“Indian courts are not bound to recognize foreign divorce decrees
“Indian courts are not bound to recognize foreign divorce decrees if the decree is obtained through fraud or lacks jurisdiction, especially when the domicile of the petitioner is falsely represented.”
Citation: (1975) 1 SCC 120
Date of Judgment: 1st October 1974
Court: Supreme court of India
Bench: Hon’ble Justice H.R. Khanna, Hon’ble Justice Y.V. Chandrachud
Facts
- Satya (the appellant) married Teja Singh (the respondent) on July 1, 1955, according to Hindu rites in Jullundur, India. Both were Indian citizens and domiciled in India at the time of the marriage. In 1959, Teja Singh left for the USA for higher studies and later secured a job in Utah. During this period, Satya remained in India with their two children. In 1965, Satya filed a petition for maintenance under Section 488 of the CrPC, claiming that Teja Singh had neglected to provide for her and their children.
- Teja Singh, in response, claimed that their marriage had been dissolved by a divorce decree granted by a Nevada court, USA, on December 30, 1964, and that he was no longer liable to maintain her.
Decision of the trial court
The Judicial Magistrate rejected the Nevada divorce decree, holding that it was not binding on the appellant as Teja Singh had not established a permanent domicile in Nevada and could only seek divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act.
Decision of the High Court
The High Court ruled in favor of Teja Singh, holding that the Nevada decree was valid since Teja Singh had established domicile in Nevada at the time of the divorce proceedings. The court applied the English doctrine that the wife’s domicile follows her husband’s domicile.
Decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s ruling, holding that the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction to grant a divorce as Teja Singh had misrepresented his domicile. The Court held that domicile is a jurisdictional fact, and a temporary stay in Nevada does not meet the legal requirements for establishing domicile. As such, the divorce decree was obtained through fraud and could not be recognized under Indian law. The Supreme Court emphasized that foreign judgments that offend India’s public policy or are obtained through fraud cannot be enforced. The decree was found to be fraudulent because Teja Singh had misled the Nevada court about his domicile and intentions.
Key legal issues discussed
1. Whether the Nevada Court had jurisdiction under Indian law to grant a decree of divorce?
No
The Supreme Court provided a detailed examination of jurisdiction based on domicile, which is the foundation for granting divorce under foreign law. The Court held that the Nevada court’s jurisdiction was founded on Teja Singh’s claim of domicile, which was fraudulent.
In this case, Teja Singh’s claim that he was domiciled in Nevada was false. He had merely stayed in Nevada temporarily to take advantage of its lenient divorce laws, and he left immediately after obtaining the decree. This did not satisfy the requirement of domicile, which involves both residence and the intention to make a place one’s permanent home.
The Court referred to the English case of Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier[1], where it was held that domicile, not temporary residence, is the basis for jurisdiction in matrimonial cases. The Privy Council in Le Mesurier held that “the domicile for the time being of the married pair affords the only true test of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage.”
The Court ruled that Teja Singh’s false representation of domicile was a critical factor in determining the invalidity of the decree. The Nevada court was misled into assuming jurisdiction, and a decree based on such fraud could not be enforced in India.
The Court cited Williams v. North Carolina[2] , where the U.S. Supreme Court held that domicile is the key to jurisdiction in divorce cases, and a decree granted by a court without proper jurisdiction is not valid in other states or countries. In this case, the Nevada court was without jurisdiction because Teja Singh’s domicile was fabricated.
The court, while observing the facts held in para 44, “Domicile being a jurisdictional fact, the decree is open to the collateral attack that the respondent was not a bona fide resident of Nevada, much less was he domiciled in Nevada.”
The Court also referred to Idleman v. Edelman[3], where it was held that a spouse cannot acquire a temporary domicile for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce. The fraudulent simulation of domicile renders a divorce decree void, as it is not based on genuine jurisdictional facts.
Therefore, The Court held that domicile is a jurisdictional fact essential for a court to exercise its authority in divorce cases.
2. Whether the divorce decree passed by the Nevada Court can be recognized in India?
No
Under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), a foreign judgment can only be recognized in India if it meets specific conditions, including that the court granting the judgment has proper jurisdiction and the judgment is not contrary to public policy.
The Nevada decree failed to meet the requirement of jurisdiction under Indian law. As discussed in Issue No. 1, the Nevada court’s jurisdiction was based on fraudulent claims about domicile. Therefore, the decree was invalid under Indian law, and it could not be recognized.
The Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 13(a) of the CPC, a foreign judgment must be passed by a competent court. Since the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction, its judgment could not be enforced in India. The Court reiterated the principle that jurisdiction in matrimonial matters must be based on domicile, as established in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier[4].
The court therefore held in Para 54 that “Fraud as to the jurisdiction of the Nevada court is a vital consideration in the recognition of the decree passed by that court.”
The Court also noted that the Nevada decree contravened India’s public policy, as it was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. Recognizing such a decree would violate Indian principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The Court further referred to R. Viswanathan v. Abdul Wajid[5] , where it was held that foreign judgments obtained through fraud or lacking jurisdiction are not binding in India.
A judgment therefore passed without proper jurisdiction is not conclusive, even if it is a judgment in rem.
3. Whether the High Court was correct in applying the English rule that a wife’s domicile follows her husband’s domicile?
No
The High Court had relied on the outdated English rule that the wife’s domicile automatically follows her husband’s domicile. This rule, while once a staple of English law, has been subject to significant criticism and reform.
The Court noted that the rule that a wife’s domicile follows that of her husband has been discredited in both English and Indian jurisprudence. The rule does not apply where there is a fraudulent claim of domicile. In cases involving fraud, the wife is not bound to accept the jurisdiction of the husband’s fraudulent domicile.
The Court referred to Formosa v. Formosa[6], where Lord Denning criticized the rule as a “barbarous relic of a wife’s servitude” and advocated for its abolition in cases where the husband fraudulently claims domicile.
The Court also cited Indyka v. Indyka[7], where the House of Lords held that the wife’s domicile needs not automatically follow the husband’s if the husband’s domicile is found to be false or feigned.
The Supreme Court emphasized that Indian courts must apply principles of justice and fairness in determining jurisdiction. The Court ruled that the wife’s domicile cannot mechanically follow the husband’s, especially in cases of fraud. The wife must be treated as having an independent right to challenge the jurisdiction of a foreign court when her husband has acted in bad faith.
[1] [1895] A.C. 517.
[2] 89 L. Ed. 1577.
[3] 161 N.Y.S. 2d 717.
[4] Supra note 1.
[5] [1963] 3 SCR 22.
[6] [1962] (3) A.E.R. 419.
[7] [1967] (2) A.B.R. 689.
