Case Study: N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy

By Yousuf Khan 10 Minutes Read

“Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that discretion to condone the delay can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter.”

Citation: (1998) 7 SCC 123

Date of Judgment: 3rd September, 1998

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Saiyed Saghir Ahmad (J), K.T. Thomas (J)

Facts

• The respondent, M. Krishnamurthy, obtained an ex-parte decree in a suit for declaration of title and ancillary reliefs on 28 October 1991. The appellant, N. Balakrishnan, who was the defendant in the suit, moved an application to set aside this decree after learning about it.
• The appellant’s application to set aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed for default on 17 February 1993. The appellant later filed an application on 19 August 1995 to set aside the dismissal order, resulting in a delay of 883 days.
• The appellant claimed that the delay occurred because he had engaged an advocate, who failed to inform him about the dismissal of the application. The appellant further argued that he only became aware of the dismissal after receiving a summons related to the execution proceedings on 5 July 1995. Upon confronting his advocate, the appellant discovered that his advocate had joined a private company and had not taken any further steps in the case. Consequently, the appellant filed an application for condonation of delay, attributing the delay to the advocate’s negligence.
• The appellant also approached the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Madras North, and was awarded compensation of Rs. 50,000 against his erstwhile advocate for the negligence.

Decision of the trial court

The trial court accepted the explanation provided by the appellant and condoned the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the respondent challenged this decision, and the High Court of Madras, in revision, reversed the trial court’s order.

Decision of the High Court

The High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, reversed the trial court’s decision. It held that the appellant had not provided an adequate explanation for the delay of 883 days.

The High Court viewed the delay as excessive and considered the explanation insufficient, stating that reliance on an advocate’s negligence did not absolve the appellant of his duty to remain vigilant about the status of his case.

In its reasoning, the High Court emphasized that the appellant should have followed up on the progress of his case more diligently. As a result, the High Court dismissed the appellant’s application for condonation of delay, effectively barring him from contesting the dismissal order.

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court emphasized that the length of delay is immaterial under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as long as a reasonable and bona fide explanation is provided. The Court underscored that procedural rules should not obstruct justice and that discretion to condone delays should be exercised to advance substantial justice, especially when delays are not due to deliberate inaction or negligence by the litigant.

The decision serves as a significant precedent, reinforcing the principle that courts should exercise discretion in a manner that ensures justice is not denied due to the failings of legal counsel or other factors beyond a litigant’s control. The judgment also highlights the Court’s commitment to ensuring that procedural rules are applied in a manner that facilitates, rather than obstructs, the delivery of justice

Key legal issues discussed

1. Whether the delay in filing the application to set aside the dismissal order can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Yes

The Supreme Court addressed the interpretation Section 5 of the Limitation Act, emphasizing that the concept must be applied liberally to ensure that justice is not denied due to procedural delays. The Court noted that the appellant had provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, citing his reliance on an advocate who failed in his professional duties.

The Court observed that the High Court’s approach was unduly harsh, especially considering that the delay was not the result of any deliberate inaction or negligence on the appellant’s part. The Court underscored that the primary objective of Section 5 is to advance substantial justice by allowing courts to condone delays when justified by sufficient cause. The length of the delay, while a factor, should not overshadow the adequacy of the explanation provided.

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for not considering the broader context of the appellant’s situation, particularly the professional misconduct of the advocate, which directly contributed to the delay. The Court also highlighted that procedural rules are designed to facilitate justice, not hinder it, and should be interpreted in a manner that serves this purpose.

The Court referred to its own precedents, such as Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari^[1] and State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality^[2], reinforces the principle that “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal interpretation to ensure that justice is done.

The court held in para number 12, “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion.“

In the same paragraph the court also noted that “A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate.“

2. Whether the reasons provided by the appellant constitute “sufficient cause” for the delay?

Yes

The Supreme Court meticulously examined the reasons provided by the appellant and determined that they indeed constituted “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court recognized that the appellant had been misled by his advocate, who not only failed to inform him about the dismissal of his application but also abandoned the case without notice. The appellant’s proactive steps, including filing a consumer complaint against the advocate and securing compensation, further substantiated his claim of being wronged.

The Court highlighted that while a litigant must be vigilant in pursuing their case, the failures of legal counsel should not automatically be attributed to the litigant, especially when the litigant has taken reasonable steps to rectify the situation. The Court held that the appellant’s reliance on his advocate, though misplaced, was reasonable under the circumstances and should not result in the denial of justice.

The Court reiterated that justice should not be sacrificed for procedural technicalities, particularly when the delay is neither intentional nor the result of a dilatory tactic. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had erred in dismissing the appellant’s application and that the delay should be condoned to allow the appeal to be heard on its merits.

Referring to the lines of this judgement in para number 13, the court said “If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor.“

The court held in para number 14 “In this case explanation for the delay set up by the appellant was found satisfactory to the trial court in the exercise of its discretion and the High Court went wrong in upsetting the finding, more so when the High Court was exercising revisional jurisdiction.“

^[1] [1969] 1 SCR 1006.

^[2] 1972 AIR 749.

Yousuf Khan