In Abdul Rajak Murtaja Dafedar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1970 SC 283), the Supreme Court held that sniffer dog evidence, while admissible, has limited reliability and requires corroboration. The appellant's conviction relied on a voluntary confession and discovery of incriminating evidence.
“Sniffer dog evidence requires corroboration”
Citation: AIR 1970 SC 283
Date of Judgment: 2nd May, 1969
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: S. M. Sikri (J), R. S. Bachawat (J), V. Ramaswami (J)
Facts
- The appellant was convicted for the offence of murder for having removed the fish plates, nuts, and bolts of a rail joint, and therefore knowingly causing a derailment that resulted in the death of 10 passengers and grievous injuries to many others. The evidence against the appellant for the offence consisted of his confessional statement to the Magistrate, the discovery of a spanner based on his statement to the police, and his identification by a police tracker dog.
- The lower court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 (murder), 307 (attempt to murder), 325 (voluntarily causing grievous hurt), and 427 (mischief causing damage) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as well as under Section 126 of the Indian Railways Act. The High Court affirmed these convictions and awarded the appellant the death sentence.
- Subsequently, the appellant filed an SLP before the Supreme Court challenging the judgment of the High Court. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant raised two primary contentions:
- His confession was not voluntary as it was made after approximately a fortnight of prolonged police custody, and
- The evidence of identification by the tracker dog was inadmissible and unreliable.
Decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the lower courts, affirming that the evidence sufficiently proved the appellant’s culpability. The court held the following:
- The appellant never claimed that his confession was made on account of any inducement or coercion by the police. Furthermore, he was in judicial custody for four days immediately before making the confession, which separated him from the influence of the investigating agency. Additionally, the Magistrate informed him that he was not obligated to make a confession and that, if he chose to do so, it could be used against him. The appellant was also given 24 hours to reflect before making the statement. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that the confession was voluntary.
- Regarding the evidence of dog tracking, the Court observed that, in the current state of scientific knowledge, such evidence, even if admissible, carries limited weight. However, even if it were assumed that the identification of the appellant by the tracker dog was inadmissible, the remaining prosecution evidence—namely, the appellant’s voluntary confession and the discovery of the spanner based on his statement—conclusively established his guilt.
Key legal issues discussed
1. Was the appellant's confession to the Executive Magistrate involuntary?
No
The appellant argued that his confession to the Executive Magistrate was not voluntary due to his extended custody. The appellant relied on the precedent set in Nathu v. State of U.P.[1], where prolonged custody without explanation was deemed sufficient to label a confession involuntary.
However, in the present case, the court held that although the appellant was previously in police custody, he had been in judicial custody for four days prior to making the confession. Moreover, the Magistrate provided a clear warning about the implications of confessing, ensuring the appellant had time to reflect on his decision.
The court also rejected the appellant claim that his confession was induced by his wife’s persuasion, claiming she visited the police station with their child. The claim was rejected because the appellant did not present any evidence to substantiate any inducement or coercion. Further, the appellant himself did not explicitly claim that his confession was the result of coercion or inducement; he merely denied having made the confession.
Both the trial court and the High Court thoroughly examined these circumstances and concluded that the confession was voluntary. The presence of safeguards such as judicial custody, preliminary warnings, and a 24-hour reflection period weighed heavily against the claim of involuntariness. Therefore, the contention that prolonged custody rendered the confession involuntary was not upheld.
2. Does the discovery of the spanner at the appellant’s instance corroborate his involvement in the crime?
Yes
The discovery of the spanner at the appellant's instance strongly corroborates his involvement in the crime. The appellant volunteered to reveal the location of the spanner. In the presence of two panchas, the appellant stated he had hidden the spanner in a shrub near the railway line. He personally led the police and the panchas to the spot, where he unearthed the spanner from six inches below the ground. This discovery, documented in the panchanama, matched the location described by the appellant and was found approximately five furlongs from the bridge toward the appellant's residence.
The trial court and the High Court both treated the discovery as an important corroborative circumstance. It substantiated the appellant's confession that he had removed fish plates, nuts, bolts, keys, and jaws from the railway line on the alleged date.
3. Should evidence based on dog tracking be admissible and relied upon to establish the guilt of the accused?
No
The evidence based on dog tracking should not be heavily relied upon to establish the guilt of the accused. The admissibility and reliability of dog tracking evidence have been debated in various jurisdictions. While some courts, such as those in Canada and Scotland, admit such evidence, there are conflicting views in the United States. Courts in the U.S. generally allow evidence of dog tracking when proper foundational requirements are met, such as proof of the dog's training, reliability, and suitability to track human beings under the given circumstances.
"There have been considerable uncertainty in the minds of the courts as to the reliability of dogs in indentifying criminals and much conflict of opinion on the question of the admissibility of their actions in evidence. A survey of the cases, however, reveals that most courts in which the question of the admissibility of evidence of trailing by blood-hounds has been presented take the position that upon a proper foundation being laid by proof that the dogs were qualified to trail human beings, and that the circumstances surrounding the trailer were such as to make it probable that the person trailed was the guilty party, such evidence is admissible and may be permitted to go to the jury for what it is worth as one of the circumstances which may tend to connect the defendant with the crime."[2]
However, three primary objections are often raised against admitting dog tracking evidence:
- Dogs cannot testify, and their behavior is interpreted by a handler, making the evidence inherently hearsay.
- In criminal cases, the life and liberty of a human being should not be dependent on canine inferences.
- Even if such evidence is strictly admissible under the rules of evidence it should be excluded because the dramatic impact of such evidence on a jury may be disproportionate to its actual value.
In R. v. Montgomery[3], the Court of Criminal Appeal in England ruled that the evidence of a tracker dog was admissible. The court likened the dog's tracking to a tool or instrument, such as a speedometer, with the handler merely reporting its movements. However, the court rejected analogies to scientific evidence, like chemical reactions or blood tests, emphasizing that dogs involve conscious volition and are not mere instruments.
In the present case, the court refrained from expressing a conclusive opinion or establishing any general rule regarding the admissibility or significance of tracker dog evidence. However, it raised concerns about the reliability of completely relying on such evidence to prove guilt. While tracker dog evidence may be admissible under specific conditions, it should not serve as the sole or decisive basis for a conviction. Instead, it should be treated as supplementary evidence, requiring corroboration to support its findings. The court acknowledged the limitations of this type of evidence given the current state of scientific understanding, emphasizing the need for corroborative evidence to ensure a fair and reliable judicial process.
The court further held that even if it assumes in favor of the appellant that the tracker dog’s identification of the appellant is inadmissible, the remaining prosecution evidence, namely the appellant’s confession and the discovery of the spanner, is sufficient to conclusively establish the charges against the appellant.
The court noted:
“But dogs are intelligent animals with many thought processes similar to the thought processes of human beings and wherever you have thought processes there is always the risk of error, deception and even self-deception. For these reasons we are of the opinion that in the present state of scientific knowledge there is evidence of dog tracking. Even if admissible, it is not ordinarily of much weight.”
[1] A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 56.
[2] Para 378, Am. Juris. 2nd edn. Vol. 29, p. 429.
[3] 1866 N.I.160.