Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory

By Sahil Kumar 11 Minutes Read

Introduction

Robert Nozick, born on November 16, 1938, in Brooklyn, New York, and passing away on January 23, 2002, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, was a prominent American philosopher renowned for his strong defense of libertarianism in his seminal work, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). A philosopher with a broad intellectual scope, Nozick also made significant contributions to epistemology, the problem of personal identity, and decision theory. He earned his Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton University in 1963, writing a dissertation on decision theory under the supervision of Carl Hempel.

Nozick’s academic career included teaching positions at Princeton (1962–65), Harvard University (1965–67), and Rockefeller University (1967–69). At the age of 30, he returned to Harvard as one of the youngest full professors in the university’s history, where he continued his teaching career. He was appointed Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy in 1985 and later became the Joseph Pellegrino University Professor in 1998.

Theory of Entitlement

Robert Nozick’s first and most renowned book, “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”, sparked a revival of social and political philosophy within the analytic school. No other work has posed a sustained and thoroughly argued challenge to the prevailing conceptions of social justice and the role of the state like Nozick’s. Through his entitlement theory of justice, Nozick critiques John Rawls’ difference principle, which represents a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Nozick’s challenge to Rawls rests on three grounds:

• First, the idea that talents are common property undermines the dignity and self-respect of autonomous beings by attributing individual worth to external factors.
• Second, Nozick disputes the Rawlsian notion that a person’s endowments are morally arbitrary, arguing that entitlement to something does not necessarily require deserving it, meaning a person may be entitled to their talents without deserving them.
• Third, he argues that using the better-off to benefit the worst-off violates the Kantian principle of treating individuals as ends in themselves, not merely as means.

This critique led Nozick to develop a theory of distributive justice and private property that focuses on “justice in holdings,” which he outlines through three principles: the principle of justice in acquisition, which addresses how property is initially acquired; the principle of justice in transfer, which governs the voluntary exchange of holdings; and the principle of rectification, which deals with correcting injustices related to unjustly acquired or transferred holdings.

Nozick believes that in a wholly just world, only the first two principles would be necessary, as a person would be entitled to a holding if it were acquired justly. However, because not everyone adheres to these rules, injustices like theft, fraud, and enslavement occur, necessitating the third principle of rectification. The concept of self-ownership is the cornerstone of Nozick’s work, from which the rights of the individual and the idea of a minimal state originate. This analysis reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of Nozick’s entitlement theory, prompting an exploration of its perceived strengths, defects, inconsistencies, and hidden fallacies. This inquiry aims to assess how consistent and relevant Nozick’s philosophy remains in the contemporary world.

Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of distributive justice is structured around three key principles: justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and justice in rectification.

1. Justice in Acquisition

The principle of justice in acquisition asserts that a person who acquires a holding justly is entitled to it, explaining how things previously unowned can be legitimately acquired. Nozick leans on Locke’s labor theory of property acquisition but modifies it with a welfare baseline, which he fails to clearly define. This raises concerns about the applicability of his principle in a modern, technologically advanced world, and whether it could justify past injustices.

2. Justice in Transfer

The principle of justice in transfer concerns the legitimate transfer of holdings from one individual to another. Nozick does not specify what constitutes “justice” in these transfers, leaving room for ambiguity. This omission is problematic, especially in situations where power imbalances might lead to transfers that one party views as unjust. Nozick does not provide a solution for these situations, which casts doubt on the robustness of his theory.

3. Justice in Rectification

Justice in rectification addresses the correction of past injustices that have occurred due to the improper application of the first two principles. Nozick suggests using historical information to determine what would have occurred if injustices had not taken place, but this is complicated by the fact that many historical injustices are irretrievable or forgotten. Moreover, rectifying past wrongs could affect current owners who were not involved in the original injustices, thereby undermining the certainty of legal titles. This leads to the suggestion that rectification claims might be limited by time.

Rawls and Nozick

Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia is, in part, a response to John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, making it essential to first consider Rawls’ theory. Central to Rawls’ work is the concept of “justice as fairness,” which articulates a version of democratic social justice. Rawls advocates for a more expansive state, where the government is responsible for ensuring that citizens have access to basic human needs and for caring for the welfare of the least advantaged. This includes state-provided welfare, education, and health services funded through taxation. Rawls’ idea of “justice as fairness” refers to the principles that would be chosen by individuals in the “original position,” a hypothetical scenario where decisions are made from behind a “veil of ignorance,” ensuring impartiality in determining the basic structure of society.

According to Rawls, two principles of justice would be selected in this original position:

(a) every individual is entitled to an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme for others; and

(b) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are reasonably expected to benefit everyone and are attached to positions and offices open to all.

Rawls’ concept of justice as fairness is rooted in social contract theory, which he defends as the most reasonable and preferable notion of justice. His primary focus is distributive justice, concerned with how goods and freedoms should be distributed in society. Rawls suggests that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to what they possess under that distribution, even if unequal treatment is sometimes justified when it leads to overall improvements for everyone. Therefore, Rawls’ theory emphasizes the benefit and welfare of society as a whole, and he sees taxation as a legitimate means for the government to achieve these goals.

Criticism

• Robert C. Elliott criticizes Robert Nozick’s conception of individual rights as being arbitrary and overly rigid. He portrays Nozick’s view of the individual as an isolated entity, cordoned off by inviolable rights that others cannot breach without consent. This notion, Elliott argues, overlooks situations where circumstances might justify overriding an individual’s rights, such as when others have a legitimate claim to dispose of property or resources in a certain way despite the owner’s objections.
• Elliott contends that Nozick’s framework places undue emphasis on property rights, seemingly deriving all other rights from them. This perspective is criticized for neglecting other fundamental rights, such as privacy, freedom of expression, and speech. Elliott’s critique aligns with Bernard Williams’ objection to utilitarianism, which he argues reduces individuals to mere conduits for actions devoid of moral content.
• Elliott further critiques Nozick’s vision as being illusory, positing an overly individualistic world disconnected from the realities of society, community, and the state. Despite Nozick’s later concession to a minimal state, Elliott questions whether this minimal state’s actions would inevitably encroach upon the “inviolable individual rights” that Nozick staunchly defends.
• H.L.A. Hart suggests that Nozick’s theory ultimately leads to a utilitarian-like outcome where a few benefits at the expense of many.
• Amartya Sen’s critique adds to this by suggesting that an inflexible adherence to strict rules, like those in Nozick’s theory, fails to adequately address the complexities of justice.

Sahil Kumar