In Dalip Kumar @ Dalli v. State of Uttarakhand, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant, overturning convictions under Sections 363 and 366-A IPC. Key issues included a delayed FIR, lack of coercion, and insufficient evidence, leading to doubts about the prosecution's claims.
Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 1005 of 2013
Date of Judgment: 16th January, 2025
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hrishikesh Roy (J), S.V.N. Bhatti (J)
Facts
- On 18th March 1998, the prosecutrix, a minor girl, was allegedly seen leaving with the appellant, Dalip Kumar @ Dalli, near her school. Her younger sister, Sarita, reportedly witnessed this but did not raise an alarm.
- The father of the prosecutrix then filed an FIR the next evening on 19th March 1998, over 24 hours after the alleged incident. The initial FIR did not name the appellant, and the delay in reporting was unexplained.
- The prosecutrix testified that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant and did not resist or shout for help. According to her statement, talks of her marriage to the appellant had taken place earlier, but her father opposed the match due to caste differences.
- The prosecutrix was examined by a doctor shortly after the incident. The medical report found no signs of injuries or sexual assault on her body. She was declared to be physically normal. Based on the radiological evidence, her age was estimated to be 16-18 years.
- The younger sister, Sarita, who allegedly saw the prosecutrix leaving with the appellant, was not brought as a witness by the prosecution. The prosecutrix's father did not inform the police immediately after Sarita saw her leave, and no alarm was raised at the time.
- The prosecutrix's testimony indicated that she was not taken by force. The lack of immediate reporting and physical evidence of coercion raised questions about the nature of the incident.
Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court analyzed the evidence presented by the prosecution, which included testimonies from key witnesses such as the prosecutrix (PW-2), her father (PW-1), the medical doctor (PW-3), and Rajendra Singh (PW-4), an independent eyewitness. The prosecutrix testified that she left with the appellant willingly and did not raise any alarm or protest, directly contradicting the prosecution's narrative that she was forcibly taken. Despite this, the court placed significant weight on her age, which the medical evidence estimated to be between 16 and 18 years, categorizing her as a minor under the law. The prosecution argued that the appellant had enticed the prosecutrix for illicit purposes, fulfilling the ingredients of Section 366-A IPC.
The medical examination of the prosecutrix found no signs of injuries or sexual assault, and her physical condition was normal. Nevertheless, the trial court inferred that the lack of visible injuries did not necessarily negate the possibility of coercion or undue influence. Additionally, Sarita, the prosecutrix's younger sister, who reportedly witnessed her leaving with the appellant, was not presented by the prosecution as a witness, leaving a crucial gap in the evidence. Despite these inconsistencies, the trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 363 (kidnapping) and 366-A (inducing a minor for illicit intercourse) IPC, while acquitting him of more serious charges. The court’s rationale for conviction rested on the presumed vulnerability of the prosecutrix as a minor and the circumstantial evidence pointing to the appellant’s intent.
Decision of the High Court
On appeal, the High Court reviewed the trial court’s findings and upheld the conviction under Sections 363 and 366-A IPC. The court acknowledged the delay in filing the FIR, which was lodged more than 24 hours after the alleged incident. While the defense argued that this delay cast serious doubts on the credibility of the allegations, the High Court dismissed this contention, stating that delays in reporting crimes, particularly those involving women and minors, are not uncommon and could stem from social pressures or fear of stigma.
The High Court placed reliance on the prosecutrix's testimony, despite her statement that she had voluntarily accompanied the appellant. It reasoned that the appellant’s actions still constituted inducement under Section 366-A IPC, considering the prosecutrix’s age and the circumstances of the case. The absence of Sarita’s testimony as an eyewitness was noted but not considered fatal to the prosecution’s case. The court also emphasized the protective intent of laws dealing with minors and upheld the conviction, emphasizing the appellant’s alleged exploitation of the prosecutrix’s young age and vulnerability.
Decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court, hearing the appellant’s challenge to the High Court’s judgment, examined the evidence and delivered a detailed and reasoned decision. The Bench, comprising Justices Hrishikesh Roy and S.V.N. Bhatti, expressed serious concerns over the lack of sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges under Sections 363 and 366-A IPC.
The Court took note of the delay in filing the FIR, observing that the prosecution failed to provide a convincing explanation for the 24-hour gap. Such a delay, the Court held, weakened the prosecution’s case by creating room for speculation and the possibility of fabrication.
Central to the Court’s reasoning was the testimony of the prosecutrix. Her statement that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant and did not resist or raise an alarm contradicted the prosecution’s claim that she was forcibly taken. The Court also highlighted that Sarita, the victim’s younger sister, was a key witness who could have corroborated the prosecution’s version but was not brought forward, leaving a critical gap in the chain of evidence.
The medical evidence further undermined the prosecution's case. The doctor’s examination found no injuries or signs of sexual assault, and the victim’s physical condition was normal. While the Court reiterated that bodily injuries are not necessary to establish sexual assault, it emphasized that in this case, the evidence as a whole failed to support the allegations of coercion or undue influence. The prosecutrix’s age, determined to be between 16 and 18 years, added another layer of doubt, as she could not definitively be categorized as a minor.
The Court also referred to its Handbook on Gender Stereotypes, 2023, emphasizing that victims of trauma react differently based on individual circumstances and societal factors. While recognizing the stigma and barriers associated with reporting such incidents, the Court noted that these considerations did not override the evidentiary gaps in the present case.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients of Sections 363 and 366-A IPC beyond reasonable doubt. It noted that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the prosecutrix was induced or forcibly taken for illicit purposes. Accordingly, the Court quashed the appellant’s conviction and set aside the High Court’s judgment, observing that sustaining the conviction would be unjustified in light of the weak evidentiary foundation. The appellant was acquitted of all charges, and the bail bond furnished by him was discharged.
Key legal issues discussed
1. Are bodily injuries necessary to prove sexual assault?
No
The court explicitly stated that bodily injuries are not necessary to prove sexual assault. It emphasized that individuals respond differently to trauma based on their circumstances, personal characteristics, and social factors. The absence of physical injuries does not negate the possibility of sexual assault. The court in paragraph number 8, court emphasized that
“We must caution that bodily injuries are not necessary to prove sexual assault1 and neither it is important to raise a hue or cry. In this regard, the Supreme Court’s Handbook on Gender stereotypes (2023) provides as under: “Different people react differently to traumatic events. For example, the death of a parent may cause one person to cry publicly whereas another person in a similar situation may not exhibit any emotion in public. Similarly, a woman’s reaction to being sexually assaulted or raped by a man may vary based on her individual characteristics. There is no “correct” or “appropriate” way in which a survivor or victim behaves.”
The court referred to earlier judgments, including State of UP v. Chotey Lal[1] and BC Deva v. State of Karnataka[2], which underscore that physical injuries are not a mandatory requirement for establishing the offense of sexual assault.
Further court in paragraph 9 highlighted that victims often do not exhibit "expected" reactions to trauma due to fear, stigma, or helplessness. Therefore, reliance on physical evidence such as injuries is not justifiable or realistic.
“It is a common myth that sexual assault must leave injuries. Victims respond to trauma in varied ways, influenced by factors such as fear, shock, social stigma or feelings of helplessness. It is neither realistic nor just to expect a uniform reaction. The stigma associated with sexual assault often creates significant barriers for women, making it difficult for them to disclose the incident to others. In the present case however, the prosecutrix herself had clearly indicated that she was not forcibly taken away by the appellant. The above evidence indicates that the ingredients for sustaining a charge under Section 366-A of the IPC of abductions with the intent to illicit intercourse of the prosecutrix, was totally absent in the present case. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 366-A IPC cannot be sustained.”
2. Did the prosecution provide sufficient evidence to support the charge of kidnapping under Section 363 IPC?
No
Court in paragraph 11, highlighted that testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-2) did not support the prosecution's claim. She stated that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant and did not shout or resist, undermining the element of force or coercion required for kidnapping.
“The evidence of the prosecutrix does not at all support the case of the prosecution. The independent eye-witness Rajendra Singh (PW-4) also did not support the prosecution case on recovery and was therefore subjected to cross-examination by the prosecution. The cross-examination of PW-4 is appreciated and the evidence lets down the theory of recovery as evidenced through Ex. K-2.”
Further court in paragraph noted that prosecution failed to present Sarita, the sister of the prosecutrix, as a witness. Her testimony could have provided critical corroboration but was withheld, creating a significant gap in the prosecution's case.
“Insofar as the conviction for kidnapping under Section 363 IPC, another witness to prove the charge of kidnapping would be the testimony of the prosecutrix’s sister - Sarita. She was however withheld by the prosecution. The age of the prosecutrix as per the opinion of the Doctor as earlier noted ranged between 16-18 years and in the absence of any contrary evidence, the possibility of the prosecutrix, being of 18 years age, cannot entirely be ruled out”
3. Is delayed lodging of an FIR fatal to the prosecution's case?
No
Court observed that delayed lodging of an FIR is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case, but it raises questions that must be satisfactorily explained. In this case, court in paragraph 6 highlighted the fact that the incident occurred on 18.03.1998, but the FIR was lodged only on 19.03.1998, without any clear explanation. The delay raised doubts about the credibility of the prosecution’s narrative.
“In her testimony, she stated that talks of her marriage with the appellant was going on but her father was opposed to the marriage as both belong to different castes. In her cross-examination, the PW-2 clearly indicated that she voluntarily went with the appellant and she never shouted or demonstrated that she was being abducted by the appellant. In fact, her younger sister Sarita saw the prosecutrix going with the appellant near her school but unnaturally, Sarita was never presented as a witness in the case. That apart, although the alleged incident had happened on 18.03.1998 at around 3:00 p.m. and Sarita reached home soon after seeing the prosecutrix proceeding with the appellant, information about the so-called alleged abduction was never given to the police and the FIR came to be lodged at 7:00 p.m. on 19.03.1998 (next day evening).”
The court further emphasized that while a delay in filing an FIR is not always fatal, it must be justified. Failure to do so can weaken the prosecution's case, particularly when other evidence is circumstantial or contradictory. In paragraph 11 the court noted that the delay, coupled with the lack of evidence of coercion or resistance, undermined the prosecution’s claim of forceful abduction, casting doubts on whether the ingredients of Section 363 IPC were satisfied.
“We are therefore of the view that to sustain the conviction of the appellant on the basis of evidence adduced, would not at all be justified. The prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of both Sections 363 and 366-A of the IPC. The impugned judgment is accordingly set aside and quashed. The appellant stands discharged of the bail bond furnished by him. The appeal is accordingly allowed.”
The court ultimately ruled that unexplained delay, when combined with insufficient evidence, justified quashing the conviction.
[1] (2011) 2 SCC 550.
[2] (2007) 12 SCC 122.