Case Study: Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma

In Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020), the Supreme Court of India upheld the coparcenary rights of daughters, granting them equal rights from birth under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. Overruling previous rulings, the court confirmed that these rights are retroactive, thus daughters

Case Study: Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma

“Supreme Court Upholds Daughter’s Coparcenary Right, Overrules Previous Rulings”

Citation: (2020) 9 SCC 1

Date of Judgment: 11th August 2020

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Justice Arun Mishra, Justice Abdul Nazeer, Justice M.R. Shah

Facts

  • In this case, the family consisted of Shri Dev Dutt Sharma, his wife, one daughter, and three sons. The father died in 1999, and one son died unmarried in 2001.
  • The daughter, Vineeta Sharma, claimed a one-fourth share in the coparcenary property. The other family members denied her claim, arguing that the father’s death predated the 2005 amendment and that her marriage would terminate her coparcenary rights.
  • Vineeta Sharma filed a suit against her brothers and mother, claiming coparcenary rights.
  • Conflicting interpretations of the Hindu Succession Act, particularly regarding the retroactive application of a daughter’s coparcenary rights, emerged in cases such as Prakash v. Phulavati[1] and Danamma v. Amar[2].
  • To establish a clear legal precedent, a three-judge bench was constituted to examine these discrepancies and provide a unified interpretation of Section 6.

Judgment of the High Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the benefits conferred upon daughters by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 were inapplicable. The court reasoned that since the father’s death occurred before the enactment of the amendment, the daughter’s claim to coparcenary property could not be substantiated under the new provisions.

Judgment of the Supreme Court

The judgment significantly impacts property rights under the Hindu Succession Act. Oral partitions are now strictly regulated, demanding strong evidence. Crucially, daughters have been granted coparcenary rights from birth, a retrospective change.

The amendment, while retrospective in nature, can be claimed prospectively. Daughters can also benefit from the 2005 amendment in ongoing partition cases. Notably, the concept of notional partition has been clarified as a legal fiction for share calculation, not an actual partition. These decisions collectively enhance the rights of daughters in coparcenary property.

Key legal issues discussed

1. Is oral partition included within the definition of Section 6(5), and is it read with Section 6(1)?

Yes

In India, oral partition or family arrangement is one of the most common forms of partition. While deciding the issue, the court observed that the original amendment bill tabled before the Rajya Sabha did not contain an explanation clause in Section 6(5) of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.

The legislature subsequently added the explanation to Section 6(5), which stated that the partition should be proved either by a registered public document, decree, or an order of the court. The aim of the explanation was to expose any bogus claim of oral partition to prevent the daughter’s right to coparcenary property.

The main purpose of Section 6 is to ensure that the daughters are not deprived of their right to obtain a share in coparcenary property by becoming coparceners. Therefore, the court disagreed on considering oral partition as a valid partition unless supported by strong documentary evidence since it can be a fraudulent act to abstain daughters from obtaining their share in the property.

In 127th para, the court answered, “ … the Court has to be very extremely careful in accepting the same, and only if very cogent, impeccable, and contemporaneous documentary evidence in shape of public documents in support are available, such a plea may be entertained, not otherwise.”

However, Section 6(1) proviso (it does not invalidate any disposition or alienation prior to the 2005 Amendment) read with Section 6(5) provides that no partitions will be re-opened which were affected prior to 20th December 2004.

The court, therefore, ruled that the purpose of Section 6(5) provision is to cast the burden of proof upon the party claiming oral partition. Furthermore, the court observed that a plea of oral partitions should be outrightly rejected unless supported by a registered document, decree, or order of the court.

2. Is the ratio given in Prakash v. Phulavati, which stated that the living daughter of a living coparcener should become a coparcener, correct or not?

No

Prakash v. Phulavati[3] held that Section 6 applies only if both daughter and father were alive on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act (09/09/2005). The apex court overruled this ratio by explaining the concept of ‘obstructed’ and ‘unobstructed’ heritage.

When the right is created in the property upon birth, it is deemed as unobstructed heritage. Whereas if the right in the property is accrued not upon birth but upon the death of the last owner without leaving a male issue, it is referred to as obstructed heritage.

The court reasoned that since Section 6 elucidates that the daughter of a coparcener “by birth becomes a coparcener,” the right to daughter is given by virtue of birth. Hence, it is the right conferred upon the daughter with an unobstructed heritage.

In the 106th para of judgment, the court remarked, “If a daughter is alive on the date of enforcement of the Amendment Act, she becomes a coparcener with effect from the date of the Amendment Act, irrespective of the date of birth earlier in point of time.”

Therefore, for having a right in coparcenary property, the daughter’s right need not depend upon the last owner’s death. Thus, the coparcener’s father need not be alive on 09/09/2005.

3. Is the Amendment Act, 2005 prospective or retrospective in nature?

Retroactive

Prakash v. Phulavati[4] determined that the Hindu Succession (Amendment Act) of 2005 has a prospective effect, meaning it applies only to events occurring after its enactment.

The Danamma v. Amar[5] case established that daughters acquire coparcenary rights by birth, similar to sons and that this right applies retrospectively.

In this case, the court differentiated between prospective and retrospective statutes. In the 56th para, the court defined retroactive statute as “A retroactive statute is the one that does not operate retrospectively. It operates in futuro. However, its operation is based upon the character or status that arose earlier.” Prospective laws operate from their enactment date, granting new rights. Conversely, retrospective laws have a backward effect, potentially affecting vested rights under prior law.

However, the court classified the amendment to Section 6 as a retroactive law with prospective application. It confers rights based on a past event—birth—but these rights can be claimed from the amendment’s effective date. While the law operates retrospectively to recognize daughters as coparceners from birth, it safeguards existing property dispositions made before 20/04/2004 (the date on which the bill was presented before the Rajya Sabha).

4. Can daughters claim benefits under the 2005 Hindu Succession Amendment in a pending partition suit initiated before the amendment, where a preliminary decree has already been passed?

Yes

While deciding this issue, the court referred to the landmark case of Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiriyanadi[6]. In this case, the court considered the amendment made to Section 6 pursuant to the Hindu Succession (Amendment Act), 2005, and observed that the suit continues until the final decree is passed. Suppose certain circumstances warrant fluctuation in the shares of the parties after passing the preliminary decree. In that case, the court can amend the preliminary decree or issue another decree, making the necessary changes.

The court also referred to the case of S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayan Reddy[7], wherein the court observed that a preliminary decree does not create an irreversible situation. A new decree or the final decree can bring in the required changes. Moreover, the court should decide the issue to not deprive the daughters of the benefit conferred by the Act.

5. Whether a notional partition amounts to an actual partition?

No

The court has determined that the concept of notional partition, a legal fiction introduced to calculate a deceased coparcener’s share, does not constitute an actual partition of the joint family property.

This concept is solely intended to determine the deceased’s share at the time of their death and does not disrupt the coparcenary or its property. The introduction of notional partition in the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 was not meant to sever the interests of the surviving coparceners or to bring about a complete division of the coparcenary property.

Such an interpretation would contradict the fundamental nature of coparcenary, which endures through birth and death. Consequently, the court concluded that the notional partition created under the original Section 6 of the HSA, 1956, did not result in an actual partition or dissolution of the coparcenary. Its purpose was limited to ascertaining the share of a deceased coparcener for the benefit of their Class I heirs or their male relatives.


[1] 2016 AIR SC 769.

[2] 2018 AIR SC 721.

[3] Supra note 1.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Supra note 2.

[6] 2012 AIR SC 169.

[7] 1990 AIR AP 263.

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