation showed those payments were actually made to the defendants’ accounts. The plaintiff therefore sued the defendants for unlawful conspiracy to injure, and the judge ultimately found that the conspiracy claim was made out. (Paras 4-5, 8, 11)

The central evidential problem for the second defendant was credibility. She said she did not know the monies transferred into her account were misappropriated, and that she made partial restitution once she discovered the truth. The judge, however, found her explanation unconvincing because she did not call the first defendant, who was the only person who could have supported her account, and because her bank statements showed spending patterns that were difficult to reconcile with her stated salary. The court treated these circumstances as powerful indicators that she knew the funds came from the plaintiff. (Paras 7-10)

Having found that the defendants conspired to misappropriate the plaintiff’s funds, the court held them jointly and severally liable for $578,347.30. The judge also noted that, because the conspiracy claim succeeded, there was no need to decide the alternative claims in unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duties, although the plaintiff would also have succeeded on those claims on the evidence as found. Costs were left to be dealt with later if not agreed. (Paras 11-12)

How did the court describe the plaintiff’s business and the discovery of the suspicious transfers?

The plaintiff was described as a Singapore company carrying on delivery, logistics and transport services, and Ms Leow was its director and shareholder. The factual narrative begins with the plaintiff’s discovery, sometime around December 2020, that there had been suspicious payments out of its account over the period from 24 December 2019 to 29 January 2021. Those payments were said to have been made to the plaintiff’s drivers and subcontractors, but the later investigation revealed that the money had in fact gone to bank accounts belonging to the first and second defendants and other unknown persons. (Paras 4-5)

"Sometime around December 2020, Ms Leow discovered that there were suspicious payments out of the plaintiff’s account from 24 December 2019 to 29 January 2021, which were purportedly made to the plaintiff’s drivers and sub-contractors." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 4

The court’s account of the facts is important because it shows the structure of the alleged wrongdoing: payments that appeared, on their face, to be legitimate operational disbursements were later found to have been diverted. The judgment does not merely state that money disappeared; it identifies the period of the transfers, the supposed recipients, and the later discovery that the actual recipients were the defendants and unidentified persons. That factual sequence formed the foundation for the conspiracy analysis that followed. (Paras 4-5, 8)

The plaintiff’s response was to commence the present action against both defendants. The judgment does not suggest that the plaintiff had to rely on a single isolated transfer; rather, the court was dealing with a pattern of suspicious payments and a broader course of conduct. That pattern mattered because conspiracy claims are often proved circumstantially, and the court’s reasoning later drew on the cumulative force of the transfers, the second defendant’s account activity, and her inability to explain the money. (Paras 4-5, 8-11)

What was the plaintiff’s pleaded case against the defendants?

The plaintiff’s pleaded case was that the first and second defendants misappropriated and wrongfully took a total of $578,347.30 from the plaintiff’s bank account. The plaintiff said this was done in two ways: first, by making unauthorized and fraudulent transactions; and second, by deceiving the plaintiff’s subcontractors into transferring monies directly to the second defendant’s bank accounts. The claim was framed as an unlawful conspiracy to injure, which required the plaintiff to prove an agreement between the defendants to cause harm. (Paras 5, 8)

"The plaintiff says that the first and second defendants misappropriated and wrongfully took a total sum of $578,347.30 from the plaintiff’s bank account by making unauthorized and fraudulent transactions, and by deceiving the plaintiff’s sub-contractors to transfer monies directly to the second defendant’s bank accounts." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 5

The court’s summary of the plaintiff’s case shows that the alleged wrongdoing was not confined to a single mode of diversion. The plaintiff alleged both direct unauthorized transactions and indirect deception of subcontractors. That dual allegation mattered because it supported an inference of coordinated conduct rather than an accidental or isolated misuse of funds. The judge later treated the evidence as consistent with a conspiracy to misappropriate funds, rather than with the second defendant’s claim of innocent receipt. (Paras 5, 8, 11)

Although the extraction does not reproduce the full pleadings, the judgment makes clear that the plaintiff’s theory was one of intentional collaboration. The court’s later finding that the defendants “conspired to misappropriate funds” reflects acceptance of that theory. The plaintiff therefore succeeded not merely by showing that money moved into the second defendant’s account, but by persuading the court that the surrounding circumstances pointed to a shared design to injure the plaintiff. (Paras 5, 11)

How did the second defendant seek to defend herself?

The second defendant’s position was that she did not know the monies transferred into her account were misappropriated funds. She said that the first defendant misled her, and that once she discovered the truth she made partial restitution to the plaintiff. Her defence therefore depended heavily on her own account of ignorance and on the proposition that she was an unwitting recipient rather than a participant in any scheme. (Para 7)

"The second defendant says that she was unaware that the monies that were transferred into her account were misappropriated funds, and that as soon as she found out, she made partial restitution to the plaintiff:" — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 7

The judge did not accept that account. The court’s reasoning shows that the second defendant’s defence was tested against the objective evidence, including the direct transfers into her account, her inability to explain the funds, and her spending patterns. The judge also placed weight on her failure to call the first defendant, whom the court regarded as the only witness who could possibly have supported her version of events. That omission was treated as highly damaging to her credibility. (Paras 8-10)

In practical terms, the second defendant’s defence failed because it was not enough for her to say she was unaware of the source of the money. The court required her explanation to be credible in light of the surrounding facts. The judgment shows that where a defendant’s account is inherently implausible and unsupported by the one person who could corroborate it, the court may draw an adverse inference and reject the defence. (Paras 8, 10, 11)

What legal test did the court apply to an unlawful conspiracy to injure claim?

The court framed the governing principle in straightforward terms: the plaintiff had to show that there was an agreement between the first and second defendants to cause harm to the plaintiff. That formulation is the legal core of the claim, and the judge expressly stated it before turning to the evidence. The judgment then applied that principle to the facts as found, concluding that the defendants had indeed conspired to misappropriate the plaintiff’s funds. (Para 8)

"In a claim based on conspiracy, the plaintiff must show that there was an agreement between the first and second defendants to cause harm to the plaintiff." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 8

The court’s treatment of the legal test is notable for its economy. The extraction does not show a lengthy doctrinal discussion; instead, the judge identified the essential element of agreement and then assessed whether the evidence supported that inference. The reasoning therefore proceeded from principle to proof: if the surrounding facts made the second defendant’s innocent explanation untenable, and if the evidence pointed to coordinated diversion of funds, then the requisite agreement could be inferred. (Paras 8, 10-11)

That approach is consistent with the way civil conspiracy claims are often proved in practice, especially where direct evidence of an express agreement is unavailable. The judgment does not invent a separate test or elaborate additional elements in the extraction provided. It simply applies the agreement-based formulation to the evidence and finds that the plaintiff had discharged its burden. (Paras 8, 11)

Why did the judge reject the second defendant’s explanation as not credible?

The judge’s credibility analysis was central to the outcome. He noted that it was undisputed that the monies were transferred from the plaintiff’s account directly into the second defendant’s account, and that the second defendant was unable to account for the monies in her account. The court then reasoned that the only witness who could possibly exculpate her was the first defendant, yet she did not call him. In those circumstances, the judge said he was inclined to disbelieve her version of events. (Para 8)

"It is undisputed that the monies were transferred from the plaintiff’s account directly into the second defendant’s account. The second defendant is unable to account for the monies in her account." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 8

"Given the second defendant’s failure to produce the only witness who could possibly exculpate her, I am inclined to disbelieve her version of events; a version that is hardly credible on its own, let alone floated without corroboration." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 8

This reasoning is significant because it shows that the court did not rely on a single factor in isolation. The judge combined the direct tracing of funds into the second defendant’s account with her inability to explain the money and her failure to call corroborative evidence. The result was a cumulative credibility assessment: her story was not merely unproven, but affirmatively implausible. (Para 8)

The court’s approach also demonstrates how adverse inferences can arise in civil litigation when a party withholds the testimony of a witness who would naturally be expected to support that party’s case. The extraction does not state the formal evidential doctrine in abstract terms, but it does show the judge applying that common-sense reasoning. The absence of the first defendant was treated as a serious gap in the defence, and that gap helped the court conclude that the second defendant’s explanation should be rejected. (Para 8)

What role did the second defendant’s spending habits play in the court’s finding of knowledge?

The judge did not stop at the failure to explain the source of the funds. He also examined the second defendant’s bank account statements and found purchases that suggested a level of spending inconsistent with her declared salary. The judgment specifically records purchases from Poh Heng Jewellery on five dates in August, September, and October 2020, with amounts ranging from $540.00 to $2,000.00. The court also referred to spending on cosmetics and beauty services. (Para 9)

"The defendant’s bank account statements show that the second defendant has made purchases from Poh Heng Jewellery on 31 August 2020, 12 September 2020, 13 October 2020, 20 October 2020 and 31 October 2020, for the amounts of $1,020.00, $2,000.00, $540.00, $984.00, and $715.00 respectively." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 9

The judge then drew the inference that the second defendant would have known that such extravagant expenditures could not have been funded solely by her monthly salary of $1,600.00. On that basis, he was satisfied that she was most probably aware that the funds came from the plaintiff. This is a classic example of inferential reasoning from financial circumstances: the court did not need direct proof of a confession or express admission if the spending pattern made innocent receipt implausible. (Para 10)

"I also find that the second defendant would have known that her extravagant expenditures could not have been funded solely by her monthly salary of $1,600.00, and I am satisfied that the second defendant was most probably aware that the funds came from the plaintiff." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 10

The significance of this part of the reasoning is that it links knowledge to objective financial reality. The court was not persuaded by a bare assertion of ignorance when the account activity suggested otherwise. The judge’s conclusion that she was “most probably aware” of the source of the funds was then used as part of the broader finding that she participated in the conspiracy to misappropriate the plaintiff’s money. (Paras 9-11)

How did the court connect the evidence to the finding of conspiracy?

After reviewing the transfers, the second defendant’s inability to account for the money, her failure to call the first defendant, and her spending patterns, the judge concluded that the defendants had conspired to misappropriate funds from the plaintiff. The reasoning is expressly cumulative: each piece of evidence reinforced the others, and together they supported the inference of a shared plan. The court therefore found that the defendants knowingly caused the plaintiff to lose $578,347.30. (Paras 8-11)

"All these suggest that the second defendant was neither as blameless nor clueless as she claims to be." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 11

The court’s final finding on conspiracy is stated in direct terms. The judge did not hedge or reserve the issue; he found that the first and second defendants were involved in a conspiracy to injure the plaintiff and should be jointly and severally liable to compensate the plaintiff for the full sum. That conclusion follows from the earlier credibility findings and the inference that the second defendant knew the funds were not legitimately hers. (Para 11)

"I, therefore, find that the first and second defendants were involved in a conspiracy to injure the plaintiff and should be jointly and severally liable to compensate the plaintiff for the sum of $578,347.30." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 11

What matters doctrinally is that the court was prepared to infer agreement from conduct and surrounding circumstances rather than direct evidence of an express pact. The extraction does not provide a separate doctrinal exposition, but the reasoning is clear enough: unexplained receipt of funds, inability to account for them, corroboration problems, and spending inconsistent with income together justified the inference of a conspiratorial arrangement. (Paras 8-11)

Why did the court not decide the alternative claims in unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duties?

Once the conspiracy claim succeeded, the judge said there was no need to address the plaintiff’s alternative claims of unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duties. The court nevertheless added an important observation: on the evidence before it, and on the facts as found, the plaintiff would also have succeeded on those claims. The judgment therefore leaves the alternative causes of action unresolved as formal holdings, but it signals that the factual findings would have supported them. (Para 12)

"Given my findings on the issue of conspiracy, there is no need for me to address the plaintiff’s alternative claims of unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duties, save to say that on the evidence before me, and the facts as I have found, the plaintiff would also have succeeded on those claims." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 12

This is an important procedural point. The court did not need to decide every pleaded cause of action once one claim fully resolved liability and quantum. The judgment therefore reflects judicial economy: the court decided the case on the strongest and most complete basis available, while noting that the same facts would likely have supported the alternative theories as well. (Para 12)

For practitioners, the passage is also a reminder that a successful conspiracy claim may render other restitutionary or fiduciary claims unnecessary to determine, at least where the same factual matrix underpins all of them. The court’s statement is careful: it does not purport to make binding findings on those alternative claims, but it does indicate that the evidence was strong enough that the plaintiff would likely have prevailed on them too. (Para 12)

What orders did the court make on liability, quantum, and costs?

The court ordered that the first and second defendants were jointly and severally liable to compensate the plaintiff for $578,347.30. That figure is the quantum expressly identified in the judgment as the loss caused by the conspiracy. The judge’s final order therefore matched the amount the plaintiff said had been misappropriated. (Para 11)

"For the reasons above, I find that the first and second defendants conspired to misappropriate funds from the plaintiff, and knowingly caused the plaintiff to lose $578,347.30." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 11

The court did not make a final costs order in the judgment itself. Instead, the judge stated that he would hear the parties on costs at a later date if the issue was not agreed upon by the parties. That means the extraction does not provide a concluded costs outcome, only the court’s direction that costs would be dealt with separately. (Para 12)

"I will hear the parties on costs at a later date if it is not agreed upon by the parties." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 12

As for the alternative claims, the court expressly declined to decide them because the conspiracy claim had already succeeded. The practical effect is that the plaintiff obtained full relief on the pleaded conspiracy cause of action, and the judgment did not need to travel further into the restitutionary or fiduciary issues. (Para 12)

Why does this case matter for civil conspiracy claims in Singapore?

This case matters because it illustrates how a civil conspiracy to injure can be proved through circumstantial evidence rather than direct proof of an express agreement. The judge relied on the tracing of funds into the second defendant’s account, her inability to explain the money, her failure to call the first defendant, and her spending patterns. Taken together, those facts were enough to support the inference that the defendants had agreed to injure the plaintiff. (Paras 8-11)

"All these suggest that the second defendant was neither as blameless nor clueless as she claims to be." — Per Choo Han Teck J, Para 11

The case also shows the evidential importance of calling the right witness. The judge treated the first defendant as the only person who could possibly have exculpated the second defendant, and her failure to call him weighed heavily against her. For litigators, that is a practical lesson in witness strategy: where a party’s account depends on another person’s corroboration, the absence of that witness may be fatal if no satisfactory explanation is given. (Para 8)

Finally, the judgment demonstrates how spending patterns can be used to infer knowledge and participation in wrongdoing. The court did not need to see a direct admission that the second defendant knew the source of the funds. Instead, it inferred knowledge from the mismatch between her salary and her expenditures, together with the unexplained transfers. That makes the case a useful authority for the proposition that financial behaviour can be probative of dishonest knowledge in civil fraud and conspiracy litigation. (Paras 9-11)

Cases Referred To

Source Documents

• Original Judgment — Singapore Courts
• Archived Copy (PDF) — Litt Law CDN

This article analyses [2022] SGHC 115 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.