Case Study: Smt. N. Usha Rani and Anr. v. Moodudula Srinivas

Citation: 2025 INSC 129

Date of Judgment: 30^th January, 2025

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: B.V. Nagarathna (J), Satish Chandra Sharma (J)

Facts

• The appellant, Smt. N. Usha Rani, was first married to Nomula Srinivas on 30th August 1999. During their wedlock, they had a male child, Sai Ganesh, born on 15th August 2000. The couple resided together until marital discord arose. Following their return from the United States of America in February 2005, they started living separately due to irreconcilable differences. Subsequently, on 25th November 2005, the appellant and her first husband executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), effectively dissolving their marital ties, though no formal legal divorce decree was obtained.
• Soon after, on 27th November 2005, the appellant entered into a marriage with the respondent, Moodudula Srinivas, who was aware of her previous marriage. However, the respondent later filed a petition under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956, read with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, seeking a declaration that their marriage was null and void. The Family Court, Hyderabad, allowed the petition and passed a decree on 1st February 2006, declaring their marriage null and void.
• Despite this declaration, on 14th February 2006, the appellant and the respondent remarried, and the marriage was officially registered with the Registrar of Marriage, Chikkadpally, Hyderabad, on 11th September 2006. The couple subsequently had a daughter, Venkata Harshini, born on 28th January 2008. Unfortunately, disputes again arose between them, leading to allegations of domestic abuse and harassment. The appellant filed a complaint against the respondent and his family members under Sections 498A, 406, 506, and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
• Following their separation, the appellant filed an application for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. The Family Court awarded Rs. 3,500 per month to the appellant and Rs. 5,000 per month to their minor daughter. Aggrieved by this order, the respondent filed a criminal revision petition before the Telangana High Court.

Decision of the Lower Court

The Family Court, while considering the appellant’s plea for maintenance, noted that despite the annulment of the first marriage with the respondent, they had remarried and lived together as husband and wife. Furthermore, they had a child from their union, which reinforced the fact that the appellant had dependent status. The court concluded that the respondent was liable to provide financial support under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as he had assumed marital responsibilities.

Decision of the High Court (Karnataka High Court)

The Telangana High Court reviewed the Family Court's decision and ruled that while the maintenance awarded to the minor daughter was justified, the appellant was not entitled to maintenance from the respondent. The court's primary reasoning was based on the legal validity of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent.

The High Court observed that under Hindu law, a second marriage while the first marriage is legally subsisting is void ab initio. Since the appellant had not obtained a formal decree of divorce from her first husband, her marriage with the respondent could not be legally recognized. Therefore, the appellant could not claim the status of a "wife" under Section 125 Cr.P.C., which is a prerequisite for claiming maintenance.

Further, the court relied on precedents such as Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat[1], where it was held that a woman in a void marriage is not entitled to maintenance. The High Court concluded that the respondent was not legally bound to provide financial support to the appellant since their marriage lacked legal sanctity. The court, therefore, set aside the maintenance awarded to the appellant while upholding the maintenance for the minor daughter.

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s ruling and restored the Family Court’s maintenance order. The Court held that the right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a legal and moral obligation of the husband, designed to prevent destitution. The Court reasoned that although the appellant did not have a formal decree of divorce from her first husband, she had effectively separated from him and was not deriving any financial benefits from him.

The Court emphasized that the respondent was fully aware of the appellant’s first marriage before entering into a relationship with her and could not later deny her maintenance on the ground that their marriage was legally void. The Supreme Court also considered past precedents, such as Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha[2] and Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse[3], which held that maintenance laws should be interpreted broadly to prevent women from being left destitute.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted the vulnerability of homemakers in India, citing Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana[4], to reinforce the argument that maintenance is essential for the financial security of women who do not have an independent source of income. The Supreme Court ruled that denying maintenance in this case would defeat the very purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. and grant an unfair advantage to the respondent, who knowingly entered into a marriage with the appellant and later attempted to escape his responsibilities.

Key legal issues discussed

1. Was the appellant entitled to maintenance despite the absence of a formal divorce from her first husband?

Yes

The Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., even though her first marriage was not legally dissolved. The Court emphasized that maintenance laws are designed to protect women from destitution and must be interpreted in a manner that upholds their welfare. The judgment specifically recognized that the absence of a formal divorce decree does not negate the reality of separation and the need for financial support.

In paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Court observed that the appellant had effectively separated from her first husband and was not deriving any financial benefits from him. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the appellant and her first husband was taken as evidence of their separation, even though it did not amount to a formal legal divorce. The Court concluded that in such cases, denying maintenance would lead to hardship for women who are financially dependent on their second husband.

“……Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.”

The Court further clarified that the term "wife" under Section 125 Cr.P.C. should be interpreted broadly to include women who are in void marriages, particularly when the second husband was aware of the first marriage at the time of entering into the relationship.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, restoring the maintenance granted by the Family Court. The Court held that her separation from the first husband, even without a formal divorce decree, was sufficient to entitle her to maintenance from the second husband, as denying it would defeat the very purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C.

2. Does a second husband have an obligation to pay maintenance even if the marriage is void?

Yes

The Supreme Court emphasized that Section 125 CrPC is a social justice provision designed to prevent vagrancy and destitution, particularly for women and children. The Court acknowledged that denying maintenance merely due to the void nature of a marriage would undermine the welfare objectives of the law. Paragraph 18 of the judgment highlighted that the respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with the appellant, despite her first marriage technically remaining legally undissolved. It was noted that the appellant had de facto separated from her first husband and was not receiving any support from him, justifying maintenance from the second husband.

“In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations.”

The Court relied on key precedents to support its reasoning. In Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga[5] (paragraph 7), the Court upheld maintenance for a wife from her second husband despite the absence of a formal divorce decree from the first marriage, given the existence of a customary divorce and the second husband's awareness of the situation. Similarly, in Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha[6] (paragraph 8), the Court observed that maintenance laws should be liberally interpreted to prevent men from exploiting legal loopholes to evade their responsibilities. Moreover, in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse[7] (paragraph 16), maintenance was granted where the wife was unaware of the husband's subsisting first marriage, reinforcing the principle that a narrow interpretation would harm women dependent on such relationships.

While the Court acknowledged previous rulings that denied maintenance in cases involving void marriages, such as Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav[8] and Bakulabai v. Gangaram[9] (paragraph 14), it distinguished the present case on factual grounds. The key difference was that the second husband in this case had full knowledge of the circumstances and continued the relationship, thereby invoking the moral and social obligation to provide maintenance.

Ultimately, the Court in paragraph 19 restored the Family Court's maintenance award, asserting that a beneficial and expansive interpretation of Section 125 CrPC was necessary to protect women's rights and prevent destitution. This judgment underscores that even in cases of void marriages, the social justice objectives of the law may necessitate maintenance obligations from the second husband.

3. Can a woman in a void marriage be considered a 'wife' under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?

Yes

The Court held that a woman in a void marriage can be considered a "wife" under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in certain circumstances, as per judicial interpretations by the Supreme Court.

The court recognized the social justice objectives of Section 125 Cr.P.C., which aims to prevent destitution and vagrancy among women and children. Paragraph 18 of the judgment emphasized that strict legal interpretations of the term "wife" must be set aside if they undermine the protective purpose of the provision.

“An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance--however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable.”

The Court observed that barring the absence of a legal decree, the appellant was de facto separated from her first husband and was not deriving any rights from that marriage. The second husband, fully aware of her previous marriage, entered into the relationship knowingly, thereby invoking a moral and legal duty to provide maintenance.

The judgment heavily relied on earlier decisions where the interpretation of "wife" was broadened to ensure justice. In Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga[10] (paragraph 7), the Court upheld maintenance for a woman despite her first marriage being legally unresolved, considering the customary divorce and the second husband's knowledge of her previous marital status. Similarly, in Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha[11] (paragraph 8), the Court suggested that the term "wife" under Section 125 Cr.P.C. should be expansively interpreted to include women in live-in relationships and void marriages if the facts of the case so warrant. The principle established in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (paragraph 16) further reinforced that maintenance should not be denied where the woman is kept in the dark about the subsistence of the husband's first marriage.

However, the Court acknowledged earlier conflicting views, particularly in Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav[12] and Bakulabai v. Gangaram[13] (paragraph 14), where the term "wife" was strictly interpreted to exclude women from void marriages. Nevertheless, the Court clarified that these cases are distinguishable because they did not involve a plea of separation from the first marriage or a scenario where the husband knowingly entered into the relationship.

4. Does the absence of a formal divorce affect the maintenance claim?

No

Court held that the absence of a formal divorce does not necessarily affect the maintenance claim if the circumstances warrant a purposive and beneficial interpretation of Section 125 Cr.P.C.

The Supreme Court recognized that maintenance provisions are intended to serve as a social welfare measure rather than being contingent on strict legal formalities. In paragraph 18 of the judgment, it was emphasized that denying maintenance solely due to the absence of a divorce decree would defeat the protective objective of the law, especially when the claimant is living independently and not deriving support from the first marriage.

The Court relied on key precedents to reinforce its stance. In Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga[14] (paragraph 7), maintenance was upheld despite the absence of a legal divorce, as the first marriage was dissolved through customary practices. Similarly, in Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha[15] (paragraph 8), the Court stressed that men should not be permitted to evade maintenance obligations by exploiting legal technicalities. The case demonstrated that the formal legality of a divorce should not bar a woman's claim if the relationship has effectively ended.

In contrast, the Court acknowledged earlier decisions such as Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav[16] and Bakulabai v. Gangaram[17] (paragraph 14), where maintenance was denied due to the absence of a legal divorce decree. However, the Court distinguished these cases on factual grounds, emphasizing that those judgments did not consider situations where a woman was genuinely separated from her first husband and not deriving any rights from that marriage.

[1] (2005) 3 SCC 636.

[2] (2011) 1 SCC 141.

[3] (2014) 1 SCC 188.

[4] (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1686.

[5] (2005) 2 SCC 33.

[6]  (2011) 1 SCC 141.

[7] (2014) 1 SCC 188.

[8] (1988) 1 SCC 530.

[9] (1988) 1 SCC 537.

[10] (2005) 2 SCC 33.

[11] (2011) 1 SCC 141.

[12] (1988) 1 SCC 530.

[13] (1988) 1 SCC 537.

[14] (2005) 2 SCC 33.

[15] (2011) 1 SCC 141.

[16] (1988) 1 SCC 530.

[17] (1988) 1 SCC 537.

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