Condonation of Delay under the Limitation Act, 1963

Introduction

The Limitation Act was brought forth to prescribe specific time limits within which legal actions like suits, appeals, or applications must be initiated. Once this period lapses, generally, the right to pursue the legal remedy is extinguished. However, recognizing the complexities and unforeseen circumstances that might prevent timely filing, the Act incorporates a provision for condonation of delay.

Condonation of delay is a discretionary power vested in the courts to overlook the delay in filing a case beyond the prescribed limitation period, provided the applicant can demonstrate a reasonable cause for the delay. This equitable doctrine ensures that technicalities do not defeat substantive justice.

Legal Provisions for granting Condonation of Delay

• Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for the condonation of delay. Section 5 acts as an exception to Section 3 which states that if a suit, appeal, or application has been instituted beyond the prescribed period, the same shall be dismissed on the grounds of bar of limitation. For instance, if a suit is instituted for specific performance of contract after the expiry of 3 years (period of limitation), from the date of Cause of Action such a suit cannot be instituted in the court of law pursuant to Section 3 of the Act. As per Section 3, it is not necessary whether the other party has raised the defence of limitation or not.
• Section 5 relates to condonation of delay, and it enables the court to allow the application or appeal even after the prescribed period. However, such condonation is granted only when the applicant or appellant provides sufficient cause for the delay. Thus, Section 5 of the Act acts as an exception to Section 3 of the Act. It is noteworthy that condonation of delay is not applicable upon suits and executed applications since they have longer periods of limitations.

Rationale behind Condonation of delay

• The purpose of the incorporation of Section 5 in the Act is to recognize the unforeseen circumstances or impediments that can lead to potential delay of the institution of legal proceedings. Section 5 empowers courts with the discretion to condone delays in filing appeals or applications.
• The concept of “sufficient cause,” central to Section 5, requires the applicant to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. While the court enjoys discretion in this matter, it’s imperative to balance the interests of the applicant with potential prejudice to the opposing party. In essence, condonation of delay is a mechanism to reconcile the statutory mandate of limitation with the broader principles of fairness and justice.
• For instance, if the prescribed period for institution of an application is 3 months but owing to serious illness, it is not possible for the appellant to do so. In such a case, the delay can be condoned, and the condoned period can be excluded from the prescribed period upon the court’s discretion.

Sufficient cause

• Sufficient cause is the axis around which the concept of condonation of delay revolves. The Limitation Act does not provide a specific list of what constitutes “sufficient cause” for condoning a delay. This is because it would be impossible to anticipate every possible reason for a delay. Instead, the law leaves it to the discretion of the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the reason given is valid enough to justify condoning the delay. However, following are the reasons that can be termed as sufficient cause:

1. Wrong practice of High Courts.
2. Mistake or wrong advice given by the counsel.
3. Imprisonment or serious illness of the party.
4. Time taken for obtaining certified copies of the decree of judgment.

• In a case, where the defendant was looking after his ailed father, which led to the expiry of prescribed period was ruled as sufficient cause by the court in Mahendra Yadav v. Ratna Devi and Others[1].
• However, certain reasons explained by the applicant cannot be termed as sufficient cause. In Collector and Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Darshan Singh and Others[2], the court ruled that non availability of file cannot be deemed as sufficient cause for the delay.

Consequences of filing appeal or application beyond the original prescribed period

• It is often the case that the applicant files an application beyond the original prescribed period and gives the sufficient cause which starts outside the original prescribed period.
• The court in the landmark case of Sagufa Ahmed and Others v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Private Limited & Others[3], held that for a period to get excluded to extend the prescribed period, it is necessary that the first date of the period to be excluded shall commence from a date within the original prescribed period. Thus, if the first date of the exclusion period falls on a day after the expiry of the original prescribed period, then exclusion cannot be done. It was also held that for extending the period of condonation of delay, it is only for extension of prescribed period by way of exclusion.
• Furthermore, in the landmark ruling of Ramlal v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd[4], the apex court observed that after the expiration of the period of limitation, the appellant must explain the delay made thereafter day by day. If the appellant is unable to explain the delay, even for a single day, it would be deemed that the party did not have a sufficient cause.

Discretion of the Courts to Grant Condonation of Delay

The court has double discretion while granting condonation of delay:

1.     If there is a sufficient cause or not.

In the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji and Others[5], the court was not hyper technical in examining the delay as in that case the appellant will lose his right of institution of appeal/application. The court further ruled that condonation of delay matters should be liberally interpreted as it would allow the appeal or application to be heard on merits.

2. Despite proving the sufficient cause, the interest of the opposite party has to be taken into consideration.

The court has the discretion to ignore the sufficient cause, if the court is satisfied that it will lead to irreparable loss to the opposite party.

In Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer[6] case, while the appellant claimed sufficient cause for the delay, the Supreme Court emphasized that the discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously. The court held that the expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fide is evident.

The court’s decision highlights the importance of balancing the need for justice with the principle of limitation and the potential prejudice to the other party.

Conclusion

The Limitation Act, while establishing time-bound parameters for legal actions, recognizes the complexities of real-world situations through the doctrine of condonation of delay. This equitable provision empowers courts to balance the principles of justice with the need for finality. However, the discretionary power vested in courts must be exercised judiciously, considering both the applicant’s reasons for delay and the potential prejudice to the opposing party. The interplay between strict adherence to limitation periods and the pursuit of substantial justice forms the crux of this legal framework, demanding a nuanced approach from the judiciary.

[1] 2006 A I H C 142.

[2] AIR 1999 RAJ 84.

[3] AIR ONLINE 2020 SC 731.

[4] AIR 1962 SC 361.

[5] AIR 1987 SC 1353.

[6] AIR 2014 SC 746.