Case Details
- Citation: [2026] SGDC 92
- Court: District Court of Singapore
- Date: 12 March 2026
- Judge: Deputy Registrar Evans Ng
- Originating process: District Court Originating Claim No 1505 of 2024
- Summons: Summons No 2467 of 2025
- Parties: Andrew Cheah Kim Wee & Anor (Claimants; Defendants in counterclaim) v Low Xiang Ping Jane (Defendant; Claimant in counterclaim)
- Procedural posture: Application to strike out portions of the defendant’s/counterclaimant’s counterclaim
- Legal area: Civil procedure; striking out pleadings; defamation (context); damages; injunctions; harassment
- Statutes referenced: Protection from Harassment Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed); Rules of Court 2021
- Cases cited: Hoo Su Hen v Sim Mao Sheng Desmond and another [2020] 3 SLR 720; Zhang De Long v Tea Yeok Kian [2012] 2 SLR 802; Ko Teck Siang and another v Low Fong Mei and another and other actions [1992] 1 SLR(R) 22; Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649; Envy Asset Management Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Lau Lee Sheng and others [2024] 4 SLR 1210
- Judgment length: 8 pages, 1,761 words
Summary
This District Court decision concerns an application by a clinic and its principal surgeon to strike out parts of a former patient’s counterclaim. The underlying dispute arises from a public Google review posted by the patient, which the clinic alleges contains false and defamatory statements about its professional conduct and medical advice. The patient, in turn, defends the review as truthful and/or justified, and counterclaims for damages and injunctive relief arising from the clinic’s alleged “malicious lawsuit” and alleged medical malpractice.
The court’s focus on the striking-out application is procedural rather than merits-based. Applying the Rules of Court 2021, the Deputy Registrar emphasised that striking out is discretionary and should not be used in a way that wastes court resources or necessitates additional hearings. The court declined to strike out most of the counterclaim, allowing evidence-like and opinion-like pleading by a self-represented litigant to stand where it may be relevant to pleaded heads of damage. The court also rejected the argument that the injunction prayer was legally unsustainable, including limbs tied to harassment, res judicata, and a stay of proceedings.
What Were the Facts of This Case?
The 2nd claimant operates an aesthetic and plastic surgery clinic. The 1st claimant is the clinic’s sole plastic surgeon and medical practitioner. The defendant, Ms Low, is a former patient of the clinic. After receiving services from the clinic, Ms Low became dissatisfied and published a public post on the clinic’s Google Reviews page, accompanied by a one-star rating.
The claimants’ pleaded case is that Ms Low’s review, together with subsequent amendments she made to it (collectively, “the Review”), contained false statements. The claimants alleged that the Review accused them and their staff of acting in an unprofessional manner, neglecting to follow proper procedures reasonably expected in an aesthetic and plastic surgery clinic, failing to provide proper advice on surgical procedures, and operating unethically. On that basis, the claimants brought a defamation claim.
Ms Low’s defence was that the statements were not false or defamatory. She pleaded a defence of justification, contending that the review accurately reflected the factual events she experienced with the claimants. She also denied that each pleaded defamatory meaning was a falsehood. In addition, Ms Low advanced a counterclaim, seeking six heads of damages and an injunction.
The claimants then applied to strike out portions of the counterclaim. The impugned portions included (i) a pleading that the court had “explicitly found” at a prior hearing that the Review was “Fair Comment and Justified”; (ii) four consecutive paragraphs describing Ms Low’s difficulties as a self-represented litigant, her reasons for undergoing surgery by the claimants, and the “stressful” effects of the claimants’ “malicious lawsuit” on her health, social and work life; (iii) a paragraph of three sentences relating to the court’s consideration of her personal circumstances and a point about judicial reform; and (iv) an injunction prayer with three limbs, including a stay, prohibiting further lawsuits based on the same facts, and prohibiting “any conduct” amounting to harassment.
What Were the Key Legal Issues?
The first key issue was whether the court should strike out parts of the counterclaim on the basis that they were legally unsustainable, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. This required the Deputy Registrar to consider the scope and purpose of striking out under the Rules of Court 2021, including whether striking out would be an efficient use of court resources and whether it would avoid or merely shift the need for a trial.
A second issue concerned the treatment of pleading content that resembles evidence rather than material facts. The claimants argued that certain paragraphs in the counterclaim should be struck out because they were not properly pleaded as material facts and instead contained matters that belonged in an affidavit of evidence-in-chief. The court had to decide how much leeway should be afforded to a self-represented litigant, particularly where the pleading might still be relevant to pleaded damages.
A third issue related to the injunction prayer. The claimants argued that the injunction was legally unsustainable and, in particular, that it was an abuse of process. The court had to analyse each limb of the injunction prayer, including whether it was superfluous, whether it was barred by res judicata, and how the statutory tort regime for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 interacts with the procedural posture of the case.
How Did the Court Analyse the Issues?
The Deputy Registrar began by reiterating that the power to strike out pleadings involves judicial discretion. The court cited authority for the proposition that striking out is not automatic and must be exercised with regard to the objectives of the Rules of Court 2021. In particular, the court considered the relevant factors in O 3 r 1, including whether striking out would promote expeditious proceedings, avoid unnecessary hearings, and serve the overarching goal of fair access to justice.
On the first impugned portion, Ms Low had pleaded that at a hearing in April 2025 the court “explicitly found” that the Review was “Fair Comment and Justified.” The claimants argued that this could not be true by reference to the certified notes of evidence. The Deputy Registrar held that the appropriate time to demonstrate falsity was at trial. Striking out this solitary point would not be an efficient use of court resources because it would require an additional hearing before trial, which would occur in any event. This reasoning reflects a pragmatic approach: where the dispute is fact-sensitive and intertwined with the merits, striking out may be premature.
Turning to the next impugned portions, the court addressed four consecutive paragraphs that described Ms Low’s personal circumstances as a self-represented litigant, her reasons for undergoing surgery, and the stressful effects of the claimants’ “malicious lawsuit” on her health, social and work life. The claimants argued that much of this content should have been placed in an affidavit of evidence-in-chief rather than in pleadings. The Deputy Registrar acknowledged that the paragraphs contained matters that “properly belong” in evidence, but emphasised that the courts have historically allowed evidence and even “irrelevant statements” to remain in pleadings.
In reaching this conclusion, the Deputy Registrar relied on prior decisions recognising that pleadings may contain unnecessary material and that the court’s discretion should be exercised to avoid procedural unfairness. The court cited Hoo Su Hen v Sim Mao Sheng Desmond and another, where evidence and irrelevant statements were allowed to stand, and Zhang De Long v Tea Yeok Kian, where the court noted that even solicitors’ pleadings of poor quality had survived striking out. Importantly, the Deputy Registrar extended this logic to self-represented litigants, reasoning that a rigid insistence on excluding any evidence-like content would likely undermine fair access to justice by forcing the lay litigant to re-file and incur additional fees and costs.
The court also addressed the claimants’ argument that a head of damages for “emotional distress caused by [the claimants’] […] lawsuit and medical malpractices” was not recognised at law. The Deputy Registrar disagreed. The court reasoned that if Ms Low could prove at trial that the claimants committed “medical malpractices” and that those wrongful acts caused her to require an increased usage and dosage of psychiatric medication, it was conceivable that she could recover general damages for suffering a recognised psychiatric illness or an aggravation of a pre-existing illness. This analysis shows the court’s willingness to allow a pleaded damages head to proceed where the pleaded facts, if proven, could fit within recognised categories of recoverable harm.
Next, the Deputy Registrar considered a paragraph of three sentences that the claimants said contained two distinct points: (i) a request that the court consider Ms Low’s personal circumstances when determining final costs; and (ii) a separate point about judicial reform that the claimants argued was legally unsustainable and an abuse of process. The court adopted a reading that treated the paragraph as making one broad point: Ms Low urged the court to have regard to all her personal circumstances and beliefs when determining costs. The court accepted that the paragraph contained evidence and opinion, but reiterated that, as with the earlier paragraphs, a layperson may be given some indulgence when pleading beyond strict material facts.
Finally, the court analysed the injunction prayer. The prayer contained three limbs. Under limb (a), Ms Low sought a stay of the action. The Deputy Registrar declined to strike this out because it was objectively clear and obvious that Ms Low had abandoned the remedy by her continuous participation in the proceedings. Under limb (b), she sought to prohibit the claimants from commencing further lawsuits against her based on the same facts. The Deputy Registrar considered this superfluous because the claimants’ cause of action would be extinguished or barred by res judicata once judgment was given. Nevertheless, the court did not strike it out because it would not prejudice the claimants and could be dealt with economically in closing submissions.
Under limb (c), Ms Low sought to prohibit “any conduct” by the claimants that constitutes “harassment” and related conduct. The claimants argued that this was legally unsustainable. The Deputy Registrar explained that the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 abolished the common law tort of harassment (s 14(1)). However, the Act creates a statutory tort and provides that a putative victim may bring civil proceedings against any individual or entity alleged to have contravened ss 3 or 4 (s 11(1)). If Ms Low succeeded, she could obtain relevant injunctive relief under s 12(2) read with s 12(2B). The court also noted that Ms Low appeared not yet to have obtained permission under s 16I(2) of the Act to pursue her “harassment” claim in the District Court, which ordinarily must be commenced in a Protection from Harassment Court. But the Deputy Registrar held that this did not negate the cause of action; Ms Low could apply for permission in due course.
In addition, the Deputy Registrar rejected the abuse of process argument. The court found no indication that Ms Low was pursuing the injunction with knowledge that it was doomed to fail. The court cited Envy Asset Management Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Lau Lee Sheng and others for the proposition that pursuing relief without such knowledge does not necessarily amount to abuse. This part of the reasoning underscores that procedural defects or future permission requirements do not automatically render a pleading abusive at the striking-out stage.
Overall, the Deputy Registrar concluded that striking out the impugned portions would not obviate the necessity for a trial and would not reduce the complexity or difficulty of the issues to be tried. The court also held that granting the application would not promote expeditious proceedings. In the circumstances, the fair and practical result was to dismiss the application with costs, consistent with the objectives in O 3 r 1(2) of the Rules of Court 2021.
What Was the Outcome?
The Deputy Registrar dismissed the claimants’ application to strike out the impugned portions of Ms Low’s counterclaim. The court allowed the counterclaim to proceed, including the challenged damages head tied to emotional distress and alleged medical malpractices, the pleading paragraphs containing evidence-like and opinion-like content, and the injunction prayer’s various limbs.
Practically, the decision means that the case will proceed to trial (or further pre-trial steps) with the counterclaim intact. The claimants will have the opportunity to contest the factual and legal merits at trial rather than obtaining an early procedural pruning of the pleadings.
Why Does This Case Matter?
This decision is a useful illustration of how Singapore courts approach striking out applications in the District Court context. It reinforces that striking out is discretionary and should be used sparingly, particularly where the disputed pleading content is fact-sensitive, intertwined with the merits, or would require additional hearings. For practitioners, it signals that courts may prefer to let issues be ventilated at trial rather than engage in piecemeal determinations on pleading sufficiency where the trial is inevitable.
The case also highlights the court’s sensitivity to fair access to justice for self-represented litigants. By relying on precedents that tolerate evidence-like or unnecessary statements in pleadings, the Deputy Registrar extended a measure of procedural indulgence to a lay counterclaimant. This is significant for lawyers advising clients who may be self-represented or who have limited legal drafting capacity: while material facts remain important, courts may be reluctant to strike out pleadings solely because they contain narrative or evidential detail, especially where relevance to pleaded damages can be shown.
Finally, the injunction analysis provides practical guidance on how statutory harassment claims under the Protection from Harassment Act 2014 should be pleaded and pursued. The court clarified that the abolition of the common law tort does not eliminate the statutory cause of action, and that procedural permission requirements (such as permission to pursue a harassment claim in the District Court) may be addressed later rather than used to strike out the pleading at an early stage. This can assist practitioners in structuring counterclaims that combine multiple remedies and in anticipating how courts may treat statutory torts and injunctive relief at the pleading stage.
Legislation Referenced
- Rules of Court 2021 (O 3 r 1(2)(a), (b), (c)(ii), (d), (e))
- Protection from Harassment Act 2014 (2020 Rev Ed): ss 3, 4, 11(1), 12(2), 12(2B), 14(1), 16I(2)
Cases Cited
- Hoo Su Hen v Sim Mao Sheng Desmond and another [2020] 3 SLR 720
- Zhang De Long v Tea Yeok Kian [2012] 2 SLR 802
- Ko Teck Siang and another v Low Fong Mei and another and other actions [1992] 1 SLR(R) 22
- Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin [1997] 3 SLR(R) 649
- Envy Asset Management Pte Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Lau Lee Sheng and others [2024] 4 SLR 1210
Source Documents
This article analyses [2026] SGDC 92 for legal research and educational purposes. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult the full judgment for the Court's complete reasoning.