Case Study: Bhuri Nath and Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors.

By Yousuf Khan 10 Minutes Read

“The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988, ruling that the State could regulate the Shrine’s management in the public interest, and the customary rights of Baridars to collect offerings could be extinguished, provided adequate compensation was offered.”

Citation: AIR 1997 SC 1711, (1997) 2 SCC 745

Date of Judgment: 10^th January, 1997

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: K. Ramaswamy (J), G.B. Pattanaik (J)

Facts

• The appellants, Bhuri Nath and others, were members of the Baridar Association who had customary rights to perform religious rituals and collect offerings at the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine. The Jammu and Kashmir Government enacted the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988, to improve the management of the Shrine and provide better facilities to pilgrims, transferring control from the Dharmarth Trust to the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board.
• The appellants challenged the Act, claiming that their customary rights were extinguished without adequate compensation and that the Act violated their fundamental rights.

Decision of the High Court

The case was initially filed in the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, where the court upheld the constitutionality of the Act and dismissed the appellants’ challenge. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court ruled that the Act was valid and was enacted in the public interest for the effective management of the Shrine, including the provision for compensating Baridars.

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, ruling that the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988, was constitutionally valid. The Court held that the Act was enacted to serve the larger public interest and to ensure better management of the Shrine, which is visited by millions of pilgrims. It was also ruled that the customary rights of the Baridars to collect offerings were not fundamental rights and could be extinguished through legislation, provided adequate compensation was offered.

Key legal issues discussed

1. Whether the Jammu and Kashmir Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988, was constitutionally valid?

Yes

The Supreme Court emphasized that the State’s authority to regulate religious institutions, particularly the secular aspects like management, was well-established under Indian constitutional law. The Court noted that the primary objective of the Act was to ensure better management of the Shrine, given the large number of pilgrims visiting annually. The government’s intention was to enhance facilities, governance, and overall convenience for the public, which justified the need for the legislation.

The Court ruled that regulating the secular management of religious institutions is within the ambit of the State’s powers, as was previously upheld in A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh^[1], where the Court stated that secular administration of religious institutions can be controlled and regulated by the State for proper management.

Moreover, the Supreme Court held that while the freedom to manage religious affairs under Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution is protected, the State has the right to regulate secular activities associated with religious practices, especially when public interest is involved.

Referring to the Paragraph 29 of the judgment, the Court clarified that “The Act merely regulates the management, administration, and governance of the Shrine. It is not an extinguishment of the right.”

The Court further explained that the Act did not violate any fundamental rights, as it did not interfere with the core religious activities or beliefs of the Baridars. Instead, it merely sought to organize the management of the Shrine more efficiently.

2. Whether the rights of Baridars to collect offerings could be extinguished by legislation?

Yes
The Supreme Court clarified that the rights of the Baridars to collect offerings at the Shrine were not religious rights but rather customary privileges that had evolved over time. The Court drew a distinction between religious duties and customary practices, noting that the latter could be regulated or extinguished through legislation if they conflicted with public interest or better management.

The Court referenced the earlier case of Badri Nath v. Mst. Punna^[2], where it was held that the right to receive a share in the offerings was not of a religious nature but rather a secular activity tied to service obligations. The Supreme Court in Badri Nath had explained that such rights could be subject to regulation and extinguishment in cases where the management of the religious institution was being reorganized for public welfare.

In Paragraph 29 of the present case, the Court stated “The right to superintendence of management, administration and governance of the Shrine is not the property which the State acquires. It carries with it no beneficial enjoyment of the property to the State. The Act merely regulates the management, administration, and governance of the Shrine.

The Court also drew attention to A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P^[3]., which held that secular functions associated with religious institutions, such as the management of endowments and properties, could be regulated by the State. The Supreme Court reasoned that the management of offerings and other revenue-generating activities associated with the Shrine fell within the category of secular activities that could be subject to governmental regulation for the benefit of the public.

The Court also remphasized that jurisdictional fraud and misrepresentation could lead to a dismissal of claims to jurisdictional rights. In this case, the Baridars had no inherent or religious claim over the offerings, as they were based purely on custom, not on any legal or religious foundation.

3. Whether the appellants were entitled to compensation for the loss of their customary rights?

Yes

The Supreme Court ruled that while the Baridars’ customary rights could be extinguished, the Act provided for adequate compensation. The Court emphasized that the compensation mechanism provided by the Act was sufficient to meet the requirements of natural justice. The Court directed the formation of a tribunal to determine the compensation for the Baridars, taking into account their previous income from offerings and the duration for which they had held those rights.

In Bela Banerjee v. State of West Bengal^[4], the Supreme Court had ruled that whenever property rights or income-generating privileges were extinguished, adequate compensation was necessary to ensure fairness. Similarly, in the present case, the Court acknowledged that the Baridars had derived income from their customary rights and were thus entitled to compensation, but this did not mean that their rights could not be regulated or extinguished in the public interest.

The Court referred to Paragraph 33, stating: “The Tribunal shall have due regard to the guidelines in determining the income of Baridars before the Tribunal makes its recommendations to the Board for consideration and the Board shall also take a decision, as it may deem appropriate.”

The Court also discussed that even though the compensation could be adjusted according to the Baridars’ previous earnings, the extinguishment of the right itself was not in violation of their constitutional rights, given the larger purpose served by the legislation.

^[1] [1996] 3 SCR 543.

^[2] [1979] 3 SCR 209.

^[3] [1996] 3 SCR 543.

^[4] [1954] 1 SCR 558.

Yousuf Khan