Case Details
- Citation: [2022] SGHC 294
- Title: Anpex Pte Ltd v Cheng Yong Sun and another
- Court: High Court of the Republic of Singapore (General Division)
- Suit No: Suit No 415 of 2021
- Date of Decision: 25 November 2022
- Judgment Reserved: 20 October 2022; further hearing on 11 November 2022
- Judge: Choo Han Teck J
- Plaintiff/Applicant: Anpex Pte Ltd
- Defendants/Respondents: (1) Cheng Yong Sun; (2) Lee Chai Yun, Winnie
- Legal Area: Civil Procedure – Costs
- Statute(s) Referenced: Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap 160, 2014 Rev Ed)
- Key Provisions: s 12(4)(c), s 14(1)(c), s 14(3)(a), s 14(3)(b)
- Related/Preceding Decision: Anpex Pte Ltd v Cheng Yong Sun and another [2022] SGHC 115 (the “Substantive Judgment”)
- Counsel: Farhan Tyebally (Gomez & Vasu LLC) for the plaintiff; Ng Boon Gan (VanillaLaw LLC) for the second defendant; Legal Aid Bureau (watching brief) by Sheela Kumari Devi and Suriakumari Sidambaram
- Procedural Note: First defendant absent and unrepresented; first defendant had judgment entered and was subsequently made bankrupt
- Judgment Length: 5 pages; 1,149 words (as reported in metadata)
Summary
This High Court decision concerns the allocation of costs after the court had already found, in a prior substantive judgment, that the defendants had conspired to misappropriate funds from the plaintiff. The plaintiff, Anpex Pte Ltd, succeeded against both defendants in the substantive action, but the costs application in this later decision was pursued only against the second defendant, Lee Chai Yun, Winnie, because the first defendant had judgment entered against him and had since been made bankrupt.
The central issue was whether the second defendant—who was legally aided throughout the proceedings—could nonetheless be ordered to pay costs to the plaintiff. The court applied the Legal Aid and Advice Act framework, which generally protects legally aided persons from adverse costs orders to other parties, subject to specific exceptions. The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the second defendant acted improperly in defending the proceedings (s 14(3)(b)), and the evidence also did not justify a finding that her legal aid grant had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation (s 14(3)(a)). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s application for costs was dismissed.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The litigation has two stages. In the earlier “Substantive Judgment” (Anpex Pte Ltd v Cheng Yong Sun and another [2022] SGHC 115), the High Court found that the first and second defendants had conspired to misappropriate funds from the plaintiff and had knowingly caused the plaintiff to lose $578,347.30. The court therefore held both defendants jointly and severally liable to compensate the plaintiff for that sum. The trial proceeded only against the second defendant in the costs stage because the first defendant had judgment entered against him and was later made bankrupt.
In the costs proceedings, the plaintiff sought an order that the second defendant should pay the plaintiff’s costs. A critical contextual fact was that the second defendant was legally aided throughout the proceedings. Under the Legal Aid and Advice Act, a legally aided person is generally not liable for costs to other parties in respect of the proceedings for which legal aid was granted. The plaintiff therefore had to rely on statutory exceptions that permit a costs order against an aided person in limited circumstances.
The plaintiff’s argument was essentially that the second defendant’s defence was improper and that she should not receive the benefit of legal aid protection. The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that the second defendant claimed she was misled by the first defendant about the nature of the transactions and that she did not know the plaintiff’s money had been misappropriated. However, the plaintiff contended that the second defendant did not call the first defendant to corroborate her account. The plaintiff further argued that, because the plaintiff succeeded in establishing unlawful means conspiracy, the second defendant’s “unwitting accomplice” position should be rejected and her defence should be treated as misconduct.
Although the court had already disbelieved the second defendant’s account in the substantive liability analysis, the costs stage required a different inquiry: whether the statutory threshold for overriding the general protection for legally aided persons was met. The court therefore examined not only the outcome of the defence, but also the manner in which the defence was conducted, and whether the legal aid grant itself had been obtained improperly.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first legal issue was whether the plaintiff could obtain a costs order against the second defendant despite her legal aid status. This required the court to interpret and apply the Legal Aid and Advice Act provisions governing costs consequences for legally aided persons, particularly s 12(4)(c) (the general rule) and the exceptions in s 14(1)(c) read with s 14(3).
The second issue was evidential and substantive: whether the plaintiff proved that the circumstances in s 14(3)(b) existed—namely, that the aided person “acted improperly in bringing or defending any legal proceedings, or in the conduct of those proceedings.” The plaintiff’s position was that the failure of the defence, coupled with the alleged omission to call the first defendant, amounted to improper conduct.
The third issue was whether s 14(3)(a) could be satisfied—namely, whether the legal aid grant had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. The court considered whether the second defendant’s financial circumstances at the time of application, and the evidence of later spending, could support an inference that she had concealed assets or misrepresented her means to the Legal Aid Bureau.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The court began by situating the costs application within the statutory structure. It noted that, pursuant to s 12(4)(c) of the Legal Aid and Advice Act, where a litigant is legally aided, that litigant is generally not liable for costs to any other party in the proceedings for which the aid was granted. The plaintiff therefore bore the burden of bringing itself within the exceptions in s 14(1)(c), which empowers the court to order an aided person to pay costs of the other party where the circumstances in s 14(3) are established.
On s 14(3)(b), the court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to equate an unsuccessful defence with improper conduct. The judge emphasised that the failure of a defence is not, by itself, evidence of misconduct. The court required evidence that the defendant conducted her defence in a way that a reasonable defendant would not. In other words, the inquiry was not whether the defence was factually or legally wrong, but whether it was conducted improperly in the sense contemplated by the statute.
Applying this standard, the court found that the second defendant’s defence was limited in substance: she maintained that she did not know the plaintiff had misappropriated the plaintiff’s money, and that the “largesse” she enjoyed was paid from her own money. The court had disbelieved her in the substantive judgment for reasons already set out there, but disbelieving her did not automatically establish that she acted improperly in the conduct of the proceedings. The judge warned against a logical consequence that would undermine the statutory protection: if every plaintiff who succeeds against a legally aided defendant could obtain costs merely because the defence failed, the general rule in s 12(4)(c) would be rendered largely meaningless.
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff had not discharged its burden in proving s 14(3)(b). This conclusion reflects a careful separation between liability findings and costs consequences. The court’s reasoning suggests that the statutory exception is intended to target egregious or unreasonable conduct, not merely unsuccessful litigation positions.
The court then considered s 14(3)(a), recognising that there was at least a “possibility” that the legal aid grant might have been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. The judge relied on the substantive findings that the first and second defendants misappropriated a total of $578,347.30, and on evidence that the second defendant likely had substantial funds in her bank account. In particular, the court noted evidence that between August and October 2020, she made large purchases of jewellery, cosmetic products, and beauty services. These facts raised the question whether her means at the time of the legal aid application were misrepresented.
To address this, the court requested evidence on how legal aid was applied for and approved. The Legal Aid Bureau provided an affidavit from an Assistant Director, Ms Suriakumari Sidambaram, explaining the means-testing criteria and the second defendant’s legal aid application process. The affidavit confirmed that at the time of the application in May 2021, the second defendant met the criteria: her savings and non-CPF investments were $10,000 or lower, and she did not own property other than her HDB flat. The affidavit also stated that she was not asked to furnish bank statements prior to April 2021, because the wealth assessment is determined at the point of application. The Bureau further indicated there was no reason to suspect that she earned a salary above what was declared in her CPF statements, and that LAB had no information suggesting concealment of assets.
Based on this evidence, the court was satisfied that the second defendant was “technically entitled” to legal aid at the material time. The judge acknowledged that the second defendant might have had more monies earlier, but inferred that she likely spent those funds by the time she applied for legal aid. The large purchases in August to October 2020 were treated as consistent with that inference. Importantly, the court accepted that this did not exclude her from legal aid because only bank statements prior to the month of her application were required to be furnished for the application. In short, the court did not find a sufficient evidential basis to conclude that the legal aid grant was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation.
Having found neither s 14(3)(b) nor s 14(3)(a) satisfied, the court concluded that there was no reason to make an order that the legally aided second defendant should pay costs to the plaintiff. The dismissal therefore followed from both the failure of proof on improper conduct and the absence of proof of fraud or misrepresentation in the legal aid application.
What Was the Outcome?
The High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for costs against the second defendant. The practical effect is that, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s success in establishing liability in conspiracy and obtaining a judgment for $578,347.30 in the substantive action, the plaintiff could not recover its costs from the second defendant because she remained protected by the legal aid costs regime.
The decision underscores that costs against an aided person are exceptional and require proof of the specific statutory triggers. In this case, the plaintiff did not meet the evidential burden for either improper conduct in defending (s 14(3)(b)) or fraud/misrepresentation in obtaining legal aid (s 14(3)(a).
Why Does This Case Matter?
This case is significant for practitioners because it clarifies the evidential threshold for overriding the general costs protection afforded to legally aided persons under the Legal Aid and Advice Act. The court’s reasoning is a reminder that an unsuccessful defence—even one that is disbelieved—does not automatically establish “improper” conduct for the purposes of s 14(3)(b). Costs consequences require more than an adverse credibility finding; they require evidence that the aided person conducted the proceedings in an unreasonable or improper manner.
For plaintiffs seeking costs against legally aided defendants, the decision illustrates the importance of gathering targeted evidence about litigation conduct (for example, procedural abuse, unreasonable refusal to provide material, or other conduct that would be characterised as improper beyond mere failure). It also highlights that arguments based on inferences from the defence outcome, or on omissions such as not calling a particular witness, may be insufficient without showing that the conduct fell below what a reasonable defendant would do.
For defendants and the Legal Aid Bureau, the case provides reassurance that the legal aid framework will not be displaced lightly. The court accepted the Bureau’s evidence about means-testing and the timing of wealth assessment, and it treated the existence of later spending as not necessarily inconsistent with eligibility at the time of application. This approach supports the integrity of the legal aid system while still leaving room for costs orders in appropriate cases where fraud or improper conduct is proven.
Legislation Referenced
- Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap 160, 2014 Rev Ed), s 12(4)(c)
- Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap 160, 2014 Rev Ed), s 14(1)(c)
- Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap 160, 2014 Rev Ed), s 14(3)(a)
- Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap 160, 2014 Rev Ed), s 14(3)(b)
Cases Cited
- [2022] SGHC 115
- [2022] SGHC 294
Source Documents
This article analyses [2022] SGHC 294 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.