Sep 4, 2024 05:04 UTC
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Case Study: Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh
“Even if a minor misrepresents their age, they retain the right to avoid contractual obligations under the Indian Contract Act. However, they cannot retain benefits from such void agreements and must make restitution to ensure fairness.”
Citation: 1928 Lah 609.
Court: Lahore High Court
Date of Judgment: 2nd April, 1928
Bench: C.J. Shadi Lal, J. Broadway, J. Harrison, J. Tek Chand, J. Dalip Singh
Facts
- The plaintiff purchased a 50% share of a property from a minor defendant who concealed his age. The defendant sold the property for Rs. 17,500, with Rs. 8,000 paid upfront and the remaining Rs. 9,500 secured by a promissory note.
- The plaintiff claimed to have fully paid the amount by transferring the promissory note to the defendant’s brother-in-law at the defendant’s request. The plaintiff paid Rs. 5,500 and was prepared to pay the rest upon demand.
- However, the defendant refused to transfer the property. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking possession of the property or, alternatively, a refund of the purchase price with interest and damages.
Decision of the trial court
The court found that the defendant had misled the plaintiff about his age, causing the plaintiff to believe he was an adult when they entered the contract. Therefore, the court applied the principle of estoppel, as seen in the case of Wasinda Ram v. Sita Ram[1], and ruled that the defendant could not use his minority to avoid the contract.
Decision of the Lahore High Court
The court held that even if a minor deliberately misleads someone into believing they are of legal age, they can still use their minority as a defense to avoid contractual obligations. This is because the Indian Contract Act deals explicitly with minors’ inability to enter into contracts, taking precedence over the general rule of estoppel in the Indian Evidence Act.
Furthermore, the court observed that while minors who lie about their age can avoid fulfilling their contractual obligations, they cannot keep the benefits they received from the invalid agreement. The court applied the principle of restitution and awarded compensation to both parties.
Key legal issues discussed
1. Can a minor who deliberately misleads someone into believing they are of legal age and then enters into a contract be barred from using their minority as a defence?
No
The court ruled that minors are not bound by estoppel, according to Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. This section states that if someone leads others to believe something false and causes them to act on it, they cannot later deny it. However, the court clarified that this rule does not apply to minors to avoid unfair treatment. The court remarked in the 6th para that “the law of contract lays down that a minor shall not be liable upon a contract entered into by him; he should not be made liable upon the same contract by virtue of the general rule of estoppel.”
In Khan Gul vs. Lakha Singh[2], the court explained that the Indian Evidence Act must be interpreted harmoniously with the Indian Contract Act, which specifically deals with minors’ inability to enter contracts. When a general law like the Indian Evidence Act conflicts with a specific provision in another law, the specific law takes precedence. This approach prevents injustice and ensures that minors are not unfairly treated when they misrepresent their age.
In the 11th para, the court observed, “It will be seen from the foregoing discussion that not only the English law, but also the balance of the judicial authority in India, is decidedly in favour of the rule that where an infant has induced a person to contract with him by means of a false representation that he was of full age, he is not estopped from pleading his infancy.”
2. Can a minor who pretends to be an adult and benefits from a contract refuse to fulfill their part of the deal?
Yes
The court ruled that minors who lie about their age can avoid fulfilling their contractual obligations. However, they cannot keep the benefits they received from the invalid agreement. The court cited Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, which states that someone who benefits from a void agreement must pay for it. Although this section assumes that both parties are capable of making contracts, it does not apply to minors because it could force them to fulfill void agreements. Instead, the court used sections of the Specific Relief Act to award compensation to both parties.
The court relied upon Jagar Nath Singh v. Lalta Pershad[3], wherein the minor had fraudulently represented his age, inducing the defendant to purchase property from him. On the grounds of equity, the court held that the minor should restore the benefit to the purchaser, which he had obtained during his possession.
In Khan Gul v Lakha Singh[4], the court discussed the principle of restitution and Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act, which allows for reimbursement for necessary items provided to minors. The court emphasized that minors are not personally responsible for such reimbursements and that this exception exists to ensure that minors receive proper care.
The judgment also examined Sections 39 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act of 1877 (now Section 33 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963). These sections allow minors to cancel a mortgage or deed, but the court can require the minor to compensate the other party if the minor is the one suing. The court, however, stated that these sections are not all-inclusive and that equitable relief should not be denied to a minor, regardless of whether they are the plaintiff or defendant, in cases involving fraudulent agreements.
The court in 14th para held that “The Court, while relieving him from the consequences of the contract may in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction restore the parties to the position which they occupied before the date of the contract. If the infant is in possession of any property which he has obtained by fraud, he can be compelled to restore it to his former owner.”
The court, in the 32nd para, quoted Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill[5] judgment “It is perhaps a pity that no exception was made where, as here, the infant’s wickedness was at least equal to that of the person who innocently contracted with him, but so it is. It was thought necessary to safeguard the weakness of infants at large, even though here and there a juvenile knave slipped through.”
[1] (1920)ILR1LAH398.
[2] AIR 1928 Lah. 609.
[3] [1909] 31 All. 21.
[4] AIR 1928 Lah. 609.
[5] [1914]3K.B.607.
