Case Study: Soman v. State of Kerala

“It is crucial for courts to consider the nature of the crime, the circumstances of the offender, and the impact on the victim while determining an appropriate sentence.”

Citation: AIRONLINE 2012 SC 468.

Date of Judgment: 14^th December, 2012

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Aftab Alam (J), Ranjana P. Desai (J)

Facts

• In October 2000, 31 people died, and more than 500 developed serious sicknesses, as a result of consuming spurious liquor, contaminated with methyl alcohol at different places in Kollam district, Kerala. 
• 48 accused were put on trial, who were broadly classified into three groups: one, the maker and manufacturers of the spurious liquor; two, the distributors and suppliers of the killer brew; and third the retail vendors who sold the stuff to the consumers. Appellant fell in the third category.

Decision of the trial court

The post-mortem report of the deceased and chemical analysis of the spirit proved that liquor was adulterated with methyl alcohol. So, court held that the spirit sold by the appellant that caused the death and sickness to several persons was spurious, being contaminated with highly injurious and poisonous substances. Trial court held the accused guilty of Sections 55(a) & (i), 57A and 58 of the (Kerala) Abkari Act as well as Section 201 of the Penal Code.

Decision of the Kerala High Court

On being appealed by both the parties, the High Court by its judgment and dated October 8, 2004[1] dismissed the appeals of the accused, including the one by the appellant. However, dealing with the question of sentence on the basis of the State’s appeal deemed it fit to enhance the appellant’s sentence of imprisonment from two years to five years.

The High Court observed in Para 6 that, “His conviction for offences under Section 55(a) and (i) and under Section 58 are confirmed. But he is punished only for two years under Section 55(a) and (i) and punishment should commensurate with the offence. Hence, his conviction and sentence under Section 57A (2) (ii) is confirmed. Under Section 55 maximum punishment is ten years. We are of the opinion that the sentence imposed on him should be enhanced.”

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Apex court upheld the decision of the High Court of Kerala and observed in Para 27.5 that, “In case of illicit and underground manufacture of liquor, the chances of toxicity are so high that not only its manufacturer but the distributor and the retail vendor would know its likely risks to the consumer. Hence, even though any harm to the consumer might not be directly intended, some aggravated culpability must attach if the consumer suffers some grievous hurt or dies as result of consuming the spurious liquor.”

However, the Apex Court by its judgment and order dated April 4, 2011 in Chandran v. State of Kerala[2], maintained the conviction of another accused given by the High Court. However, it accepted the plea to reduce his sentence from a life term to ten years imprisonment. Since this Court has deemed fit to reduce the sentence given to another accused from a life term to ten years rigorous imprisonment, the court felt that it will not be fair not to give the same concession to the appellant who was the last and weakest link in the chain. So, the Apex court reduced the sentence from five years rigorous imprisonment to three years rigorous imprisonment, being the minimum under Section 57A (2) (ii) of the (Kerala) Abkari Act. 

Key legal issues discussed

1. Whether or not the social consequences of a culpable act and its impact on other people can be a relevant consideration for giving a heavier punishment, of course, within the limits fixed by the law.

Yes

Court observed that giving punishment to the wrongdoer is at the heart of the criminal justice delivery, but in our country, it is the weakest part of the administration of criminal justice. There are no legislative or judicially laid down guidelines to assist the trial court in meting out the just punishment to the accused facing trial before it after he is held guilty of the charges.

Court referred to the State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar[3], Para 2,

“2. In our judicial system, we have not been able to develop legal principles as regards sentencing. The superior courts, except making observations with regard to the purport and object for which punishment is imposed upon an offender, have not issued any guidelines. Other developed countries have done so. At some quarters, serious concerns have been expressed in this behalf. Some committees as for example Madhava Menon Committee and Malimath Committee have advocated introduction of sentencing guidelines.”

Court considers a combination of different factors while exercising discretion in sentencing, that is proportionality[4], deterrence[5], rehabilitation[6] etc.

In a proportionality analysis, it is necessary to assess the seriousness of an offence to determine the commensurate punishment for the offender. The seriousness of an offence depends, apart from other things, also upon its harmfulness. Thus, to understand the relevance of consequences of criminal conduct from a Sentencing standpoint, one must examine:

• whether such consequences enhanced the harmfulness of the offence;
• whether they are an aggravating factor that need to be taken into account by the courts while deciding on the sentence.

Court referred to four main stages[7] in the process of assessing the seriousness of an offence:

1. Determining the interest that is violated (i.e. physical integrity, material support, freedom from humiliation or privacy/autonomy)
2. Quantification of the effect on the victim’s living standard.
3. Culpability of the offender.
4. Remoteness of the actual harm.

Reference could be taken of the dicta of Miller J who twenty years earlier in S v. Ngcobo 1962 (2) SA 333 (N) at 336H-337B had set out the approach to road death cases. At 861H Corbett JA said:

“It seems to me that in determining an appropriate sentence in such cases the basic criterion to which the Court must have regard is the degree of culpability or blameworthiness exhibited by the accused in committing the negligent act. Relevant to such culpability or blameworthiness would be the extent of the accused’s deviation from the norm of reasonable conduct in the circumstances and the foreseeability of the consequences of the accused’s negligence. At the same time the actual consequences of the accused’s negligence cannot be disregarded. If they have been serious and particularly if the accused’s negligence has resulted in serious injury to others or loss of life, such consequences will almost inevitably constitute an aggravating factor, warranting a more severe sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.”

So, punishment should acknowledge the sanctity of human life. Hence, it could be concluded that:

1. Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various different rationales – most prominent amongst which would be proportionality and deterrence.
2. The question of consequences of criminal action can be relevant from both a proportionality and deterrence standpoint.
3. Insofar as proportionality is concerned, the sentence must be commensurate with the seriousness or gravity of the offence.
4. One of the factors relevant for judging seriousness of the offence is the consequences resulting from it.
5. Unintended consequences/harm may still be properly attributed to the offender if they were reasonably foreseeable.

In the present case, under Section 57A, the adulteration of liquor or the omission to take reasonable precaution to prevent the mixing of any noxious substance with any liquor are made offences. And then different sentences are provided in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii), depending upon the different consequences resulting from the offence. In case of grievous hurt, the minimum sentence is two years’ imprisonment, in case of death, three years and in any other case, one year’s imprisonment. There is no reason why the same basis may not be adopted for sentencing under the other provisions of the Act, e.g., Sections 8, 55 (a) & (i) and 58.

[1] Sudhakaran v. State, Criminal Appeal No. 711 of 2002, decided on 08/10/2004 (Ker.).

[2] (2011) 5 SCC 161.

[3] (2008) 7 SCC 550.

[4]  Ramashraya Chakravarti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 1 SCC 281.

[5] Dhananjoy Chatterjee alias Dhana v. State of W.B., (1994) 2 SCC 220.

[6] Union of India v. Kuldeep Singh, (2004) 2 SCC 590.

[7] Andrew Ashworth, In Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 5th Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (pg., 108-112).